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Abstract: 
Penal policies and programmes for the control and management of offenders have 
always been essential in maintaining law and order in the colonial setting. Hong Kong, 
being one of the few remaining British crown colonies in the twentieth century, is 
used as an example in this thesis to illustrate how colonial penality was developed 
after the Second World War.  
Penal policies and programmes in Hong Kong divorced gradually from the British 
practices after the Second World War and ended with significant differences in 1997 
when Hong Kong was handed back to China. This thesis explores in detail how penal 
policies and programmes were developed in Hong Kong from 1945 to 1997. Roles of 
the British administrators in London and Hong Kong, local elites and the community 
at large in the policy making process are studied and suggestions given to explain why 
Hong Kong only transported certain penal policies and programmes from England 
after the War. The differences in timing for the implementation of these adopted 
policies as well as penal policies and programmes which were developed entirely 
locally are examined.  
This former British colony is claimed to be one the safest cities in Asia. Penal policies 
and programmes in Hong Kong are used to explain how they contributed towards the 
maintenance of law and order in Hong Kong and their relationship with the 
interwoven political, social, cultural and economical factors and social institutions 
which helped transforming Hong Kong into a world class city whilst under the British 
administration.  
This case study of colonial penality in post-War penal policy and programme 
development in Hong Kong would provide insights and contributions in the fields of 
historical and comparative penology.  
Samson Chan 
April 2012 
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Preface 
 
I started my career as a young Prison Officer with the then Prisons Department in 
Hong Kong in 1974. I worked in the Department for 32 years and retired from the 
Correctional Services Department in 2006 with the rank of Assistant Commissioner. I 
have witnessed changes of the Department not only the change of the name from 
Prisons Department to the Correctional Services Department in 1982 but also changes 
in penal policies and programmes as well as the number and types of offenders held 
under custody. With such a long career in the prisons, it is natural for me to develop 
my interest in the history of the Hong Kong prisons and colonial penality. 
 
The history of the prison services in Hong Kong could be traced back to the 1840s 
shortly after Hong Kong was ceded from the Imperial China to the British. When 
Hong Kong was handed back to the Chinese Government in 1997, there were great 
varieties of publications covering the different aspects of this Colony’s history. 
However for a prison service with history as long as the Colony, surprisingly very 
little has been written on Hong Kong’s penal system and prisons, and in particular on 
the development of penal policies and programmes in Hong Kong whilst a British 
Colony. 
 
Even for an insider working within the penal system, I found my knowledge in this 
area extremely limited. To satisfy my curiosity, I have attempted to trace Hong Kong’s 
pre-war penal history when writing my Master dissertation in the 1990s. My research 
at the time allowed me to realize that penal policies and practices in pre-war Hong 
Kong basically followed the practices in England but adopted a much harsher 
 x 
approach to the local population in view of the colonial context.  
 
Professor Carol Jones, my MA dissertation supervisor found my work interesting and 
encouraged me to continue with my academic pursuit. I took on this challenge by 
enrolling in a part-time PhD programme in the 1990s whilst working with the 
Correctional Services Department. This however did not work out partly because of 
the difficulties associated with the distance learning mode of the study but mostly 
owing to the heavy workload I had with the Correctional Services Department at the 
time.  I had been working at the Correctional Services Headquarters since 1994 as 
the Senior Superintendent responsible for the development of correctional 
programmes for the offenders. In 1998 I was transferred to the newly formed 
Rehabilitation Division. Being the deputy in a newly established Division, it was 
simply not possible for me to find time for the study and I have no alternatives but to 
withdraw from the part-time PhD programme. 
 
My aspiration to undertake the PhD programme however still persists despite of this 
set back. In deciding what I am going to do upon my retirement from the Correctional 
Services Department in 2006, my wife had encouraged me to take up the study again. 
My return to Durham after my retirement allowed me to enrol in the full time PhD in 
Criminology programme with the University of Hull and I have enjoyed my best two 
years as an over-age postgraduate student in the campus. 
 
As a full time student, I have more time to think about this thesis and decided that I 
should focus my area of research on the post war penal policies and programmes 
development in Hong Kong whilst still a British Colony. Unlike the pre-War situation, 
penal policies and practice in post-War Hong Kong was moving further and further 
 xi 
away from that of the United Kingdom despite the fact that Hong Kong still followed 
the British practice of not executing prisoners from 1966 onwards, the introduction of 
the after-care services, the reformatory schools and the psychiatric institution for 
prisoners suffering from mental illness, etc.  
 
On the other hand, corporal punishment and dietary punishment were still heavily 
relied upon for the maintenance of prison discipline in Hong Kong up to the 1980s 
when similar practices were long abolished in Britain under Criminal Justice Act 1948. 
The ‘short-sharp-shock’ detention centre programme is still a favourite choice of 
sentence for judges and magistrates to hand down onto the young offenders in Hong 
Kong until this day. Whilst working with the Correctional Services Department, I 
have opportunities to visit many overseas penal establishments. In England and 
Scotland, I spent some time to study a number of penal establishments including the 
first privately run Wold’s Remand Prison shortly after it came into operation under the 
charge of Group 4.  My personal observation and experiences during these study 
tours further increased my quest to unearth the reasons why Hong Kong, being a 
British Colony, developed a set of penal policies and practices quite different from the 
British system at the time.  
 
With the research topic settled, the two years spent at Hull had been most rewarding 
not only for my own academic development but also allowed me to build up my 
bonds with my supervisors at Hull, Professor Peter Young and Dr Helen Johnston. 
Through their unfailing guidance, I have formulated and developed my research plans 
and progressed steadily with my research project. 
 
In 2008, I was asked and eventually returned to Hong Kong to help setting up a 
 xii 
number of full time and part-time criminal justice related programmes for local 
students and law enforcement practitioners. These new commitments had taken up my 
scheduled write-up time and the completion period of this thesis has to extend from 
three to five years. These two extra years had however given me additional time to 
think through some of the finer points in the thesis and I am indeed grateful for 
Professor Young and Dr Johnston’s understanding and tolerance on my disrupted 
progress.  
 
Hong Kong remained to be one of the safest cities in the world in 1997 and the 
contribution of a sound penal system within the criminal justice system was 
indispensable for this success. Colonial penality in Hong Kong officially ended on the 
midnight of 30 June 1997 and new penal policy initiatives under the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region were launched after this date. Nevertheless most of the 
pre-1997 penal policies and programmes remained intact and are still being practiced 
in Hong Kong. It is fifteen years after Hong Kong’s return to Chinese sovereignty and 
the completion of the thesis at this moment provided a good opportunity to look back 
on how colonial penality was evolved in post-War Hong Kong. 
 
 1 
Introduction 
 
This is a thesis about how penal relations develop in a colonial setting. It takes the 
case of Hong Kong to explore this topic in detail and develops the argument by 
introducing the concept of colonial penality. 
 
The British Empire began with the founding of her colonies in North America and the 
West Indies in the seventeenth century and ended with the reversion of her last crown 
colony of Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China in 1997.1 The map of the 
British Empire had altered significantly with the acquisition and independence of her 
colonies over time. Looking back at these four hundred years of British colonial 
history, “T(t)he twentieth century saw the British Empire reach its greatest 
geographical extent, and for a brief time exercise its greatest power.”2  
 
Given the long history of the British Empire, the different circumstances and reasons 
for Britain to acquire her colonies in the first place, the huge and scattered 
geographical locations of these colonies, their differing social, political and economic 
situations together with the ethnic and cultural diversity of its colonial subjects, the 
study of the operation of the British Empire and the determinants of imperial 
management are extremely complex subjects. On the other hand, there were common 
issues shared within the British Empire throughout the colonial history such as the 
                                                          
1
 Brown, J. (1999) ‘The Twentieth Century’ in Louis, R. Wm. (Ed.) The Oxford History of the British 
Empire, Volume IV. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
2
 Ibid. p. 703. 
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governance of the colonies, in particular the maintenance of law and order through 
which the colonial governments’ authorities were anchored.3  
 
The British legal and penal systems were transported to her colonies and territories as 
part of the colonisation process and as “the colonies were embedded within the 
Empire, the colonial criminal justice system was never autonomous of imperial 
forces”.4 The operation of the imperial criminal justice system, in particular the work 
of prison systems in Britain and its related policies are therefore central for the 
understanding of its impacts on the British colonies.  
 
Punishment is regarded as the state’s most important tool of social control for 
sanctioning those who break the law, it is therefore necessary to learn of the history 
and functions of the responsible institutions and their effects. However the study of 
punishment is not just limited to penology with primary concern “to monitor the 
practices of penal institution, tracing and evaluating their effects, and suggesting 
ways in which institutional ways might be more effectively achieved.”5 With the 
advancement on the study of punishment in sociological perspectives since the 1980s, 
Garland and Young (1983) put forth “penality” as a new approach to analysing 
punishment and penal control by referring to their relationship to the socio-political 
discourse of the society.
6 
 
                                                          
3
 See Fitzgerald, W. (1952) Penal Administration in the Colonies. The Howard Journal of Criminal 
Justice, 8(3), pp. 140-5. 
4
 Meranze, M. (2008) ‘Penality and the Colonial Project: Crime, Punishment and the Regulation of 
Morals in Early America’ in Grossberg, M. and Tomlins, C. (Eds.) The Cambridge History of Law in 
America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 182. Also see Marcks, E. (2000) English Law in 
Early Hong Kong: Colonial Law as a Means for Control and Liberation. Texas International Law 
Journal, 35 (2). 
5
 Duff, R.A. and Garland, D. (1994) ‘Introduction: Thinking about Punishment’ in Duff, R.A. and 
Garland, D. (Eds.) A Reader on Punishment. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.21. 
6
 Garland, D. and Young, P. (1983) (Eds.) The Power to Punish – Contemporary Penality and Social 
Analysis. London: Heinemann Educational Books. 
 3 
The philosophies and methods of punishment as well as the penal system in Britain 
have changed a lot since the seventeenth century. Punishment has moved away from 
inflicting bodily pain through corporal sanctions and from exiling criminals through 
transportation to the extensive use of incarceration in penal institutions; from 
operating a punitive prison regime and the adaptation of the less eligibility standards 
to reformation of offenders through penal welfarism and rehabilitation, and the 
emergence of the new penology in this century as means to address the penal crisis.
7
  
 
There are theories within the sociology of punishment which explain penal changes. 
Marxist criminology emphasises the economy as a driver of change (Marx, 1954)
8
; 
Foucault emphasises that changing penal relations can be understood as changing 
modes of power (Foucault, 1977) and Durkheimian criminology’s focuses upon penal 
change as a result of changes in morality / collective consciousness (Durkheim, 
1984).
9
 Elias’ work derived from The Civilizing Process (Elias, 1939) portrays penal 
change as an aspect of long term developmental shifts in sensibilities coupled with the 
emergence of the modern state as the repository of legitimate violence.
10
  
 
These theoretical frameworks have informed the development of this thesis by 
sensitising the analysis the need to see penal change as the product of complex forces 
and long term process (Pratt, 2002).
11
 They all share, however, a common fault; they 
                                                          
7
 See Rusche, G. and Kirchheimer, O. (1968) Punishment and Social Structure. New York, Russell 
and Russell.; Foucault, M. (1977) Discipline and Punish. London: Allen Lane; Garland, D. (1985) 
Punishment and Welfare: a History of Penal Strategies. Aldershot, Gower; (1990) Punishment and 
Modern Society. Oxford, Oxford University Press; Feeley, M. and Simon, J. (1992) The New Penology: 
Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and its implications, Criminology, 30 (4); Garland D. 
and Young, P. (eds) (1983) op cit. 
8
 Marx, K. (1954) Capital, Volume I. London : Lawrence and Wishart. 
9
 Durkheim, E. (1984) The Division of Labour in Society. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
10
 Elias, N. (1994) The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations. Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers. 
11
 See Pratt, J. (2002) Punishment and Civilization. London: Sage Publications. 
 4 
ignore the expansion of western empires and the development of the penal systems 
outside Europe. Hong Kong, the last British crown colony in the Far East, is therefore 
used in this thesis as a case example to develop this new concept of colonial penality. 
 
 
Colonial Penality 
 
There are few studies on the relationship between penality at home and in the colonial 
contexts. A combination of scholastic works covering the general topics of crime and 
punishment in various colonies under the European Empires, including British 
colonies in Australia, New Zealand, India and Africa, were collected by Godfrey and 
Dunstall (2005).
12
 Apart from the cited work on colonial penality in America from 
Meranze (2008)
13
 and colonial prisons in Africa, Asia and the Latin America by 
Dikötter and Brown (2007)
14
 earlier, Barker (1944)
15
 and Arnold (2007)
16
 had 
written respectively on India’s penal system whilst a British colony. Milner (1969, 
1972)
17
 and Bernault (2007)
18
 had both written on penal systems in Africa and Pratt 
(2006)
19
 on New Zealand’s penal system. 
  
There were many former British Colonies and Territories exhibiting various traits of 
colonial penality characteristics worth studying but there are comparative few 
                                                          
12
 Godfrey, B. and Dunstall, G. (2005) (Eds.) Crime and Empire 1840-1940: Criminal Justice in Local 
and Global Context. Devon:Willan Publishing. 
13
 Meranze, M. (2008) op cit. 
14
 Dikőtter, F. and Brown, I. (Eds.) (2007) Culture of Confinement: A History of the Prisons in Africa, 
Asia and Latin America. New York: Cornell University Press.  
15
 Barker, F.A.L.C. (1944) The Modern Prison System of India – A Report to the Department. London: 
Macmillian. 
16
 Arnold, D. (2007) ‘India: The Contested Prison’ in Dikőtter, F. and Brown, I. (Eds.) op cit. 
17
 Milner, A. (Ed.) (1969) African Penal Systems. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul; (1972) The 
Nigerian Penal System. London: Sweet and Maxwell. 
18
 Bernault, F. (2007) ‘The Shadow of Rule: Colonial Power and Modern Punishment in Africa’ in 
Dikőtter, F. and Brown, I. (Eds.) op cit. 
19
 Pratt, J. (2006) The Dark Side of Paradise, British Journal of Criminology, 46, pp. 541-560. 
 5 
in-depth studies of penality in the colonial context within the British Empire despite 
of its long history and geographical coverage. As remarked by Radzinowicz and 
Turner (1944) over half a century ago and still being true at present that: 
“Too little is known in this country about penal developments in other 
parts of the Empire. These provide a student interested in criminal science 
with a most important field for investigation. A decent and efficient 
administration of criminal justice constitutes an essential element in the 
social welfare and cultural level of any country. Within the British 
Commonwealth of Nations the responsibilities of England in this domain 
have long been acknowledged.”20  
 
The subject of colonial penality after the Second World War is in particular a 
neglected subject in the field of criminology despite its significance in understanding 
penal changes and their relationships with the social institutions of the former and 
existing colonies since 1945. This is an important period when major penality changes 
happened in England whilst the wind of decolonisation was swiping across the British 
Empire.  
 
This thesis therefore aims to fill this historical gap by providing a comprehensive 
historical record on the transformation of Hong Kong’s post-War colonial penal 
policy and penal system. Apart from compiling the penal history, this thesis is also 
aiming at explaining the penal transformations in Hong Kong. As remarked by 
Garland (2006), “One wants to know how to explain penal transformations, not just 
how to document and classify them." 
21
 Through this approach, the finished work 
                                                          
20
 See Editorial Note by Radzinowicz, L. and Turner, J.W.C. in Barker, F. A. L. C. (1944) op cit, p. 
xiii. 
21
 Garland, D. (2006) Concepts of Culture in the Sociology of Punishment. Theoretical Criminology, 
10, p. 22. 
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should contribute towards the concept of colonial penality through the case study of 
Hong Kong.  
 
To understand colonial penality, it is necessary to start with the legal frameworks 
from which the various penal systems operate and their relations with the Empire. 
Dikötter (2007) when quoting examples of colonial prisons in Africa, Asia and the 
Latin America comments that “I(i)n colonial contexts, prisons were part and parcel of 
the ‘civilising mission’ of colonisers, as existing penal practices, which were often 
based on physical punishment, were viewed as ‘barbaric’ and ‘uncivilised’.”22 
 
Meranze (2008) in his study of the British colonies in America noted the complex 
relations between the colonial authorities and the local elites in penality. “In 
transporting British legal forms and traditions, colonial authorities aimed to maintain 
their own claims to civility on the borderlands of their cultural world while 
establishing their authority over natives and settlers.”23 Meranze further comments 
that “the lack of effective imperial oversight allowed local elites to turn the law to 
their own purposes, while the absence of meaningful police intensified the importance 
of publicly imposed corporal penalties. The fragmentation of the British polity was 
inscribed on the juridical cultural of British colonial world…. Colonial penality 
became more of a piece.”24 
 
This observation has rebutted the belief that British colonies would exhibit the same 
penal philosophies and systems at home. Banton (2008) elaborates that the day-to-day 
operations of the colonies were not governed by the Colonial Office from London. He 
                                                          
22
 Dikőtter, F. (2007) ‘Introduction’ in Dikőtter, F. and Brown, I. (Eds.) op cit, pp. 3-4. 
23
 Meranze, M. (2008) op cit., p. 178. 
24
 Ibid., pp. 178-9. 
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explains that “the secretary of state for the colonies was ultimately responsible to the 
British government, and thence to the UK Parliament, for the peace, order and good 
government of the colonies, day-to-day responsibility for administration was 
effectively devolved to the governors and the colonial governments. There were 
occasions when London made demands on the colonial authorities – which might be 
accepted or vigorously resisted – but in most respects British colonies were governed 
internally rather than by the imperial centre.”25  
 
As a result, there was no unified colonial penal system across the British Empire and 
each colony or territory had modified and developed its set of legal and penal system 
marked with its own characteristics based on individual circumstances. It was not 
until late 1920s that there was any real attempt within the Colonial Office in London 
to co-ordinate various policy areas, and matters for the treatment of offenders in the 
colonies was only started in 1937.
26
 The Colonial Office’s approach in dealing with 
the colonial affairs explains why penal policies and practices differed widely between 
the colonies and making the study of colonial penality much more challenging than 
the study of penality in Britain in view of the added complexity and diversity. 
 
Case studies on colonial penality in America and Australia would reveal very 
different findings from other British colonies such as those in Africa or in Asia. 
Although both America and Australia had been British colonies, yet their penal 
populations were in main transported from Britain for punishment. They were 
essentially of the same ethnic background sharing the same language with identical 
                                                          
25
 Banton, M. (2008) Administrating the Empire, 1801-1968: A Guide to the Records of the Colonial 
Office in the National Archives of the UK. London: Institute of Historical Research and the National 
Archives of the UK, p. 21. 
26
 Ibid., p. 22, 300. Also see Fitzgerald, W. (1952) op cit. 
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cultural and social heritages except being removed from their hometowns. Colonial 
penality in other parts of the British Empire where vast ethnic and cultural differences 
from home would generate far more complicated issues. 
 
Britain starting from the eighteenth century had possessed colonies in North and 
Central America, Africa, India, Australia and the Far East. The vast landscape of the 
British Empire covered geographical areas of different continents embracing colonial 
subjects with very different ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Penality in the colonial 
context therefore covers much more than the social analysis of the institutions and 
policies composing the penal systems of the colonies but also the relationship and 
interaction between the colonies and in this case Britain in political, economical and 
cultural aspects. 
 
The end of the Second World War in 1945 saw the colonial powers of the West under 
immense pressure from the United Nations lad by America to give up their colonial 
possessions. Together with the political consciousness stimulated by the war, these 
external pressures had encouraged and facilitated in firming up the various colonial 
territories’ demand for self-government.27 The effect on the British Empire was 
significant starting from 1946 with the independence of Transjordan (renamed 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1949). This was followed rapidly by the partition 
and independence of India and Pakistan in 1947 and the independence of Burma and 
the formation of the Northern Rhodesia during the same year. Ceylon (renamed Sri 
Lanka in 1972) also gained her independence in 1948.
28
 
 
                                                          
27
 Hyam, R. (2010) Understanding the British Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
28
 Brown, J. (1999) op cit. pp. 726-739. 
 9 
During the 1950s, more former British colonies gained their independence such as 
Libya in 1951; Gold Coast became the independent state of Ghana in 1957; the 
granting of self-government in Eastern and Western Nigeria and the independence of 
Malaya in the same year. The 1960s witnessed the complete withdrawal of the British 
Empire from Africa with the independence of Sierra Leone and Tanganyika (1961); 
South Africa became a republic (1961); the independence of Uganda (1962); Nigeria 
became a republic (1963); the independence of Nyasaland as Malawi (1964); 
Northern Rhodesia as Zambia (1964); Gambia and Lesotho (1965); Basutoland as 
Lesotho and Bechuanaland as Botswana (1966); Biafra (1967) and finally Swaziland 
(1968).
29
 
 
Apart from colonies in the African continent, other British colonies also gained their 
independence during the 1960s and the 1970s such as Western Samoa (1962), Malta 
(1964), Mauritius (1968), Fiji (1969), Tuvalu (Ellice Islands) and the Solomon Islands 
(1978), Kiribati (Gilbert Islands) (1979) and Vanuatu (New Hebrides) (1980). Hong 
Kong was the last British colony to severe official linkage with the British 
Government in 1997.
30
 
 
By 2008, Britain was left with only fifteen dependent territories now known as United 
Kingdom Overseas Territories. These include: Anguilla; Ascension; Bermuda; British 
Antarctic Territory; British Indian Ocean Territory; British Virgin Islands; Cayman 
Islands; Falkland Islands; Gibraltar; Montserrat; Pitcairn; Henderson, Ducie and Oeno 
Islands; St Helena; South Georgia and Sandwich Islands; Tristan de Cunha and the 
Turks and Caicos Islands.
31
 Despite the decline of the British Empire, Brown (1999) 
                                                          
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Banton, M. (2008) op cit., p. 9. 
31
 Brown, J. (1999) op cit., p.703. 
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comments that “the historical legacies of British colonial rule still profoundly mark 
the international world, the former metropolis, Britain herself, and the 
once-dependent areas. The power of these legacies and interest in the Empire is still 
deep and ideologically sensitive.”32 
 
 
Hong Kong 
 
Hong Kong was under British administration from 1841 and was the largest and most 
successful British crown colony before its return to Chinese Sovereignty in 1997. 
Academic work on Hong Kong’s penal system is rare and there has not been any 
comprehensive empirical study on the development of the colonial penal policy and 
system in Hong Kong. This is particularly true in the absence of historical studies on 
colonial penality on the twentieth century Hong Kong as previous works by 
academics and students only highlighted specific areas or covering short period of 
Hong Kong’s penal system and programme.33 ‘Criminal Justice in Hong Kong’ by 
Jones with Vagg (2007) is the exception which covers both criminal justice 
institutions and practices in the colonial and post-colonial era of Hong Kong.
34
  
 
                                                          
32
 Ibid. p. 703. 
33
 See Sinclair, K. (1999) Society's Guardian: A History of Correctional Services in Hong Kong 
1841-1999. Hong Kong: Kevin Sinclair Associates Ltd.; Munn, C. (1999) 'The Criminal Trial Under 
Early Colonial Rule' in Ngo, T.W. (Ed.) Hong Kong' s History: State and Society Under Colonial Rule. 
London: Routlege; Dikőtter, F. (2004) A Paradise for Rascals: Colonialism, Punishment and the Prison 
in Hong Kong (1841-1898) Crime, History and Societies, 8, pp. 49-63; Lowe, K. and McLaughlin, E. 
(1993) An El Dorado of Riches and a Place of Unpunished Crime: The Politics of Penal Reform in 
Hong Kong, 1877-1882, Criminal Justice History, 14, pp. 57-89; Vagg, J. (1991) 'Corrections' in 
Traver, H. and Vagg, J. (Eds.) Crime and Justice in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press; 
(1994b) ‘The Correctional Services Department’ in Gaylord, M.S. and Traver, H. (Eds.) Introduction to 
the Hong Kong Criminal Justice System. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. 
34
 Jones, C. with Vagg, J. (2007) Criminal Justice in Hong Kong. London: Routledge Cavendish. 
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Some correctional officers in Hong Kong, e.g. Chan, W.K. (1988);
35
 Poon, K.L. 
(1988);
36
 Sham, S.S. (2000)
37
 and Lau, S. (2000)
38
 had in their social sciences 
postgraduate dissertations studied parts of the penal policy and programme in Hong 
Kong. Chan (1994a) was the first to document the early penal history of Hong Kong 
in a Master’s dissertation titled ‘Development of the Hong Kong Penal Policy and 
Programme under the British Administration (1841-1945)’.39 
 
The year 1945 was chosen as the beginning of this thesis as it marked the beginning 
of the ‘modern era of penality’ in Hong Kong, a term on historical periodisation 
suggested by the conventional penologists.
40
 Prior to the fall of the colony to Japan at 
the onset of the Second World War in December 1941, the colony basically adopted 
the English penal system of the same period but significantly more punitive in 
approach in view of its colonial background.
41
  
 
After a period of three years and eight months under Japanese occupation, Hong 
Kong’s infrastructure and population suffered greatly when most of the Chinese 
residents in Hong Kong were forcibly send back to Mainland China. After the 
unconditional surrender of Japan on 15 August 1945, the British Government took 
swift action to liberate and re-occupied Hong Kong on 30 August 1945.
42
  
 
                                                          
35
 Chan, W.K. (1988) An Analysis of the Hong Kong Government’s Policy on Capital Punishment. 
MSc Dissertation, Hong Kong, University of Hong Kong. 
36
 Poon, K.L. (1988) Historical Development of the Correctional Services in Hong Kong. MSc 
Dissertation, Hong Kong, University of Hong Kong. 
37
 Sham, S.S. (2000) Role of Attribution and Efficacy Expection of the Local Penal Services. MSc 
Dissertation, Hong Kong, University of Hong Kong. 
38
 Lau, S. (2000) Rehabilitative Programmes for Female Offenders Operated by the Hong Kong 
Correctional Services Department. MSc Dissertation, Hong Kong, University of Hong Kong. 
39
 See Chan, S. (1994a) ‘Development of the Hong Kong Penal Policy and Programme under the 
British Administration (1841-1945)’, MA Dissertation, University of Leicester. 
40
 Garland, D. (1985) op cit. 
41
 See Chan, S. (1994a) op cit.,  
42
 See Endacott, G. B. (1958) A History of Hong Kong. London: Oxford University Press. 
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When Britain re-took Hong Kong in 1945, the few remaining British civil servants 
had to be repatriated back to the United Kingdom for rest and recuperation. Many of 
them were in poor health as a result of malnutrition whilst being interned and were 
unable to return to Hong Kong. The British Government had to start everything 
almost afresh in Hong Kong after the war including the rebuilding of the government 
and the administration. To allow the effective management of the War torn city, the 
colony was placed under Military Administration until 1 May 1946 when the 
administration of Hong Kong was returned to the civil government.
43
 
 
The year 1997 was chosen as the year for the conclusion of this research given the 
fact that Hong Kong was handed back to the People’s Republic of China on 1 July 
1997, thus marking the end of the British administration in Hong Kong. Although 
there were other significant changes in Hong Kong’s penal policy after 1997 under 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Government especially on the emphasis on the 
rehabilitation and community involvement in offender rehabilitation, the inclusion of 
such would require coverage far exceeding the remit of this thesis. 
 
The term penal development used in this thesis refers to the penal policy as well as 
operations of penal establishments and programmes under the Prisons Department, 
Hong Kong (renamed as the Correctional Services Department, Hong Kong after 1 
February 1982). Prisons and penal establishments are used as the framework for the 
analysis on the development of penal policy and programmes in this thesis as they are 
“… the most important apparatus of penality and that the central task of the nation’s 
penal administration is simply to improve its functioning’ 44  
                                                          
43
 Ibid. 
44
 Garland, D. (1985) op cit, p. 10. 
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Penal policies and programmes discussed in this thesis will cover both pre-court and 
judicial sanctions adopted in Hong Kong. Primarily focus is given on penal policies 
that had direct impact on the custodial and non-custodial sanctions delivered by the 
then Prisons Department and the current Correctional Services Department. Other key 
community sanctions such as suspended sentences and community services orders are 
also studied as these policies are having direct impact on custodial sanctions. 
 
Being a crown colony of Britain, one might expect the development of the Hong 
Kong penal policy and programmes to be heavily influenced by changes which took 
place in England during a similar time frame. The other objective of this study 
therefore aims to explore how closely did Hong Kong follow the British model on 
penal policies and systems; and did Hong Kong move from penal welfarism to that of 
‘new punitiveness’ and ‘actuarial penology’ as happened in England and Wales?45  
 
It is suggested in this thesis that penal policies and practices in Hong Kong were 
indeed closely following the penal welfarism developments in Britain shortly after the 
Second World War.
46
 The British Empire at the time immediately after the War was 
still in possession of a large number of colonies and territories across the globe and it 
is demonstrated in this study that it was the wish of the Whitehall that British colonies 
should adhere to the more advanced and welfare oriented Western penal philosophy 
through the watchful eyes of the Colonial Office and its Advisory Committees.
47
 
With the gradual decline of the British Empire, Hong Kong, in view of its unique 
                                                          
45
 See Garland, D. (2001) The Culture of Control. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Pratt, J. (2005) 
‘Elias, Punishment and Decivilization’ in Pratt, J. et.al. (Eds.) The New Punitiveness- Trends, Theories, 
Perspectives. Devon: Willan Publishing; Feeley, M. & Simon, J. (1992) The New Penology: Notes on 
the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and its implications, Criminology, 30(4). 
46
 See Vagg, J. (1994a) ‘Crime and its Control in Hong Kong: Recent Developments and Future 
Prospects’ in Leung, B. & Wong, T. (Eds.) 25 Years of Social and Economic Development in Hong 
Kong. Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, The University of Hong Kong. 
47
 See Barker, F. (1944) op cit.  
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political position (not being able to become an independent state), became Britain’s 
only outpost in the Far East and developed gradually into a world class international 
city.  
 
Penal policy and programme in Hong Kong had moved gradually from changes 
occurred in England and Wales after the 1970s and ended with major differences 
when the colony was returned to China in 1997. On the other hand, Hong Kong’s 
penal system also shared similar traits of the new punitiveness and actuarial penology 
though under very different circumstances as illustrated in this study. 
 
By 1997, the Correctional Services Department was operating a total of 22 penal 
institutions, 16 of which were prisons, and six of which were training, treatment, 
detention, or psychiatric centres. None of the penal institutions in Hong Kong are 
operated by the private sector. The average daily population of prisoners and inmates 
in these institutions was 11,713 including young offenders aged 14 and above. They 
were under the charge of 6,364 uniformed staff in a highly regimented department. 
The imprisonment rate in Hong Kong was 180 per 100,000 of the population which is 
relatively high by Asian standards and was also much higher than the 120 per 100,000 
imprisonment rate for England and Wales in 1997.
48
 (Appendix A refers.) The total 
expenditure of the Correctional Services Department for the year 1997 was Hong 
Kong Dollar $2,501.5 million.
49
 
                                                          
48
 See Walmsley, R. (2006) World Prison Population List (seventh edition). London: International 
Centre for Prison Studies, King’s College and White, P. (1998) The Prison Population in 1997: A 
Statistical Review. Research Findings No. 76, Home Office Research and Statistics Directorate. 
49
 See Biles, D. & Lai, M.K. R. (1997) Hong Kong Prisons Before the Handover, Overcrowded Times, 
8, 1, pp. 6-8. The imprisonment rate of 201 per 100,000 quoted by Biles and Lai should be the 1996 
figure of which the average daily population was 12,713 and the total population of Hong Kong was 
6,311,000 as reported in the Hong Kong Correctional Services Annual Review 1996, Appendix 8. 
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Objectives of this Study 
 
One of the objectives of this thesis is to fill in the historical gap in Hong Kong’s penal 
history covering the period immediately after the Second World War in 1945 until 
Hong Kong was handed back to the Chinese Government in 1997. This period is 
chosen as no comprehensive study in this area had been carried out.  
 
Historical penology is an essential and important topic in the field of criminology. As 
suggested by Morris and Rothman (1995), ‘the history of the prison serves to 
illustrate the history of all social institutions.’50 The study of penal history would 
further help to understand our current system as remarked by Sir Edmund Du-Cane, 
Chairman of the Prison Commissioners in 1885: 
"It would be impossible to understand our present penal and preventive 
system, or to appreciate the reasons for many of its characteristics, 
without some knowledge of what has gone before, and of the experience 
on which it is founded.
"51   
 
This historical approach, as suggested by Garland (1985), would allow ‘a more 
precise and controlled form of comparability’ 52 with the structure and pattern of the 
modern penal system. Winston Churchill also commented on the importance in the 
study of treatment of crime and criminals in the society when speaking in the House 
of Commons as Home Secretary in 1910 that:  
“The mood and temper of the public in regard to the treatment of crime 
and criminals is one of the most unfailing tests of any country. A calm, 
                                                          
50
 Morris, N. & Rothman, D. (Eds.) (1995) The Oxford History of the Prison – The Practice of 
Punishment in Western Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. vii. 
51
 Du Cane, E. (1885) The Punishment and Prevention of Crime. London: Macmillan and Co., p. 8. 
52
 Garland, D. (1985) Punishment and Welfare. Aldershot: Gower, p. 3. 
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dispassionate recognition of the rights of the accused, and even of the 
convicted criminal, against the State - a constant heart-searching by all 
charged with the duty of punishment - a desire and eagerness to 
rehabilitate in the world of industry those who have paid their due in the 
hard coinage of punishment: tireless efforts towards the discovery of 
curative and regenerative processes: unfailing faith that there is a 
treasure, if you can only find it, in the heart of every man. These are the 
symbols, which, in the treatment of crime and criminal, mark and measure 
the stored up strength of a nation, and are sign and proof of the living 
virtue within it.”53  
 
Garland (1985) further considered the history of penal strategies significant as: 
“[it]can reveal the competing ways in which the penal problem was 
variously formulated, the choices available between different objectives, 
institutions and techniques, the struggles and concerns which decided 
these choices, and the wider issues which were seen to be at stake in these 
calculations and struggles.”54 
 
The primary objective of this thesis is therefore to document and analysis the 
historical development of the Prisons Department in the post-War years. The Prisons 
Department, later changed its name to Correctional Services Department in 1982, was 
the key agent in Hong Kong not only responsible for the execution of penal policy 
and programmes but had actively involved in the formulation of penal policies in 
Hong Kong. 
 
A full account on the post-War development of the Prisons / Correctional Services 
Department could enable a better understanding the evolution of colonial penality that 
had taken place from 1945 to 1997 and the reasons for the changes. Roles and views 
                                                          
53
 See Howard, D. L. (1960) The English Prisons - Their Past and Their Future. London: Methuen & 
Co. Section before Introduction. 
54
 Garland, D. (1985) op cit, p. 4. 
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of the leaders in this organisation, in particular the Commissioners are studied as they 
were the penal elites having major influence in the formulation of penal policies in 
Hong Kong. This is similar to the influences made by the Prison Commission on 
penal policies in England and Wales as observed by Thomas (1977).
55
 
 
The management of the different types of offenders in post-War Hong Kong under the 
custody of the Prisons Department / Correctional Services Department will be 
discussed. How these different groups of offenders were treated represented Hong 
Kong’s attitude and social values towards crime and punishment. 
 
Another objective of this thesis is to study the distinctive colonial penality 
characteristics in post-War Hong Kong. The study looks at how penal policies were 
formulated and shaped in Hong Kong and the key figures behind the penal policy 
formulation process. Particular attention will be paid to colonial influence and the 
mechanisms used to influence Hong Kong’s penal policy.  
 
Specific areas studied in this thesis include the identification of penal policies and 
programmes that Hong Kong had transported or adopted from England and the 
process and time taken for this. Another area of study is on those British penal 
policies that Hong Kong had only partially adopted and those Hong Kong did not 
adopt at all. Again attempts are made to explore the rationales involved. Finally there 
were penal policies in Hong Kong which were different from the British system and 
developed entirely under the local situation. 
 
                                                          
55
 Thomas, J.E. (1977) ‘The Influence of the Prison Service’ in Walker, N. (Ed.) Penal Policy-Making 
in England. Cambridge: Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge. 
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The latter two scenarios had resulted in Hong Kong having developed a unique penal 
system and policies with distinct differences to that of England and Wales by 1997. 
The non-conformity to the sovereign state’s penal policy and practice is of particular 
interest to this research bearing in mind Hong Kong was a British crown colony under 
the direct governance of British appointed Governors during the period from 1945 to 
1997. 
 
 
Methodology  
 
Different approaches have been considered on how this research should be conducted. 
It was finally settled that this study would be conducted through empirical research by 
referring to mainly primary source materials kept in Hong Kong and in the United 
Kingdom. For a study of this nature, it is necessary to conduct archival research of 
official records. The search focused on finding out how the post-War penal policies 
were formulated and transformed in England and in Hong Kong and who were the 
key decision makers. Records of the agencies which implemented these policies were 
studied to find out how these policies were carried out. Furthermore, the research had 
looked into the political and social condition of Hong Kong as well as changes in the 
society during the period from 1945 to 1997 through press cuttings and other related 
literatures. 
 
Apart from English records used in this research, it was important and necessary to 
look at Chinese records on related subjects. The Chinese perceptions regarding the 
British administration in Hong Kong, attitudes towards crime and punishment and the 
general livelihood of the Hong Kong society were important factors that needed to be 
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covered. After all, 95% of the population in Hong Kong in 2001 was of Chinese 
origin.
56
 
 
Literatures and government publications on the post War development of the English 
penal system after 1970s are abundant for using as a comparison to Hong Kong’s 
development. However documents on penal development in Hong Kong, especially 
those with dates prior to 1945 were more difficult to collect as most of the pre War 
official records kept in Hong Kong were destroyed during the War years. Fortunately 
microfilmed documents on the related topics obtained from the National Archives at 
Kew are now available in the public and university libraries as well as in the 
Government Records Service of Hong Kong making research work much easier.  
 
The archive research at Kew focused mainly on unearthing the role of the Colonial 
Office in the shaping of colonial penality. Colonial Office correspondence between 
England and Hong Kong which includes: despatches between the Governors of Hong 
Kong and the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office; minutes of the related Advisory 
Committees; the Hong Kong Government Gazette; Hansard of the Hong Kong 
Legislative Council meetings as well as Government and departmental records were 
studied.  
 
For information covering the post-War era, departmental and Government papers in 
both England and in Hong Kong were used as reference in analysing the development 
and changes in the penal policy and programme in Hong Kong. The Annual Prisons 
Department Reports immediately before the War as well as Prisons Department 
                                                          
56
 See Table on ‘Population by Ethnicity, 2001 and 2006’, 2006 Population By-census Office, Census 
and Statistics Department, Hong Kong. 
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Annual Reports after the War, and from 1982 onwards Correctional Services 
Department Annual Reports till 1997 had provided a rich source of primary 
information on the post War penal development and these were used extensively for 
referencing. 
 
In view of the different nature and vast volume of materials to be selected for this 
research, the author was mindful on documenting the method of archival selectivity or 
might face similar criticism made by Braithwaite (2003) about Garland’s (2001) work 
The Culture of Control in which it was suggested that the choices Garland makes lack 
methodological explicitness as he only records his method of archival selectivity. 
57
  
 
The limitations of using administrative or official records in this study are being 
considered but are outweighed by the conceived advantages of being the official 
discourse.
58
 Official statistics covering the research period are sometimes found to be 
inconsistent or inaccurate especially during the time immediately after the Second 
World War when the colony was short of experienced civil servants in keeping 
departmental records. However the lacking of official data for the research is more 
problematic. Unlike the standard returns required by the Colonial Office before the 
War, government departments in Hong Kong after the War were given a free hand on 
how they would like to present their work in the respective annual reports.  
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Using the Prisons Department in Hong Kong as examples, statistics available in the 
Annual Reports in the 1950s were no longer available in the later versions and in the 
case of the Judiciary, statistics on sentencing were absent from the early 1950s.  It is 
in fact very difficult for the general public to gain access to official information and 
statistics regarding the criminal justice system in Hong Kong and the published 
information from these departments are extremely limited. This is in sharp contrast 
with countries like the United Kingdom where research findings and statistics on 
criminal justice and the prisons are being published and made available to the public 
on a regular basis by the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice.  
 
Another difficulty encountered in this research was to identify and select useful 
information that is related to this study. Owing to the long time span covered by this 
research from 1945 to 1997 (over 50 years) and that the relevant information is 
scattered under different subjects, the research started off by going through the 
Colonial Office’s Advisory Committee minutes to look for remarks on the Hong 
Kong penal system. The developments of the English Criminal Justice Ordinances as 
well as the Hong Kong Prison Ordinances and Prison Rules after 1945 were compared 
and the differences between the two places studied to find out why certain Ordinances 
and Rules in Hong Kong were amended following the English version whilst some 
were not being amended at all.  
 
The research also included Commission Reports ordered by the Governor of Hong 
Kong relating to the prison incidents or issues in Hong Kong to discover why and 
how such issues came into being. By adopting these steps, the author expects to 
identify how penal policies and systems were developed and transformed in Hong 
Kong, in particular the rationales for not following the established penal policies and 
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programmes in England and Wales. The final scope of this research is to identify the 
key figures behind the penal policy formulation process in Hong Kong, their views 
and the agendas they represented, the arguments they presented and the influences 
and impacts they had in the process. 
 
The author did not conduct any interviews with members of the serving or former 
staff of the Prisons Department or the Correctional Services Department, prisoners or 
former prisoners or other members of the Administration or the community when 
conducting this research. Views of the former Commissioners are however collected 
from published materials including their own published or unpublished works, 
interviews by media as well as newspaper articles. 
 
In preparing this thesis, it is necessary to point out that the spellings of a number of 
street names in Hong Kong as mentioned in the early despatches and papers between 
Hong Kong and London were different from the current spellings. In this thesis, 
spellings will appear as quoted from the original documents to be followed by the 
current name. 
 
To avoid confusion on the translated Chinese names which might appear in either 
Hong Kong ‘Cantonese forms’ or in ‘Pinyin’, which Ngo (1999) has identified as 
another example of the ambiguity and complexity of the Hong Kong situation, this 
thesis will adopt the similar method by using Cantonese proper names as appeared in 
the official records whenever available. Pinyin will only be used when the Chinese 
name has no official or common translation.
59
 In addition to this, Chinese names, in 
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traditional Chinese characters forms, will also be added as far as possible after the 
translations to allow Chinese readers’ ease of referencing. 
 
 
The Structure of this Thesis 
 
This thesis is divided into two main parts covering firstly Hong Kong’s penal system 
and secondly on Hong Kong’s penal policy. Part I consists of six chapters including: 
penal history of Hong Kong before the Second World War; post War development of 
the Prisons / Correctional Services Department and the management of young and 
adult offenders in Hong Kong. The issues relating to death sentence, execution, life 
sentence and corporal punishment are included in this Part as separate chapters in 
view of their complexity and these special punishments are also used as case 
examples to illustrate the controversies in penal policy formulation in the British 
colony of Hong Kong.  
 
Chapter One provides the necessary background information on the development of 
penal policy and programmes starting from 1841 when Hong Kong was claimed by 
the British as a crown colony. The birth and the development of the first prison and 
the early penal policies in Hong Kong are discussed in brief. Hong Kong’s penal 
policy and programmes in the 1930s are covered in a greater detail under a separate 
sub-section in order to portray the situation of the penal system up to the time before 
the Second World War in December 1941. To bridge up the pre-War and post-War 
penal development in Hong Kong, a sub-section is used to cover the conditions of the 
Hong Kong prisons whilst under the Japanese administration from 1942 to the 
surrender of the Japanese in 1945. 
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Chapter Two covers the development of the Prisons Department from 1945 to 1997. 
The development of the Department is broken down into three periods starting with 
the Prisons Department operated under the Military Administration immediately after 
the War. The period of Military Administration was less than a year from 1945 to 
1946, but it provided the necessary linkage between the pre and post-War situation of 
the Prison Department. The next period of the development was from 1946 to 1973 
seeing the rise and fall of the progressive penal policies and programmes in Hong 
Kong. The next phase of development started with the 1973 Stanley Prison riot which 
was regarded as the watershed of the Prisons service in Hong Kong. The subsequent 
changes and improvements had formed the basis of the current penal system in Hong 
Kong. The impacts of the Vietnamese refugees and the illegal immigrants on the 
prison service are also included in this Chapter. 
 
Chapter Three covers the policies and management on the young offenders in post 
War Hong Kong. The Chapter starts with the immediate years after the War when 
special efforts were made to separate the juvenile and young offenders from the adult 
prisoners. Reformatory Schools were developed and later transferred from the Prisons 
Department to the social welfare agency followed by the development of the training 
centres modelled after the borstals in England. The development of the detention 
centre in Hong Kong as a response to the rise of violent youth crime and the treatment 
of young prisoners who were sentenced to undergo periods of imprisonment; setting 
up of half-way houses and the involvement and roles of the professionals in the 
Young Offender Assessment Panel are also discussed in this Chapter. Discussions are 
made on each of these young offender programmes looking at how such policies and 
programmes were developed in Hong Kong, the operations of these programmes and 
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the respective programme effectiveness up to the time when the colony was returned 
to China.  
 
Chapter Four is on the management of adult prisoners in post-War Hong Kong and 
starts off with a sub-section describing the life of the Japanese War Criminals in Hong 
Kong. They were a unique group of prisoners in Hong Kong’s penal history. The 
other section covers the management of adult prisoners in Hong Kong and how Hong 
Kong had developed a unique treatment programme in dealing with prisoners who 
were found to be drug addicts. Two sections in this Chapter are used to describe Hong 
Kong’s ‘parole’ system, the Release under Supervision Scheme and the Post Release 
Supervision Scheme set up in 1988 and 1996 respectively. These two Schemes are 
having similarities and differences reflecting rather different penal philosophies on 
adult offenders in Hong Kong during the 1980s and the 1990s. 
 
Chapter Five devotes to the history of death sentence and execution in Hong Kong. 
The life of the condemned prisoners, their death as a result of judicial hanging and the 
disposal of their remains were also covered. This Chapter also deals with the 
commutation of death sentences in Hong Kong following the British practice and the 
subsequent replacement of death sentences by life sentences. Attitudes and feelings on 
capital punishment are divided in both Britain and Hong Kong and this Chapter will 
trace the related debates represented the opposing views of the Hong Kong society on 
this topic. The Chapter ends with the sequences of events leading to the abolition of 
death sentence in Hong Kong. 
 
Chapter Six discusses in detail the practice of corporal punishment in Hong Kong, its 
historical roots and how Hong Kong had retained this physical punishment when 
 26 
Britain had already removed such practice under the Criminal Justice Act 1948. 
Finally this Chapter ends with the sequences of events leading to the removal of 
corporal punishment in Hong Kong. 
 
Part II of this thesis mainly addresses on the formulation of post-War penal policies in 
Hong Kong. This Part is divided into four Chapters and starts with Chapter Seven 
which presents the study on the colonial impact on Hong Kong’s post-War penal 
development. The roles and impacts of the Colonial Office and its Advisory 
Committees in penal policy formulation in Hong Kong are discussed together with the 
influence from Home Office, the Parliament and the HM Prison Services also 
explored. 
 
The remaining three Chapters attempt to divide Hong Kong’s penal development into 
three phases with Chapter Eight covers the period from 1945 to 1969 when the 
Colonial Office was still active in overseeing the administration of Hong Kong. The 
Chapter looks into how the political, social and economic conditions in Hong Kong 
had interacted with the British influence in formulating a welfare-oriented penal 
system amidst a Chinese society which favours punitive penal policies in this period.  
 
Chapter Nine covers the period from 1970 to 1981 analysing how Hong Kong had 
followed the populist demand in shifting its penal policies towards a more punitive 
approach in the wake of the rising crime rates, in particular violent crimes committed 
by young offenders. Outdated British penal practices like detention centre, corporal 
punishment for young offenders and preventive detention were brought to Hong 
Kong.  
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Chapter Ten discusses the impact on the change of sovereignty in 1997 on Hong 
Kong’s penal policy. The handing over of a westernized Hong Kong to the 
Communist China in 1997 is arguably the catalyst in seeing the rush on introducing 
human rights related amendments on Prison Rules, programmes and the rights related 
legislations to safeguard the standard of the colonial penality would not be 
compromised after 1997. 
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Part I 
 
Penal System in Hong Kong
 29 
Chapter One 
Hong Kong Penal Policies and Programmes Prior to 1945 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
To fully appreciate the development of penal policy and practices in Hong Kong after 
the Second World War, it is necessary to trace back the penal history of Hong Kong 
before the War. Penal system of the colony started right after the British took 
possession of Hong Kong in 1841 and Victoria Gaol was one of the two earliest 
buildings erected on the island of Victoria.
1
 The colonial penality evolved in Hong 
Kong for a century mainly following the British system until interrupted by the fall of 
the colony to the Japanese in December 1941 and the subsequent three years and eight 
months when Hong Kong was under Japanese occupation. 
 
Hong Kong had undergone great transformation from mid 19
th
 to mid 20
th
 century 
changing from an island of farmers and fisherman in small villages to a well 
developed international city. To enable Hong Kong to be prosperous in trade and 
business, the Administration had spared no efforts in maintaining law and order in the 
colony, which included the formulation and development of penal policies and 
practices in Hong Kong. 
 
                                                          
1
 See Chan, S. (1994a) ‘Development of the Hong Kong Penal Policy and Programme under the 
British Administration (1841-1945),’ MA Dissertation, University of Leicester. 
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Hong Kong’s penal policy and practice had gone through several major stages of 
development before the Second World War in 1941 as suggested by Chan (1994a).
2
 
The formative stage, started in 1841 and lasted until the enactment of the first 
‘Ordinance for the Regulation of the Gaol of Hongkong’ and the ‘Regulations for the 
Government of the Gaol at Hongkong’ in 1853.3 The Ordinance was drawn up to 
meet the circumstances of the colony and the Rules were mostly taken from Acts of 
Parliament covering similar subject.
4
  
 
The second phase of development, from 1853 to 1885, was a period of high crime 
rates and deterrence punishment that resulted in overcrowded prison with Chinese 
prisoners forming the bulk of the penal population. Hong Kong’s penal system and 
the treatment of prisoners, based on the British model, were considered to be too 
lenient by the community as well as Government officials in Hong Kong. It was 
remarked that the British penal model had no deterrent effect on the Chinese criminal 
elements when compared to the harsh sentences in the neighbouring countries as 
“imprisonment with hard labour in the Gaol of Victoria, wherein the prisoner is 
better fed, better and cleanser clothed, better lodged and less worked (inasmuch as he 
has rest on the Sabbath) than the honest artisan or labourer, would scarcely operate 
as a prevention of crime”. 5 Interestingly enough, the British penal system Hong 
Kong mirrored had already ingrained the ‘less eligibility’ principle from the days of 
the Poor Law which stated “that the condition of the pauper should be less eligible 
than that of the lowest grade of independent labourer.”6 
                                                          
2
 Ibid. 
3
 C.O. 129/43, pp. 241-8. 
4
 Ibid., pp. 239-40. 
5
 C.O. 129/184, p. 587. 
6
 Fox, L. (1952) The English Prison and Borstal Systems. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., p. 
133. 
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Flogging and branding of Chinese prisoners were used extensively before deportation 
was introduced in 1866. The aim of imprisonment, ‘to deter from crime’ was affirmed 
in the first Gaol Committee Report in 1876,
7
 emphasizing the need to deal with the 
Chinese prisoners ‘by hard labour, hard fare, and strict physical discipline’, which 
was similar to British deterrent penal policy at the time. 
 
The third phase of Hong Kong’s penal development began in 1885 during Governor 
Hennessy’s time. He introduced a new set of Prison Ordinance, Rules and Regulations 
based on England’s prison regulation and reformatory discipline. These new 
provisions removed all discriminatory laws against the Chinese offenders, ended 
public flogging, replaced the ‘cat-o-nine’ with rattan (cane) and ceased the branding 
of prisoners. The concept of reformation was carried out through the importation of 
penal policy and practice from England bringing in the ‘Silent System’, remission of 
sentence and rewards under the ‘Mark System’ to Hong Kong. This ‘Deterrent and 
Reformatory’ period with most of these penal measures remained in force up until 
1932.
8
 These three phases of penal development were also similar to what had 
happened in England
9
 and would be covered in greater detail in the next section 
under the heading “The Birth of the Hong Kong Prison”. 
 
The final phase of penal development in Hong Kong prior to the outbreak of the 
Second World War, to be discussed in more detail in the section “Hong Kong’s Penal 
Policy and Practices in the 1930”, was regarded as a period of reformation. Industrial 
and Reformatory Schools were set up based on the British model to house juvenile 
and young offenders. The ‘Silent System’ in use in the prison was repealed under the 
                                                          
7
 C.O. 129/177, pp. 176-83. 
8
 Chan, S. (1994a) op cit., p. 73. 
9
 See Garland, D. (1985) Punishment and Welfare: A History of Penal Strategies. Aldershot: Gower. 
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1932 Prisons Ordinance.
10
 The new Hong Kong Prison at Stanley was completed in 
1937 with 1,500 single cells and purpose built workshops.
11
 A classification system 
was introduced in 1939 to separate the first offenders from the recidivists.
12
 This was 
an important period as most of the post-War penal policies and practices were 
inherited from this period. 
 
 
1.2 The Birth of the Prison in Hong Kong 
 
When the British occupied Hong Kong in 1841, the Victoria Island was having a 
small population of less than 7,000 of which 2,000 were fishermen living on their 
boats.
13
 Owing to this small population, no prison was provided in Hong Kong by the 
Chinese Government.  
 
Victoria Gaol, sometimes referred to as the Central Gaol, was set up in the central part 
of Hong Kong island soon after the British took possession of Hong Kong.
14
 The 
earliest record on Victoria Gaol was a copy of its Elevation Plan published in the 
‘1844 Annual Return on Gaols and Prisoners’.15  The Gaol was designed and 
constructed as a single-story building with a day room, three large cells, twelve 
solitary cells and a yard. ‘The Regulations for the Government of Her Majesty’s Gaol 
on the Island of Hong Kong’, appeared in the ‘1845 Annual Return on Gaols and 
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Prisoners,’16 was the first set of regulations governing the operation of the colony’s 
prison. This was a simple, three pages hand written document listing the eight 
regulations embracing the entire operation of Hong Kong’s only prison.17 (Copy 
attached at Appendix B) 
 
In Hong Kong, transportation was still the most popular sentence passed by the courts 
during the early years. The necessary logistics for the transportation of prisoners was 
mutually arranged between the Colonies, with the Colonial Office in London being 
informed of the eventual actions.
18
  
 
Between 1844 when transportation of prisoner first started in Hong Kong until the last 
lot of prisoner transferred out in 1858, a total of 569 prisoners, of which 555 were 
Chinese, were actually transported. 70% of the Chinese convicts transported were sent 
to the Straits Settlement (Malacca, Penang and Singapore) and others to Van 
Diemen’s Land (Tasmania), the Sind (Pakistan) and Labuan (East Malaysia). All of 
these destinations are in the Pacific Rim and mainly within South East Asia, which 
ensured that the shipping cost for transporting prisoners from Hong Kong to these 
territories could be better managed.
19
 
 
Hong Kong encountered similar problems to that of England in the 1840s in finding 
suitable Colonies to accept penal labours.
20
 Together with the high cost involved in 
carrying out the transportation making this an expensive exercise, imprisonment 
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gradually became the more viable option in dealing with criminals in Hong Kong. In a 
Despatch sent out in 1858 from Hong Kong, Governor Bowring commented that: 
We have no means of relieving the Gaol by carrying out sentence of 
transportation except through an occasional and uncertain demand from 
Labuan, which may or may not be repeated.
21
  
 
As argued by Chan (1994a),
22
 the decline of transportation in Hong Kong was not 
because of a lack of deterrence in this sentence as suggested by Radzinowicz and 
Hood (1990) for the case in England.
23
 Nearly all of the residents in Hong Kong were 
new settlers and they had no strong social or family links established in this British 
colony. Hong Kong’s decline of transportation was mainly due to the lack of convict 
colonies in the region willing to accept unskilled prisoners from Hong Kong as well 
as the high cost involved in the actual transportation process. 
 
From its formative days, the Victoria Gaol was under the direct control of the Hong 
Kong Government and was merely designed for the containment of prisoners with 
very limited facilities and activities. Prisoners were managed by policemen with the 
Magistrate in charge of the Gaol activities. It was only in 1879 that the administration 
and management of the Gaol was separated from the police and under the 
administration and management of a separate department of the Hong Kong 
Government.
24
  
 
Victoria Gaol was Hong Kong’s only prison until 1863 when the Hong Kong 
Government used the ship ‘Royal Saxon’ as the prison hulk to accommodate all the 
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colony’s prisoners whilst Victoria Gaol was renovated. Prison labour was used in 
building a new prison in Stone Cutters Island, a small island next to Kowloon (九龍) 
peninsula. In 1867, upon the completion of the renovation work, all prisoners were 
moved back to Victoria Gaol. The newly built prison at Stone Cutters Island was 
turned into other use and Victoria Gaol remained the only prison in Hong Kong until 
a branch prison with 350 bed spaces was built in 1924 at Laichikok (Lai Chi Kok) (茘
枝角). In 1936, the building of the six cell block prison with a total of 1,500 cells 
located in the Stanley peninsula on the southern tip of Hong Kong Island, was 
completed and named the Hong Kong prison. This prison was regarded as the most 
advanced prison in the region at the time.
25
  
 
 
1.3  Hong Kong’s Penal Policy and Practices in the 1930s 
 
The final phase of penal development in Hong Kong prior to the outbreak of the 
Second World War was regarded as a period of reformation. Juvenile and young 
offenders were managed in the Industrial and Reformatory Schools; the ‘Silent 
System’ was repealed under the 1932 Prisons Ordinance. The new Hong Kong Prison 
at Stanley was completed in 1937 with 1,500 cells and purpose built workshops. A 
classification system was introduced in 1939 to separate the first offenders from the 
recidivists in the prison. 
 
The completion of a modern prison in Hong Kong was not being welcomed by 
everyone in the colony. During the Legislative Council meeting debating the 
Government’s budget of 1938, the Senior Unofficial Member of the Council, Sir 
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Henry Pollock again used the ‘less eligibility’ principle to suggest the new prison 
could lead to the increase of crimes by saying: 
“We view the proposals for the construction of a third Court at the 
Central Magistracy with mixed feelings, because we consider that the 
number of cases tried by the Magistrates or, to put the matter in another 
way, the considerable increase in various forms of crime is due to a great 
extent to the somewhat too luxurious accommodation for prisoners which 
is provided in the new four million dollar gaol at Stanley, where the 
inmates enjoy comfortable lodging, too liberal a scale of food, regular 
exercise, and free medical attendance. 
 
We concede that the modern humanitarian treatment of prisoners in 
Britain is a success, but, having regard to the everyday conditions 
unfortunately prevailing amongst the poorer classes in Hong Kong, 
entirely different considerations apply here. 
 
In fact in this Colony we ought to make prison condition harder, and we 
trust that the Government will give its earnest consideration to this aspect 
of the problem.”26 
 
Major James Lugard Willcocks, DSO, MO, became the head of Hong Kong’s prisons 
in June 1938 and the title of the department head was also changed from 
Superintendent of Prisons to Commissioner of Prisons. Commissioner Willcocks had 
been a regular officer of the Black Watch who earned his decorations at Somme. He 
later became the Adjutant to the Governor of Bermuda and then joined the Prison 
Service in Kenya.
27
  
 
Shortly after his appointment as the Commissioner, Willcocks submitted a 20-page 
report to the Governor of Hong Kong proposing a number of changes to Hong Kong’s 
penal system. His proposed changes included the re-organization of the Prisons 
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Department and the management of prisoners. In addressing the prison overcrowding 
problem, he recommended that those prisoners sentenced to less than one month’s 
imprisonment be renamed or reclassified under the title ‘detainee’. He proposed that 
these detainees be treated differently from prisoners and be housed in detention camps. 
Regarding the management of the prisons, he proposed the ‘Mark System’ in use for 
remission be replaced by a simpler system in order to relieve the work of the clerical 
staff; to employ more European Warders; adding a post of Assistant Superintendent, 
and a review of staff prisoner ratios for outside working parties, staff salaries and 
uniforms. As for the day-to-day operation of the prisons, he proposed the following 
changes: to open part of the disused Victoria Prison to house remand prisoners; to 
divide the Hong Kong prison into two sections for easier operation; prisoners to be 
re-classified and dressed in distinctive uniforms, and better managed through proper 
separation and segregation.
28
  
 
Commissioner Willcocks further proposed to relocate his headquarters from the Hong 
Kong Prison in Stanley to the Central District in town where the central government 
offices were located. He also questioned the rational of having the Juvenile Remand 
Home under the charge of the Police which was not in line with the practice in 
England and in some Colonies like Kenya. Finally, he commented that he would like 
to publicize the work of the prisons through the media in order to gain support from 
the public as “Ignorance and apathy on the part of officials and non-officials alike on 
the whole penal question can but hamper Government in its efforts to create a system 
suitable to the needs of the Colony.”29  
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The Governor and the Executive Council considered Commissioner Willcocks’ 
proposal sound but, “for financial and other reasons, it was not possible to take 
immediate action on them.” On his letter of 17 February, 1939 to the Colonial Office, 
the Governor stated that he would “submit individual proposals based upon the report 
for your approval as opportunity offers from time to time.”30  
 
The Governor of Hong Kong did send a despatch to the Secretary of State on 15 
March 1939
31
 proposing the setting up of detention camps in Hong Kong under the 
control of the Commissioner of Prisons “for confining short-term prisoners convicted 
of crimes, such as persistent begging, hawking without licences and so forth” and that 
they “will be employed on useful work, such as reclamation.” It was the intention of 
the Governor of Hong Kong that “the detention camp or camps will, I hope and 
expect, be a permanent feature of this Colony’s prison organisation.”32  
 
A request of HK$169,000 was tabled before the Legislative Council on 27 April 1939 
for building the detention camp. When asked by the legislator, the Financial Secretary 
Hon. Mr. S. Caine explained that:  
“It has not yet been decided where it is to be situated. It is intended to put 
short-term prisoners in the detention camp where it is hoped the upkeep 
will be cheaper and at the same time relieve the congestion in Stanley 
Gaol. They can be used on public works such as reclamation work, and 
the camp may be situated somewhere in the New Territories. This method 
will save an elaborate staff of warders, and only short-term prisoners are 
to be put in the camp.”33 
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The segregation of Chinese first offenders from the repeat offenders at the Hong 
Kong Prison was completed on July 1939. Part of the disused Victoria Gaol
34
 was 
reopened on 16 October 1939 as Victoria Remand Prison with accommodation for 
160 remand and short term prisoners. This however did not relieve the overcrowding 
situation at the Hong Kong Prison. The Prison was built with a capacity of 1,578 but 
was holding more than 3,000 prisoners in mid January 1940. As a result, premature 
release of selected prisoners had to be arranged as: 
“3,000 is the agreed figure beyond which overcrowding cannot be 
allowed to go-neither the staff not the accommodation nor the equipment 
can stand the strain above that figure.”35  
  
The Commissioner of Prisons selected prisoners for Governor’s ‘Order of Special 
Release’. Prisoners selected were on summary conviction with sentence ranged from 
6 to 18 months and subject to deportation after sentence. Their sentences were 
normally reduced by 2 to 3 months and most of them were deported to Mainland 
China upon the early release. The draw back to such an arrangement was that most of 
these early released prisoners were soon back in Stanley Prison serving new sentences 
for returning from deportation before their original sentences had expired as 
commuting between China and Hong Kong was easy and there was no proper border 
control between the two places.
36
  
 
The overcrowding in Stanley Prison had generated disciplinary as well as 
management problems for the Prisons Department. Two large scale faction fights 
broke out in 1939 and on one occasion warning shot had to be fired to stop the fight. 
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On another occasion, a prisoner was killed in an assault case. To maintain order in the 
prison in view of the overcrowded condition, “[I]t has had to be largely the discipline 
of repression rather than of expression.” And that “the issue of heavy canes to 
European officers was found to be most effective.
37
   
 
As the Sino-Japanese war was getting more intense by late 1930s, Hong Kong was 
regarded as a safe haven by many Chinese on the Mainland. In the last Prisons 
Department Annual Report prepared before the Second World War in April 1941, 
Commissioner Willcocks reported that the work of the department was being severely 
affected by prison overcrowding in view of the unstable social condition and the 
influx of poor Chinese refugees to Hong Kong. During this period, a total of 20,391 
persons (18,718 males and 1,673 females) were sentenced for imprisonment. 15,161 
or 74% of them were first offenders and 18,735 or 92% were serving sentences of less 
than 6 months. The daily average prisoner population in 1941 was 2,874, with 2,538 
male prisoners in the Hong Kong Prison;
38
 151 male prisoners in Victoria Remand 
Prison and 185 female prisoners in Lai Chi Kok Prison.
39
  
 
On 1 April 1941, the management of the Juvenile Remand Home was transferred 
from the Police to the Prisons Department.
40
 The Juvenile Remand Home later 
became the Causeway Bay Reformatory for convicted boys under the control of the 
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Prisons Department while boys on remand were kept in the Juvenile Section of 
Victoria Prison.
41
  
 
The Prisons Department at the time had an entire compliment of 387 staff from the 
Commissioner downwards. Eighty-two of them were European staff including eleven 
clerical staff, a locksmith and an electrician. The few ‘Gazetted Officers’ of the 
Prisons Department were all English, recruited either at Home or from other parts of 
the Empire. The Prison Officer rank was also filled by British nationals only, mostly 
former Non-Commissioned Officers recruited from Her Majesty Forces in Hong 
Kong.
42
 The European staff were backed up by 220 Indian staff performing mainly 
warder and guard duties. Twenty-eight female staff, mostly wardresses under the 
charge of a Matron, were responsible for the management of the female institution. 
Sixteen staff were employed to operate the printing workshop at the Hong Kong 
Prison.
43
 Forty-one Chinese were employed by the department but none of them were 
responsible for the supervision of prisoners. Except a few working as mechanics and 
fitter, most of the Chinese employees were either cooks or coolies.
44
 The budget for 
the Prisons Department in 1940-41 was HK$1,220,972, which was about 2.4% of the 
total government expenditure for Hong Kong of the same period.
45
  
 
With the possibility of hostilities with Japan closing-in, male European and Indian 
prison staff in Hong Kong were required to prepare for their newly acquired 
additional roles as members of the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps. The female 
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prison staff were also prepared to work with the British War Organization should 
Hong Kong enter into war with Japan. These added roles for the prison staff required 
training sessions which had taken staff off their prison duties and added fuels to the 
prisons overcrowding problems. 
 
To deal with the prison overcrowding problem, the Government had put up the 
Magistrates Amendment Bill during the Legislative Council session on 13 November 
1941 proposing the granting of power for the Magistrates “instead of sending a 
person to prison for some summary offence, may bind him over to do a day’s work for 
a day or two on some useful object and then go away, and never be put in prison at 
all.” The proposed Bill was mainly aiming at relieving overcrowding at Stanley 
Prison but also carried the rational of keeping casual offenders from associating with 
the more serious offenders in a prison environment. The proposed work in mind was 
stone-breaking at the quarry.
46
  
 
Should this Bill be passed, Hong Kong could have claimed to have its first 
non-custodial ‘community service order’ introduced as early as 1941. However this 
Bill had only gone through its first reading and there were no more Legislative 
Council sittings as the Japanese attacked Hong Kong in December 1941.  
 
 
1.4  Hong Kong Prison under Japanese Administration 
 
On 8 December 1941, Japanese warplanes bombed Hong Kong and started the 18 day 
‘Battle of Hong Kong’. The prison officers at the Hong Kong Prison were mobilised 
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as the Stanley Platoon of the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps and were one of 
the last units to surrender to the Japanese. Commissioner Willcocks was given the 
field appointment of Lieutenant-Colonel overseeing the defence of the Stanley 
Peninsula. He was injured during the battle and Assistant Superintendent Norman 
took over the command from within Stanley Prison.
47
  
 
Norman (undated) in his unpublished memoirs mentioned that the official surrender 
of Hong Kong took place at 3.00 pm on Christmas Day, 1941 but the surrender of the 
Stanley Platoon, the last organized fighting group in the colony, only happened during 
the Christmas evening owing to the cut off of communication with its headquarters in 
town. Upon the surrender, the Japanese released all prison officers temporarily on 
condition that they returned to their post in the prison and carry on the prison 
administration therein until the Japanese could impose their own form of law and 
order in Hong Kong.
48
  
 
All short-term prisoners were released at the outbreak of the war under the 
Emergency Order leaving only about 500 ‘dangerous criminals’ in Stanley Prison.49 
Their fate was not mentioned by Norman, but in Joyce Ho’s book collecting oral 
history from retired prison staff; one stated that only 70 of them were left in Stanley 
Prison when the Japanese soldiers arrived. All of them were later taken out to a 
near-by beach and beheaded by the Japanese.
50
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When the first prisoner sentenced by the Japanese was sent to Stanley, all European 
prison officers ‘down tooled’ and ceased to work in the prison. They joined the other 
European civilians and were interned in the staff quarters of Stanley Prison. The 
Indian warders however remained working inside Stanley Prison under the charge of 
the Japanese officer throughout the period of occupation.
51
  
 
The BBC monitored Hong Kong’s war time news and reported that the 
Government-General of Hong Kong had decreed the revision of the judicial system on 
15 October 1943 by creating a public prosecutor’s office and a criminal court. 
Offences against the occupying army would remain to be dealt with by court martial 
while other criminal cases were to be dealt with by the criminal court in accordance 
with the published criminal ordinance with different sanctions spelt out.
52
  
 
Very little information on the administration of the prison under Japanese occupation 
is available. However a report sent by a confidential source to the Military Attaché of 
the British Embassy, Chungking, China in 1943 did provide some information on life 
inside Stanley Prison.
53
  
 
The report revealed that twenty-two of the original sixty Mohammedan Indian 
Warders had resigned, leaving thirty-eight working under the four Japanese Officers 
inside Stanley Prison. In addition there were eleven Chinese working in the prison as 
cooks, drivers and various tradesmen. There were about thirty to forty prisoners 
imprisoned inside Stanley Prison at the time for minor offences such as theft. 
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The daily routine of the prison started at 6.00 a.m. (Tokyo time) when all prisoners 
have to get up. Work started at 7.00 a.m. and finished at 4.00 p.m. with a meal break 
between 11.00 - 11.30 a.m. Prisoners returned to their cells after having a bath and 
evening meal from 4.00 – 5.00 p.m. The daily ration consisted of 12 ounces of rice 
with very little vegetables and a small piece of fish occasionally.  
“Before the American attack on Hong Kong, two 12 oz. tins of meat were 
allowed daily for 46 prisoners, but after the attack, this meat ration was 
stopped. The prisoners also occasionally get potatoes, but no bread. 
Allowed tea and water.”54  
 
Information concerning the other prisons during the Japanese occupation was 
unavailable. Acting Commissioner of Prisons J. T. Burdett reported in the Annual 
Report of the Prisons Department in 1946 that the Japanese had performed some 
service by bombing the oldest part of the Victoria Gaol during the period of 
occupation. He expressed the hope that the remainder of the Victoria Prison would 
eventually be demolished and replaced by a new remand prison.
55
  
 
Norman in his unpublished memoirs mentions that around the summer of 1945, a new 
Japanese commandant arrived and took charge of the Stanley internment camp. He 
ordered all male internees, except those with wives in the camp, to be locked up 
inside Stanley Prison in order to tighten up the camp discipline. Norman himself was 
one of those put inside Stanley Prison for a period of three weeks and this experience 
allowed him to experience being a prisoner inside the prison. He mentions that: 
“The commandant had done me an unintentional good turn. For the first 
time I learned what it is really like to be confined in a cell, to see and hear 
the heavy door close upon you, and to spend long hours waiting for it to 
open again. Physical torture apart, solitary confinement is the most 
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dreadful punishment that can be inflicted. I have hated being alone ever 
since. I resolved there and then that so far as I had the power no prisoner 
should be confined to his cell except during the hours of sleep, and that he 
should be allowed constant communication with his fellow prisoners and 
with the outside world. The absurd and unenforceable rule of silence in 
the workshops must go. There was much else to be done, but I was still a 
prisoner myself, and in no position to do it.”56  
 
This three week lock-up inside Stanley Prison had casted tremendous impact upon 
Norman and affected his future administration of the Hong Kong prisons. He kept his 
words by launching a more progressive and reformative penal system in Hong Kong 
especially during the time he took up the post of the Commissioner of Prisons from 
1953 to 1968. Corporal punishment was not awarded to prisoners found in breach of 
prison disciplines and the number of prisoners placed on disciplinary reports was 
much fewer than the subsequent years after his retirement. 
 
In another source information obtained by the British Embassy in Chungking (重慶), 
China in February 1943 also mentioned the locking up of 246 single male internees 
under the age of thirty-five in ‘F’ Hall of Stanley Prison during November 1942. The 
reason given was fear of escape and possibility of signalling to allied planes during 
black out period. After about one month, black-out was discontinued and the locking 
up of male internees inside Stanley Prison was also discontinued.
57
  
 
During the three years and eight months stay in the internment camp, Norman and 
Commissioner Willcocks had discussed and made plans for the administration of 
prisons in Hong Kong after the War.
58
 The Second World War ended with Japan’s 
                                                          
56
 Norman, J. (undated) op cit., p. 36. 
57
 See C.O. 129/590/22. 
58
 Norman, J. (undated) op cit., p. 29. 
 47 
surrender on 14 August 1945. When the news of Japan’s surrender reached Stanley 
Internment camp, Mr. Gimson, the Colonial Secretary of Hong Kong and the highest 
Hong Kong Government official amongst the internees, took over the administration 
of Hong Kong from the Japanese starting from 15 August 1945. The Prison Officers 
took back the prison from the Japanese and “released those of our comrades who had 
not been executed or starved to death.” 59 
 
The Royal Navy’s liberation fleet, under the command of Rear Admiral Sir Cecil 
Harcourt, entered the Hong Kong harbour on 30 August 1945 and Hong Kong was 
once again returned to British administration as a crown colony.
60
 A Proclamation on 
1 September 1945 established a Military Administration in Hong Kong. The next day, 
Admiral Harcourt was appointed as the Commander-in-Chief and Head of the 
Military Administration with Gimson temporarily assumed the role of Lieutenant 
Governor. 
 
 
1.5  Conclusion 
 
Penal development in Hong Kong followed, in general, the changes in penal policy in 
England, as to be expected in a crown colony. However it was widely believed that 
the transportation of the humane and reformative England penal system to the colony 
would not have any deterrent effect on the Chinese criminals. With the majority of the 
penal population consisting of Chinese from Mainland China, whose culture, diet and 
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living habits differed so much and standard of living much lower from those in 
England, it would be an incentive for the poor who would find the life and diet in the 
prison better than what they could get with their hard earn wages, which contradicted 
completely to the “less eligibility” concept guided by the Victorian penal policy at the 
time. As a result, the treatment of the Chinese prisoners was made much harsher than 
the European prisoners in Hong Kong, with the treatment of the latter group quite 
similar to the English practice. 
 
The penal philosophy adopted by England at the time before the Second World War 
had shifted to welfarism. Social and economic condition in Hong Kong however 
differed from England and affected the penal policy adopted. Although there were 
moves in introducing the reformative penal philosophy in Hong Kong by building a 
modern prison; the elimination of the non-productive penal sanctions; the 
classification of prisoners and the removal of the silent system, yet the punitive 
element had never been totally taken out from the system. 
 
The influx of refugees from China before the War had posted a threat to the internal 
security of the colony and mass imprisonment was used to maintain social security by 
warehousing the destitute as well as labouring poor inside prison. This had caused 
serious overcrowding and administrative problems for the prisons in Hong Kong and 
once again the deterrent penal policy returned through the reduction of prison diets 
and the tightening of prison regime. Judicial corporal punishment, imprisonment and 
the speedy deportation of the non resident Chinese back to Mainland China after 
serving sentence formed the best available answers to law and order in the colony 
prior to the outbreak of the Second World War. 
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The British administration of Hong Kong was interrupted during the period of 
Japanese occupation of the colony. The prisons in Hong Kong however still continued 
to function although under a very different regime operated by the occupation force. 
Nevertheless the experience of being imprisoned in their own prison during the War 
time had changed the perceptions of some of the senior prison officers affecting their 
way and attitude in the management of the Hong Kong prisons after the War. Details 
of the post-War penal development are covered in the following Chapters. 
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Chapter Two 
Post War Development of the Prisons / Correctional Services 
Department  
 
2.1   Introduction 
 
The Prisons Department had started with basically nothing except the only surviving 
working prison, the Stanley Prison after the Second World War in 1945. The few 
British Prison Officers had gone through a very difficult three years and eight months 
occupation period being internees themselves. They were arranged to return to 
England and so were the remaining Indian prison staff that were also sent back to 
India for rest and recuperation. Not all of them returned to Hong Kong owing to 
health reasons and the Prisons Department in 1945 could be regarded as starting from 
scratch. 
 
The current penal programmes in Hong Kong are rehabilitative orientated though the 
provision of welfare, counselling, psychological, psychiatric and after-care services 
by professionals to address the offenders’ needs and offending behaviour. These 
services were introduced to the penal system in Hong Kong gradually after 1970s. 
Education and vocational trainings are compulsory for young offenders from 14 to 21. 
All adult offenders are required to engaged in work six days a week unless found 
medically unfit to do so. The philosophy is to cultivate a working habit to the 
prisoners and for them to pick up a skill through the work they involved with the 
prison industries.  
 51 
The correctional administrators in Hong Kong emphasis that a stable and orderly 
penal environment is needed before any rehabilitation programme could be 
successfully launched. Basing on this philosophy, high degree of discipline is 
maintained within the penal regime and movements of prisoners are monitored at all 
times under direct staff supervision or through CCTV monitoring. Special intelligence 
networks are in place to monitor the gang and triad activities. Searching and 
mandatory drug tests are carried out on a regular basis to prevent the smuggling of 
illicit drugs inside penal institutions. 
 
These contemporary penal philosophies are very different from what was in place in 
Hong Kong before 1980. This Chapter will provide a detailed discussion of the 
philosophies of punishment based on the development of the Prisons / Correctional 
Services Department from 1945 to 1997. To enable a more systematic understanding 
on these fifty-two years of development, this Chapter is divided into sections covering 
the different phases of the Department’s development. The Chapter starts by firstly 
describing the law and order situation and the condition of the prison in Hong Kong 
during the period of Military Administration from 1945 to 1946. This was a unique 
period in the history of Hong Kong when the colony was recovering from the Second 
World War with shortage of material and supply on everything.  
 
Another section is used to discuss the conditions of the prison in Hong Kong from 
1946 to 1973. This would trace the post War development of Hong Kong’s penal 
system leading right up to the time before the 1973 Stanley Prison riot. This riot was 
considered as the watershed of the Hong Kong prison service leading to its speedy 
reform. The events leading to the 1973 riot and the subsequent changes to the Prisons 
Department are included in another section of this Chapter. 
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Backgrounds leading to the change of the name of the Prisons Department to 
Correctional Services Department in 1982 and the emphasis on offender rehabilitation 
are discussed in another section of this Chapter. The section also includes the 
development of the Department from 1982 to 1997 with impacts of the Vietnamese 
refugees and the illegal immigrants from Mainland China separately discussed under 
two separate sections of this Chapter. 
 
The Prisons Department and later the Correctional Services Department had since 
1978 involved in the management of Vietnamese refugees who fled to Hong Kong 
and other South East Asian countries after the fall of the South Vietnam in 1975. With 
the increased numbers and later the shift from political refugees (from former South 
Vietnam) to later economic illegal immigrants (from North Vietnam), Hong Kong had 
to adjust its policies on the treatment of the Vietnamese. This shift was from the open 
door refugee resettlement policy in the earlier years to detention for screening and the 
ultimate repatriation, by force if necessary, for those considered non-refugees under 
the ‘Comprehensive Plan of Action’. At one stage in 1991, there were more than 
34,200 people held in mega detention camps managed by the Correctional Services 
Department.
1
 
 
The last detention camp, the High Island Detention Centre was closed on 28 
September 1998 ending Correctional Services Department’s twenty-two years 
involvement in the management of the Vietnamese. The Prisons / Correctional 
Services Department’s involvement in this unwelcome task had strained the 
Department especially in resources, accommodation and manpower. Although the 
Vietnamese were detained, they were however not being treated as offenders and 
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were managed in a much relaxed routine and supervised mainly by temporary staff 
specially employed for this task.
2
 
 
Unlike the Vietnamese refugees, the illegal immigrants from Mainland China were 
being arrested and detained as prisoners since 1980. The change in immigration 
legislations and the use of imprisonment as penal policies for deterrence had direct 
impacts on the Correctional Services Department. Details of which are discussed in 
the final section of this Chapter. 
 
 
2.2  From Military Administration to the Prisons Department 
 
The British navy entered Hong Kong on 30 August 1945 after the surrender of the 
Japanese Government. Hong Kong’s status as a British crown colony was reinstated 
on this date with the British Government resumed her administration on Hong Kong. 
A Military Administration was established on 1 September 1945 to oversee the 
smooth operation of the Government during this transitional period.  
 
Within three weeks of the establishment of the Military Administration, all British 
and Indian prison officers and their families were repatriated back to England and 
India respectively.
3
 The Hong Kong Prison (Stanley Prison) was the only operating 
prison in Hong Kong whereas the other penal facilities were damaged during war time 
and rendered unserviceable. During the period of Military Administration, Stanley 
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Prison was temporarily manned by the Royal Marines of the 42nd Commando under 
the charge of Captain Gardner-Brown.
4
 Two British officers, assisted by a small 
force of Portuguese were responsible for the administration of the civil prisoners 
(ordinary criminals sentenced by the military courts) located inside the prison. Further 
assistance was later received through reinforcement staff from Shanghai.
5
  
 
During the period of Military Administration, Mr. John Burdett was appointed by the 
Colonial Office in London and brought in from Africa to take up the role as 
Superintendent of Prisons in Hong Kong. This appointment had caused much 
resentment from the two remaining senior prison officers in Hong Kong, 
Superintendent Bill Harrison and Assistant Superintendent James Norman who 
believed that this post should be internally promoted amongst the senior prison 
officers in Hong Kong. It was felt that Burdett, despite of his brief posting as 
officer-in-charge of the prison in Tripolitania when the Italians surrendered, had no 
experience of running a prison but was given a more senior position than the more 
experienced senior prison officers in Hong Kong. Norman had even raised a 
complaint with the Governor directly but he was bluntly rebuked for doing so.
6
  
 
Norman further made his remarks on Burdett that: 
“He had however, brought from his background strong prejudices, in 
particular against those he chose to call “coloured” people. He detested 
Indians, which was not going to help him in his new job.”7   
The first Quarterly Review of the Civil Affairs Administration (September to 
November 1945)
8
 reported that: 
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“The prisons are controlled by one officer and one inspector out of a War 
Establishment of 38. A War Criminals Camp for 266 prisoners and a 
Quisling Internment Camp in which 98 persons are detained, have been 
established at Stanley under military control. 423 civil [ordinary] 
prisoners are at present under various sentences in Stanley Prison where 
the prison buildings are in a satisfactory condition. There is no female 
prison or reformatory.”9  
The first Quarterly Review Report of the Kowloon Court mentioned the problem of 
shortage of accommodation for the male juveniles and that they had to be housed with 
the adult prisoners whilst on remand.
10
 There was an even bigger problem regarding 
sentencing for the male juveniles as there was only one industrial school with a 
maximum accommodation for 15 boys and the minimum period of stay in the school 
had to be two years. In view of the lack of separate facilities for the accommodation 
of juveniles in Stanley Prison, there was very little option left for imposing 
appropriate sentences for cases not requiring two years’ custody in the industrial 
school. The situation was better for the female juvenile offenders as the Salvation 
Army Home was made available for them.
11
  
 
During February 1946, the Chief Civil Affairs Officer formed the Child and Juvenile 
Welfare Committee with Assistant Superintendent Norman being appointed one of the 
members. The three most urgent tasks concerning juveniles faced by the Committee 
were remand home, hospital and the industrial school. Norman had suggested to the 
Committee to convert some of the pre-war food storage huts in Tai Tam (大潭) and 
Stanley as temporary boys’ homes but the suggestion was only taken up after the time 
of the Military Administration. The site was chosen at Stanley close to the Maryknoll 
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Mission
12
 as the proposal of using the Tai Tam site was objected by the Lo brothers, 
an eminent Chinese family fearing the value of their nearby property would be 
adversely affected.
13
  
 
The Judicial Section of the Military Administration stated that the number of cases 
dealt with by the Summary Courts was considered to be low in view of the shortage of 
police for law enforcement duties. A large number of cases brought to court were on 
charges of looting from unoccupied houses and the unauthorised cutting of trees for 
firewood.
14
 
 
The prison population on the other hand continued to grow after the War. By the end 
of February 1946, “2,380 prisoners had been admitted to Stanley Prison since the 
beginning of the Administration. At the beginning of March, Stanley Prison housed 
896 civil [ordinary] prisoners and 302 prisoners of war.”15  
 
The overall discipline in the prison during the period of Military Administration was 
described as satisfactory except one case of prison escape was recorded. Owing to the 
shortage of prison accommodations, female prisoners had to be accommodated inside 
Stanley Prison but located in separated section away from the male section. The 
juveniles were relocated to a small reformatory within the prison precincts.
16
 The 
Military Administration ended on 30 April 1946 and the colony was returned to civil 
administration on 1 May 1946. 
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2.3  Prisons from 1946 to 1973 
 
The Prisons Department faced a number of difficulties immediately after the War. 
Apart from the shortage of material and resources, the loss of all official records 
during the period of Japanese occupation made the classification of prisoners 
impossible without their previous penal records. The growing number of prisoners 
admitted into the prison system, in particular the increase in the number of young 
male offenders, was of particular concern. Finally difficulties were caused by the lack 
of trained staff in running prisons, as most pre-war staff were in extremely poor state 
of health and were unable to return to duty after the War. 
 
Victoria Prison was re-opened on 1 July 1946 with cellular accommodation for 150 
and was used mainly to house remand prisoners in view of its proximity to the courts. 
Some short-term prisoners were also located at Victoria Prison to provide domestic 
services.
17
  
 
The pre-War practice of having Justice of Peace (JP) visiting prisons resumed in 1946. 
On 12 August 1946, Stanley Prison was reported by the visiting JP of holding a total 
of 1,654 prisoners including 24 Chinese females, 96 juveniles and 290 Japanese. The 
JPs found the arrangement of accommodating female prisoners in the Condemned 
Block of the prison not a desirable practice as these female prisoners had to be moved 
to the prison hospital whenever there were impending executions.18  
 
In December 1946, the reformatory age boys were moved out from Stanley Prison to 
the Stanley Reformatory. The women prisoners also left Stanley Prison on 1 October 
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1947 when the repair work at the former female prison at Lai Chi Kok was 
completed.
19
 
 
Despite the opening of the Victoria Prison in housing the remands, juveniles to 
reformatory and the female prisoners to Lai Chi Kok Prison, overcrowding remained 
to be the major problem faced by Stanley Prison. The main cause of the prison 
overcrowding was due to the influx of short-sentence prisoners. The types of 
prisoners admitted as described in the 1947/48 Annual Departmental Report was: 
“16,160 persons were admitted to prison to serve sentence, 11,982 of 
which were for periods of under 3 months, 9,216 of them being for under 
1 month. A total of 7,967 persons were committed for short and 
completely ineffective terms of imprisonment for “Obstruction” and 
“Hawking without a licence”, this being a big factor in causing the 
overcrowding of the prisons and frustrating all efforts made to classify 
and improve the real criminals therein. Many of these persons were well 
able to pay their fines but preferred to come to prison.”20  
 
Similar problem was recorded in the 1948/49 Annual Departmental Report 
mentioning that 8,254 persons (5,291 males and 2,963 females) were admitted for 
short sentences during the year on trivial offences such as ‘Spitting’, ‘Obeying a call 
of nature’ and ‘Hawking without a licence’. They were accounted for 40% of the 
daily average penal population.
21
 
 
Further, Commissioner Shillingford wrote to the Governor on 23 June 1948 
requesting emergency measures to be taken to release certain selected groups of 
prisoners before the end of their sentences. This was a practice which had been 
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adopted in 1939 in view of prison overcrowding. Taking note of the unsatisfactory 
arrangements in 1939 when most of the early released prisoners were re-admitted to 
prison for fresh offences even before their original sentences expired, the Governor 
reluctantly agreed to release prisoners serving sentences of six months or less except 
those committing the following offences: 
 Larceny from the person, 
 Working illegal wireless stations, 
 Possession of dangerous drugs, 
 Being a member of an unlawful society, and 
 Offering a bribe to a policeman 
 
Records kept in Hong Kong’s Public Record Office revealed that 23 batches of 
prisoners numbering more than 1,400 were released early under such arrangements 
between 12 July 1948 and 13 December 1948.22  
 
Commissioner Shillingford made further suggestions to the central government in 
addressing the influx of non-fine-paying short-term prisoners by giving the offenders 
a reasonable allowance of time to pay their fines and, if necessary, the enforcement of 
fine payment through forfeiture of goods in the case of the hawkers. He also believed 
that a comprehensive and liberal probation system should be adopted in Hong Kong 
as: 
 
“I am confident that adoption of some of these suggestions would result in 
the vast majority of these petty offenders paying for their offences and thus 
relieve the community of the cost of maintaining them to the tune of over a 
million dollars a year. I am equally confident that this would also have a 
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certain deterrent effect. At present the state is being fined, instead of the 
offenders, against its laws.”23 
 
Another measure to address the prison overcrowding problem was the deportation of 
alien prisoners when they have completed their sentences in Hong Kong.  The 
Commissioner of Prison was appointed as the Competent Authority since January 
1950 and to make Deportation Orders against alien convicts under the amended 
Deportation of Aliens Ordinance of 1935. A further amendment of the Ordinance on 
16 August 1950 added the number of offences for which the Competent Authority 
might make Deportation Orders. As most of the prisoners in Hong Kong were from 
Mainland China, it was sometimes difficult for the Police to arrange the actual 
deportation at times when Sino-British relationship was tense and the Chinese 
Government had on occasions refused to accept these deportees.
24
 
 
Owing to the lack of resources in maintaining the prison buildings in the immediate 
years after the War, Stanley Prison was left in a poor state and the living conditions 
for the prisoners therein were bad. It was reported that: 
 
“During the year under report no satisfactory works of rehabilitation or 
maintenance have been carried out and these costly and impressive 
buildings are gradually rotting. Most of the roofs leak badly and the cell 
windows give little protection from rain if accompanied by wind because 
about 80% of the glass is missing from the louvers. Most of the cells have 
to accommodate 3 prisoners and it is not unusual to find bed-boards 
propped slanting against the cell wall with prisoners crouched under them 
for protection against the rain which is blowing in.”25   
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Two open prisons were set up in Hong Kong in the 1950s following the British 
practice before the War.
26
 The Prisons Department took over the under-utilized ‘Shap 
Long (十塱) Home for the Disabled’ in Lantau Island (大嶼山) from the Social 
Welfare Office and renamed it as H.M. Prison Chimawan (芝麻灣監獄) and started to 
take in Star Class short-term prisoners from January 1957. In October 1958, the 
Prisons Department took over the former on-site staff quarters of the engineers and 
workers building the Tai Lam Chung Reservoir (大欖涌水塘) in the New Territories 
and turned this into the Hong Kong’s second open prison, H.M. Prison Tai Lam (大欖
監獄).  
 
The open prison concept was not without its drawbacks in particular the possibilities of 
prisoner escapes. On 2 August 1969, twelve inmates escaped from a dormitory at Tai 
Lam Prison and in August 1970, three prisoners escaped from Chimawan Prison; they 
evaded a large scale man-hunt by members of prison, police and military personnel for 
nine days before their recapture.
27
 
 
There were further signs of mass indiscipline in the prisons in the 1970s. On 27 
December 1970, over 500 prisoners barricaded themselves inside the dormitories at 
Tong Fuk Prison (塘福監獄) and holding one warder as hostage. The stand-off lasted 
for three hours and only ended when assurances was given to the prisoners that an 
official enquiry would be convened to look into their grievances. 
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The subsequent enquiry, conducted internally by the Prisons Department, did reveal a 
‘below standard’ management of the institution and four prison staff were disciplined 
for failing to follow the laid down routines in the unlocking and locking up of 
prisoners from the dormitories. As for prisoners, none of them were disciplined for 
their involvement in the disturbance due to insufficient evidence.
28
 
 
On 28 June 1971, two inmates escaped from Tong Fuk Prison, ran towards the Shek Pik 
Reservoir (石壁水塘) direction and killed an employee of the Waterworks Office 
en-route. Both escapees were subsequently re-captured and charged with murder. They 
were later convicted on a lesser charge of manslaughter and sentenced to seven years 
imprisonment.
29
 
 
The state of indiscipline had continued in the open institutions with minor disturbances 
at Tai Lam and Ma Po Ping Addiction Treatment Centres (麻埔坪戒毒所). Stanley 
Prison also noted the trend of increased violence amongst prisoners involving the use of 
weapons and four prisoners died as a result of assaults between prisoners. As a 
counter-measure, the prison management tightened up the security of Stanley Prison by 
setting up a special searching squad; they removed metal stockpiles outside the prison 
until required by the workshop and prisoners involved in outside work were to be 
accommodated outside the prison proper. Another area of concern was the wide spread 
use of illicit drugs found inside prisons leading to the introduction of compulsorily 
rectal examinations upon prisoners’ admission to the prison.30 However, all these 
added security measures could not prevent the disturbance which took place in Stanley 
Prison in April 1973. 
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Before moving to the next section covering the 1973 Stanley Prison riot, it is 
necessary to cover the development of the Prisons staff after the War. As mentioned 
in Chapter One on conditions of the Hong Kong Prisons Department before the War, 
the Prison Officer grades as well as the Non-Commissioned Officer grades were 
occupied by Europeans only. The latter mainly recruited from Her Majesty’s Forces 
in Hong Kong. Prior to the War, the Warder grade was entirely filled by the Pakistani 
and Sikh staff and Chinese were not allowed to join as their loyalties were in doubt 
and the fear of their links with the undesirables in the colony.
31
 In 1938, there were 
over 230 Pakistani and Sikh staff in service in 1938.
32
  
 
The situation changed after the War in particular the Warder grades as localisation 
started to take place in Hong Kong. Indian and Pakistani Warders upon their 
resignation were replaced by locally recruited Chinese. However owing to poor pay 
and the low social status of being a prison Warder, the locally enlisted Chinese 
Warders were found to be of poor quality. This was further hampered by the lack of 
training provided to the new recruits. Tight discipline had to be exercised on the 
prison staff and 824 prison staff were disciplined and punished in the year 1947/48.
33
 
 
The situation improved since 1947 when the Salary Commission increased the salary 
of the local prison staff to be in line with that of the police. Arising from this financial 
improvement, better quality local Chinese were attracted to join as Warders.
34
 Proper 
trainings were arranged for the newly recruited Warders since 1950. A month long 
training covering foot-drill, weapon training, Prison Rules and duties of a Warder 
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were given before they were posted out to work in the prison, and continued to be 
supervised until ready to work independently.
35
 By 1954, the number of Pakistani 
and Sikh staff number were down to 41 as all vacancies came up were filled by local 
recruitment.
36
 
  
Until late in 1948, the grade of ‘Prison Officer’ was restricted to Europeans. Starting 
from 1949, the ‘Prison Officer’ grade was split into two: ‘Prison Officer Grade I’ and 
‘Prison Officer Grade II’. The latter grade allowed for direct entry or by promotion 
from the Warders.
37
 
 
The recruitment of European expatriate prison officers was through the Crown Agent 
who advertised in the home press and eight of them were recruited during the year 
1952-53. Through arrangement with the Colonial Office, assistance were rendered by 
the Prison Commissioners for these new recruits to undergo three months training 
courses in the United Kingdom prisons before taking up their post in Hong Kong.
38
  
 
This was a great improvement in preparing the new officers as no formal training was 
organized for the Prison Officers before in view of the small number of Officers 
recruited at a time. Officers joined before this arrangement had to take up the 
apprentice system of working alongside an experienced officer until they were readied 
to perform duty independently.
39
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During the same year, the Governor of Hong Kong approved the alternation to the cap 
badge and badge of the Prisons Department. The new badge incorporated the new 
Royal Cypher when Queen Elizabeth II became the new head of the Empire.
40
 The 
new badge looked very similar to Her Majesty’s Prison Service badge except with the 
addition of the letters ‘Hong Kong’, signifying the close resemblance of the two 
services.   
 
The quality of some European Officers recruited immediately after the War was 
however far from satisfactory. In a memorandum from the Commissioner of Prisons 
to the Colonial Secretary dated 25 September 1952, he reported that 59 disciplinary 
reports were laid against twenty European Officer in the year with 32 of these reports 
being ‘late for duty’. At the time there were only 58 European Officers in the service. 
The Commissioner explained that most of those involved were ex-Palestine 
policemen who were sent to Hong Kong by the Crown Agents in 1947-48 on three 
year contracts and so far sixteen of them had left the Service.
41
 
 
With the increased number of locally enlisted staff joining the prison services, the 
Prisons Department established its first Staff Training School at Stanley in 1958. A 
four weeks training was provided to all new recruits and one week refresher training 
for the serving prison staff.
42
  
 
With the closing down of the Colonial Office, the practice of employing European 
prison officers from England also ceased since 1963. Recruitment for both rank and 
                                                          
40
 See Commissioner of Prisons, Annual Departmental Reports, 1952-53. 
41
 See HKRS 41-1-1425-1, op cit. 
42
 See Commissioner of Prisons, Annual Departmental Reports, 1958-59. 
 66 
file and officer grade prison staff for the Hong Kong prison service were conducted 
locally.
43
   
 
In 1968, the new Staff Training School for the Prisons Department was completed. 
The first course for newly recruited prison staff started in the same year with 171 men 
and 4 women recruits. The basic training for the staff was extended to six months and 
apart from courses run by the Department, the Extra Mural Department of the 
University of Hong Kong
44
 was involved in the training in social science subjects 
such as: ‘The Evaluation of Law and Punishment’; ‘The Objects and Ethics of 
Punishment’; ‘Delinquency and Human Nature’; ‘Theories of Deviant Behaviour’; 
‘Chinese Attitudes to Law’; ‘Social Aspects of Crime’; ‘Drugs and Crime’; 
‘Psychiatric Aspects of Crime’; ‘Group Counselling’ and ‘The Effects of Various 
Treatments in Law’.45 
 
Despite all these trainings, the standard of some prison staff, especially those in the 
junior ranks, were not the best type of staff the Department might require as reflect in 
the riot that happened in Stanley Prison in April 1973. 
 
 
2.4  The 1973 Stanley Prison Riot and the Subsequent Changes 
 
A riot broke out at Stanley Prison during the Easter weekend of 19 April 1973 and 
ended on 23 April 1973. At the time Stanley Prison was housing 2,396 prisoners 
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which was almost doubled its certified accommodation. The prison was staffed by 
263 prison staff, including 28 on hospital and driving duties; and was 26% below its 
approved establishment of 361. 
 
Around 1700 hrs on 19 April, 300 prisoners barricaded themselves in the dining hall 
in protest of an earlier incident when a prisoner was warned by staff. This particular 
prisoner was however a known triad boss and one of the major illicit drug suppliers 
inside the prison. Commissioner Garner stepped-in personally and persuaded the 
prisoner representatives that there would be an investigation to look into their 
allegations of undue security measures, frequent searches and poor diet. He promised 
to take appropriate action if they had legitimate grievances. Prisoners subsequently 
returned to their cells and were fed in small groups after handing out their list of 
complaints which concerned inadequate recreation facilities, poor quality of food and 
the new system of searches which had been recently introduced.
46
  
 
Riot broke out the next morning shortly after unlock. Prisoners of A Hall took three 
prison staff hostage, took the cell door keys and unlocked all prisoners from their cells 
and caused havoc inside the Hall. They had succeeded in blocking the prison officers 
responding to the situation from entering the Hall despite the use of tear smoke. 
Commissioner Garner again intervened personally and parleyed with the prisoner 
representatives. The three hostages were later released unharmed and an uneasy peace 
followed.
47
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Meanwhile fire broke out in other Halls as prisoners protested about the delay of the 
issue of the morning meal. For the next two days, there were more disturbances in the 
other Halls. Glass windows were smashed and thrown at staff and more fires were 
started by prisoners by burning their wooden cell doors. The riot finally died down on 
23 April and according to the official report: 
“Despite the intensity of the disturbance and the fact that two members of 
the staff received minor injuries, no prisoner was injured.”48 
 
This incident had aroused great concern from the Government and the Secretary of 
State was also informed of the incident by the Governor of Hong Kong. A request was 
also made to avail two experts from the Home Office in London to advise on the 
general prison architecture and fittings as well as prison administration and security. 
The need for having a full commission of enquiry by the Home Office was also 
considered whilst the Prisons Department was ordered to conduct its own initial 
enquiry.
49
  
 
The departmental Board of Enquiry, chaired by the Deputy Commissioner Mr. T. 
Ecob, submitted its report in May 1973 pointing to two key areas concerning staff and 
the prisoners. Staff issues included the shortage in junior rank staff, low staff morale 
and the involvement of corrupt staff in the trafficking of dangerous drugs. As to 
problems concerning prisoners, it highlighted the influx of more young and violent 
offenders, overcrowding, triad and gang activities and inadequate supervision. 
Tightening of security and discipline was recommended and improvement to the 
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physical security of Stanley Prison was urgently needed to cope with this new type of 
prisoner elements which had created the situation leading to the Easter riot.
50
 
 
Whilst awaiting the Home Office experts to arrive Hong Kong, the Government had 
taken urgent actions on 30 April 1973 for the Finance Committee to approve 
HK$500,000 for security improvement at Stanley Prison. A ten feet high barbed wire 
fence encircling the prison was immediately erected inside the prison wall, providing 
a protected road round the inner perimeter of the prison. Stanley prison was divided 
into two sections with fence and the open space was fenced off for use as a football 
field.
51
 
 
The two Home Office experts, Mr. J. E. Henderson-Smith, Senior Deputy Regional 
Director of Prisons, former Deputy Governor of Liverpool and Governor of 
Gloucester Prison together with Mr. J. A. Burrell, Senior Grade Architect involved in 
development and improvement of UK prisons, stayed in Hong Kong from 18 May to 
1 June 1973. Their terms of reference were to advise on the administration of Stanley 
Prison in particular, and that of other prisons in general; to examine the structure of 
and security arrangement at Stanley Prison and to make recommendations as to their 
improvement; to review other building proposals in the planning stage in the Prisons 
Department programme, and to advise on security and structural aspects and to report 
their findings and recommendations to the Governor.
52
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Another urgent measure taken up by the Government was for the Finance Committee 
to approve on 25 June 1973 the creation of 53 supernumerary posts for Stanley Prison 
as an interim step to beef up the staffing situation thereat before the UK experts 
finalised their report. The created posts included 24 Assistant Officers Class I and II 
as additional Hall staff for night duty, 26 Assistant Officers for the temporary Stanley 
Prison Annexe under construction for 80 prisoners together with one Principal Officer 
and two Prison Officers as supervisors.
53
 
 
After the Easter riot, twelve Assistant Officers were dismissed from the services 
mainly for refusing to obey orders to enter the Halls during the riots. Prisoners 
involved in the riot were disciplined and punished under Prison Rules. 65 prisoners 
mostly kitchen cooks or cleaners who maintained the essential services at Stanley 
Prison during the riot had a reduction of three months of their sentence.
54
 
 
The two Home Office prison advisors presented their report to Governor Sir Murray 
MacLehose in June 1973 with 53 recommendations which could be grouped into six 
major areas, i.e., buildings, industries and stores, management, medical, prisoners, 
security and staff.
55
 
 
A Steering Committee chaired by the Secretary of Security Mr. G. P. Llord with the 
Commissioner of Prisons, Principal Government Architect, Principal Assistant 
Colonial Secretary and the Principal Assistant Financial Secretary as members was 
formed to study the recommendations made by the UK advisors and to decide on the 
way forward on the implementation of these recommendations. 
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The degree of support received from the related Government branches and 
departments after the riot had enabled the Prisons Department to embark in a most 
comprehensive reform programme since the Second World War. The Department was 
using this opportunity to adopt a much more authoritative approach in the 
management of offenders under its charge. One of the priorities was the enhancement 
of the quality of the prison staff. Apart from getting rid of those who had refused to 
take orders during the riots, the Department had co-operated fully with the newly 
established Independent Commission Against Commission (ICAC) to remove those 
prison staff involved in corruptive practices.  
 
The government gave its approval for the Prisons Department to create 540 new posts 
in 1974 which was almost a third of the existing staff strength with an additional 
HK$9.4 million provision in respect of personal emoluments.
56
 These additional 
posts included 3 Senior Superintendents, 8 Superintendents, 15 Chief Officers, 21 
Principal Officers, 87 Officers and 406 Assistant Officers I/II. The post of Inspector 
of Prisons and other senior management staff to deal with narcotics, prison industries, 
vocational training, nursing and after-care were also created. The new posts allowed 
for the establishment of the Escort Unit within the Prisons Department to provide 
their own court escorts; departmental training reserve to enable serving staff to attend 
in-service training without affecting the operation and security of the institutions. 
57
 
 
The post of the Inspector of Prison, at the rank of Senior Superintendent, was created 
in October 1973. The post was modelled on the HM Prison Services system and the 
designated officer was arranged to attach to the Inspectorate of the Prison Department 
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of the Home Office in England on training purpose. He had accompanied the Chief 
Inspector of Prisons in the Prison Service for England and Wales on a number of 
inspections of HM Prison establishments.
58
 
 
The English practices on prison inspection were brought back to Hong Kong to enable 
the development of a systematic inspecting and reporting system on the efficiency, 
shortcomings and needs of individual institutions by full inspections carried out by the 
Inspector of Prisons and his team once every three years. Apart from monitoring the 
performance of the institutions, the Inspectorate was also required to oversee the 
security of the department by maintaining close liaison with the Police and other law 
enforcement agencies and the collection and analysis of prisoner intelligence through 
the institutional security officers.
59
 
 
With the approval given to employ more prison staff, in particular at the officer 
grades, the department had approached the local tertiary institutions for graduates to 
join the services. It succeeded in securing a new cadre of better educated young 
graduates in joining the service as Prison Officers. During the year 1974-75, 29 
degree holders joined the Prisons Department as Prison Officer.
60
  
 
With the enhanced staff strength, the Prison Department was able to tighten the 
control and management of prisoners under its charge. As a result, the problem of 
illicit drugs in the prisons was under control and the triads had lost their influences 
inside the prison.
61
 Other major security improvement was the adaptation of the 
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prisoner categorization system used in England and Wales as per recommendations of 
Lord Mountbatten’s Report of 1966. Prisoners are graded in one of the four categories 
from A to D according to their security risks and they would be appropriately located 
to institutions suitable to accommodate prisoners of that particular security category.
62
 
 
A lot of these improvements required additional funding from the central Government. 
As revealed from the Prisons Department Annual Reports, the expenditure for the 
Prisons Department was indeed increased from HK$24.5 million in 1972 to HK$73.9 
million in 1975, an increase of over 200% in three years.
63
   
 
Another important change happened to the Prisons Department after the 1973 Stanley 
Prison Riot was the change in the chain of command within the Hong Kong 
Government. Acting upon the recommendations of the ‘McKinsey Report’ in 
enhancing the efficiency of the Hong Kong Government, six new policy branches, 
each under a newly appointed Secretary, were established to cover the: Economic 
Services, Environment, Home affairs, Housing, Security, and Social Services.
64
  
 
“On Monday 1st October, 1973 Security Branch [of the Government Secretariat] 
assumed responsibility from Social Services Branch for prisons matter.”65 All matters 
concerning penal policy objectives, initiatives from and resources for the Prisons 
Department had to be cleared by the Secretary of Security, who was also responsible 
all other disciplinary services in Hong Kong. 
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2.5  From Prisons to Correctional Services Department 
 
By early 1980s, the Prisons Department had successfully portrayed to the public an 
image of a professional department specialised in providing quality rehabilitative 
services to offenders under its custody. The success of the Prisons Department in the 
work with young offenders was praised by local experts and suggestions were even 
made to transfer the probation service of the Social Welfare Department to be under 
the charge of the Prisons Department as: 
“Children and young persons committed to institutional care after being 
found guilty by the Courts should be given the opportunity to reform 
themselves in a properly designated section of the Prisons Department. 
The Prisons Department is doing a fine job with young men and women. 
Visit their institution for girls at Tai Tam Gap [correctional institution] 
after seeing the Ma Tau Wai Girls’ Home [operated by the Social Welfare 
Department] and you will be in no doubt which place is giving the young 
offenders a second chance in life, a respect for themselves and sound 
training for their future return to the community.”66 
During the same Legislative Council meeting when these comments were made, it 
was also revealed that the Prisons Department had already planned to change its name 
from Prisons Department to Correctional Services in order to enhance the 
department’s image: 
“We would support a recommendation put forward a few years ago that 
the Prisons Department should be renamed the Department of 
Correctional Services.”67 
On 1 February 1982, the Prisons Department was formally renamed as the 
Correctional Services Department (CSD) and the rank of Commissioner of Prisons 
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was re-titled as the Commissioner of Correctional Services. According to the CSD, 
the change was made in recognition of the diverse programmes the department 
undertakes in addition to the management of prison, such as the drug addition 
treatment centre, training and detention centre programmes and in the field of 
aftercare. Furthermore, the name of correctional services conveys a more positive 
image of the department’s work and is considerably more in line with contemporary 
international trends.
68
 
 
Commissioner Garner in 1984 claimed that “the Department has over the years 
developed into a fully professional service and is ranked very highly in the field of 
corrections on a world-wide basis.”69 Prior to his retirement in 1985, CSD hosted the 
first Commonwealth correctional administrators meeting from 18 - 22 March 1985. 
Representatives from over 30 Commonwealth countries and international 
organisations took part in the meeting.
70
 
 
On 1 July 1985, Mr. Chan Wa-shek succeeded Mr. T.G. Garner and became the first 
Chinese Commissioner of the department.
 
Amongst the disciplined services in Hong 
Kong at the time, the Correctional Services Department was the first to have a 
Chinese head of department demonstrating the department’s advance in the 
localisation process. Commissioner Chan joined the Prisons Department in the early 
1950s and was promoted from the ranks. 
 
Commissioner Chan retired in November 1990 and the post of the Commissioner was 
filled by Mr. Eric McCosh, a Senior Assistant Commissioner of the Royal Hong Kong 
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Police Force. This arrangement was a departure from the tradition of promoting the 
post of the Commissioner from within the department and had generated both 
resentment and speculation from both within and outside the department.
71
 
 
The Link between the HM Prison Services and CSD maintains. In July 1990 a study 
team comprising representatives from the CSD, the Architectural Services 
Department and the Electrical and Mechanical Services Department from Hong Kong 
visited the United Kingdom to gather information and ideas from HM Prison Services 
for planning the re-development of the Stanley Prison.
72
 
 
With Commissioner McCosh’s Scottish background, he visited the Scottish Prison 
Service in early 1994 and had established with the Scottish Prison Service a staff 
exchange scheme between the two services.  The author was the first CSD staff to 
stay with the Scottish Prison Service for a four-week attachment programme with 
particular task to study the ‘Sentence Planning Scheme’ in use in Scotland.73  
 
Mr. LAI Ming-kee, the Deputy Commissioner of Correctional Services, was 
appointed Commissioner on 20 February 1995 upon Mr. McCosh’s retirement.74 
With this appointment, CSD’s tradition of having a career correctional officer leading 
the department resumed and also it followed the Government’s localisation policy for 
having an ethnic Chinese Commissioner to lead CSD through the time of the change 
of sovereignty in 1997.
75
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As to the ‘Sentence Planning Scheme’ for long term prisoners basing on the Scottish 
framework, it was being modified to suit Hong Kong’s situation and launched by 
CSD in July 1996. In promoting this scheme, it was remarked that: 
“This recognises the fact that long-term confinement entails problems and 
needs that are different from those presented by short-term incarceration. 
Such prisoners need to structure their time wisely under the guidance of 
our professional staff. A special and individualized programme has been 
devised for these prisoners to gear them towards rehabilitation and to 
equip them with job skills for their ultimate discharge.” 76  
As at 31 December 1997, there were 297 prisoners taking part in the ‘Sentence 
Planning Scheme’.77 
 
Starting from 1 April 1993, the Security Bureau of the Government Secretariat had 
devised a ‘Framework Agreement’ between the Secretary of Security and the 
Commissioner of Correctional Services. The Agreement spelled out the relationship 
between and the respective responsibilities of these two parties and subject to review 
once every two years. 
 
In the 1993 Agreement (copy attached in Appendix C), the Secretary of Security was 
mainly responsible to: define the core activities of the CSD; formulating and 
reviewing policies; securing resources for CSD; setting performance targets to 
achieve specified value for money objectives, reviewing CSD performance; act as 
Government spokesman on policy matters and processing legislative enactive or 
amendment. 
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The Commissioner under the Agreement was only responsible to carry out the day to 
day operation of the Department and to achieve the agreed performance targets. The 
three agreed activities for CSD were (a) Prison Management; (b) Re-integration and 
(c) Management of Vietnamese Migrants. Performance measurements were specified 
but targets were not set except on the time of response to prisoner requests (7 days) 
and out of cell / dormitory time per day (10 hours). Budgets provided for the 
Department in1993-94 was HK$1,552.3 million, with HK$1,040.7 million or 67% 
allocated for prison management, HK$230.5 million or 14.9% for re-integration and 
HK$281.1 million or 18.1% for the Vietnamese.
78
 
 
CSD had continued to grow and by 1997, it had an approved staff establishment of 
7,286 
79
operating 23 penal institutions. These institutions consisted of 13 prisons, two 
training centres, two drug addiction treatment centres, one detention centre, one 
psychiatric centre and four institutions with multiple roles. The budget of the CSD 
was HK$2,501.50 million for the 1997-1998 fiscal year.
80
  
 
As at 31 December 1997, there were 10,069 sentenced person and 1,043 remands 
under the custody of the Correctional Services Department. Furthermore, there were 
252 detainees who were non Hong Kong residents who have finished their custodial 
sentences and awaiting repatriation as well as 969 Vietnamese Migrants awaiting 
repatriation.
81
 No penal facilities are privatized in Hong Kong up to this moment. 
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2.6  The Vietnamese Saga 
 
After the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, Vietnamese refugees began to flee their 
country. Hong Kong since late 1970s became one of the preferred destinations for the 
refugees as Britain had assigned Hong Kong as one of the first port of asylums for the 
refugees. The number of Vietnamese arrived in Hong Kong reached its peak of 
68,695 on 11 September 1979.
82
  
 
At the beginning only a small number of Prisons Department staff were seconded to 
the Government Security Branch to assist in the management of the refugees. But 
with Vietnam started its ethnic cleansing programme in the cities, many Vietnamese 
with Chinese origins were forced to leave their country by sea and land with many 
chosen Hong Kong as their destination for possible re-settlement to the Western 
countries.  
 
Since late 1970s, many Vietnamese reaching Hong Kong were found to be 
non-refugees but economic migrants from North Vietnam. The Hong Kong 
Government had decided to locate all Vietnamese arrivals in closed centres with 
movement restricted as deterrence starting from July 1982. The task of managing 
these closed centres fell mainly on CSD and penal institutions had to be reshuffled to 
make room for their detention before new closed centres could be established. CSD 
further set up a Refugee Unit and employed many temporary Officers and Assistant 
Officers to carry out the supervision duties at these centres aided by regular 
Correctional Officers with experience in the management of penal institutions.
83
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The flow of Vietnamese however did not slow down. In 1988 and 1989, over 52,000 
Vietnamese reached Hong Kong which prompted the Hong Kong Government to set 
up the ‘screening policy’ in June 1988. 84  Those Vietnamese determined to be 
refugees by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) were 
relocated from the closed centres to the ‘open camps’ waiting to be re-settled to other 
Western countries. Those considered to be non-refugees would remain to be detained 
in the closed centres as deterrence to those non-refugees who wanted to come to Hong 
Kong. 
 
Agreements were finally reached between the British, Hong Kong and the Vietnamese 
Government in 1989 for the non-refugees detained in Hong Kong to be returned to 
Vietnam. The first group of 75 Vietnamese left Hong Kong on March 1989 which 
started the voluntary repatriation programme for those willing to return. ‘Orderly 
repatriations’ were also arranged for those reluctant to return. Strong police escorts 
had to be arranged to accompany their return to Vietnam in chartered flights.
85
  
 
The management of the Vietnamese at the closed centres was extremely challenging. 
The detainees were not treated as prisoners but their movements were restricted to the 
confines of the centre area which was limited. They were not required to work unless 
they wanted to take up some of the paid domestic tasks within the centre. Fractional 
fights between the Vietnamese were common and there were two serious incidents 
happened in Hong Kong.  
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On 27 August 1989, over a thousand Vietnamese took over the small island of Tai A 
Chau (South Soko Island) (大鴉洲) and forced the 51 police guarding the camp to 
retreat. The island fell into a lawlessness state with fierce battles fought between the 
northern and southern Vietnamese on the island and female Vietnamese being raped. 
When the police re-took the island the next day by force, three of the Vietnamese 
were not accounted for and believed to have been killed during the night.
86
  
 
Another fatal incident happened at Shek Kong Camp (石崗) on the eve of the Chinese 
New Year in 1992. The camp was managed by the police and a flight broke out 
between the northern and southern Vietnamese. The northerners retreated to their 
dormitory but were locked from the outside and were set fire upon with 24 killed and 
over 120 injured in this incident.
87
 
 
With the commencement of the ‘orderly repatriation programme’, some of the 
Vietnamese directed their frustration and anger towards the camp management. Many 
small scale disturbances and riots broke out in the camps. The worst case happened on 
10 May 1996 when hundreds of Vietnamese at the Whitehead Detention Centre (白石
羈留中心) started a riot and setting fire to the office buildings before rushing the gate, 
broke the fence and fleeing the Centre. The riot was eventually stopped with 
reinforcements from the Police Tactical Unit and the Emergency Support Group of 
the CSD. Over 1,800 rounds of tear gas grenades were fired in stopping the riot.
88
 
 
The task of managing the Vietnamese refugees for over twenty years had diverted the 
Prisons / Correctional Services’ resources and attention from its primary mission of 
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offender management and rehabilitation. The frequent large scale re-shuffling of 
penal facilities to make room for accommodating the refugees had caused interruption 
to penal facilities. Experienced CSD officers were deployed to the camps and centres 
to supervise the temporary staff in their performance of duty. During major 
disturbance in the camps, all available CSD staff were called out or asked to stand-by 
to render necessary assistance. When Vietnamese detainees were arranged to return to 
Vietnam under the ‘orderly repatriation programme’, large contingent of CSD staff 
were pulled from their normal duties to provide support. 
 
The positive factor for the involvement of the CSD in this Vietnamese saga was the 
experience gained in working with non-government organisations and the tactical 
skills developed in dealing with major incidents and handling large scale disturbance 
in institutions. CSD had developed a team of seasoned specialised staff in handling 
emergency situations in penal institutions with lessons learnt from this era. 
  
From 1975 to 1997, there were over 224,000 Vietnamese arrived Hong Kong. 
143,000 of them were subsequently resettled as refugees to other countries. 57,000 
returned to Vietnam voluntarily and 11,600 were returned under the ‘orderly 
repatriation programme’ or deported as illegal immigrants. Another 24,000 were 
repatriated to Mainland China as they were classified as ex-Chinese Vietnamese 
Illegal Immigrants.
89
  
 
By the end of 1997, only 3,400 Vietnamese remained in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong 
Special Administration Region Government terminated Hong Kong’s status as a ‘port 
of first asylum’ for the Vietnamese on 8 January 1998. With the closing down of the 
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last detention centre at High Island (萬宜羈留中心 ) in the same year, the 
Correctional Services Department’s involvement in this challenging task was finally 
concluded.
90
  
 
 
2.7  The Illegal Immigrants 
 
Owing to its geographical position where Hong Kong and Mainland China are land 
locked at the New Territories, free crossing by Chinese between the land border of 
Hong Kong and China was historically permitted. Immigration control was only 
introduced in 1940 to stop the refugees fleeing China during the Sino-Japanese War 
from entering Hong Kong. This measure was suspended during the Second World 
War and revived in 1949.
91
 
 
The 1949 border control was minimal in effect and basically Hong Kong had adopted 
the ‘Open Door’ policy on Chinese nationals from Mainland China. Anyone who 
evaded arrest at the border area could report to the immigration authorities in town to 
obtain permit to stay in Hong Kong. Between 1962 and 1972, about 60,000 Chinese 
persons entered into Hong Kong without permission and were subsequently permitted 
to stay.
92
  
 
The ‘Cultural Revolution’ in China created another influx of refugees to Hong Kong 
and in 1973 alone, 56,000 illegal immigrants arrived Hong Kong from Mainland 
                                                          
90
 Ibid. 
91
 Chan, J. (2009) ‘Immigration Policies and Human Resources Planning,’ in Siu, H. and Agnes, S. 
(Eds.) Hong Kong Mobile: Making a Global Population. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, p. 
152. 
92
 Ibid, p. 159. 
 84 
China. This prompted the Hong Kong Government to introduce the ‘Touch Base’ or 
‘Reached Base’ policy on 30 November 1974. 
“Under this policy, illegal immigrants who were arrested in the border 
region or in Hong Kong territorial waters during their attempt to enter 
Hong Kong would be repatriated, but all others who evaded immediate 
capture, entered the urban areas and subsequently gained a home with 
relatives or otherwise found proper accommodation would be given 
permission to stay in Hong Kong when they applied to the Immigration 
Department. The rationale of this policy was to avoid creating an illegal 
community of people living outside the law who could be exploited by 
employers and blackmailed by unscrupulous people and who might be 
compelled to live on the fringe of society and be drawn to crime as a 
means of survival.”93 
 
The problem of illegal immigration remained in the 1970s. In 1979, 89,000 illegal 
immigrants from China were arrested on arrival and repatriated whereas another 
107,000 had successfully evaded capture and reached base and allowed to stay. To 
stop the flow of the illegal immigrants, the Hong Kong Government abolished the 
‘Touch Base’ policy on 23 October 1980 and all illegal immigrants arrived after this 
date would be repatriated.
94
 In addition, there were two Sections included in the 
Immigration (Amendment) (No 2) Ordinance 1980 requiring all Hong Kong residents 
over the age of fifteen to carry in person their Hong Kong identity cards and 
prohibiting the employment of illegal immigrants.
95
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When the Hong Kong Government launched its massive infra-structure building 
projects after 1989 preparing for Hong Kong’s handing over, many illegal immigrants 
came to Hong Kong to look for employment. The Government therefore established 
sentencing guidelines for imprisoning illegal workers caught in Hong Kong to fifteen 
months imprisonment in 1990 as deterrence. The immediate effect of this sentencing 
guideline was the rise in penal population and the severe overcrowding in penal 
institutions, especially institutions holding females. In 1990, illegal immigrants from 
China constituted about 40% of the total prison population. Despite this harsh 
sentence, there were still some 3,100 illegal immigrants from China serving sentence 
in Hong Kong in 1991 constituted 30% of the penal population.
96
 
 
Another important issue arising from this influx of illegal immigrants was the number 
of female illegal immigrants coming to Hong Kong and a large number of them were 
involved in the sex industry. They were arrested and sentenced not for their 
involvement as sex workers but mainly for ’breach of condition of stay’, a measure 
which was described as ‘bureaucratic justice’ by Laidler, et.al. (2007).97  
 
Statistics from the Correctional Services Department showed that the total number of 
females sentenced by court and admitted to penal institutions had increased from 944 
in 1986 to 1,287 in 1991 and 3,966 in 1996. The number of male prisoner admissions 
had also increased during this period but the rate was not as high as the female 
prisoners, i.e., 9,718 in 1986, 12,361 in 1991 and 13,654 in 1996.
98
 This high 
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 Hong Kong Hansard, 23 October 1991, pp. 38-45. 
97
 Laidler, K., et. al. (2007) ‘Bureaucratic Justice: The Incarceration of Mainland Chinese Women 
Working in Hong Kong’s Sex Industry’, International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative 
Criminology, Volume 51 Number 1, pp. 68-83. 
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 See Table 8.3, ‘Sentenced Persons Admitted into Penal Institutions by Age Group and Sex’ in 
Census and Statistics Department, (2011) Women and Men in Hong Kong, Key Statistics 2011 Edition, 
p. 218. 
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admission rate had push up the overall penal population for both male and female 
prisoners. The average daily penal population for all sentenced female prisoners 
jumped from 676 in 1991 to 1,438 in 1996 and for male sentenced prisoners, the 
average daily population was increased from 9,407 in 1991 to 10,011 in 1996. As to 
the prisoner composition, female prisoners from Mainland China had outnumbered 
the local female prisoners by around four to one in 1996. 
99
  
 
 
2.8   Conclusion 
 
This Chapter has traced the path of the development of the prison services in Hong 
Kong from immediately after the post-War days until 1997 when Hong Kong was no 
longer under British administration.  
 
The end of the Pacific War in 1945 had given the Prisons Department in Hong Kong 
the opportunity to have a fresh start. Most of the experienced prison staff were 
replaced by local staff after the War. A few senior British prison officers had rebuilt 
the Department at the time when resources were in short supply and the prisons in 
Hong Kong were being used as warehouses for the destitute and poor in addition to 
those committed for criminal offences. 
 
The prisons services had always been considered an important agency by the colonial 
service in the maintenance of law and order in the colonies. Until late 1960s, the 
Colonial Office was still actively monitoring the work of the colonial prison service 
                                                          
99
 Figures obtained from Commissioner of Correctional Services Department, Departmental Annual 
Reports, 1986, 1991 and 1996.  
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through its Advisory Committees. In Part II of this thesis, more discussion will be 
given on the roles of the Colonial Office in shaping Hong Kong’s penal policies.  
At operational level, Hong Kong was under strong British influence and had 
maintained very close linkage with Britain in particular the recruitment and training of 
senior officers and European officers for the Prisons Department. These arrangements 
had ensured the elites in the Hong Kong Prisons Department were in full conveyance 
with the penal philosophies and practices in England. Prison Ordinances and Prison 
Rules covering the work of the HM Prison Service were adopted in Hong Kong if 
there were no contradictions with the local situation. 
 
With the shrinking of the British Empire in the 1960s and the deletion of the Colonial 
Office in 1969, the Prisons Department, along with the other Government 
departments in Hong Kong, began to pick up pace in the localisation process. This 
however did not prevent the Prisons Department from seeking professional advices 
from the Home Office and transporting British penal management philosophy from 
the HM Prisons Service as evident from the aftermath of the 1973 Stanley Prison riot. 
On the other hand, the removal of the Colonial Office had enabled the Prisons 
Department to have more flexibility in the selection and adaptation of penal practices 
both within and outside England. 
 
As illustrated in this Chapter, the Prisons Department in Hong Kong had gone through 
tremendous changes since 1945. Progressive English penal practices in the 
management of prisoners were introduced to Hong Kong in the 1950s and 1960s. This 
Chapter also discussed how the Prisons Department had shift from the English 
welfare model to that of a deterrent tool in maintaining law and order in Hong Kong 
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during the 1970s following the rise of crimes in Hong Kong and the 1973 Stanley 
Prison riot.  
 
This shift towards discipline and control in Hong Kong’s penal system received no 
opposition from the community. On the other hand, this highly regimented 
environment had provided a stable platform for the Prisons Department to develop 
rehabilitation programmes for the offenders under custody, leading to the change of 
the name of the Prisons Department to Correctional Services Department on 1 
February 1982.   
 
With the strain on resources in dealing with the Vietnamese refugees, the uncertain 
future of the Department after 1997 and the apparent effective penal programmes that 
were in place in the 1980s, there were no longer any urgent needs to follow changes 
that occurred in the British penal system thereafter. Hong Kong’s penal system 
remained to adopt the Framework Agreement of prison management and 
re-integration by maintaining order and discipline within the penal establishments as 
primary task followed by the rehabilitation of offenders. By 1997, the Correctional 
Services Department had grown into a key government department in Hong Kong 
earning international reputation in the management and rehabilitation of offenders. 
 
The following two Chapters will describe in detail how young offenders and adult 
offenders were being managed in Hong Kong from 1945 to 1997. 
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Chapter Three 
Management of Young Offenders after the War 
 
 
3.1   Introduction 
 
The penal policy and treatment for juvenile and young offenders in Hong Kong is 
distinctively different from that of the adult offenders after the Second World War 
and remained very much so until today.  
 
The bifurcation of penal policy and treatment on adults and juveniles in Hong Kong 
began in the early 1900s with the provision of the Belilios Reformatory at Causeway 
Bay,
1
 the first residential institution for juveniles in the colony of Hong Kong. This 
early arrangement for the juveniles in Hong Kong was indeed following Britain’s 
move of providing a separated punishment regime for the juveniles corresponding 
with the rise of the philanthropic and welfare philosophy in the beginning of the 
twentieth century. Under the Young Persons (Death Sentence) Ordinance in 1909, no 
person under 16 should be sentenced to death in Hong Kong but would be detained 
under His Majesty’s Pleasure. This was a mirrored Ordinance following the 
enactment of the Children Act of 1908 in Britain. 
 
Despite this move of assigning juveniles to the Reformatory, the harsh penal 
philosophy still applied to the youth and juveniles in Hong Kong. It was revealed by 
Legislator Kotewell during a Legislative Council meeting in Hong Kong in 1930 that 
                                                          
1
 See Hong Kong Hansard, 11 March 1900, pp. 74-5. 
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of the 985 boys and 137 girls under the age of 16 brought to court in 1929, 131 boys 
and 5 girls were sentenced to prison terms and 433 boys, including 125 convicted of 
hawking without a licence, were ordered to be whipped. 
 
When the Prison Ordinance was amended in 1885 under Ordinance 18, there were 
already provisions in the Ordinance for the separation of prisoners under the age of 16 
from the adult prisoners in the Gaol.
2
 However in view of the limited penal facilities 
at the time, it was revealed that it was common for juveniles to be mixed with adult 
prisoners in the Gaol.
3
 Kotewell’s proposal of setting up a juvenile court in Hong 
Kong, following the British model, gained the support of not only his English 
colleagues but also the Chinese Legislators quoting the teaching of the Confucius that 
“Chinese are taught to bear kindly with the faults of the young.”4 
 
The Government’s response to this proposal was positive and agreed to set up a 
Committee to plan for its implementation. It was also revealed by the Government 
that the establishment of the Juvenile Court “was one of the subjects of discussion at 
the recent Colonial Office Conference, and it is expected that a model Ordinance 
dealing with this question will shortly be circulated to this and other Colonies for the 
consideration of their legislatures.”5 
 
The 1930s could be regarded as the new era for Hong Kong’s juvenile and youth 
justice system when the colony finally developed a separate penal policy and 
programme for the juvenile delinquents and the young offenders. The first Industrial 
                                                          
2
 S. 6 of Ordinance No. 18 of 1885 stipulates that “In a prison where prisoners under the age of 16 
years are confined, they shall be kept separate from prisoners of or above that age.” 
3
 See Hong Kong Hansard, 2 October 1930, pp. 155-8. 
4
 See statement by the Hon. Mr. S. W. Tso, ibid, p. 157. 
5
 See statement by the Hon. Colonial Secretary Mr. E. R. Halifax, ibid, p. 158. 
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and Reformatory Schools Ordinance was passed in 1932 to empower the court to send 
convicted adolescents under 16 to a reformatory or certified industrial school. On 20 
November the same year, the first Juvenile Court was set up under the Juvenile 
Offenders Ordinance to deal with cases of juvenile and to assess the provision of 
probation services to them.
6
 In 1938, the probation service was put under the 
administration of the Prisons Department. In 1941, the Prisons Department had taken 
over the management of the Juvenile Remand Home in Causeway Bay from the 
Police.
7
 
 
In practice, the separation of juveniles from adult offenders, as stipulated by these 
Ordinances, might only be the physical separation of these two groups in different 
wings under the same roof of the prison in view of the lack of designated institutions 
for juveniles. Special programmes were however designed to allow the juveniles to 
receive educational classes and vocational training sessions during their sentences. 
This had become the blue print for the treatment of young and juvenile offenders in 
Hong Kong. 
 
With the closing in of the Pacific War when resources in the colony of Hong Kong 
were being diverted to defence installation, there were no further injection of capital 
for the improvement of the juvenile justice system in Hong Kong
8
. The situation 
however changed rapidly after the end of the Second World War in 1945.  
 
                                                          
6
 See the Juvenile Offenders Ordinance No. 1 of 1932 and the Reformatory Schools Ordinance No. 6 
of 1932. 
7
 See para. 31 of the Commissioner of Prisons, Annual Departmental Reports 1946-47. The Colonial 
Office had strong views on the Police managing Juvenile Remand Home in Hong Kong. 
8
 See Chan, H. Y. (2003) The Institutional Control and Care of Young People in Colonial Hong Kong 
1932-1997: A Social History. PhD Dissertation, University of Hong Kong, p. 88. 
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The post-War approach towards juvenile delinquency continued to follow the British 
experience as expressed in 1948: 
“Juvenile Remand Homes, antecedent investigators, Probation Officers, 
Approved Schools and Borstals with an after-care system on the lines of 
the Borstal Association of England and Wales provide the only ultimately 
satisfactory solution and there is little doubt that the capital expenditure 
of money on such projects would be justified by the dividends of human 
salvage in the early stages of deterioration.” 9  
 
 
3.2   The Stanley Reformatory 
 
The pre-War Juvenile Remand Home at Causeway Bay, which had the combined 
function of a remand home and an Approved School or Reformatory, was totally 
destroyed after the War. The decision was made not to rebuild the reformatory on the 
site as the location was considered not suitable for this purpose. As a result, all 
reformatory age children sentenced to custody were sent to Stanley Prison after the 
War but were separately located from the adult prisoners.
10
 
 
Despite the shortage of supplies and the tight fiscal condition at the time when Hong 
Kong was still recovering from the carnage of the Japanese occupation, arrangement 
was made by the Hong Kong Government in December 1946 to set aside four former 
food storage huts near the Maryknoll Mission at Stanley (current site of Ma Hang 
Prison) (馬坑監獄) to be used by the Prisons Department as a Reformatory for boys 
under the age of 16. They were required to stay in the Reformatory for a minimum 
period of two years.
11
 
                                                          
9
 Commissioner of Prisons, Annual Departmental Report 1948-49, para.7.  
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 Prisons Department Annual Report for 1946-47. 
11
 Ibid. 
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For delinquent girls of the reformatory age, they were “committed to the care of the 
Salvation Army, which conducts a special institution for their training. Financial 
support is given by Government and the whole is supervised by the Social Welfare 
Officer.”12   
 
Until the end of March 1947, a total of 531 boys aged from 10 to 17 were admitted to 
the Reformatory with a daily average population of 76. The admission slowed down 
to 40 – 50 cases per year from 1948 onwards. From the inception of the Reformatory 
in December 1946 until its closure on 23 February 1953, a total of 915 boys were 
admitted to the Stanley Reformatory with an average daily population of around one 
hundred.
13
 
 
This Reformatory was indeed Hong Kong’s first ‘open’ delinquent institution as 
physical security for the institution was minimal and the buildings were not 
surrounded by walls or fences. The initial staff complement for manning the 
Reformatory included two European Prison Officers, two Chinese Principal 
Discipline Officers, twelve Chinese Discipline Officer, one school master and two 
instructors responsible for the trade of rattan and carpentry. They were under the 
general direction of Superintendent Norman from Stanley Prison who was once a 
Schoolmaster in North Sea Camp for delinquent boys in Britain before joining the 
Hong Kong Prisons Department. Staff working in the Reformatory wore plain clothes 
instead of prison officer uniform to induce a boarding school than a penal 
                                                          
12
 Commissioner of Prisons, Annual Departmental Reports 1949-50. 
13
 Figures compiled from Commissioner of Prisons, Annual Departmental Reports 1946-53. 
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environment atmosphere for the boys.
14
 From 1951 onwards, Stanley Reformatory 
was called Stanley Reformatory School to reflect its reformative and training nature.
15
 
 
Boys in the Reformatory had three hours classroom education daily from Monday to 
Friday. Subjects taught included English, Chinese and Mathematics. With the increase 
of an additional School Master, other subjects like Geography and Hygiene were 
introduced. For vocational training, some boys were engaged in rattan work and 
carpentry trade while the others were engaged in gardening, vegetable growing and 
domestic work. A new trade of motor mechanics was introduced since 1951. For 
hobby classes, the Reformatory had set up a dark room for the boys to learn the skill 
of photography and to develop films. A very successful scout troops, the 8
th
 Hong 
Kong Scout Troop was formed in the Reformatory on 13 September 1951 and the 
Scout Troop took part in all major scouting events and competitions in Hong Kong.
16
 
 
Activities for the boys included football, ping pong and chess in the Reformatory and 
the boys were taken out to Stanley beach for swim during summer and hill walk 
during other times. Owing to the open nature of the Reformatory, it was difficult to 
maintain total security in this institution particularly during its first year of operation. 
There were a total of 24 escapes from the Reformatory in 1947, with 17 boys escaped 
on 8 September 1947 by breaking out of the dormitory. Eleven of them were 
re-captured by the Police the next day.
17
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 Details compiled from Commissioner of Prisons, Annual Departmental Reports 1946-53. 
15
 Commissioner of Prisons, Annual Departmental Report 1950-51. 
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 Commissioner of Prisons, Annual Departmental Report 1951-52. 
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Despite these small set backs, the Reformatory programme was well received by the 
public with well wishers and visitors coming to the School regularly to give support to 
the boys. This included ex-reformatory boys who came back to visit the School during 
the annual sports meets and on other social event occasions.
18
 There was no statutory 
after-care follow-up upon the boys’ release but the after-care officers would ensure 
they would either return to their parents or arrange to stay in orphanages if they have 
no parents or next-of-kin in Hong Kong.  
 
Unfortunately, there are no statistics covering how successful the Reformatory School 
programme was. It was once reported in 1950 that seven of the ex-Reformatory boys 
joined the Chinese section of the British armed force in Hong Kong with one of them 
won the title of the ‘Best Recruit’ in the class.19  
 
Stanley Reformatory was closed on 23 February 1953 when all the boys were 
transferred to the new Boys Home at Castle Peak under the administration and 
management of the Social Welfare Officer. The former reformatory school site was 
converted to become Hong Kong’s first Training Centre for boys.20 The Prisons 
Department and its staff had in these seven years learnt a lot through the Reformatory 
School programme on how to work with young offenders. This allowed the Prisons 
Department to lay a solid foundation for setting up the Training Centre programme in 
Hong Kong. 
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 Commissioner of Prisons, Annual Departmental Report 1950-1. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Commissioner of Prisons, Annual Departmental Report 1952-3. 
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3.3   The Training Centres 
 
The plan to set up a Training Centre for boys of Borstal age of 16 to 21 in Hong Kong 
was conceived as early as in 1948 with the proposed Training Centre Ordinance 
forwarded to the Secretary of State for the Colonies for consideration in 1951.
21
  The 
proposed Training Centre Ordinance contains similar legal provisions as to the 
‘Borstal’ section of the Criminal Justice Act, 1948 in Britain but the target age group 
of detainees in Hong Kong was from 14 to 18 rather than the 16 to 21 years age group 
as in Britain’s Borstals. This age difference as well as the rational of not adopting the 
term ‘Borstal’ in Hong Kong was explained by the Commissioner of Prisons as 
follows: 
 
“The reason for this is that in Hong Kong “young persons” (i.e. 14-16) 
may still be sent to prison if there is no alternative means of dealing with 
them, and there are many boys in this category who are not suitable for 
“approved school” treatment. It is most important that boys of this group 
should not find their way into prison. The upper age limit was dictated 
solely by the limitations of space and the facilities at our disposal.”  
 
“The word Borstal has been avoided throughout, and it is not intended to 
attempt to reproduce the Borstal system, but rather to evolve a method of 
training to which Chinese boys will respond most readily and which will 
have the best results. The experience gained at Stanley Reformatory 
School, and the continuity implied by the transfer of the staff as a whole to 
the new Centre, will stand us in good stead.” 22 
 
Before the Training Centre Ordinance became law in Hong Kong, the Prisons 
Department had already experimenting this programme in 1951 by having young 
male prisoners aged from sixteen to eighteen separately accommodated in the former 
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 Commissioner of Prisons, Annual Departmental Reports 1946-47, 1951-52. 
22
 Commissioner of Prisons, Annual Departmental Report 1952-53. 
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Printing Workshop of Stanley Prison. They were managed by a selected team of 
prison staff and sent out of the prison to two war-time food storage huts outside 
Stanley Prison before the adult prisoners were unlocked from their Halls, and returned 
to Stanley Prison only after the adult prisoners returned to their cells. 
 
The young prisoners had a routine similar to that of the Reformatory boys as they 
would attend education and vocational classes conducted by the school master and the 
instructor as well as having meal and recreation inside the two huts.  Outdoor works 
included reclamation work, minor repair work on the prison buildings and manning 
the vegetable garden.
23
 
 
With the endorsement from London, the Training Centre Ordinance became law on 6 
March 1953 providing character training for male young offenders aged from 14 - 18. 
The period of detention in the Training Centre was from nine months to three years 
with the actual release date to be decided by the Commissioner of Prisons taking into 
consideration the progress of the inmate towards training. The training centre inmates 
were required to undergo statutory after-care supervision upon release from the 
training centre by Prison Department After-care Officers and were subject to recall if 
found in breach of the supervision conditions. Stanley Training Centre (site of the 
former Stanley Reformatory School) commenced operation on 24 February 1953 with 
a total of four admissions sent by the courts by the end of March 1953.
24
 The Centre 
could accommodate up to 148 boys and activities organised at Stanley Training 
Centre were very similar to what Stanley Reformatory School had provided 
previously. 
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In October 1954, the huts outside the Stanley Prison perimeter, formerly known as 
Stanley Prison Extension where the experimental training centre programme was 
conducted, were gazetted as a second Training Centre. This place was renamed as Tung 
Tau Wan Training Centre (東頭灣教導所) and admission commenced on 1 February 
1955. The opening of the second training centre tied in with the lifting of the upper 
age limit of the training centre inmates from 18 to 21. The younger age group training 
centre inmates were accommodated at Stanley Training Centre whereas the older age 
groups were located at Tung Tau Wan. With the provision of two training centres, it 
was the intention of the Prisons Department that: 
“It should now be possible for all young men under 21 who are suitable 
for training to be received into one of the Centres, only the most 
intractable being committed to prison. With the co-operation of the Courts 
it is hoped that most of the under-21's appearing before them will be 
committed on Training Centre remand warrants for a report as to whether 
they are suitable for this type of training.”25 
 
On 8 September 1958, Tung Tau Wan Training Centre was relocated to Cape 
Collinson, a former Royal Artillery gun position in the eastern tip of Hong Kong 
Island. This new site was vacated by the army and Commissioner Norman took the 
initiative to secure this site from the Government as the building in this site were 
more permanent in nature than the go-down buildings at Tung Tau Wan. The Cape 
Collinson Training Centre provided accommodation for 166 boys living in small army 
bunkers and inmates receiving educational and vocational classes in army Nissen huts. 
Both training centres were open institutions with no fences and it was the practice of 
both training centres that boys of the intermediate and leavers grades were not locked 
up in the evening.  
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 Commissioner of Prisons, Annual Departmental Report 1954-55. 
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On the evening of 17 November 1958, four intermediate grade training centre inmates 
broke out from a dormitory at Cape Collinson Training Centre and a prison warder, 
called staff leader in the training centre, was injured by the escaping inmates during 
the course of the break-out. The staff member later died as a result of the injuries 
sustained and became the first prison staff killed on duty after the War.
26
 
 
The four inmates were later arrested and charged with murder, with one convicted at 
the end of the murder trial and executed.
27
 This incident had deep impact on the 
prison staff at Cape Collinson Training Centre with allegations of assault and 
ill-treatment on the training centre inmates reported on the nights of 19 and 20 
November 1958. These allegations together with the murder of the prison staff led to 
a full Commission of Inquiry ordered by the Governor in April 1959. 
 
The Commissioners’ Report was presented at the Legislative Council on 3 February 
1960 with most of the recommendations accepted.
28
 Three prison staff involved in 
the alleged maltreatment of inmates were dismissed from the service and the Chief 
Officer in charge of Cape Collinson Training Centre was allowed to retire from the 
Prisons Department. The Council disagreed with the Commission’s recommendations 
which found Cape Collinson unsuitable for use as the site for the training centre and 
that the leaver grades should be locked up at night. The Council felt that the murder 
incident was an act on the spur of the moment and should be regarded as an isolated 
incident which should not discredit the good performance of the training centre 
programme. As revealed in the Commission Report, it was reported that: 
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“…in the five years of this Training Centre's existence (including the period 
during which it was located at Tung Tau Wan) the percentage of the trainees 
who have not subsequently been reconvicted stands at 72%, a record which 
compares most favourably with the results achieved by comparable 
institutions in the United Kingdom and elsewhere.”29 
 
Commissioner Norman in 1960 proposed to build the third training centre in Hong 
Kong taking note of the impending United Kingdom legislation of not passing prison 
sentences in exceed of two years for offenders under 21 years old except for some 
very serious offences. He supported Hong Kong to have similar amendments which 
meant training centre sentence would replace most of the medium term prison 
sentences for young offenders in Hong Kong. He foresaw the additional demand for 
training centre accommodation and suggested to taking over the site office and 
accommodation buildings left by the construction workers after the completion of the 
Shek Pik reservoir (石壁水塘) project at Lantau Island. He had the support from the 
Colonial Secretary but this proposal was objected by the Financial Secretary on 
grounds that there were already five prison projects in hand and “…these cheap starts 
could easily lead to expensive follow-ups.”30 
 
This did not deter Commissioner Norman from pressing the need for getting this site 
for use as the third training centre as the number of admissions to the training centre 
had exceeded 200 during the financial year 1961-2 and this trend continued in the 
following two years with annual admissions of 191 and 184 respectively. (Appendix 
D refers.) Shek Pik Training Centre (石壁教導所) (the third Training Centre) was 
finally approved by the Government and was gazetted for operation on 15 May 1964. 
The Centre was established on the foreshore below the Shek Pik Reservoir on Lantau 
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 See Hong Kong Hansard, 2 March 1960, pp. 26-8. 
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 See HKRS 41-1-10051. 
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Island. The bungalows, formally occupied by engineers and contractors’ staff, were 
modified to provide dormitories, classrooms, workshops, etc. for 185 boys aged 
16-18.
31
 
 
The new multi-function female institution Tai Lam Centre for Women (大欖女懲教
所), became operational on 1 November 1969, had the provision of a Training Centre 
Section for the accommodation of 30 girls. The female training centre was operated 
under the same Training Centre Ordinance as the boys and by the end of March 1970; 
four girls were sentenced to the training centre.
32
 
 
In April 1971, a Wardress of the Tai Lam Centre for Women was attacked and 
subsequently died from injuries sustained during an escape attempt by five female 
training centre inmates. She was the second staff who was killed in the line of duty 
after the War and both incidents were connected with the escape of training centre 
inmates. Three of the five female training centre inmates were found guilty and 
convicted of Manslaughter. They were sentenced to a period of detention in a 
Training Centre under a new Training Centre Order. On appeal, the Training Centre 
sentence of the three was changed to three years imprisonment.
33
  
 
With all the female offenders transferred to Tai Lam, the Prisons Department made 
use of the vacated Lai Chi Kok Women Prison (茘枝角女子監獄) as the remand and 
recall centre for the training centre boys and named the place as Lai Chi Kok Training 
Centre (茘枝角教導所).34  However owing to the dilapidated condition of the 
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 Commissioner of Prisons, Annual Departmental Report 1969-70. 
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 Commissioner of Prisons, Annual Departmental Report 1971-72. 
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 Lai Chi Kok Training Centre had never been a training centre for girls as suggested by Chan, H. Y. 
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buildings and the lack of officially approved staff establishment for its operation, the 
Centre was closed on 29 July 1972. The site was returned to the Government for 
building a new Reception Centre. Inmates of Lai Chi Kok Training Centre were 
moved to the new Tai Tam Gap Training Centre (大潭峽教導所) which began 
operation on 1 May 1972 with facilities for 170 inmates. To focus on the delivery of 
the training centre programme, the training centre remand section was relocated to 
Victoria Reception Centre. Parts of the Victoria Reception Centre were gazetted as a 
Training Centre on 22 July 1972 and training centre remands began to be admitted 
from 1 November 1972.
35
 
 
The Training Centre Ordinance and Regulations were amended on 29 March 1974. 
The new minimum period of detention was reduced from nine months to six months 
but the maximum period of stay at the Centre remained at three years. The statutory 
supervision period was changed to three years counting from date of release 
(previously up to four years from date of admission). This amendment had literally 
extended the maximum period of custodial training plus after-care supervision of an 
inmate from four to six years, not counting a possible period of recall on top of the 
maximum period.
36
  
 
It is of interest to note that the highest number of training centre boys admitted in a 
year was 598 which was recorded in the financial year of 1972-1973. The number of 
training centre admissions was on the decrease after the 1974 amendment with the 
annual admission dropped to less than 400 until 1987. The number of girls sentenced 
to the training centre was low in number, with the highest of 53 recorded in 1976. In 
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pp. 372-3. 
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1997, there were a total of 209 boys and 33 girls sentenced to the training centre. 
(Appendix D refers.)  
 
One possible suggestion for this decrease in the training centre admission was owing 
to the introduction of the Detention Centre programme to Hong Kong in 1972. In 
addition, the new detention period of the training centre programme under which it 
was possible to keep a young person in custody and after-supervision for six years 
was regarded by some magistrates or judges as too lengthy for a young person and 
should only be used for those who had committed very serious offences. 
 
In the same 1974 amendment to the training centre programme, the award of caning 
(12 strokes maximum) was added to the list of punishments the Superintendent could 
award to the male training centre inmates found in breach of the centre discipline. 
37
 
When the training centre amendments were tabled at the Legislative Council, the 
legislators made no comments despite the fact that the training centre programme had 
been in existence since 1956 without the need for physical punishment to uphold 
discipline in the centres. Very little information was available to the public on the 
extent of training centre inmates being punished with caning as statistics were only 
reported in the 1974 and 1975 Prisons Department Annual Departmental Reports 
where 28 and 89 inmates were caned respectively. The award of caning as a 
disciplinary award was only repealed in 1990.
38
  
 
Other available punishments that the Officer-in-charge of the training centre could 
award included caution, deprivation of privileges, delaying promotion, stopping visits 
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and letters, deduction of earnings for the lost or damaged government property and 
the dietary punishment for a period of not more than seven days. The dietary 
punishment was repealed in 1983, which was years ahead before the repeal of caning 
in Hong Kong.
39
 
 
The open and relaxed borstal type of training centre programme shifted towards a 
more deterrent regime from 1972. Prior to 1973, training centre leaver grade inmates 
were given regular leave passes of 48 to 72 hours for them to return home to prepare 
for jobs or re-establishing relationship with their families before their release. The 
number of leave passes granted was drastically reduced from 2,105, 1581, 1396 to 
417 in 1970, 1971, 1972 and 1973 respectively.
40
 Training Centres were no longer 
open institutions from the 1970s with chain-link fences topped with barb-wire erected 
around the centres. 
 
On the other hand, the rehabilitative programmes offered to the training centre 
inmates were enhanced considerably in the areas of education, vocational as well as 
character training. Formal education classes were arranged mainly in arts, language 
and IT technologies and inmates were encouraged to take part in public examinations. 
The same applied to the vocational training programmes where training centre 
inmates were arranged to take part in internationally accredited qualifications such as 
Pitman Examination and London Chamber of Commerce and Industries Examinations. 
Training facilities at Pik Uk Correctional Institution as well as the other training 
centres were greatly enhance through internal funding as well as outside donations. 
For character trainings, training centre inmates, apart from joining the scouting 
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activities, also took part in the ‘Duke of Edinburgh’s Award Scheme’41 as well as 
attending ‘Outward Bound’ courses. 
 
There were no major changes on the training centre programme since the 1980s. In 
1997, there were a total of 209 young males (21 under 16 years and 188 from 16 to 20 
years) and 33 girls below the age of 21 admitted to the training centres. 68% of those 
new inmates had no previous institutional experience and for those with previous 
institutional experience, most were having no more than two previous institutional 
sentences.
42
 The daily average training centre population in 1997 was of 427 males 
and 61 females. Male training centre boys were located mainly at Cape Collinson 
Correctional Institution and Lai King Training Centre (勵敬教導所). Training centre 
remands as well as special management cases were located at Pik Uk Correctional 
Institution (壁屋懲教所 ); a maximum security multi-purpose young offender 
institution. Young females were all accommodated at the multi-purpose Tai Tam Gap 
Correctional Institution (大潭峽懲教所).43 
 
There have been a number of academic studies carried out on the effectiveness of the 
training centre programme which suggested the training centre programme effective.
44
 
Success rates for the training centre from 1982 to 1997 indicate a range of 59% to 
71% for males and from 86% to 94% for females.
45
 ‘Success Rate’ is defined by the 
Correctional Services Department that the supervisees did not commit any criminal 
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offences during the three years after-care supervision period and had compiled with 
the supervision requirements. Appendix D also contains success rates for the Training 
Centre programme from 1988 to 1999 which indicates a positive response from young 
offenders that had gone through this long term character training programme. 
 
 
3.4   The Detention Centres 
 
The beginning of 1970 noted the public’s growing concern on the rising of youth 
crime in Hong Kong. In one way it was the direct result of the post War baby boom 
when half of Hong Kong’s population in 1972 was under 25 years old. (Appendix F 
refers) The memories of the 1967 riot, with most of the rioters being young people, 
was also very much in the minds of the locals. The Legislators had on more than one 
occasion called for tougher sentences in dealing with the young offenders, especially 
those who were involved in violent crimes.
46
 
 
The crime rate for 1970 had gone up significantly with robbery cases increased from 
220 cases per year in 1961-66 to 3,000 cases in 1970. Young persons prosecuted in 
1970 for robbery was a 12 fold increase compared to early 1960 figures. The reduced 
use of corporal punishment by the courts and the restriction of sentencing young 
offenders to imprisonment in the 1967 legislation were also blamed for this increase.
47
 
 
Apart from bringing back corporal punishment for the young offenders (See later 
Chapter on the subject of Corporal Punishment), the Government was also at this time 
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considering the Chief Justice’s proposal to introduce the detention centre programme, 
similar to that in practice in United Kingdom after the 1948 Act, to Hong Kong to 
deal with the young offenders. 
48
 
 
Apparently the Hong Kong Government had written to London regarding the proposal 
for setting up the detention centre programme in Hong Kong. The Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department) wrote on 21 July 
1972 to the Acting Deputy Colonial Secretary informing Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office’s ‘non-disallowance’ for the Detention Centres Ordinance but reminded Hong 
Kong to comply with Article 1 of the International Labour Organisation’s Forced 
Labour Convention No. 105 of which labour performed by young offender should be 
subject to the requirement of the Factories Ordinance, etc.
49
 
 
The memo further mentioned that Mr. Prosser, the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office Advisor on Social Development, would visit Hong Kong in August of the same 
year. He would discuss the operation of the detention centre programme with the 
Commissioner of Prisons during his visit. 
 
During the subsequent meeting on 8 August 1972, Mr. Prosser did not comment on 
Hong Kong Government’s intention of setting up the detention centre programme. He 
agreed that International Labour Organisation’s Convention did not apply to Hong 
Kong’s case after noting the Commissioner of Labour’s comments that: 
“the labour performed by these young detainees is of a physical nature 
and involves sometimes the use of simple tools. All work is done outdoors 
and there is no employment as such, nor do the hours of work exceed eight 
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in any one day. In all these circumstances, the Factories and Industrial 
Understandings Ordinances and its subsidiary legislation do not apply to 
these centres.”50 
 
The Attorney General introduced the Detention Centres Bill to the Legislative 
Council in 1972. He stated that “I can assure honourable Members that it is the 
intention of the Commissioner of Prisons to submit to the Governor in Council 
recommendations for a Spartan regime, under which the detainee will be subjected to 
rigorous discipline and required to perform hard physical work, consistent with his 
age and state of health, and will be sharply dealt with for any breaches of 
discipline.”51 
 
The Bill was in general well supported by the legislators who were in favour of 
providing a short period of deterrent sentence for young offenders and felt that the 
maximum detention period of six months was appropriate. Legislator Wang 
commented that: 
“The limitation of the maximum detention periods to six months will have 
two advantages. First, it will make it unsuitable for the more hardened 
criminals whose proper places should still be the prison and, secondly, 
none of the detainees will have a chance to establish themselves as the 
"big brothers" of the centre.”52 
 
The Detention Centres Bill was passed on 15 March 1972 and the first Detention 
Centre, the Sha Tsui Detention Centre (沙咀勞役中心) was set up on 16 June 1972 at 
the former site of the Shek Pik Training Centre on Lantau Island providing a ‘Short, 
Sharp, Shock’ programme for 80 detainees aged from 14 to 18. The Chinese 
translation of the ‘Detention Centre’ means ‘Centre for Hard Labour’. 
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Only young male offenders without previous penal institution experience, certified fit 
for the rigorous detention centre programme by the prison Medical Officer and 
considered suitable for admission by the Commissioner of Prisons could be sent by 
the court to this programme. This is the only correctional programme that the 
sentencing judge needed the consent of the Commissioner of Prisons before they 
could commit a young person to the detention centre under the respective Detention 
Centre Ordinance.
53
 The period of detention was between one and six months and 
detainees were required to undergo six month statutory after-care supervision by 
Prisons Department After-care Officers on release and were subject to be recall if 
found in breach of the supervision requirements.  
 
The detention centre programme in Hong Kong adopted the same ‘short, sharp, shock’ 
spirit of the British detention centres with an aim to “deter them, during the earliest 
stage of their deviation from law and order, from future criminal activity. Emphasis is 
placed on the strictest discipline and hard work with little or no privileges. Whatever is 
done must be done well and no excuses from detainees are accepted for failure to 
maintain a high standard.”54 
 
The second detention centre, the Tong Fuk Detention Centre (塘福勞役中心), was 
opened on 1 June, 1973. The additional centre provided capacity for the Prisons 
Department to extend the admission of young people up to the age of 21. The courts 
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responded well to this new programme and by the end of March 1974, both centres 
were holding a total of 224 detainees with the younger boys located at Tong Fuk.
55
 
 
Strict discipline was maintained in the detention centres and caning was the main 
form of punishment for detainees found in breach of Detention Centre discipline in 
the 1970s. The average award passed down by the Superintendent was two strokes of 
the cane.
56
 
 
Detention Centres Regulations 9 (1), Cap. 239, Laws of Hong Kong specifies that:  
 
Every detainee, unless excused by a medical officer on medical grounds, shall 
undertake such work or instruction, for not more than 10 hours a day, as may 
be required by the Officer-in-charge, and 
 
9 (2) Such work shall, as far as possible, involve physical effort. 
 
One of the tasks performed by the detainees was the one hour rock and aggregate 
breaking session when detainees had to hammer big piece of rocks to aggregates. This 
non productive manual task was only ceased after an internal review conducted by the 
Correctional Services Department in 1992. Grass cutting and gardening work were 
introduced as replacement.
57
 
   
From the inception of the detention centre programme in 1972 till the end of 1977, 
2,621 young males had been released from the detention centres with 2,336 or 89% 
successfully completed the six months after-care supervision without reconviction. 
The period of after-care supervision was extended to twelve months from August 
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1977 as the Prisons Department’s findings indicated that the most vulnerable period 
for reconviction was between seven to eleven months after discharge. 
58
 
 
With such a high success rate recorded, the detention centre programme was further 
extended to young adults aged from 21 to below 25 years of age from September 
1977. They were separately located from the younger boys and the new Ordinance 
provided for a longer custodial period than the younger age group with a minimum 
training period of three months to a maximum of one year. This was followed by one 
year after-care supervision including nightly curfew requirements. The average period 
of detention at detention centres, as reported in the Commissioner’s Annual Report of 
1979, was 4.8 months for young offenders and 8.6 months for young adults. 
 
Similar to what had happened to the training centres, a number of correctional 
institutions had been used as detention centres from 1970s to 1990s to cater for the 
demand of accommodation for different groups of persons under custody, in particular 
the Vietnamese detainees.  
 
The detention centres’ admission numbers had exceeded those of the training centres 
from 1974 until 1993 when the training centre admission caught up again. The highest 
annual admission for the detention centre was 758 in 1974. The admission of young 
adults to the detention centre was on the contrary not many in numbers when 
compared with those under the age of 21. The highest admission for young adults was 
78 in 1980 and the lowest was 38 in 1981. The detention centre admission trend had 
started to drop from 1989 and there was a 60% decrease in admission by 1997 when 
there were only 249 admissions to the detention centre, of which 202 were young 
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offenders under 21 and 47 young adults aged from 21 to 25.
59
 The author in 1997 
explained to the media on the decline of the detention centre admission despite of its 
very high success rate. It was suggested that the decline was due to the courts’ 
preference in passing non-custodial sentences to young offenders as well as the 
increasing number of young offenders found medically unfit for the strenuous 
detention centre programme.
60
 
 
Population chart showing the admission of detention centre detainees from 1992 to 
1997 is attached at Appendix G as reference. Success rates for the Detention Centre 
from 1988 to 1999 remained to be very high as illustrated in Appendix E. 
 
 
3.5   The Young Prisoners 
 
As suggested in the earlier sections of this Chapter, the Prisons Department had in the 
years immediately after the Second World War, despite the shortage of resources, put 
in extra measures to separate the young offenders from the adults inside Stanley 
Prison. With the establishment of the Reformatory School programme in late 1946, 
young prisoners aged 16 to 18, who had exceeded the age limit of the reformatory 
school, were located in the old Printing Workshop inside Stanley Prison from 1 
October 1947. Two food storage huts outside Stanley Prison were converted for these 
boys who were sent out from Stanley Prison after unlock to work in the areas 
immediately outside the prison and only returned to the prison after the adult 
prisoners were locked up. The Prisons Department was using this as an experimental 
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‘Borstal’ type of open institution for the young offenders and named the two huts 
‘Young Prisoners Training Centre’ well before the Training Centre Ordinance was 
enacted in Hong Kong.
61
 
 
The establishment of the training centres in Hong Kong in 1953 and 1954 allowed the 
Prisons Department to advocate in 1954 the use of the training centre programme as 
the preferred method for dealing with young delinquents. It was thought prison 
sentences should only be left to the worst cases or the incorrigibles or those serving a 
very short sentence. In April 1955, there were only 17 young prisoners under 21 being 
kept inside Stanley Prison and they were separated from the adult prisoners. In view of the 
small numbers, very little could be done to assist this group of young prisoners apart from 
segregating them in cells and working parties.62 
 
The situation with male young offenders remained very much the same during the next 
decade with majority of the young offenders being sentenced to the training centres. Young 
prisoners, as remarked by the Commissioner of Prisons in 1958, had become “increasing 
rare species”63 as the courts appeared to have accepted the training centre sentence more 
suited for the young offenders. From 1960 onwards, male young prisoners were transferred 
away from Stanley Prison to Chi Ma Wan Prison, an open prison for adults situated in 
Lantau Island. They were located in a separate dormitory and worked in a separate working 
party from the adult prisoners. By the end of 1966, there were 93 young prisoners serving 
sentence in the open prisons at Chi Ma Wan and Tong Fuk in Lantau Island whereas there 
were 569 young offenders under training in the training centres.64 
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In 1965, Commissioner Norman was appointed member of a Working Party appointed 
by Government to investigate the adequacy of the law in respect of crimes of violence 
committed by young people. The Working Party recommended that all young men 
under 21 should, on conviction, be remanded for a background report on their 
suitability for treatment other than imprisonment. In view of the proven success of the 
Training Centre programme, the expected effect would be a further reduction on the 
number of young prisoners. 
65
 The Working Party’s recommendation was finally put 
into practice starting from April 1967, a time between the two riots in Hong Kong. 
 
In April 1966, riot broke out in Kowloon which was sparked by a rise in the Star Ferry 
fare. At least 332 rioters were convicted for offences such as riotous assembly and 
curfew breaking and sentenced to imprisonment up to six months. Most of them were 
sent to Chi Ma Wan Prison. Amongst this group of 332 prisoners, 43 (12.95%) were 
aged from 14 to16, 77 (23.19%) were from 17 to18 and 68 (20.48%) were from 19 to 
21.
66
 
 
Just a year later, Hong Kong was facing another major social, political and public order 
crisis with the outbreak of the Communist inspired riot which broke out in May 1967. 
This riot was much more serious in nature when compared to the previous disturbances. 
Improvised explosive devices were planted in Hong Kong on a grand scale causing 
havoc to the community. The riot was eventually put down in November of the same 
year with more than 1,700 rioters given custodial sentences by the courts. The young 
offender population at year end of 1967 was 456 young prisoners and 547 training 
centre inmates. The young prisoner population had a five-fold increase when compared 
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with 93 in year end 1966 whereas the training centre inmate number remained rather 
stable.
67
 
 
During an Establishment Sub-committee meeting in 1968, it was remarked that: 
 
“The disturbances and unrest in the Colony, particularly among young 
people, have produced a new type of young prisoners and consequently new 
problems for the Prisons Department which must be resolved promptly if 
young persons with long prison sentences to serve are not to become more 
embittered and eventually return to the community with their prejudices 
more deeply rooted than ever. 
 
The ideal solution to this problem would be a maximum security Training 
Centre, but no such institution exists nor can one be improvised.”68 
 
The trend towards a younger penal population continued. The number of young 
offenders under 21 years of age sentenced to prisons, training or treatment centres had 
gone up from 1,015 (1970-71) to 1,340 (1971-72), 1,740 (1972-73) and 1,830 
(1973-74), more than 80% increase in three years. The increase was due to the rise of 
crime in these years especially on violent crimes committed by young offenders. With 
such a large admission of young offenders, young prisoners were no longer kept at Chi 
Ma Wan Prison alone but scattered in several prisons including the Stanley Prison.
69
 
 
Following the 1973 disturbance at Stanley Prison, the Departmental Board of Enquiry 
had identified the rise of a new group of violent offender in Hong Kong, particularly in 
the younger age group, as one of the causes of the disturbance that took place in Stanley 
Prison.
70
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To relieve the overcrowding situation at Stanley Prison, young prisoners therein were 
transferred out to the Chatham Road Centre starting from 20 March 1973. Other young 
prisoners were located at Chi Man Wan Prison where full time education classes were 
provided. As resources was limited, young prisoners were divided into two groups 
during educational classes; those above Primary 6 standard (equivalent to Year 7 and 
above in England) in the Senior Class and the Junior Class for those with qualification 
below Primary 6.
71
  
 
The accommodation of young prisoners had greatly improved with the completion of 
the first maximum security young offender institution in Hong Kong, the Pik Uk 
Correctional Institutions (壁屋懲教所) located in the country side of Sai Kung (西貢) 
on 20 January 1976. This was a purpose built multi-function institution with a certified 
accommodation for 398 young offenders, with majority of the accommodations in 
single cells. The institution serves as the remand centre for all male young offenders 
under 21 with separate sections for Training / Detention / Drug Addiction Treatment 
Centre remands as well as holding young prisoners of high security category. All 
sentenced young prisoners at Pik Uk Correctional Institution are receiving half-day 
education and half-day vocation training.
72
 
 
In Hong Kong, the number of young offenders being sentenced by the courts to 
receive custodial sentences was much fewer than those being placed on remand. For 
example, of the 1,097 young persons remanded for Training / Detention Centre 
suitability reports during the year 1977-78, 330 or 30% were sentenced to the 
detention centre, 242 or 22% were sentenced to the training centre and 105 or 10% for 
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imprisonment. 420 or 38% were given non-custodial sentences.
73
 Apparently some of 
the sentencing judges preferred to use a short period of remand by detention to a 
correctional institution to shake up the young offender. A District Court Judge at the 
time, wrote in his findings that: 
“He has lost about 25 days of liberty already. It may not have the same 
short sharp shock effect of a detention centre order, he has a sufficient 
taste of the clang of the prison gate. I order the defendant to perform 180 
hours of unpaid work under a Community Service Order.”74 
 
At Pik Uk, the education programme covers academic subjects comprising English, 
Chinese, Mathematics and Social Studies were taught from Primary 3 to Form 2 levels 
(equivalent to Year 3 to Year 8 in England). Creative subjects such as Art and Music 
were introduced during the evenings in form of hobby classes. Young prisoners are 
required to take the Attainment Test on admission and are allocated to classes 
appropriate to their standard. Monthly tests are held to decide on their progression to a 
higher class. Young prisoners in the illiterate, semi-illiterate or over-qualified groups 
are to receive separate tuition. Moral training of traditional Chinese family values, etc. 
are provided during educational classes.
75
 
 
Starting from 1986, the Hong Kong Examination Authority recognized inmates from 
Pik Uk Correctional Institution as ‘School Candidates’ to participate in the ‘Hong Kong 
Certificate of Education Examination’76 inside the prison. This arrangement allowed 
the young prisoners to be treated on equal terms as students of the other schools with a 
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much expanded range of courses that could be examined rather than the limited courses 
they could take as private candidates.
77
  
 
After-care was not provided for young prisoners upon release before 1980 but they 
could obtain help from voluntary agencies including the Discharged Prisoners’ Aid 
Society whose workers visited the institutions on a regular basis. This situation was 
rectified with the enactment of the Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Ordinance in 
May 1980 providing statutory after-care supervision for young prisoners sentenced to 
three months or more who were under 21 on admission and under 25 on discharge. 
After-care supervision, same as other correctional programmes, was provided by the 
Prisons Department. The success rate for the young prisoners as illustrated in 
Appendix E is considered satisfactory as the young prisoners were only given prison 
sentences as the last resort when no other correctional programmes were deemed 
suitable.   
 
 
3.6   Half-way Houses for Young Offenders 
 
The concept of providing half-way house programme for discharged offenders was 
not new for the Prisons Department. The programme began not with the young 
offenders but the addicted offenders, who had completed their drug treatment centre 
programme. (Programmes for the addicted prisoners will be discussed in more detail 
in the next Chapter.) 
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The first half-way house for young offenders in Hong Kong operated by the 
Correctional Services Department; ‘Phoenix House’ (豐力樓) was opened on 5 July 
1983. It provided accommodation for up to 120 young male and female offenders who 
had completed their period of custodial training and were in need a period of 
adjustment before returning home, or provided temporary accommodation for those 
who had difficulties in finding lodging after release from the institutions. It was 
reported that: 
“The half-way house programme is a continuation of the work carried out 
within the community aiming at reinforcing the sense of responsibility and 
the cultivation of good working habit for this group of young supervisees. 
Period of residence would not exceed their statutory supervision period 
and would normally in excess of one month.”78 
 
Prior to the setting up of the Phoenix House, young offenders in need of such 
residential services were normally referred to the non-government voluntary agencies 
by the after-care officers. 
 
Majority of the residents of Phoenix House are from the detention centres and are 
directed by the Board of Review to take accommodation as part of their supervision 
conditions.
79
 The main reason for such an arrangement was because of the need for 
the detention centre discharges to ‘de-regiment’ from the ‘Short, sharp, shock’ 
experience. It also allowed the residents to be placed under a period of close 
supervision when the after-care officers could monitor their adaptation to work or 
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studies. Their average period of stay at Phoenix House was short and normally not 
more than two months. 
 
The experiment on placing female young offenders in Phoenix House ended when a 
designated half-way house, the ‘Bauhinia House’ (紫荊樓) was made available to the 
female supervisees in August 1984. 
 
 
3.7   Young Offender Assessment Panel 
 
In August 1984, a ‘Working Group on Youth’ under the Fight Crime Committee was 
established to study ways of improving the work with young offenders in Hong Kong. 
The Working Group was chaired by the Secretary for Security with the Secretary for 
Health and Welfare and representatives from the Education and Manpower Branch of 
the Government Secretariat, Social Welfare, Correctional Services, Legal and the 
Police as members.
80
 
 
It was reported in the media that the Working Group had met members of the 
Californian Youth Authority when they visited Hong Kong in 1984. The Group was 
interested in the Authority’s approach in dealing with young offenders in California 
and was considering whether some of the American approach could be adopted in 
Hong Kong.
81
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The Working Group did not put forth the recommendation on adopting the American 
model at the end, and instead “…recommended that an inter-departmental Panel 
comprising professionals directly involved in the treatment of young offenders should 
be set up. The panel would provide magistrates with a co-ordinated view on the most 
appropriate rehabilitation programme for a particular young offender.” 82  The 
Working Group’s proposal of setting up the ‘Young Offender Assessment Panel’ or 
YOAP in short, was endorsed by the Fight Crime Committee on 5 July 1986. 
 
The Californian Youth Authority was set up as an independent department which 
decided the most appropriate treatment programme for the young offenders, to 
follow-up on their progress and to make changes on their treatment programmes as 
deemed appropriate. The subsequent Hong Kong model emphasised that “the Panel 
serves solely as a source of additional assistance to the courts and it is not intended in 
anyway to interfere with the ultimate discretion of the magistrates”.83 The Terms of 
Reference for the YOAP were: 
 
“(a) to assist the courts in the sentencing of convicted young offenders 
through the provision of a co-ordinated view on the most appropriate 
programme of rehabilitation; and 
 
 (b) to provide a forum for detailed examination of a young offender under 
treatment when the supervising authorities consider a change in treatment 
programme is desirable, and to make recommendations for further action 
to be taken.”84 
 
                                                          
82
 Social Welfare Department & Correctional Services Department, (1988) Review of the Young 
Offender Assessment Panel Pilot Scheme, Hong Kong, p. 1. 
83
 Ibid, p.2. 
84
 Ibid. 
 122 
The Panel consisted of professional members including clinical psychologists, 
education officer / senior school master, probation or after-care officers from the 
Social Welfare Department and the Correctional Services Department. YOAP 
meetings were chaired by the Deputy/Assistant Director of Social Welfare and the 
Deputy/Assistant Commissioner of Correctional Services alternatively once every six 
months.  
 
The Panel commenced operations on 1 April 1987. As a pilot scheme, the Panel had 
only taken up referrals from two magistracies as well as cases from all juvenile courts. 
After assessing the case through joint interview whilst the offender was remanded in 
custody of the Correctional Services Department, the Chairman submitted a report to 
the magistrate with a co-ordinated view on the most appropriate programme for the 
young offender. 
 
An evaluation was conducted in 1988 after the YOAP was in operation for fifteen 
months. The review found the services of the Panel regularly used by the magistrates 
and meeting had to be conducted on a weekly basis to meet the courts’ needs. A total 
of 278 referrals were received with 87.6% of the recommendation made by the Panel 
accepted by the courts.
85
 Some of the decisions made by the courts basing on the 
YOAP’s recommendations were challenged by the defendants through appeal but in 
general the High Court was in support of the professional views made by the Panel.
86
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3.8   Conclusion 
 
Reformatory mirrored after the British system was established in Hong Kong in the 
early twentieth century as alternatives to imprisonment for young offenders. In 1932, 
the Industrial and Reformatory Schools Ordinance was enacted to further regulate the 
disposal of young offenders. In the same year, the juvenile court was formed to deal 
with young offenders as well as to consider the needs for the provision of probation 
services to the young offenders.  
 
On the other hand, Hong Kong in the 1930s to 1940s had adopted a harsh stance on 
young offenders as evident by the frequent use of imprisonment and whipping as 
sentence by the courts. This was mainly due to the influx of refugees from Mainland 
China both before and after the War who came to Hong Kong to escape war and look 
for better living.  
 
The Prisons Department in Hong Kong had a long history in the management of 
young offenders. Apart from keeping juveniles sentenced by court to serve terms of 
imprisonment, young boys of reformatory age were under the management of the 
Prisons Department as the probation service was placed under the administration of 
the Prisons Department as early as 1938. Before the Second World War, the Prisons 
Department was also responsible for the operation of the Juvenile Remand Home.  
 
Immediately after the War, the Prisons Department had taken up the duties of 
managing the Reformatory School and succeeded in diverting young offenders from 
imprisonment to this welfare based treatment programme. The programme was 
successfully operated by the Prisons Department until 1953 when the Reformatory 
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School programme was transferred to be under the care of the newly set up Social 
Welfare Officer in line with the British practice.  
 
Penal elites in Hong Kong, especially the senior prison officers with experience with 
the English Borstal system, had monitored the development at home closely. With 
experience gained from running the Reformatory, the British Borstal system under 
Criminal Justice Act 1948 was modified to fit into the local situation and became 
Hong Kong’s training centre programme. Since its inception in 1953 until early 1970s, 
the training centres in Hong Kong were operated on welfare model with minimal 
restrictions. The programme was being used as the preferred sentencing option for the 
courts in dealing with young offenders. 
 
The post War baby boom had altered the population composition of Hong Kong. 
Young people formed the bulk of the population in Hong Kong in the early 1970s and 
with this came the rise in youth crime. The public outcry on the rise of crimes, 
especially violent crimes committed by young offender, turned into moral panic and 
demanded response from the Government and the Judiciary. Penal elite scavenged the 
out-dated detention centre programme from England and launched it in Hong Kong in 
1972. The programme was modified on lessons learnt from the English experience by 
giving the Commissioner of Prison the power to select who to be admitted. This 
proved to be a successful move. The ‘short, sharp, shock’ programme, cope with one 
year compulsory after-care supervision with recall sanctions executed by officers of 
the Prisons Department turned this programme into the most successful young 
offender programme in Hong Kong with success rates exceeding 90%.   
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Corporal punishment formed part of the disciplinary awards the Superintendent could 
order onto the detention and training centre boys in 1970s in response to the hard-line 
penal policy on crime. This was however quietly removed from the Detention and 
Training Centre Regulations in 1981 to conform with the international standards when 
the Prisons Department was aspired to become an internationally recognized 
correctional service. This move was taken by the Prisons Department well before 
judicial corporal sentence was abolished in Hong Kong in 1990. 
 
There were no major changes in the way young offenders were managed under the 
Correctional Services Department from 1980s to 1997 despite the introduction of the 
youth custody system in England. Only minor enhancement of the programmes were 
made which included the provision of half-way houses and the establishment of the 
Young Offender Assessment Panel in providing expert opinions for the courts in 
sentencing young offenders. The public seemed to have accepted the disciplinary 
welfare model for young offenders in Hong Kong effective. The management of adult 
offenders, as seen in the next Chapter, is rather different.  
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Chapter Four 
Management of Adult Offenders after the War 
 
 
4.1   Introduction 
 
Compared with the young offenders under the custody of the Prisons and later 
Correctional Services Department, the treatment of adult offenders in Hong Kong was 
more focused in the maintenance of custodial discipline and the positive engagement 
of prisoners through work. There were initiatives taken by the Prisons Department in 
providing separate treatment programmes for addict prisoners and prisoners with 
mental problems starting from the 1950s and the 1960s respectively. It was in the 
1980s that the Correctional Services Department had really adopted a more 
rehabilitative approach in dealing with the adult offenders in Hong Kong.  
 
This Chapter will examine the changes occurred from 1945 until 1997 when the role 
of the Hong Kong prisons were changed from the warehousing of prisoners to 
correctional facilities with structured  programmes providing full rehabilitative 
services for the offenders. Possible explanations will be suggested to account for such 
changes in penal policies and practices.  
 
A section in this Chapter is used to describe the conditions of the Japanese war 
criminals incarcerated in Hong Kong after the Second World War. They were treated 
not as prisoners of wars but as ordinary prisoners and were a very unique group of 
prisoners in Hong Kong’s penal history. 
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4.2   The Japanese War Criminals  
 
Stanley Prison, apart from holding local criminals sentenced by the courts, was also 
keeping a small group of Japanese prisoners admitted under war crime charges when 
the War ended in 1945. They were located in F Hall of Stanley Prison under the direct 
control of the British military personnel and their custody and management were 
outside the jurisdiction of the Prisons Department. The British military personal 
responsible for the management and supervision of the Japanese War criminals were 
provided with accommodation at the European Prison Officers quarters located just 
outside Stanley Prison. Meals for this group of prisoners were different from the 
prison diets provided to other prisoners in Stanley Prison. They were the 
responsibilities of the British military and at one time they were provided with army 
rations as prison diet. On 17 July 1947, all the remaining Japanese War criminals, 87 
in total, were handed over by the British military authority to the Prisons Department 
for management.
1
 
 
This group of prisoners were visited by the Red Cross on a number of occasions. 
During the Red Cross’ visit to Stanley Prison on 6 September 1949, it was recorded 
that 85 Japanese prisoners were still being detained. Amongst this group of prisoners, 
60% were officers; four serving life sentences with the remaining serving sentences of 
two years and more. They were treated as ordinary prisoners and not prisoners-of-war 
and were subject to the same restrictions and regulations as other prisoners at Stanley 
Prison. They were all located in a separate block and most of them were employed in 
running a large vegetable, fruit and flower garden. They also run a piggery, keep hens 
and attending the lawns, gardens of government buildings outside the prison 
                                                          
1
 See HKRS 125-3-406. 
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compound. They ran their own kitchen but had the same prison diet as the other 
prisoners in the prison. According to record, they had applied to be transferred back to 
Japan to serve their remaining sentences and were waiting for decision from the Hong 
Kong Government.
2
 
 
A follow-up visit by the Red Cross to Stanley Prison was made on 25 January 1951. 
61 Japanese prisoners were noted to be still serving their sentences in Hong Kong. 
The Red Cross report noted that conditions for this group of Japanese prisoners were 
very similar to that of the last visit.
3
  
 
Arrangement was finally made for this group of Japanese prisoners to be repatriated 
back to Japan. They were sent off by sea on board S.S. Hai Lee in the latter part of 
1951 under the escort of Principal Officer Blumenthal and three other Prison 
Officers.
4
 
 
 
4.3   Adult Prisoners after the War 
 
Stanley Prison was the only functional prison in Hong Kong immediately after the 
War, accommodating not only male adult offenders, but also children of Approved 
School age and women prisoners. War time damages and neglect had made both 
Victoria Prison and Lai Chi Kok Female Prison not suitable for occupation. Urgent 
repair and renovation work was made to parts of Victoria Prison with a purpose to 
house the remand prisoners therein as it was becoming a heavy burden for the 
                                                          
2
 See HKRS 41-1-5179. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 See file HKRS 125-3-408. 
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department to transport remand prisoners between the courts in town and Stanley 
Prison daily.
5
 
 
Victoria Prison was repaired and re-opened in July 1946. The prison was used mainly 
to house remand prisoners in view of its location to the courts. A small number of 
short-term prisoners were also located in this prison to provide domestic services as 
remands were normally not required to work.
6
  
 
During these immediate years after the War, penal policies and practices in Hong 
Kong were gradually brought back to align with the British system. One of the 
examples was the interpretation of the court sentences. Starting from 1935, some 
Magistrates in Hong Kong had been sentencing prisoners to ‘Simple imprisonment’ 
instead of ‘Hard Labour’. As a result, these prisoners were only employed in light 
labour as opposed to hard labour whilst imprisoned.
7
 On 14 November 1946, the 
Chief Justice informed the Governor that he had given instructions to the magistrates 
that the use of the expression “Simple imprisonment” was incorrect and should 
cease.
8
  
 
Hong Kong did not follow the Prison Visitor system in England but having a system 
of prison visits by the appointed Justice of Peace (JP) who were required to pay 
regular visits to the prison and reported their findings to the Governor. This system of 
visits by the Justice of Peace resumed after the War and the first JP visit to Stanley 
Prison was conducted on 12 August 1946 by J.M. Gray and D. Bension. The report of 
                                                          
5
 See HKRS 41-1-1427 
6
 Commissioner of Prisons, Annual Departmental Reports 1946-47. 
7
 See HKRS 146-13-5. There was no such provision of ‘Simple imprisonment’ in the statues. Hard 
labour was abolished in England under the Criminal Justice Act 1948. 
8
 Ibid. 
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the JPs showed the condition of the prisoners inside Stanley Prison at the time was 
rather unsatisfactory. The prison was extremely overcrowded with male and female, 
juvenile and adult prisoner all located inside one prison, though in separate sections. 
 
After the departure of the reformatory age boys in December 1946 and the women 
prisoners to Lai Chi Kok Female Prison on 1 October 1947, Stanley Prison resumed 
its role as prison for the male prisoners.
9
 Despite these remedies, overcrowding 
continued to be a major concern for Stanley Prison. In 1948 Stanley Prison had 
recorded the daily prisoner muster reaching 3,032, which had doubled the designed 
capacity of the prison.  
 
The pre-War ‘Mark System’10 in practice in Hong Kong was continued in the 
post-War years as incentive for prisoners to behave and perform. This was however a 
cumbersome system involved in recording individual prisoner’s performance and the 
workload greatly increased in view of the large penal population. Commissioner 
Shillingford wrote to the Chief Secretary on 22 March 1948 saying that the eight 
clerks in Stanley Prison were unable to cope with the calculating of the ‘Mark 
System’ and their work was two months in arrears. To address this situation, 
Commissioner Shillingford had devised immediate means by granting all prisoner one 
third remission and only prisoners serving sentence of two years or more might 
receive gratuities.
11
  
 
                                                          
9
 Commissioner of Prisons, Annual Departmental Reports 1947-48. 
10
 The ‘Mark System’ required a daily record and evaluation on prisoner’s work performance for 
calculating the remission earned. See Chan, S. (1994a) op cit., pp. 58-9. 
11
 See HKRS 146-13-5. 
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To further address the problem of acute prison overcrowding, Commissioner 
Shillingford requested the Governor in 1948 to take emergency measures to early 
release certain selected groups of prisoners before they had completed their sentences. 
The Governor reluctantly agreed and more than 1,400 prisoners were released early 
between 12 July 1948 and 13 December 1948.12  
 
Overcrowding of the prison also caused difficulties in the management of the prison 
and resulted in the deterioration of prison discipline. The use of home made weapons 
and fractional fights involving triads and clans were frequent amongst the Chinese 
prisoners. Most of these fights were related to unlawful trafficking of unauthorized 
articles including illicit drugs and triad societies’ fight for dominance of interests 
inside prison. As a result, the Prison Rules were amended to make violence towards 
fellow prisoners a disciplinary offence for which corporal punishment could be 
awarded.
13
 
 
For the first two years after the implementation of this policy, 14 and 25 cases of 
corporal punishments were awarded to prisoners for committing violence inside 
prison. There was no award of corporal punishment on prisoner in 1949 and there was 
1 case in 1950 and two cases in 1951. No corporal punishment on adult prisoners was 
recorded after 1951.
14
 The low usage of corporal punishment on prisoner by the 
Prisons Department, despite the regular judicial corporal punishment passed down by 
the courts, was probably under the influence of the strong anti-corporal punishment 
sentiment of the penal elites in the Prisons Department. Further discussion on corporal 
                                                          
12
 See HKRS 41-1-2916. 
13
 Commissioner of Prisons, Annual Departmental Reports 1947-48. 
14
 Commissioner of Prisons, Annual Departmental Reports 1947-48; 48-49; 49-50; 50-51 and 51-52.  
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punishment in Hong Kong is given under Chapter Six in view of the complexity of 
the issue. 
 
By 1951, the Prisons Department had built up enough post-War prisoners records to 
resume the pre-War practice of classifying the prisoners into “Star Class” and 
“Ordinary Class” prisoners as adopted from England. The classification of ‘long term 
imprisonment’ was also changed from 2 years to one year starting from November 
1951. It stated that “The object of this re-organization is to increase the possibility of 
educational and other training, and to prevent undue contact between habitual 
criminals and first offenders.”15 
 
A long-term sentence prisoner review system was also established in 1950. Lists of 
prisoners sentenced to more than six years were submitted to the Governor after the 
prisoner had served four, seven, ten and twelve years and thereafter at the completion 
of further periods of two years. The Medical Officer of the prison would also report 
on his mental and physical state and to comment on whether further period of 
imprisonment would have an injurious effect on the prisoner. The Commissioner 
would report on his conduct and industry in prison and on any matter which might 
affect consideration of his case.
16
 Any prisoner who was considered by the Medical 
Officer to be unsuitable for imprisonment on health reasons, or may not survive his 
sentence would be reported to the Commissioner, who would report such case to the 
Governor for consideration of early release.
17
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 Commissioner of Prisons, Annual Departmental Reports 1951-52. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
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The modern practice of granting privileges in full to a prisoner on admission was also 
adopted from 1950. Privileges for prisoners included smoking, football and soft-ball 
matches, indoor games, educational films and concerts. Privileges may be withdrawn 
as a punishment and as means of incentives for the prisoners to behave whilst 
imprisoned. Prisoners entitled to privileges would wear ‘Privilege’ badges so that they 
could be identified by staff.
18
 
 
The Colonial Office had encouraged the Colonies to follow the English practice in 
providing after-care services for their prisoners. However the official attitude of the 
Hong Kong Government in 1951 was not positive on reason that: 
 
“Generally imprisonment does not carry the same stigma with Chinese 
that it does with Europeans. There is not therefore the same urgency for 
after-care as there is in England. Nevertheless it is essential that there 
should be some form of after-care. 
 
Since more than half our prisoners are deported from the Colony on 
completion of their sentences and a large proportion of the remainder 
returning to their families, probably would not require assistance. It 
should not be difficult for interested social workers to make a start. 
Tentative inquiries have already been made, and it may be possible to 
report next year that a discharged prisoners’ after-care society has been 
or is being formed.”19   
  
Acting Commissioner Burdett did not elaborate why he thought imprisonment would 
not carry the same stigma with Chinese than the Europeans. One possible explanation 
was that many Chinese were facing poverty at the time and were willing to risk 
imprisonment in order to make their ends met through working as hawkers. Another 
possible reason was that a lot of these Chinese prisoners were from the Mainland and 
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 Ibid. 
19
 Commissioner of Prisons, Annual Departmental Reports 1950-51, p. 22. 
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without links in Hong Kong. Europeans on the other hand were having no difficulties 
in securing employment in the Colony and not many Europeans were imprisoned in 
Hong Kong. This was evident in the large number of Chinese prisoners admitted for 
minor non-crime offences or for non-payment of fine during the early years after the 
War.  
 
A six-month pilot after-care scheme was started at Stanley Prison and Lai Chi Kok 
Female Prison in November 1951. This was arranged by the ‘Discharged Prisoners’ 
Aid Sub-committee’ of the Hong Kong Council of Social Services with caseworkers 
sent from the Salvation Army and the Family Welfare Society.
20
 
 
When Norman took up the post of Commissioner of Prisons in February 1953, there 
were further moves to introduce a more reformative regime within the Hong Kong 
prisons in addition to his personal interest in the rehabilitation of young offenders. 
The pilot after-care scheme was allowed to continue after the six month trial period. 
Furthermore, an improved diet scale was introduced on 1 September 1952 and no 
more award of corporal punishment to prisoners found in breach of prison 
discipline.
21
 The ‘Earning and Canteen Scheme’ for prisoners was also introduced 
from 1 May 1953 and it was reported that there was a noted improvement in prison 
discipline, industrial production and the general atmosphere of the prisons.
22
 
 
In the following year, open visits were introduced at Stanley and Lai Chi Kok Prison. 
Visitors could have their visits with their imprisoned relatives or friends sitting across 
a table in the prison garden. This was a huge improvement as “Previously prisoners 
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 Commissioner of Prisons, Annual Departmental Reports 1951-52. 
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 Commissioner of Prisons, Annual Departmental Reports 1952-53. 
22
 Commissioner of Prisons, Annual Departmental Reports 1953-54. 
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had to shout to their visitors through double wire mesh with a warder patrolling in 
between inside a cage like structure in the main gate.”23 
 
1957 saw further improvements in the treatment of prisoners. Prison Rules were 
amended to allow the Commissioner to grant home leave for up to five days at a time 
for prisoners in the last six months of a sentence over four years. The rational for such 
arrangement was for the prisoner to re-adjust himself to a normal life after a period of 
institutional treatment as well as repairing family relationships and looking for 
employment.
24
 
 
The Discharged Prisoners’ Aid Society (DPAS), a voluntary group was set up in 1957. 
The main function was for co-ordinating and extending the work done by voluntary 
agencies, notably the Salvation Army in providing help and hostel services for the 
discharged prisoners. The Commissioner and some senior officers of the Prisons 
Departments were appointed to be the Vice-President and Advisors of the Society, 
and DPAS started to receive subsidies from the Social Welfare Department since 
1959. From its inception until today, the Discharged Prisoners’ Aid Society, renamed 
the Society of Rehabilitation and Crime Prevention (SRACP) in 1982, has been the 
main non government organisation providing welfare and supportive services to the 
ex-offenders.
25
 
 
Commissioner Norman was also the key figure in setting up open prisons in Hong 
Kong. The colony’s first open prison, the H.M. Prison Chimawan located at Lantau 
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 Commissioner of Prisons, Annual Departmental Reports 1955-56. 
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Island, started to take in Star Class short-term prisoners from January 1957. This was 
indeed an open prison without physical security; windows of the prison were not 
barred and there was no surrounding fence enclosing the site. Condition at the Prison 
was however rather primitive in the beginning. Lighting at Chimawan Prison was by 
kerosene pressure lamps as electric mains were yet to be supplied at the time of its 
inception. Works performed by those able-body prisoners included forestation and 
road work.
26
  
 
In October 1958, the Prisons Department took over the staff quarters of the engineers 
and workers building the Tai Lam Reservoir in the New Territories and turned this 
into the Hong Kong’s second open prison, H.M. Prison Tai Lam. As a high proportion 
of the newly admitted prisoners either confessed to be or were found to be drug 
addicts, the Prisons Department started an experiment by assigning only drug addict 
prisoners to this new open prison. Four full-time Social Welfare Officers were 
assigned to Tai Lam for the provision of after-care services to those with the greatest 
needs. 
 
At Tai Lam, all prisoners upon admission who were found suffering from drug 
withdrawal symptom or from deficiency and malnutrition were admitted to the prison 
hospital. After a period of resting and medication, the prisoners were arranged to take 
part in occupational therapy sessions and eventually engaged in outdoor physical works 
aiming to build up their physique. The Medical Officer commented that in the majority 
of cases, there had been a marked improvement in physical condition before their 
discharge.
27
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The successful experiment at Tai Lam Prison has led to the development of the unique 
Drug Addiction Treatment Centre programme in Hong Kong with details to be 
discussed in the next Section. 
 
After the 1973 Stanley Prison riot, the Department was provided with extra staff and 
this enabled the tightening on control and management of prisoners under its charge. 
Illicit drugs were no longer a major problem in the prisons and was basically under 
control with the arrest or the broken up of the corrupted syndicates.
28
 The triads had 
also lost its influences inside the prison when the supply of illicit drugs had dried up. 
The Prisons Department also adopted the close supervision approach on prisoners 
with the adequate provision of staff. All prisoners must be properly supervised and 
were not allowed to leave the sight of the duty staff.
29
 Amidst the move in tightening 
up of prison disciplines, the practice of open visits for prisoners at Stanley Prison was 
ceased. This change was to minimise physical contact to prevent trafficking between 
visitors and inmates and this practice continues until today.
30
 
 
Another measure that affects prisoners in Hong Kong after the 1973 Stanley Prison 
riot was the security classification in line with the British practice after the Lord 
Mountbatten’s Report of 1966. Prisoners are classified from category A to D (highest 
to lowest) according to their assessed security risks. They are assigned to institutions 
suitable to accommodate prisoners of that particular security category.
31
 These 
security grading are subject to regular reviews but in general, the high security 
category prisoners would require strong escort when removed from the institution and 
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would not be mixed with low security grade prisoners. The Prisons Department 
adopted a rather conservative approach on prisoners’ security classification and it is 
not uncommon to find elderly or fragile prisoners still being classified as category A 
prisoners whilst still on life or long sentences. 
 
There were no major changes in penal policies for the adult offenders thereafter apart 
from the introduction of the Release under Supervision Scheme in 1987 and the Post 
Release Supervision Scheme in 1996. These two programmes will be discussed in 
more detail in the latter part of this Chapter.  
 
 
4.4   The Drug Addiction Treatment Centre Programme 
 
Opium was legally traded and consumed in Hong Kong until the related Opium 
Ordinance was repealed by the British Military Administration under Proclamation 
No. 13 of 1945.
32
 It was in fact the dispute arising from the trading of opium which 
led to the ceding of Hong Kong to the British.  
 
With this historical background, Hong Kong’s prison after the Second World War 
was keeping a large number of prisoners with drug problems or committed for 
narcotic offences. Of the 17,479 prisoners admitted during the year 1958-59, 7,099 or 
40.6% were on drug related offences.
33
 When the Prisons Department took over the 
site office and the workers’ quarters of the completed Tai Lam reservoir and turned 
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the place into the Tai Lam Prison, the Prisons Department had embarked in an 
experimental project by filling the entire prison with addicted prisoners with less than 
three years sentence. After a short period of medical treatment for the addicted 
prisoners to overcome their withdrawal systems, the prisoners would be sent out to 
perform mainly outdoor tasks such as forestation work. Upon discharge, they could 
volunteer for after-care follow-up. From 1958 to 1968, a total of 17,501 prisoners had 
passed through Tai Lam Prison, which was re-named Tai Lam Treatment Centre from 
1965.
34
 
 
With experience gained from operating the Tai Lam Prison, the Prisons Department 
proposed to the Government in putting up a new legislation to specially deal with the 
treatment of addicted offenders. The Drug Addiction Treatment Centres Ordinance 
became law on 17 January 1969 which authorised the Prisons Department to run these 
treatment centres.  
 
The legislation provided that the court could sentence a confirmed addict, male or 
female from 14 years and above and guilty of an offence, to a drug addiction 
treatment centre for a period of compulsory treatment in lieu of imprisonment. The 
period of detention was from six months to a maximum of eighteen months to be 
followed by twelve months compulsory after-care supervision by the Prisons 
Department. The actual release from the drug treatment centre would be determined 
by a Review Board similar to that of the Training Centre with the inmate’s progress 
towards treatment, his health and the likelihood of abstention from drugs upon release 
being assessed for consideration.
35
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In 1974, the Drug Addiction Treatment Centre Ordinance was amended to allow 
conviction not to be recorded against an offender sentenced to treatment unless a court 
so orders on grounds that “Treatment is medical rather than punitive, and 
rehabilitation is more likely to succeed if offenders, particularly young and first 
offenders can return to normal life with clean sheets.”36 The other amendment was to 
empower the Commissioner of Prison to recall supervisees back to the treatment centre 
if found in breach of supervision conditions. 
 
The Drug Addiction Treatment Centres Ordinance was further amended in 1977 to 
reduce the period of detention from the former minimum of six months and a maximum 
of eighteen months to a new minimum of four months with a maximum of twelve 
months. “This shortening in the period for treatment was justified based on the average 
length of treatment which was between 7 and 9 months in 1976.”37 
 
From the commencement of the Drug Addiction Treatment Centres programme in 
January 1969 up to 31 December 1977, a total of 11,850 persons were treated and 
discharged. Of the total of 9,788 persons who completed the twelve months’ period of 
statutory after-care supervision, 6,005 or 6l.4% were considered as successful in that 
they had completed the supervision period without further reconviction, recall or 
relapse to drug use and remained gainfully employed. A random sampling of 10% of all 
those discharged were involved in a three-year follow-up study, and at the end of this 
three years period, 41.6% were certified drug-free and had not been reconvicted of a 
criminal offence or recalled for further treatment.
38
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From 9 May 1986, the minimum detention period for the drug addition treatment centre 
programme was further reduced to two months, allowing a “greater flexibility within 
the programme to cater for those addicts who respond well to treatment.”39 
 
Various correctional institutions had been used as drug addiction treatment centres. 
The Government in April 1975 allocated the former leprosarium, located in Hei Ling 
Chau (喜靈洲), a remote island opposite Lantau Island to the Prisons Department. 
This had enabled the Prisons Department to use this island as the base for running the 
compulsory drug addiction treatment programme in Hong Kong. 
 
The number of females involved in drug addiction used to be small in Hong Kong. 
According to figures kept by the Security Bureau, there were 797 reported female 
drug abusers in Hong Kong in 1981. From 1980s onward, Hong Kong witnessed the 
increased number of females involved in abusing illicit drugs. The number of female 
addicts jumped to 1,236 in 1986; 1,283 in 1991 and 2,433 in 1996.  
 
More than half of the reported female drug abusers (1,310 or 54%) in 1996 were 
under the age of twenty-five.
40
 Corresponding to this increased trend was the number 
of females sentenced by court to undergo compulsory treatment at the Correctional 
Services Department’s drug addiction treatment centres (DATC). In 1991, the average 
number of female DATC inmate was 64 whereas this daily average figure was 
increased to 224 in 1996.
41
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In 1997, the Correctional Services Department was operating two drug addiction 
treatment centres at Hei Ling Chau and Chimawan
42
 for male and female addicts 
respectively. Separate sections were set up in these centres for young addicts under 21. 
During the year 1997, a total of 1,916 persons were admitted to the DATC 
programme whereas 2,215 were discharged after treatment. The average period of 
stay in the centres was 5 months 28 days for young addicts and 5 months 15 days for 
adult addicts. Of the 2,515 cases that had complete the one year supervision period, 
68% did not reconvict of a fresh offence or relapse to drugs. 
 
Appendix H shows the admission of males and females offenders to the Drug 
Addiction Treatment Centres from 1970 to 2000. 
 
 
4.5   The Release under Supervision Scheme  
 
The Prisoners (Release under Supervision) Ordinance, enacted in 1987, became 
operational on 1 July 1988 with the establishment of the Release under Supervision 
Board. This “Release under Supervision Scheme” was Hong Kong’s version of parole 
arrangement for prisoners and it had taken fifteen years for this Scheme to secure the 
necessary support from the public and the Government’s endorsement to become 
law.
43
 
 
The parole scheme in England started on 1 April 1968 under the provisions of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1967. The scheme was basing on the assumption that some 
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prisoners would have a better chance of reformation if they could be released earlier 
than their scheduled release dates whilst subject to some form of supervision. All 
prisoners serving a sentence of imprisonment of eighteen months or more were 
eligible to be considered for early release on parole when they had completed 
one-third of the sentence or twelve months, whichever longer. Most prisoners had 
chosen to have their cases reviewed and 49% of the eligible prisoners were granted 
parole at some time in their sentences. A small number of those were recalled whilst 
on parole for breach of licence conditions. 
44
 
 
Garner, Commissioner of Prisons in Hong Kong, found this United Kingdom scheme 
interesting and had similarities to Hong Kong’s Training and Detention Centres 
programme of the young offenders as well as the Drug Addiction Treatment Centre 
programmes for both adults and young addicts. Under these programmes, the inmates 
were normally released before their maximum detention period to undergo a period of 
compulsory after-care supervision. Commissioner Garner proposed to the central 
Government as early as 1972 that a similar parole scheme should be introduced to the 
adult prisoners in Hong Kong. With the support of the Colonial Secretary, a number of 
Government departments, which included the Judiciary, the Police, the Home Affairs, 
the Social Welfare and the Medical and Health Services were asked to study the 
Commissioner of Prison’s proposal.  
 
The deliberations of this proposal were held behind closed doors and kept within the 
concerned Government Departments only. It was generally felt at the time that the 
public should not be informed of this topic being deliberated within the Government. 
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 Home Office, (1977) Prisons and the Prisoners – The Work of the Prison Service in England and 
Wales, London: HMSO, pp. 64-65. 
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Public misgivings would arouse on Government’s apparent leniency to criminals at a 
time when crime rates were high. It was only in 1975 that Commissioner Garner stated 
openly in the newspaper of his support on the proposed parole scheme.
45
 The 
Governor in his Address to the Legislative Council on 8 October 1975 however stated 
that: “The question of release under supervision is being looked into. There is merit as 
well as danger in such a scheme and it will be necessary to examine the proposal from 
every angle before arriving at any firm recommendation.”46 
 
Nothing happened after the Governor’s reveal of the proposal until the subject was 
brought up again this time by a new Governor Sir Edward Youde during his annual 
address at the Legislative Council on 1983 saying that:  
“Other important developments will include the introduction of the parole 
and pre-release employment schemes, which will help offenders on their 
release to integrate themselves properly into society and not to turn again to 
crime. These schemes represent an extension of existing correctional 
programme, and will, we hope, eventually lead to a reduction in our penal 
population.”47 
 
It was eventually reported in the media that the matter was being considered by the 
Security Branch, the Correctional Services and the Legal Department but this news had 
attracted little publicity. It was also explained by the media of why nothing had 
happened on this proposal after 1975 as “In 1975 the idea came before the Executive 
Council but was rejected – after an influential working party had spent three years 
debating and wrangling over the details.”48 
 
                                                          
45
 See South China Morning Post, 23 March 1975. 
46
 Hong Kong Hansard, 8 October 1975, p. 32. 
47
 Hong Kong Hansard, 5 October 1983, p. 32. 
48
 See South China Morning Post, 31 December 1983. 
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It was in 1985 when the Attorney General Michael Thomas revealed that a Bill 
providing for the early release of prisoners under supervision was being drafted.
49
 The 
debate on this draft Bill was again laborious and it was reported in the media again at 
end of 1986 that the proposal was revised and would take another six months before the 
Bill could be ready for legislation. It was mentioned that “A tight lid of secrecy was 
clamped on the matter as it was considered highly sensitive” and “the Government is 
concerned that the crime rate would soar once people got wind that a parole scheme 
was imminent.”50 
 
The Prisoners (Release under Supervision) Bill 1987 was finally tabled at the 
Legislative Council for the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 reading in 1987. It was explained by the 
Secretary of Security that: 
“The idea of introducing a system of parole in Hong Kong has been under 
consideration for more than 15 years. We have long considered that there 
are considerable benefits both for society and for the persons involved in 
such a scheme. The problem has been, in the past, a lack of experience in 
this field and a doubt as to whether the public would support it. I am 
pleased to say that I believe both problems have been overcome.”51 
 
There were two separate Schemes included under the Bill for prisoners to be released 
on parole, namely, the ‘Release under Supervision Scheme’ and the ‘Pre-release 
Employment Scheme’. Under the first Scheme, a prisoner who has served half of his 
sentence or twenty months of a sentence of three years or more, whichever is longer, 
may be released to live and work outside the prison. A prisoner opts for release under 
this Scheme would forfeit his entire remission which equals to one third of his 
sentence. He is required to undergo supervision by the after-care officers of the 
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Correctional Services Department until the expiration of his full sentence. He may be 
required to reside in the Correctional Service Department operated hostels and is 
subject to be recalled back to prison if found in breach of his supervision conditions. 
 
For the ‘Pre-release Employment Scheme’, a prisoner with a sentence of two years or 
more may be released within six months of completing his sentence with remission 
allowed. He is allowed to go out to work during day time and required to return to the 
Correctional Service Department operated hostels after work. He is again liable to be 
recalled back to prison if found in breach of his supervision conditions. 
 
It was emphasised during the Legislative Council meetings that the Schemes would be 
highly selective for the prisoners and was estimated that successful applicants within 
the first year of operation would be less than 90 in total as “no more than 5 percent of 
those eligible will be granted release under supervision on their first application.”52  
 
The Prisoners (Release under Supervision) Ordinance became operational on 1 July 
1988 with the establishment of the Release under Supervision Board. The Board 
consists of not less than five members appointed by the Governor and chaired by a 
High Court Judge with members including a medical practitioner with experience in 
psychiatry and the others to have experience or interest in the rehabilitation of 
offenders. The Board would consider applications from prisoners and refer the 
recommended cases to the Governor for early release from prison.
53
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 Hong Kong Hansard, 14 October 1987, p. 101. 
53
 See Prisoners (Release under Supervision) Ordinance, Cap. 325, Laws of Hong Kong. 
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In the first year of operation, a total of 103 prisoners applied for the Release under 
Supervision Scheme and only four were successful in their application. 174 prisoners 
applied for the Pre-release Employment Scheme and 14 of them were approved. As 
after-care supervision could only be extended to prisoners who could remain in Hong 
Kong after discharge, non Hong Kong prisoners who are subject to deportation after 
release are excluded from these two early release schemes.  
 
With such a low approval rate, the applications from prisoners dropped sharply and 
from 1988 up to the end of 1997, there were only 309 prisoners applied for the 
Release under Supervision Scheme with 45 or 14.6% successful in their applications. 
There was a higher rate of applications for the Pre-release Employment Scheme with 
1,014 applications and 170 or 16.8% of them were successful during the same 
period.
54
 These figures were much lower than the original estimation given by the 
Correctional Services Department.
55
 
 
On the other hand, owing to the small number of cases being released under 
supervision, the Correctional Services Department’s after-care officers were able to 
provide more intense supervision over these cases. Up to 30 September 2000, a total 
of 228 prisoners were early released to undergo either one of these two Schemes. 
Only one supervisee’s supervision order was revoked by the Release under 
Supervision Board and he was recalled back to prison.
56
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 148 
4.6   The Post Release Supervision Scheme 
 
Another scheme for the supervision of adult prisoners, the Post-release Supervision 
Scheme was introduced in Hong Kong at the end of 1996. The idea of requiring adult 
prisoners to undergo a period of after-care supervision began in 1986 with the 
Research Sub-Committee of the Fight Crime Committee
57
 calling for studies to be 
conducted on services provided to the discharged prisoners to ensure they would 
receive sufficient help so that they would not revert to crime.
58
 
 
The Report, completed in May 1988, revealed that the use of services provided to the 
discharged prisoners were low because many ex-prisoners disliked the stigma of 
being linked to these services. For the hard-core criminals and recidivists, they had no 
intention to use the services at all as they would revert to illicit activities soon after 
discharge. The Report considered a statutory supervision scheme should be 
introduced in Hong Kong to ensure sufficient assistance would be given to the adult 
ex-prisoners to keep them away from crime.
59
 
 
The Correctional Services Department on the other hand put forth a separate proposal 
in May 1987 calling for a ‘Care and Control Scheme’ for the adult hard-core prisoners 
after their release from correctional institutions. The idea was modelled upon the 
newly enacted provision for the supervision of young offenders under the Criminal 
Procedure Ordinance (Cap. 221) on 2 May 1980. The proposal aimed at providing 
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representatives from the Correctional Services Department, the Royal Hong Kong Police Force and the 
Senior Statistician of the Security Branch. 
58
 See Chan, K.W. (1996) Attitudes of Hong Kong Legislators towards Crime and Punishment: An 
Exploratory Study on the Post-Release Supervision of Prisoners Ordinance. MSc Dissertation, 
University of Hong Kong. 
59
 Ibid., pp. 40-41. 
 149 
assistance to the discharged prisoners and more importantly, offered protection to the 
public by monitoring the progress of the discharged prisoners through a period of 
compulsory after-care supervision.  
 
Unlike the proposed provisions under the Release under Supervision Scheme which 
was still being considered by the Legislative Council at the time, prisoners in the 
proposed Care and Control Scheme would not get early release for joining the scheme. 
In fact, prisoners identified by the Correctional Services Department as hard-core 
criminals according to risk assessment and with sentence of one year or more were to 
be considered by a Board to undergo a period of compulsory after-care supervision 
after they have completed their normal period of sentence with remission. The 
proposed supervision team would consist of both Correctional Services Department 
after-care officers and a Police sergeant. In a sense, those prisoners being placed into 
this Scheme were subject to a longer period of monitoring and control by the law 
enforcement agencies than what they used to get without this legislation.
60
 
 
The Fight Crime Committee examined the proposal submitted by the Correctional 
Services Department in great detail. It was reported during a discussion on the 
problem of triads in Hong Kong at the Legislative Council session on 6 June 1990 
that the Government would require further examination on the proposed introduction 
of a post release supervision scheme for ex-offenders owing to divergent views from 
the public. 
61
 The Fight Crime Committee in July 1991 finally endorsed the proposal 
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and the Government had undertaken to prepare a draft Bill for legislation which was 
presented to the Legislative Council for its 1st and 2nd readings on 19 January 1994.
62
 
 
The Bill in essence adopted many of the original proposals made by the Correctional 
Services Department in 1987. The major difference between the draft Bill and the 
original Correctional Services Department proposal was on the type of prisoners to be 
included in the scheme, which would include all local prisoners with sentence of six 
years or more and prisoners sentenced to two years or more on specific offences like 
sexual offences, triad-related offences and offences of violence. Period of compulsory 
supervision would be between one to two years by the Correctional Services 
Department and the Police.
63
 
 
As this proposed Bill would not release prisoners early as in the Release under 
Supervision Scheme but instead the element of compulsory after-care supervision was 
added upon the high risk prisoners, the Government expected few opposition from the 
public as this legislation “will help and encourage prisoners to reintegrate into 
society as law-abiding citizens, and thereby reduce recidivism.”64 
 
A Bills Committee was formed to study the proposal in detail. Nine meetings were 
held between June 1994 and May 1995 when legislators meet with Government 
officials; heard comments from the NGOs involved in the rehabilitation of offenders 
and also studied the representations from over a hundred prisoners. Their main 
concern was on the proposed retrospective aspect of the legislation; the feeling of 
having double punishment as well as the loss of remission. The issue of having the 
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police involved in the supervision of discharged prisoners was strongly contested by 
the Legislators at the Bills Committee feeling a social worker would be more useful in 
the rehabilitation of the offender than the police. During the meeting on 23 February 
1995, the Administration gave in and agreed to amend the Bill by replacing the post 
of Police in the supervision team with a social worker from the Social Welfare 
Department as well as setting a lower tariff of supervision period for those serving 
prisoners when the Ordinance was enacted.
65
  
 
The Legislators raised few questions during the 3rd Reading of the Bill on 31 May 
1995 when it became law. The Post Release Supervision Board was set up on 30 
November 1996 to consider which prisoner should be granted post-release supervision. 
The first Board was chaired by a retired High Court Judge with a former District 
Judge as deputy. There were six members with backgrounds in psychiatry, 
psychology, social work and law. Representatives from the Correctional Services 
Department and the Police were sitting in the Board as ex-official members. The 
Board would normally consider the cases thorough the submitted reports from the 
Correctional Services Department, the police and the trial judge but a prisoner could 
request to present his representation in person to the Board.
66
 
 
From December 1996 to 30 June 1999, the Board had considered 1,412 prisoners 
meeting the requirement of the Scheme and a total of 1,386 supervision orders were 
issued, representing 98.2% of the considered cases. The length of supervision granted 
was from 6 months to a maximum of 18 months. Up to 30 June 1999, only 25 
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supervisees were re-admitted to prison and six lost contact during the supervision 
period.
67
 
 
 
4.7   Conclusion 
 
This Chapter highlighted the development of the penal policies and programmes on 
adult offenders operated by the Prisons Department from end of the Second World 
War in 1945 to 1997. Hong Kong had suffered greatly during the War and had to 
rebuild its community and infrastructure from scratch. The Prisons Department faced 
the same difficulties after the War and had to cope with the situation with whatever 
resources the Department could savage in 1945 and the immediate years afterwards. 
 
The War had produced not only the unique group of prisoners, the war criminals 
sentenced by the Military Tribunals, but casted a long lasting and unforgettable 
experience onto those senior British Prisons Officers who became civilian internees 
during the War themselves. As internees, they were confined to the prison staff 
quarters and the St. Stephen’s College at Stanley. They had also personally 
experienced the life of prisoners as they had for a short period of time being locked up 
inside Stanley Prison by the Japanese keepers. 
  
During the late 1940s, China was embroiled in civil wars and the colony was flooded 
with refugees fleeing from mainland China. The community had adopted a hard-line 
approach in maintaining law and order at the time resulting in the mass incarceration 
of the young and the underclass and the extensive use of corporal punishment by the 
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courts as means of social control. Prisons for the male adult offenders could only 
serve the function of containment. Even this role was unable to be attained with the 
large admission numbers and extra-ordinary measures had to be taken to release 
prisoners early before their scheduled release dates.  
 
The penal elites within the post-War prison service however took a rather liberal view 
in line with the welfare approach at home when dealing with offenders under its 
charge since the 1950s. For adult prisoners, open prisons were established not only for 
relieving prison overcrowding but to provide a more open environment for the Star 
Class prisoners. Prisoners were assigned constructive prison labours and received 
earning for their labour for canteen purchase. Open visits and home leaves were 
arranged for well behaved prisoners which were all practices copied from England. 
When the courts at the time still sentenced prisoners to undergo corporal punishment, 
the Prisons Department had refrained from using the cane as means of punishing 
prisoners for breach of discipline. On the other hand, rehabilitative measures such as 
after-care services were mostly absent for the adult prisoners in Hong Kong. These 
services were mainly left to be rendered by voluntary agencies and religious groups. 
 
In view of the long history of the legitimate use of opium in the colony before the 
War, the size of the addicted population in Hong Kong was significant. With the use 
of opium outlawed after the War, a high percentage of prisoners were on drug charges 
and many of them were drug abusers. The Prisons Department had since late 1950s 
initiated to experiment with the special treatment programme on these addicted 
prisoners. This had led to the enactment of the Drug Addiction Treatment Centres 
Ordinance and the setting up of the Treatment Centre at Tai Lam providing 
compulsory drug treatment as alternative to imprisonment since 1969.  
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The 1973 Stanley Prison riot had resulted in the major revamp on both organisational 
and operational aspects of the Prisons Department. With the support of the central 
Government, the Department was being injected with much needed resources in 
particular additional staffing and accommodation provisions. The up-to-date 
techniques and systems in prison management were transported from England on 
advices given by the Home Office experts. The regimes for the adult offenders were 
tightened and security became the paramount concern of the Prisons Department 
especially at the time when the Department had to deal with the additional task of 
managing the Vietnamese detainees when large scale riots broke out from time to 
time inside the detention camps. 
 
The Prisons Department still believed in the rehabilitation of offenders despite from 
operating a highly disciplined regime since 1973 as evidenced by its success in the 
addicted offender programmes. This happened at the time when the Western world 
was questioning the effects of their own penal systems in the rehabilitation of 
offenders with the resultant feeling of ‘Nothing Works’. The change of the title from 
Prisons Department to Correctional Services Department in 1982 further signified the 
Department’s commitment towards the work on offender rehabilitation. 
 
Penal elites were forthcoming in proposing new ideas on penal policies for Hong 
Kong but their belief in offender management and rehabilitation were not always 
acknowledged or accepted by the Administration or the general public. The enactment 
process of the Release under Supervision Scheme and the Post Release Supervision 
Scheme were good examples to illustrate how the community leaders perceived penal 
policies as ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ on offenders and the response of the Government to the 
public opinion in the formulation of penal policies. 
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The Government apparently was not only sensitive but also showing great 
apprehension on public opinion on penal policies, in particular those programme 
regarding offender rehabilitation. The Administration would not wish the public to 
have the impression that the Government was soft on offenders and weak in the 
tackling of crimes. These would be seen as giving out wrong signals to the 
community in particular the criminals which might lead to the rise of crimes in Hong 
Kong. Changes and adaptation to penal policies in Hong Kong in particular offender 
rehabilitation was therefore cautious and the resultant changes were often borne with 
the hallmark and characteristics of ‘disciplinary-welfare’.68  
 
This Chapter has portrayed penal policies and programmes developed in Hong Kong 
for adult offenders from 1945 to 1997 indicating both similarities and differences with 
what had happened in England and Wales after the War. More detailed examinations 
will be made in Part II of this thesis on the policy aspects. Two topics have been 
omitted from this Chapter, i.e. the death sentence and corporal punishment. These two 
forms of punishment reflects the conflicting views of the West and the East, need 
more detailed discussion and are presented in the following two Chapters separately.  
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Chapter Five 
Death Sentence, Execution and Life Imprisonment in  
Hong Kong 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In the study of penal policy development in Hong Kong whilst a British colony, it is 
necessary to draw special attention on how physical punishments, in particular capital 
punishment and corporal punishment, were used by the colonial administrators as 
“means of repression” as described by Spierenburg (1984) over the natives in 
maintaining law and order.
1
  
 
The death sentence, the most severe form of punishment the law could prescribe, is 
used in this chapter to illustrate how policies relating to the sentence of death were 
formed, executed, changed and reviewed in Hong Kong. This is a topic of particular 
interest as it illustrates how political, social and cultural factors had contributed to 
shaping this extremely important penal policy whilst Hong Kong was under the 
British Administration. Explanations are given on how and under what circumstances 
Hong Kong followed the British approach in dealing with capital punishment cases 
and why Hong Kong had total abolition of capital punishment on 23 April 1993 under 
the Crimes (Amendment) Ordinance 1993 before Britain removed the same in 1998.
2
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 See Spierenburg, P. (1984) The Spectacle of Suffering – Executions and the Evolution of Repression: 
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Press. 
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 The death penalty was abolished by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 for treason and piracy with 
violence. See Radzinowicz, L. (1999) Adventures in Criminology. London: Routledge, p. 273, Notes 41. 
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Examinations are also made on how the public in Hong Kong perceived the value on 
human lives and the impact of public sentiment and opinion on penal policy as 
suggested by Walker (1968)
3
 on capital punishment against the backdrop of the 
handing over of Hong Kong to China in 1997. This helps to explain why Hong Kong 
had become one of the rare territories in Asia Pacific region with the majority of 
population being Chinese that had abolished death sentence for all crimes at the time,
4
 
and in contrast to other former British colonies like India, Malaysia and Singapore 
where death sentences are still being carried out. 
 
 
5.2 Executions in Hong Kong prior to 1941 
 
Hong Kong followed the English practice of having capital punishment in its statutes 
as the ultimate punishment the law could impost on convicted criminals. Following 
the English practice, the execution method adopted in Hong Kong was judicial 
hanging
5
 and the first execution was carried out in Hong Kong on 4 November 1844, 
two years after Hong Kong was ceded to the British.
6
 Early executions were carried 
out in the open at West Point for maximizing the deterrent effect on the natives. 
Public execution was in practice in England at the time and described by Spierenburg 
(1984) as the ‘pearl in the crown of repression’. 7  The exact number of public 
executions held in Hong Kong was difficult to establish as there were no standardized 
                                                          
3
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official records kept for these figures.
8
 In the ‘1869 Gaol and Prisoner Report’, 
Superintendent of Victoria Gaol, F Douglas stated that between 1862 and 1869, a total 
of 60 prisoners were executed, 15 for murder and 45 for piracy and murder.
9
 
 
Shortly after England had ceased public execution in 1868,
10
 the Hong Kong 
Government was asked by the Colonial Office to consider adopting the same practice. 
The matter was brought up at the Executive Council with the decision “that any 
change in the mode of carrying out Capital Sentences in this Colony appears to the 
Council at present uncalled for by any local necessity and is otherwise inexpedient.”11 
Governor McDonald in his letter to the Secretary of State further elaborated that 
“because none of the disgraceful scenes which almost invariably accompanied Public 
Executions in England, especially in London, ever take place here, and for other 
reasons I do not think it advisable amongst so suspicious a race as the Chinese, and 
so incapable often of appreciating the real motives of the actions of Foreigners, to 
invest with the least appearance of secrecy the mode of conducting Executions, which 
in China take place publicly.”12 
 
With the changes made in England, Hong Kong as a colony had to follow the home 
practice and execution was eventually moved away from the public eyes and carried 
out inside Victoria Gaol in 1882. The first recorded execution inside the gaol was of 
                                                          
8
 Miners, N. (1987) mentioned a Circular Despatch in 1922 requiring the colonies to submit not only 
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an Indian prisoner.
13
 Executions were conducted inside Victoria Gaol until 1937 upon 
the completion of the new Hong Kong Prison
14
 and the vacation of the entire Victoria 
Gaol to this new prison. 
 
Stanley Prison, when built in 1935, had incorporated in its design an execution 
chamber within the ‘Punishment / Condemned Block’ complex or ‘H Block’ as it was 
officially named within the prison. The design of the condemned block was very 
similar to that of the Holloway Prison in England and consisted of a two storey 
building with 18 cells on the ground floor, 9 on each side facing each other with the 
bathroom located at the rear of the hall. There were six cells on the upper floor with a 
doorway linking the first floor condemned cell block to the execution chamber as 
illustrated in Diagram 1:  
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 Hong Kong Blue Books v. 1882; Colonial Surgeon’s Report in Administrative Reports Hongkong 
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14
  Renamed Stanley Prison after the War. 
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Diagram 1  Holloway Prison’s “Execution Suite” 15 
 
 
 
 
 
The six cells in the upper floor of the condemn block were at least twice the size of 
the normal cells in the prison proper which measures around 50 square feet each. 
There were no beds for the first floor cells but there was raised wooden floor on one 
side of the cell for use as sleeping area with mattress placed on top. Staff complement 
for the condemned block was one to three, i.e., one Warder (renamed to Assistant 
Officer in the 1970s) watching three cells with an Officer posted inside the block as 
the officer in charge. A logbook was kept for each condemned prisoner and the staff 
had to make entries therein once every fifteen minutes to confirm the state of the 
prisoner. Prisoners sentenced to death were not required to work under the Prison 
Rules and they spent most of their time reading or listening to radio. When televisions 
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were available at Stanley Prison, watching television became the favourite pass time 
activity. Condemned prisoners were given one hour outdoor exercise per day at the 
adjoined enclosed exercise area, weather permits or they would have their exercise 
inside the block. They were arranged with daily showers at the shower room located 
at the rear of the block. Similar prison meals as other prisoners were provided except 
meat and fish were deboned to ensure the safety of the condemned prisoners. For 
condemned prisoners declared to be smokers, they would be issued with one pack of 
cigarette per day at government expense.
16
 
 
The prison authority paid particular attention to the security of the condemned 
prisoners and the block where they were located. Daily searching on the area around 
the condemned block, inside the cells as well as the prisoners themselves were 
conducted. All incoming and outgoing mail for the condemned prisoners were read 
and censored by designated prison officials. 
 
Condemned prisoners awaiting execution were located in the first floor cells and 
taken to the execution chamber through this linking doorway normally around seven 
in the morning upon receipt of the ‘Warrant for Carrying Out Sentence of Death’ 
signed by the Governor the previous day.
17
 When there was more than one execution 
held in a day, the first execution would normally start at around half-past six in the 
morning with around 15 to 30 minutes interval for each execution thereafter.  
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 Other prisoners were provided with three sticks of cigarettes per day on government expense. This 
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Equipment and procedures for the execution were adopted from England similar to 
what is described in The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1949-1953).
18
 
The condemned prisoner was standing on the trap door with the hanging loop placed 
round his neck. When the executioner pulled the lever, the trap door opened and the 
condemn prisoner would drop down the chamber. The hanging rope would break his 
cervical vertebrae in the process of the fall leading to a quick death.
19
 The length of 
the rope required for the drop was calculated carefully in accordance with the 1913 
Home Office table taking into consideration the body weight and height of the 
condemned prisoner to ensure the drop would instantly break the prisoner’s neck bone 
without decapitating him.
20
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Diagram 2: Stanley Prison Execution Chamber 
 
 
 
The inside of the execution chamber inside Stanley Prison is shown in the above 
photo. (Diagram 2) The trap door for the execution was located in the centre of 
the chamber. The canvas sand bags were used to simulate the weight identical to 
the condemned prisoner for mock runs the day before the actual execution took 
place.
21
 
 
Starting from 1882 when executions were no longer carried out in public but inside 
Victoria Gaol till the commissioning of the Stanley Prison in 1937, at least 140 
                                                          
21  Photo taken in 1996 before the Condemned Block at Stanley Prison was demolished to make way 
for building the new prison hospital. (Personal collection). A mock execution chamber is being set up at 
the CSD Museum. 
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prisoners were executed inside Victoria Gaol and at Stanley Prison.
22
 There were no 
records on the execution of any female prisoners in Hong Kong as ‘decency forbids’ 
and their death sentences commuted.
23
 There was no official record of the number of 
executions carried out during the period of Japanese occupation in Hong Kong.  
 
 
5.3 Executions in Hong Kong after the War 
 
Immediately after the War in 1945, Hong Kong was placed under Military 
Administration and Military Courts were set up in September 1946. These courts 
“exercised no civil jurisdiction but dealt with all offences committed by civilians 
against the Proclamations or subsidiary enactments and with all offences committed 
by civilians against the ordinary law of the Colony.”24 Seven new offences carrying 
capital punishment were introduced in Hong Kong on 18 September 1945 by the 
Military Administration. These offences included armed resistance to the Force, 
possession of arms or explosives during the commission of crime, assist prisoner of 
war to escape, etc.
25
 There was however no record on cases sentenced to death and 
executed under these charges. Any cases sentenced to death, with imprisonment 
exceeding two years or fine exceeding two thousand dollars or forfeiture of goods of 
an equivalent value required the confirmation of sentence by the Chief Civil Affairs 
Officer.
26
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Judicial hanging remained as the method of execution in Hong Kong after the War. 
However the gallows inside Stanley Prison was found to be out of order because of 
damage of the trap and the beam whilst under the Japanese occupation. Drawings had 
to be obtained from London and the gallows were repaired and readied for use on 16 
March 1946.
27
  
 
The first execution after the War was carried out at 7.02 am on 1 April 1946.
28
 The 
Military Court sentenced Prisoner 1809 Lam Tim Cheung to death for the charge of 
murder and he was the only person executed during the period of Military 
Administration. Hong Kong returned to civil administration on 1 May 1946. 
 
The last execution in Hong Kong was held at 7.01 am on 16 November 1966 on 
prisoner Wong Kai Kei, who was also sentenced to death on a charge of murder. 
According to the records kept by Stanley Prison and the Government Records Service, 
a total of 125 prisoners,
29
 all of them males, were executed inside the prison after the 
War, including twenty-four Japanese military personnel sentenced under various war 
crime charges. Apart from these twenty-four Japanese prisoners, there was only one 
out of the remaining executed prisoners bearing an English name (James Richard 
Becker) who was executed in 1955 and another executed prisoner with a non-Chinese 
name (Inouye Kanau) was a Canadian Japanese interpreter of the Japanese 
Gendarmerie who was executed in 1947 on a charge of High Treason.
30
 The 
remaining 98 executed prisoners all bore Chinese names and were aged from 20 to 67. 
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Apart from the Japanese military personnel on war crime charges, four of the 
executed prisoners were on offences of ‘High Treason’ and the rest were executed for 
‘Murder’. (List of the 125 executed prisoner in Appendix I) 
 
When prisoner George Wong was executed 10 July 1946 for High Treason, his body 
was placed in a coffin and buried at the Stanley cemetery closed to Stanley Prison. 
The burial spot was later found to be outside the area designated for deceased / 
executed prisoners. Further there were legal issues regarding the burial of the 
executed prisoner on sentences other than murder. Paragraph 4 of Ordinance No. 2 of 
1865 stipulates that “The body of every person executed for murder shall be buried in 
such place as the Governor may order, and the sentence of the Court shall so 
direct.” 31  To enable the coverage of prisoners executed for offences other than 
murder as in this case, the said Ordinance was amended in conjunction with a clear 
designated site for use as prison cemetery which was not spelt out in the legislation 
before. The designated prison cemetery site was on 13 May 1947 approved by the 
Executive Council,
32
 which locates within an enclosure of about 5,000 square feet of 
land within the boundaries of Stanley Cemetery, some 250 yards to the south of St. 
Stephen’s College Preparatory School Building in Stanley and within walking 
distance of Stanley Prison. 
 
The twenty-five Japanese military personnel were executed by the prison staff 
although they were sentenced by the War Crime Courts and were under the direct 
charge of the military whilst kept in Stanley Prison. British military personnel were 
present at their executions and their bodies, sew inside canvas, were transported from 
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Stanley to the Naval Yard at Admiralty by the military and then transferred to naval 
launch where sea burials were held in the southern waters of Hong Kong Island.
33
  
 
All other executed prisoners and those who died inside the prison with bodies not 
claimed by relatives were buried at the prison cemetery. Their graves were not 
marked and were only identified by numbered grave stones. In accordance with the 
practice in Hong Kong where burial grounds are scare, their remains were to be 
exhumed after five years. For the executed prisoners, their bones were placed inside 
urns and reburied in another section of the prison cemetery to save space. Remains of 
the executed prisoners would not be released to their relatives for fear of 
demonstrations if an execution was generally unpopular, a practice which was in line 
with that in Britain. Those prisoners buried in the prison cemetery for reasons other 
than execution could have their remains handed over to their relatives if they were 
claimed. Unclaimed bodies of this category, upon exhumation, would be cremated 
and ashes kept at Sandy Ridge cemetery, a public cemetery in the New Territories. 
The prison cemetery was fenced off in 1957 to prevent trespassing. In 1967, the 
practice of burying unclaimed prisoners who died of natural causes in the prison 
cemetery was ceased and all unclaimed deceased prisoners were removed and dealt 
with in the same way as ordinary Hong Kong citizen by the Urban Services 
Department. 
 
On 27 October 1972, the coffin section of the prison cemetery was cleared and all 
executed prisoners’ remains, except two, were located in the urn section of the prison 
cemetery.
34
 Although there had not been any execution since 1966 and the death 
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sentence was repealed in 1991, with ‘H’ Block together with the Execution Chamber 
demolished in 1996 to make way for the new Stanley Prison Hospital, the 
Correctional Services Department is still charged with the up keep of the prison 
cemetery.  
 
 
5.4 Commutation of Death Sentences and the Life Sentences  
 
The Governor of Hong Kong, under Article XV of Hong Kong Letters Patent 1917 to 
1995 “…may grant to any offender convicted of any crime or offence by any court of 
law in the Colony (other than a court martial established under any Act of 
Parliament), either free or subject to such conditions as the Governor may think fit to 
impose, a pardon or any remission of the sentence passed on such offender, or any 
respite of the execution of such sentence for such period as the Governor thinks fit, 
and may remit any fines, penalties, or forfeitures due or accrued to Us.”35 
 
Furthermore, Clause XXXIV of the Royal Instructions requires the Governor of Hong 
Kong to examine all sentences of death cases and “not to pardon or reprieve any such 
offender unless it shall appear to him expedient so to do, upon receiving the advice of 
the Executive Council thereon; but in all such cases he is to decide either to extend or 
withhold a pardon or reprieve, according to his own deliberate judgment, whether the 
Members of the Executive Council concur therein or otherwise, entering nevertheless 
on the Minutes of the Executive Council a Minute of his reasons at length, in case he 
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should decide any such questions in opposition to the judgment of the majority of the 
Members thereof.”36 
 
From available records, it is noted that not all death sentences passed by the court 
were carried out and a significant number of these cases being commuted. Chan (1988) 
in his research on Hong Kong Government’s policy on capital punishment 37 
nevertheless believed that prior to 1966 when execution was still being practiced in 
Hong Kong, the Governor seldom took pro-active action in reviewing these death 
sentence cases unless the condemned prisoners petitioned to him for clemency. When 
going through the Executive Council papers from 1954 to 1956, Chan found that all 
the fifteen petitions from the condemned prisoners during this period were turned 
down with a standard remark written in the meeting minutes that "Council advised 
and the Governor ordered that the law should take its course." 
38
 
 
In Hong Kong, as in England, the death penalty could only be passed on prisoners 
who committed the offences of treason, piracy with violence and murder.
39
 England in 
1965 had basically abolished the death penalty for murder under the Murder 
(Abolition of the Death Penalty) Act 1965 and in 1969 abolition was made permanent 
by resolution of both Houses of Parliament. Similar legislation was however not being 
initiated in Hong Kong as the government in Hong Kong had received no such 
pressure from the public to amend the existing ordinances. 
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Chan (1988) noticed that the Governor in Hong Kong had since the last execution in 
November 1966 commuted all death sentence cases to that of determined sentences.
40
 
This practice was the result of the Governor acting either on instructions from the 
Secretary of State or anticipating his adverse reactions to the infliction of the death 
penalty after it had been abolished in Britain.
41
 The commutation of death sentence 
had generated discontent and negative feelings in Hong Kong and there had been 
from time to time calls to reactivate the death sentence in Hong Kong.
42
  
 
In 1973, the Governor had taken the rare move in refusing to exercise the prerogative 
of mercy on the death sentence of Tsoi Kwok-cheung in view of the mounting public 
pressure. There was opposition to the Governor’s move and seventy signatures were 
collected from church leaders, lawyers, academics etc in Hong Kong asking the 
Queen to exercise pardon when Tsoi petitioned the Queen for clemency. There were 
on the other hand strong views expressed by the people of Hong Kong including 
students and even Buddhist leader backing the Governor’s decision.43 The Queen did 
intervene on the advice of the Secretary of State and a pardon was granted to Tsoi on 
15 May 1973.
44
 This result came as no surprise as the pro-death sentence groups in 
England were once again being defeated in the House of Common on 11 April 1973 
on the move of reintroducing death penalty in Britain.
45
  
 
This rare intervention from Britain, not based on the concern for a possible 
miscarriage of justice, was regarded by Liu (1992) as “an attempt to procure Hong 
Kong’s conformity with the United Kingdom Parliament’s decision to abolish the 
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death penalty in the United Kingdom.”46 The Chinese press in Hong Kong expressed 
great dissatisfaction with London’s interference and feared such action would fume 
up more violent crimes in Hong Kong, especially when Hong Kong had just 
commenced its Fight Violent Crime Campaign.
47
 No further attempts by the 
successive Governors in refusing to exercise the prerogative of mercy on the death 
sentences happened after 1973 “as it seems extremely unlikely that any Governor will 
risk such an open rebuff again, now that both the major political parties in Britain 
have made their position on executions clear.”48 
 
Life imprisonment was on the other hand being introduced as an alternative for some 
of the commuted death sentence cases after 1973. This move was promoted by one of 
the leading English newspaper in Hong Kong with its editorial commenting the jurors 
were reluctant to convict murder charges and preferred to opt for the lesser charge of 
manslaughter for which they do not have to pass the mandatory death sentence to the 
convicted murderers.
49
  With an increase of serious crimes in Hong Kong, the 
demands from the community, including Legislators, The Hong Kong General 
Chamber of Commerce and civic groups to resume capital punishment were raised 
time and again.
50. A senior police officer on the other hand commented that “the 
desire for the death penalty is motivated by social vengeance not justice” as the 
murder cases in Hong Kong had in fact dropped from 115 to 110 and 102 cases in 
1972, 1973 and 1974 respectively.
51
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The public sentiment in favour of resuming capital punishment in Hong Kong was 
addressed by the Colonial Secretary at the Legislative Council meeting held in 
November 1975. He remarked that the “great majority of the Hong Kong population 
are convinced that the death penalty would serve as a substantial deterrent to violent 
crime. It is also the common view that even if it does not deter, then it should be 
imposed as a measure of the outrage of the community and because it is widely 
believed that evil conduct should be visited by punishment.”52 
 
The Colonial Secretary on the other hand explained to the Legislators the practical 
difficulties on why capital punishment could not be re-activated in Hong Kong owing 
to the opposition in England, in particular views of the House of Commons. As 
condemned prisoners could petition to the Queen for clemency and her decision 
would have to be based on the advice of the Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, who, in making his advice to the Queen, had to take heed of 
the reaction of the Parliament. It was of the opinion that “they would not be supported 
in the House of Commons if they were to advise that death sentences should be 
carried out in Hong Kong. Moreover, there are no signs that this attitude of the 
House of Commons is likely to change in the immediate future.”53 To address the 
concerns in Hong Kong, the Colonial Secretary raised the motion in the Legislative 
Council in 1975 that: 
 
 "In future, whenever he commutes a death penalty, the Governor will 
impose the alternative punishment of life imprisonment, unless, in 
exceptional circumstances, he feels able to accept advice from Executive 
Council that a lesser sentence should be imposed."
54
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The Attorney General further clarified that life sentence “will mean precisely what it 
says and a prisoner will not be released to society again for the term of his natural 
life. The only exception will be where there are very compelling humanitarian 
grounds.”55 
 
 
5.5 Debates on Executions in Hong Kong 
 
This assurance from the Attorney General however was unable to pacify the local 
community. The calls for bringing back the death penalty were sounded out from time 
to time and were even taken up with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 
London but the pleas from the community leaders were rejected.
56
 
 
The legal quarter also criticized Hong Kong’s approach to sentencing the murderers 
as unofficial repeal of the law without the necessary legislative process being 
followed. When Lord Denning lectured at the University of Hong Kong in 1977, he 
commented on Hong Kong’s death penalty for murder as a farce as all murderers 
sentenced to death were granted automatic reprieve by the Governor-in-Council.
57
  
On the other hand, there was a concern that the practice of commuting the sentence of 
death penalty to life sentence would lead to the growing numbers of lifers in the 
prison and added pressure to the administration of the prison system.
58
 The latter 
remark was also echoed by the prison administrators at the time. The then 
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Commissioner of Prisons, even up to 1980, still expressed his support in carrying out 
death penalty in Hong Kong.
59
  
 
The hope for bringing back the death penalty to Hong Kong was once again raised 
when Margaret Thatcher became the Prime Minister in the United Kingdom in view 
of her pro death penalty attitude.
60
 When the House of Common again voted to drop 
the death penalty in the United Kingdom, two of the local urban councillors urged the 
Hong Kong Government not to follow the decision of the British Parliament as “it 
was a Chinese tradition to execute people convicted of homicide and South East Asian 
countries with large Chinese population saw harsh penalties effective in fighting 
crime.”61 
 
Every time when there were noise from Britain calling for reinstating the death 
penalty, hopes were raised in Hong Kong for bringing back the death penalty. 
However such hopes were turned into disappointment as the House of Common had 
voted down such appeals again and again. With the belief that death penalty would 
never be carried out again in Hong Kong, Sir Alan Huggins, the Acting Chief Justice 
remarked that the pantomime of the death sentence only brings the law into disrepute 
and considered the courts not the place for pantomime
62
 and even called for the 
removal of death penalty from Hong Kong’s statute law books as soon as possible.63 
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Though the call for ending the death penalty was supported by Legislator Lydia Dunn 
and the leading English newspaper,
64
 the community on the other hand also felt that 
death penalty could deter crime and the police even blamed the increase of violent 
crime the result of the suspension of the death penalty in Hong Kong.
65
 When 
convicting the “Hong Kong Butcher”, a taxi driver who murdered and butchered four 
females, the community’s outcry was to carrying out death penalty onto this evil 
person.
66
 
 
The Hong Kong Government’s position on death penalty at this juncture could best be 
summarized by the Attorney General Michael Thomas, himself an abolitionist, at the 
Legislative Council meeting in 1983 that: 
 
“I have previously made known my personal conviction that society has no 
right deliberately and in cold blood to kill one of its members unless there 
is some necessity for doing so. And so long as there is the fearful prospect 
of life imprisonment, there is no need to kill merely to punish. Equally I 
have previously made known that I share Miss DUNN’s concern that in 
retaining capital punishment, we unfairly impose upon judges and those 
who guard condemned prisoners under sentence of death awesome and 
morbid responsibilities. 
 
But given the feelings of the ordinary people of Hong Kong and of 
Parliament in Westminster, I can see no immediate prospect of action here 
in Hong Kong to satisfy either of Miss DUNN’s demands. The Government 
therefore takes note of her points but the political realities are well known 
to her and indeed to all honourable Members.”67 
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5.6 Change of Sovereignty and the Death Sentence Debate  
 
The fate of Hong Kong was sealed with the Draft Agreement for the return of Hong 
Kong to China in 1997 signed on 26 August 1984. With the understanding that Hong 
Kong would become A Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China, there was a 
general believe that death penalty would remain in Hong Kong until and after the 
handing over of the sovereignty. Whether death penalty would be carried out after 
1997 should be a matter to be decided by the future Chief Executive of the Hong 
Kong SAR Government.
68
 
 
In December 1986, the leading English newspaper in Hong Kong conducted a survey 
and found that 68% of the Hong Kong population supported the restoration of the 
death penalty on convicted murderers and another 15% might or might not support the 
death penalty depending on the nature of the crime.
69
 With the findings of the survey, 
the newspaper further suggested referendum on death penalty to end this “official 
hypocrisy and charade”.70 
 
These pro death penalty sentiments had, on the other hand, caused great concerns on 
the condemned prisoners whose death sentences were yet to be commuted by the 
Governor of Hong Kong as well as those prisoners with death sentences already 
commuted to life sentences. They were concerned on their fate after 1997 as nothing 
concrete were mentioned in the Draft Agreement with China on this matter and there 
was the high possibility that they could be executed by the future SAR Government.
71
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The Legal Department on the other hand assured that the Hong Kong Government 
would take appropriate action to deal with the 23 young murderers being sentenced 
under Her Majesty’s Pleasure with length of sentence yet to be determined by the 
Queen.
72
  
  
In Hong Kong, no young person under the age of eighteen was executed after the War. 
As to death sentences passed on young offenders, the Colonial Office in London sent 
a despatch on 22 August 1952 asking colonies and territories to give consideration to 
introduce legislation to bring their respective local law concerning passing death 
sentence for those below 18 years into line with that of the United Kingdom.
73
 Under 
Section 53(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, a person convicted of 
murder committed before reaching the age of 18 is sentenced to be detained during 
Her Majesty’s Pleasure and liable to be detained in such place and under such 
conditions as the Secretary of State may direct.
74
 
 
In Hong Kong, the Executive Council considered this matter on 21 October 1952 and 
the Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Ordinance 1952 was passed on 20 November 
1952 incorporating the English practice in dealing with young offenders committing 
murders whilst under the age of 18.
75
 This new ordinance was introduced with such 
expediency which could only be explained by the nature of its sensitivity involving 
death sentences on young persons.   
 
                                                          
72
 Ibid, 22 January 1987. 
73
 HKRS 41-1-7338. 
74
 See Home Office, (1977) Prisons and the Prisoners – The work of the Prison Services in England 
and Wales, London: HMSO, p.88. 
75
 HKRS 41-1-7338. 
 178 
The Legislative Council members were themselves also divided on the issue of the 
death penalty and the issue of carrying out the death penalty were from time to time 
brought up in the Council whenever there were increases in serious crimes. During a 
Legislative Council meeting in 1986 when options in dealing with the triad problems 
were discussed, Legislator Mrs Selina Chow Liang Shuk-yee (周梁淑怡) states that 
“it is time to seriously consider the reinstatement of the death penalty for masterminds 
of gang wars as well as syndicated drug trafficking.”76 
 
From 1987 onwards, all murderers sentenced to death were having their sentences 
automatically reviewed six months after the expiration of the appeal period if they had 
chosen not to appeal or their appeal being rejected. This arrangement would ensure all 
death sentences passed would be dealt with according to the established guideline 
leading to the commutation of sentence. 
 
During another Legislative Council session in the late 80s, the Government was again 
asked why death sentences were not being carried out in Hong Kong. The Chief 
Secretary repeated the 1975 decision on this matter by saying that there was no 
change in the House of Commons on attitudes towards death penalty at this moment 
and as such the situation in Hong Kong would remain unchanged. On the other hand 
he would not speculate on what would happen after 1997.
77
 The cultural arguments on 
death penalty was further brought up by a Chinese Legislator saying that there is the 
Chinese teaching that “the murderer deserves the death penalty” and as people of 
ethnic Chinese origin constitutes the majority of the population in Hong Kong; the 
public order policy should be in line with the Chinese ethnical thinking.
78
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Legislator Martin Lee then raised the question of why the death penalty was not 
scrapped under such circumstances and was responded to by the Chief Secretary that 
“public opinion is in favour of the death sentence” and as such it would not be 
“opportune to abolish the death penalty”. 79  As death penalty also applied to the 
offence of treason in Hong Kong, Mr Lee then raised the issue on “whether the 
government Members of this Council would be given a free vote if there is a private 
Member’s Bill proposing to abolish the death penalty” of which the Chief Secretary 
refused to respond to on the assumption that it was a hypothetical question.
80
 
 
The same issue was being played up by Legislator Lee and it was immediately 
reported by the media that a private Member’s Bill to remove death penalty would be 
raised as a safeguard to civil liberty after 1997. After all treason was still a capital 
offence and some members of the Democratic Party were being portrayed as traitors 
by their opponents.
81
 
 
Hong Kong’s return to Mainland China in 1997 suddenly became a major confidence 
crisis in Hong Kong after the Chinese Government’s forceful crack down on the 
demonstrators in Beijing on 4 June 1989. Fearing the same degree of political control 
would be exercised in Hong Kong after the handing over, there was an exodus of 
talents and capitals from Hong Kong and a special debate was held at the House of 
Commons on 13 July 1989 to find ways to restore Hong Kong people’s confidence in 
1997.
82
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The call for the abolition of the death penalty in Hong Kong picked up its momentum 
after the 1989 incident as it was feared that the Hong Kong SAR Government would 
certainly reinstate execution after 1997 when the hindrance from the House of 
Commons were gone and executions were common in China with death penalties 
covering a wide range of offences other than murder. 
83
 
 
Public opinion on the whole was still in support of having death penalty in Hong 
Kong despite the fact that China had been executing the highest number of prisoners 
amongst all countries still carrying out death penalty. The local branch of the 
Amnesty International had tried to really public support to abolish death penalty by 
calling a signature campaign in 1989 but received only lukewarm response.
84
 
According to surveys conducted by the Fight Crime Committee and the South China 
Morning Post, over 70 % of the local population want the death penalty to be kept in 
Hong Kong’s statute books with only 25% of the population in favour of abolishing 
death penalty.
85
 
 
 
5.7 The Abolition of Death Sentence in Hong Kong 
 
On 26 June 1991 legislator Kingsley Sit proposed the Member’s motion to the 
Legislative Council that “in view of the increasing concern caused by the present law 
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and order situation, this Council urges the government to resume immediately the 
carrying out of the death penalty."
86
  
 
Mr Sit’s motion was raised after a gang of five masked robbers raided five goldsmith 
shops consecutively in a busy street in Kowloon on 9 June 1991. The leader of the 
group was captured in picture waving an AK 47 assault rifle in the commission of the 
crime and fled from the scene by firing at the arriving police.
87
 A local poll was 
conducted at the district where the armed robberies took place and found 84% of the 
respondents supported death penalty.
88
 
 
It was ironic that the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance had only become law on 8 
June 1991, one day before the shoot out.
89
 The Hong Kong Bill of Rights is mirrored 
after the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) with almost 
exact wordings being used in the Bill of Rights.  Article 6 of the ICCPR which covers 
the right to life is being adopted in Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance in Hong 
Kong without amendment. Though the Article still accepts death penalty for the most 
serious crimes (S. 2) and should not be imposed on young offenders under eighteen 
years old or on pregnant women (S. 5), yet it states in S. 6 that “Nothing in this article 
shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition of capital punishment by any 
State Party to the present Covenant.”90 
 
In the Legislative Council, legislator Martin Lee tabled an amendment to counter Mr. 
Sit’s motion by proposing:  
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"That in view of both the need to deter and prevent crime and the 
importance of Hong Kong maintaining the highest standards of a modern, 
humane community, this Council urges the Government to strengthen the 
capability of the police force to fight crime and calls for legislative 
measures to be introduced into this Council which would abolish the death 
penalty and replace it with life imprisonment.”91  
 
It was a heated and emotional debate starting from half-past five in the afternoon till 
nine minutes to ten in the evening. Arguments of the pro death penalty group stressed 
that the majority of the Hong Kong people are in support of the death penalty which is 
also the traditional Chinese belief that murderers should be executed. They believed 
that only by resuming the death penalty in Hong Kong would the tide of the violent 
crime be stopped. To abolish the death penalty in Hong Kong would send a wrong 
signal to the criminals that they could kill without the fear of being sentenced to death, 
which is most unfair to the victims. 
 
The abolitionists’ arguments were mainly focused on the possibilities of wrongful 
execution of innocent persons, the unproven deterrent effect of the death penalty and 
the fear that Hong Kong, after 1997, would resume executing offenders on offences 
not limiting to murder as practiced in China. Other opinions such as those expressed 
by the Bar Association felt that the current practice of passing death penalty and then 
commuted by the Governor had already amount to a de facto abolition. Others felt 
that life sentence should have adequate deterrent effects for the potential offenders.  
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During the course of the debate, it was also revealed that “a total of 243 convicted 
murderers’ death sentence has been commuted by the Governor in Council since 1966. 
Some 28% got a jail sentence of about 20 years or more.”92 
 
Before putting the motion to vote, the Secretary for Security promised that the 
Administration would consider bringing forward legislation to abolish death penalty if 
the majority of Members of Council voted in favour of abolition. When the votes 
were cast, Legislator Martin LEE’s amendment gained the majority support of 24 
votes against 12, with another 5 abstentions from the members. 
 
A few days before this Legislative Council’s debate on death sentence, the University 
of Hong Kong organized an international conference on the Bill of Rights Ordinance 
in Hong Kong from 19-22 June 1991. The international participants attending the 
conference petitioned to the legislators by signing a letter stating that “We are people 
of many countries in Hong Kong to speak at the International Conference on the Bill 
of Rights. We believe that the death penalty is incompatible with human rights and 
that its reinstatement would be against the best interests of the people of Hong 
Kong.”93 The letter was circulated to the Legislative Council members before the 
meeting and its effect was not known as only Martin Lee had mentioned the petition 
in his speech. The editor however suggested that it was “one of the rare occasions 
when an international conference may have played some practical part in local 
lawmaking by reason of the coincidence of its concerns with proposals for law reform 
in the local legislature.”94 
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Governor Wilson when addressing the Legislative Council on the topic of rule of law 
and human rights on 31 October 1991 stated clearly for the Government “to maintain 
the confidence of the people of Hong Kong in our future, we must ensure the rule of 
law and judicial independence now and in the years beyond 1997”. Amongst other 
actions, to “Amend as soon as possible the law to replace the death sentence with life 
imprisonment”.95  However there was not much progress on this issue up till his 
departure as Governor of Hong Kong in June 1992. 
 
Chris Patten arrived in Hong Kong on 9 July 1992 as the last Governor representing 
the British Government’s interest over this colony before the handover. When 
addressing the Legislative Council the first time on 7 October 1992, he had affirmed 
his plan to abolish the capital punishment as part of his law, order and justice initiates 
by saying: 
  
“Any society based on the rule of law must ensure that its laws reflect the 
realities of contemporary life and thought. I think it is wrong in principle 
to leave laws on the statute books which are out of date, which we do not 
use and which we have no intention of using. I am referring here to the 
law on capital punishment. 
 
 On 26 June last year, the Council voted for a motion in favour of the 
repeal of capital punishment. In the debate, many Members recognised 
that laws which are not used or out of date should be repealed. We have 
therefore prepared draft legislation to replace the penalty of capital 
punishment with life imprisonment. This amending legislation will be 
presented to the Council during this new session.”96 
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The Administration, based on Martin Lee’s amendment, prepared the Crimes 
(Amendment) (No. 3) Bill 1992 and tabled it for the First and Second Reading at the 
Legislative Council on 11 November 1992.
97
 
 
The Bill proposed to abolish the death sentence currently being the mandatory penalty 
for murder, treason and piracy with violence and to be replaced by life imprisonment. 
The power of the Governor to impose death penalty under the Emergency Regulations 
would be replaced by life imprisonment as the maximum sentence. The Bill also 
proposed the trial judge to indicate in a written report the special considerations or 
mitigating circumstances and the recommended minimum sentence to be served if a 
life sentence were to be handed down. 
 
The sentence reviewing mechanism was also proposed for all life sentences to be 
reviewed by the Board of Review initially after five years and subsequently every two 
years unless the Governor directs that a case should be reviewed earlier after 
considering the trial judge’s report. As for the 32 condemned prisoners under the 
sentence of death, it was proposed that their death sentences were to be commuted to 
life imprisonment once the Bill becomes law. 
 
A Committee was set up by the Legislative Council to study the Bill in detail and 
representations were received from the Bar Association and the Law Society, both 
supporting the abolition but the Bar Association suggested to limit mandatory life 
sentence to murder cases only whilst the Law Society proposed life imprisonment 
should only be used as the maximum sentence. The Committee also received 
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representation from the Hong Kong Citizens Alliance who opposed any move in 
abolishing capital punishment.
98
 
 
Four meetings were held by the Bills Committee including meeting with the 
Administration. The Committee proposed and was eventually agreed by the 
Administration that the penalty for treason and piracy with violence should be 
changed to discretionary life sentence as these are offences of a category entirely 
different from murder and therefore not appropriate for the mandatory life sentences. 
It was also agreed that the existing review system should cover both the mandatory 
life sentence cases together with all other long sentence cases. The Bills Committee 
also felt strongly for the formalization of the Board of Review of Long Term Prison 
Sentences as it was basically an administrative tool for the government without 
legislative backing. The Administration agreed on the need for change and undertook 
to introduce a separate Bill in the 1993-94 Legislative Session.
99
  
 
When the Second Reading of the Crimes (Amendment) (No. 3) Bill was resumed on 
21 April 1993, the Chairman of the Bills Committee presented the motion and again 
there were Legislators voicing objections to the abolition of capital punishment in 
Hong Kong. Nevertheless the Bills Committee’s motion was supported by 40 votes 
against 9 votes opposing the motion.
100
 With the blessing of the Legislative Council, 
the death penalty in Hong Kong was formally removed from the laws of Hong Kong 
under the Crimes (Amendment) Ordinance 1993 which came into force on 23 April 
1993. 
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Vagg (1997) commented that this was an “unanticipated outcome of opportunistic 
and short-term politicking” of a single legislator putting forth a motion for carrying 
out execution in the midst of violent crimes and armed robberies.
101
 As death 
sentences were being routinely commuted by the Governor after 1966, it was most 
unlikely that the debate would have any effect in changing this situation but forcing 
the first group of elected legislators to show their stances on this law and order 
issue.
102
 The amendment to the motion put forth by Legislator Lee was successful not 
only because of the fear of the SAR Government reverting to the practice of carrying 
out death sentences after the handing over in 1997, but the voting of the government 
officials at the Council who had no alternative but to veto the original motion as it 
runs against the official position of the government.
103
    
 
The practice of sentencing young murderers to be detained pending Her Majesty’s 
Pleasure (HMP) was ceased in 1993 following the repeal of the death penalty in Hong 
Kong. Stanley Prison’s ‘H’ Block was demolished in 1996 and a new prison hospital 
complex was built on its site as part of the Stanley Prison re-development programme. 
 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
 
According to Amnesty International’s Death Penalty 2010 Report104, death sentences 
are still being practiced in China, Taiwan and the neighbouring South East Asian 
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countries like Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia, etc where the Chinese population is 
in dominance. China tops the table with over 1000 executions – more people than the 
rest of the world put together and Singapore having the highest execution rate in the 
world with over 400 prisoners hanged between 1991 and 2004.
105
 Hong Kong and the 
former Portugal enclave Macau, both currently being Special Administrative Regions 
of China are the only exceptions where death sentences have been abolished for all 
crimes whilst under the colonial administration. It is of particular interest to 
understand why and how Hong Kong had abolished its death sentences against penal 
populism of the majorities in a Chinese society where capital punishment is deemed 
to be the proper approach in dealing with murderers. Furthermore, it is necessary to 
find out why Hong Kong, whilst a British colony, moved ahead of London in 
achieving a total abolition of death sentence. 
 
British colonies were normally given a degree of latitude in designing its law and 
order approaches as long as stability of the colonies was maintained. Directives from 
the Colonial Office were most of the time coming as advices and might not be 
followed completely especially if these were not falling with the popular expectation 
of the colony. The issue on death penalty was however different.  
 
Hong Kong since its early days under the British administration had followed closely 
the home practices in exercising this ultimate sanction openly onto the native 
population. Public execution by hanging was ceased in Hong Kong and executions 
were carried out inside Victoria Gaol following changes made in Britain where 
executions were conducted behind prison walls. Teenagers and pregnant women were 
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spared the rope according to the Western humanitarian standards which were accepted 
in this colony without much controversy. The design of Stanley Prison’s Condemned 
Block and the execution chamber together with method of execution were exact 
replica from home including the adoption of the drop table for measuring the length of 
the hanging rope ensuring the process would be conducted in a scientific and 
humanitarian manner.
 106
 
 
On the issue of death sentence for adult male murderers, the administrators in Hong 
Kong were caught between the decisions made by the House of Commons in London 
and the public sentiments in Hong Kong. With the legal framework established in this 
colony where all condemned cases were to be dealt with in London, there were no 
chances for Hong Kong to go against the practice at home in executing its prisoners 
no matter how strong the locals felt on this issue.  
 
The success of the abolitionist in the Legislative Council debate in 1991 could be 
regarded as incidental to the Legislators’ fear and uncertainty towards the future of 
Hong Kong after the 1989 Beijing Incident resulted in casting their votes against the 
wishes of the population in large.
 107
 As a colony, this course of action in abolishing 
the death sentences ahead of London, without the Beijing Incident, could not be 
imagined and there were speculations at the time that even though the death penalty 
was abolished in 1993, it would highly likely to be brought back after 1997 when 
Hong Kong was under the Chinese administration.
 108
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As stated by Sir Leon Radzinowicz, “Capital punishment was both a penal and 
humanitarian issue, but it was also a social-political issue with a deep and clear-cut 
split along the traditional lines of party allegiance.”109 Formulation and development 
of the penal policy regarding death sentence in Hong Kong, as seen in this case, was 
an extra-ordinary event and could only occur in a colony caught between the cultural 
and social norms of the East and West and fumed by the uncertainty of the handing 
over of the colony back to China where death sentences are deemed as necessity in 
maintaining State security and prosperity. The same analogy however could not be 
applied to the penal policy on corporal punishment in Hong Kong, which will be the 
subject of discussion for the next Chapter.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
109
 Radzinowicz, L. (1999) op cit., p. 247. 
 191 
Chapter Six 
Corporal Punishment in Hong Kong 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In this Chapter, corporal punishment refers to corporal punishment passed down by 
court as sentences to either adult or young offenders. The Chapter also includes 
corporal punishment administered on prisoners as awards for breach of prison 
discipline.  
 
Corporal punishment, like capital punishment, had been a controversial form of 
punishment in Hong Kong. Not only it was one of the punishments which involved 
the infliction of violent physical pain and suffering onto the offenders, it also 
demonstrated differences in penal philosophy regarding punishment between the 
locals in Hong Kong and Britain on the use of the cane. Corporal punishment would 
still be regarded by some of the Hong Kong residents as the most effective means of 
punishment for the deterrence of crime whilst those opposing corporal punishment 
would consider this an uncivilized and barbaric form of regressive punishment 
without any element of rehabilitation for the offender. 
 
Unlike the case of capital punishment where it is still being practiced in China and 
Taiwan, judicial corporal punishment had never been incorporated in the criminal law 
of the People’s Republic of China or Taiwan as one of the sentencing options. In fact 
judicial corporal punishment was eliminated from the list of criminal penalties as 
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early as in 1909 during the Qing Dynasty when China was at the time launching the 
campaign to pick up the Western ideas in punishment and to modernise its criminal 
codes.
1
 Interestingly corporal punishment is still being practiced in Malaysia and 
Singapore in this part of the world; both were former British colonies which gained 
their independent state status in the 1960s. 
 
This Chapter covers the history and development of policies governing corporal 
punishment in Hong Kong with details on how corporal punishment was administered 
inside the penal institutions. Possible arguments are presented to explain why Hong 
Kong, as a British colony, did not follow suited Britain’s move in the abolition of 
corporal punishment under the Criminal Justice Act 1948 but preferred the use of the 
cane on criminals as punishment. Further arguments are made to explain why Hong 
Kong adopted the differential approach towards physical punishment allowing 
corporal punishment to be in practice in Hong Kong up to 1989 until its repeal from 
the statute on 1 November 1990, whilst capital punishment had ceased in operation 
more than twenty years earlier in 1966. 
 
 
6.2 Corporal Punishment in Hong Kong prior to 1941 
 
Corporal punishment was one of the earliest forms of punishment adopted by the 
British colonial administrators in Hong Kong. Munn (1995) suggested that at the very 
beginning when the British took possession of Hong Kong in 1841, Captain Caine, 
                                                          
1
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the Chief Magistrate of Hong Kong, adopted a tough stance on law and order in the 
colony to prevent the collapse of British rule by employing a range of repressive and 
discriminatory measures.
2
 The Magistrates’ Warrants of 1841 and 1842 permitted him 
“to inflict on Chinese offenders sentences of imprisonment with or without hard 
labour of up to three months (increased to six months in May 1842), fines of up to 
$400, and corporal punishment of up to one hundred lashes.”3  
 
In January 1844, nine pirates were sentenced to five years imprisonment with hard 
labour and were in addition directed to “receive 100 strokes during each year of their 
confinement within the 1
st
 and 6
th
 Months on such day as the Chief Magistrate may 
appoint; that they shall stand in the Pillory (Cangue) for an hour on each occasion 
before they are flogged with labels on their breasts descriptive of their crime and 
sentence; that at the expiration of the full period of imprisonment they shall be turned 
off the island and warned if they are ever again found in the Colony they will be 
confined for life.” 4 
 
These exemplary punishments were accepted by the Colonial Office at the time as 
they believed that “W[w]e have there to do with people for whom our Penal Law has 
no adequate terror and to whom it is barely applicable and yet there is no possibility 
of enforcing their Law by British Courts and Officers without a compromise of 
principles which we are bound to maintain inviolate.”5  
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5
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The Supreme Court of Hong Kong was set up in 1844 with the first criminal session 
held in October of the same year.
6
 However the establishment of the Supreme Court 
did not seem to slow down the passing down of the sentence of flogging by the lower 
courts and flogging was commonly used to control the vagrants that were attracted to 
Hong Kong when the colony began to prosper. Section 5 of the Police Court 
Ordinance No. 6 of 1847 authorized “corporal punishment to the extent of 60 stripes, 
to be inflicted with a cane or rattan with the addition that persons unable to give a 
satisfactory account of themselves were liable, if unregistered, to be sent out of the 
island.”7  
 
The early law enforcement actions were mainly targeting the Chinese population; not 
only because they dominated the population of the colony, but they were in general 
being “criminalised as a community in the eyes of the Europeans”.8A number of 
Ordinances were enacted aiming specifically on the Chinese such as the Suppression 
of the Triad Society Ordinance (12 of 1845); Ordinance to regulate the Chinese 
certain nuisances within the colony of Hongkong (12 of 1856); Ordinance for 
regulation of the Chinese people, and for other purposes of Police (8 of 1858); 
Ordinance to make provision for the more effectual suppression of piracy (1 of 1868);  
Ordinance to empower the Supreme Court to direct offenders to be whipped and to be 
kept in solitary confinement in certain specified cases (3 of 1868); Ordinance to make 
provision for the branding and punishment of criminals in certain cases (4 of 1872); 
Ordinance to amend and consolidate the laws concerning the jurisdiction of 
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magistrates over indictable offences and for other purposes (16 of 1875); and 
Ordinance to consolidate and amend the Ordinances relating to deportation, 
conditional pardons, the branding and punishment of certain criminals (8 of 1876).
9
 
 
The situation was only rectified in 1881 when Governor Hennessy took the initiative 
to correct the situation and proposed the “Branding Ordinances, and all Ordinances 
imposing flogging on the Chinese race exclusively, be repealed; that public flogging 
and flogging Chinese on the back be abolished, and that no flogging be allowed in 
Hongkong except for such offences as would entail flogging in England.”10 
 
Corporal punishment was declining rapidly in England as court sentence for 
punishment since 1900 when whipping constituted only 7% of the total punishment in 
the year. The figure further dropped to 3% in 1910, 1 % in 1924 and 0.2% in 1936.
11
 
Examining the crime of robbery with violence and the number of offenders flogged 
for this offence during the period from 1863-1936, a British research found “there is 
no evidence that the infliction of corporal punishment has in any way acted as a 
deterrent to prevent others from committing such crimes.” 12  The situation was 
however very different outside Britain and the frequent use of corporal punishment on 
its colonial subjects had raised concern in London. 
 
Corporal punishment was also widely used inside the Victoria Gaol in Hong Kong for 
maintaining gaol discipline. In 1896 a prisoner was alleged to have died inside the 
gaol as a result of repeated flogging received inside the gaol for refusing to work. This 
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incident together with other allegations on the use of corporal punishment inside the 
gaol had resulted in the appointment of a Committee by the Governor to enquire into 
the question of flogging inside Victoria Gaol.
13
 
 
The Colonial Office in 1939 called for returns from all colonies on their respective 
administration of corporal punishment and their views held on it. Replies from the 
colonies were studied by the Advisory Committee on Penal Administration in London 
and found that in many cases the colonial law permits corporal punishment for adults 
for a wide selection of offences. However relatively few adults actually received 
corporal punishment and the general consensus was that it should be used only for 
serious offences. On the other hand, corporal punishment was used more frequent on 
young offenders by courts in lieu of imprisonment when there were no alternative 
punishments available. As for prisoners in breach of prison discipline, corporal 
punishment could be awarded for a wide variety of prison offences in some 
Dependencies. There was however no evidence to indicate corporal punishment was 
frequently used for trivial offences and the consensus for the colonies was to retain 
corporal punishment for prisoners only on serious offences against prison discipline.
14
 
 
Although the Committee considered that “the gradual abolition of corporal 
punishment as a sentence of the Court should be aimed at”15 but “the time is not ripe 
for this in the Colonial Empire” in view of its value as a deterrent. Instead the 
Committee issued general guidance and standards for the colonies which included 
limiting the use of corporal punishment only for serious offences against persons 
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involving the use of violence; and sentences of corporal punishment imposed by 
inferior courts to be confirmed by the High Court or reported to the Chief Justice after 
infliction.
16
 
 
The Committee also recommended that only approved instruments, the ‘cat’ or the 
cane should be used for corporal punishment. The ‘cat’ should be administered on the 
back of the offender and the cane on their buttocks and the concerned offenders must 
be examined by the medical officer prior to the punishment. The maximum 
punishment should be 24 strokes and the cat should not be used on offenders under 
the age of 18.  
 
For boys under the age of 16, the Committee recommended that corporal punishment 
should continue as a court sentence in the absence of alternative forms of punishment 
other than imprisonment. A light cane of an approved pattern should be used and 
administered on the buttock with a maximum of 12 strokes. The Committee however 
felt that “the gradual replacement of corporal punishment by supervision, either in 
suitable reformatory schools or by probationary officers, or by other means, should 
be aimed at.”17 
 
The Committee also considered the use of corporal punishment for prisoners in breach 
of prison discipline and recommended corporal punishment to be limited as awards 
for only three types of prison offences as specified by the United Kingdom 
Departmental Committee, which were mutiny, attempted mutiny and violence 
towards officers of the prison service. The maximum awards for adult prisoners 
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should be 24 strokes by the ‘cat’ or the cane, and 12 strokes of the cane for prisoners 
under the age of 18.
18
 
 
Finally, the Committee recommended that corporal punishment by light cane could be 
awarded by the officer in charge on juveniles detained in the reformatory institutions 
or approved schools. A maximum of 12 strokes should be administered and all 
corporal punishment administered should be reported to the Governor at suitable 
intervals.
19
 
 
Lord Lloyd in the despatch conveyed these recommendations to the colonies and was 
pleased to note that there was a decreasing trend in the use of corporal punishment in 
the colonies without the corresponding increase of crimes, and hoped the respective 
colonial governments would “see its ways to adopt these proposals and to make any 
legislative changes as opportunity offers.” He further suggested that there remained 
the need “to scrutinize very carefully any deviations from the lines which public 
criticism and expert advice have combined to lay down in England as being 
reasonable, and such as most right-minded men would approve”.20  
 
Hong Kong in 1939 recorded 352 corporal punishments ordered by the courts and 
administered by the prison authority at Stanley Prison. Furthermore, there were five 
prisoners caned for breach of prison discipline during the year.
21
 This was during the 
time of the Sino-Japanese war when tens of thousands of refugees fled to Hong Kong 
causing major social as well as law and order problems for the colony. The prisons in 
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Hong Kong were severely overcrowded with daily average prisoner number exceeded 
3,000 and the Administration had to arrange premature release of prisoners to bring 
down the prisoner population.
22
 
 
Despite such difficult conditions inside the prisons, the Prison Rules were amended in 
1940 to limit the punishment of corporal punishment to the following four types of 
prison offences should other forms of punishment considered ineffective by the 
Commissioner of Prisons:
23
 
(a) repeated serious offences against prison discipline; 
(b) personal violence to any person; 
(c) grossly abusive or offensive language; or 
(d) any act of grave misconduct or insubordination. 
 
For male adult prisoners, the maximum number of strokes was 24, either with a light 
cane or rattan, or ‘cat-o’-nine’ tails. For juveniles, the maximum award was twelve 
strokes by light cane or rattan. 
 
 
6.3 Corporal Punishment in Hong Kong after 1945 
 
From the Commissioner of Prisons report to the Colonial Secretary on 22 August 
1951, details of corporal punishment practiced in Hong Kong after the Second World 
War was reported.
24
  
                                                          
22
 Ibid,  p. L2. 
23
 Gazette Amendment No. 119 of 2 February 1940. 
24
 Minutes dated 22 August 1951 from Commissioner of Prisons JT Burdett to Hon. Colonial Secretary, 
HKRS 41-1-1425-1. 
 200 
It was recorded that between 1946 and 22 August 1951, 1,167 male adults and 
juveniles received corporal punishment administered in the prisons.
25
 The cane was 
used on all occasions except two cases of corporal punishment by the ‘Cat o’nine 
tails’ (See Picture A) in 1948, which were also the only reported occasions on the use 
of the ‘Cat o’nine tails’ after the War. 26 In 1957 the ‘cat’ was officially abolished for 
use in flogging in Hong Kong.
27
 
 
The sealed pattern of the cane, submitted by the Commissioner of Prisons, was 
approved by the Governor on 16 February 1950. The specifications of the cane were 4 
feet in length and must pass through a metal gauge 5/8
th
 of an inch in diameter.
28
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Picture A  
Cat O’Nine Tails used for corporal punishment in Hong Kong. 
 
(Item currently kept at the Hong Kong Correctional Services Museum, photo-personal 
collection.) 
 
Prison officers who volunteered to administer corporal punishment were given 
trainings and practiced on the padded bag under the instruction of a senior officer. 
The officer eventually selected for this duty needed not be ‘big and strong’ but must 
be able to perform the task efficiently. It was also commented that if the officer tasked 
with the administration of corporal punishment “was gaining some form of 
satisfaction from this duty, he would be taken off it at once. This course has never 
been necessary. It is in fact difficult to find flogging officers, and those who perform 
the duty do so unwillingly.”29 
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The report also described how corporal punishment was administered in the prison by 
first having the prisoner certified fit to receive the punishment by the prison Medical 
Officer. The Superintendent of the prison, the Chief Officer, the Medical Officer and 
the hospital supervisor were all required to attend corporal punishment. As a general 
rule there were two flogging officers in attendance as the work would be exhausting 
and there were always a number of prisoners to be flogged at any one time. 
 
After checking the warrant of punishment, the prisoner would be fastened to the 
“flogging horse” (See Picture B & C) with ankles strapped to prevent kicking. He 
would be bent over an adjustable padded bar, arms extended with wrists strapped to a 
cord to prevent movement. With the buttocks uncovered, a thick canvas belt would 
secure over the small of the back to prevent injury in the event of a misdirected stroke. 
 
When the prisoner was in position, caning would be inflicted stroke by stroke as the 
number was called out by the Chief Officer. The prisoner would be released from the 
“flogging horse” immediately after the last stroke to receive medical treatment. Those 
sentenced solely to corporal punishment would be released from the prison 
immediately after receiving medical attention. Prisoners sentenced to both corporal 
punishment and imprisonment would remain in the cell for 24 hours after punishment 
and thereafter to receive treatment twice daily from the prison hospital as per 
instruction of the prison Medical Officer. Records shown that no prisoner required 
hospitalization after the corporal punishment and there was only one case when the 
Medical Officer had to stop the corporal punishment on medical grounds during the 
period from 1946 to 1951.
30
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The Medical Officer of Stanley Prison gave a vivid account in his report the effect of 
corporal punishment on prisoners after witnessing 768 floggings from 1948 to 1952 
and stressed that there was no evidence to suggest there were long term physical or 
mental damage to the offenders being flogged. The actual floggings were nevertheless 
bloody and painful as described in the Medical Officer’s account: 
 
 “One stroke would produce an immediate wheal ½” wide with 
excoriation of the skin, and bruising of the skin sets in within a matter of 
seconds, with some capillary bleeding. Six strokes of the cane, causes ½  
the surface area of the buttocks to be thus affected, and 18 to 24 strokes 
would cause almost the whole surface area of the buttocks to be bruised, 
excoriated, and bleeding.” 31 
 
With the immediate application of sterile antiseptic power on the wounds of the 
prisoner after flogging, it was reported that there were very few complications 
developed on the wounds which would normally took one to three weeks to heal 
depending on the number of strokes inflicted. 
 
The Medical Officer further opined that the maximum sentence of 24 strokes were 
excessive and did not serve the purpose of corporal punishment. “After receiving 18 
strokes, the whole buttocks is numbed, as the nerve cells, and the nerve fibres relaying 
the sensations of pain are “paralyses”, and further flogging inflicted little or no pain 
at all, apart from the unnecessary further bruising which has only a delaying effect on 
healing of the wounds.”32 
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Corporal punishment was repealed in Hong Kong on 1 November 1990, shortly 
before the Hong Kong Bill of Rights became law on 8 June 1991. Appendix J shows 
the number of offenders sentenced to corporal punishment in Hong Kong from 1945 
to 1990. Statistics on corporal punishment in Hong Kong were scattered between 
different Government departments and despatches and could varied greatly. To allow 
better understanding on the extended on the use of corporal punishment in post War 
Hong Kong, the major sources where these statistics derived were listed side by side 
for reference. One possible explanation for these varied statistics on corporal 
punishment was the lack of centralized criminal statistics at the time. The Prisons 
Department was only interested in statistics on corporal punishment inflicted inside 
the prison whereas court statistics would include those sentenced solely to corporal 
punishment with the sentences executed inside the court house.  
 205 
Picture B  
Flogging Horse used for Young Offenders in Hong Kong 
 
  
(Item currently kept at the Correctional Services Museum, photo-personal collection.) 
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Picture C  
Flogging Frame and Cane used for Adult Offenders in Hong Kong 
 
(Item currently kept at the Correctional Services Museum.)  
Photo: Sinclair, K. (1999), Society’s Guardian, Kevin Sinclair Associates: Hong 
Kong, p. 23. 
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6.4 Corporal Punishment Policy in Post War Hong Kong  
 
There were strong Colonial Office influences on the colonial penal policies 
immediately after the War. One of the Colonial Office’s main concerns was the 
increasing use of corporal punishment in the colonies and this had become “the 
subject of considerable criticism, both in Parliament and other quarters at the present 
time.” 33 
 
To enable the Colonial Office to monitor the extend of corporal punishment being 
applied in the Colonies,  Circular dated 9 May 1946 was sent from Downing Street to 
the Governors calling for the colonies to submit returns on corporal punishment.
34
 
The calling of returns on corporal punishment was a practice started in 1937 but 
ceased in 1940.
35
  
 
In October of the same year, the Colonial Office issued another despatch to the 
colonies to reaffirm Britain’s wish to reduce and restrict the use of corporal 
punishment in the colonies. Basing on the recommendations of the Treatment of 
Offenders Sub-Committee and the Social Welfare Advisory Committee, Downing 
Street urged colonial governments that “the power of inflicting corporal punishment 
should be diminished as regards both juvenile and adult male offenders”.36 
 
In specific terms, the Committee recommended that corporal punishment should be 
abolished for juveniles under 16 and this punishment should be replaced by probation 
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or reformatory training. For adult offenders, only the Supreme Court should have the 
power to hand down corporal punishment as sentence in the colonies. Prisoners 
should only be awarded corporal punishment on the three types of serious breach of 
prison disciplines as covered in Lord Lloyd’s earlier despatch. Furthermore, no 
corporal punishment should be awarded to males over the age of 45.
37
 
 
As Hong Kong had just been through the war followed by Japanese occupation for a 
period of three years and eight months, it was quite natural that the rectification of the 
corporal punishment would not hold a high priority in the agenda of the Hong Kong 
Government in 1946. Other British colonies affected by the Second World War were 
also facing similar difficulties whilst trying to rebuild their cities. The Colonial Office 
was however facing much stronger pressure at this time to persuade the colonies to 
drop the sentence of judicial corporal punishment from the court as the British 
Government had already removed corporal punishment as a court sentence under the 
Criminal Justice Act 1948.
38
  
 
Hong Kong had in fact looked into the issue of corporal punishment as pressed by the 
Colonial Office. Mr. T.M. Hazlerigg, Chairman of the Child and Juvenile Welfare 
Committee in Hong Kong, reported to the Colonial Secretary on 6 December 1946 
regarding the Committee’s views on corporal punishment to juveniles in Hong Kong. 
It was reported that “the Committee is in complete agreement with the view that 
corporal punishment is not in the majority of cases a desirable or effective deterrent 
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38
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personally by the Secretary of State. The maximum award is 18 strokes by cat o- nine tails (on back) or 
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to juvenile offenders.” However opinion was divided on the question whether 
corporal punishment to juveniles should be abolished immediately.
39
  
 
It is of interest to note that four members of the Committee, the Rt. Rev. Bishop of 
Victoria, the Hon. Director of Medical Services, the Acting Superintendent of Prisons 
and Dr. Thomas were those strongly in favour of the immediate abolition of corporal 
punishment on reason that corporal punishment to juveniles “has no good effect and 
frequently does harm”. 40  The remaining five members, the Hon. Secretary for 
Chinese Affairs, the Commissioner of Police, the Director of Education, the Rev. 
Father Ryan and the Chairman were the ones against immediate abolition believing 
that “the time is not yet ripe for the abolition of corporal punishment in this Colony 
because of conditions which are peculiar to Hong Kong and because of present lack 
of other sanctions for the maintenance of law and order.”41 The Administration did 
not accept the Committee’s recommendation and corporal punishment continued to be 
handed down by the courts in Hong Kong. 
 
The continued use of corporal punishment in the British colonies and Territories had 
turned the British Commonwealth in 1950 “one of the few remaining groups which 
made extensive use of corporal punishment that had been discarded by the majority” 
and that the United Nations had passed a resolution recommending the immediate 
abolition of corporal punishment in all Trusted Territories.
42
 Although this UN 
resolution was resisted by the United Kingdom delegation, the issue of corporal 
punishment in the British colonies had become a matter of concern and 
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 Circular Despatch dated 1 August 1950 from Mr James Griffith, HKRS 41-1-1425-1, Appendix C. 
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embarrassment for the British Government as well as drawing unnecessary attention 
to the post-War international community keen on the decolonization agenda. 
 
The new Secretary of State James Griffith on 1 August 1950 issued another despatch 
to the colonies
43
 drawing their attention to this new situation regarding corporal 
punishment. Apart from reaffirming the British Government’s interest in seeing the 
scaling down and eventual abolition of the corporal punishment from the colonies, he 
suggested the colonies to consider setting up local committees with majority 
membership from the locals along the earlier Cadogan Committee
44
 to look into the 
issues on corporal punishment. 
 
Killingray (1994) commented that the response from the colonies on Colonial 
Office’s call for the abolition of corporal punishment “was often strongly resisted and 
slow to be implemented”.45 This remark was also true for Hong Kong at the time as 
corporal punishment was being frequently used during the immediate years after the 
War as shown in Appendix J. In London, the House of Lords raised the issue of 
corporal punishment in Hong Kong in 1951 as figures showed that Hong Kong had 
the second highest figures of corporal punishment in the colonies, only after Nigeria. 
It was reported that 405 juvenile offenders received corporal punishment in 1950, 
already a significant decrease from 4,367 in 1949, of which most of them were 
flogged for non-criminal types of offences such as obstruction by hawking.
46
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Governor Grantham on 25 September 1951 requested the Chief Justice to comment on 
Secretary Griffith’s despatch. After a lapse of over a year and in his reply to the 
Colonial Office on 20 November 1951, he stated Hong Kong’s position on corporal 
punishment as: 
 
“In brief, I hope that in the course of time it may be possible to abolish the 
use of corporal punishment. I consider that corporal punishment must be 
retained at present for offences involving brutality, violence or threat of 
violence or which may endanger public tranquility. I intended to appoint a 
Committee to consider for which offences corporal punishment of adults 
may safely be abolished. It will be necessary to retain corporal 
punishment for juveniles as at present, but I trust that infliction may 
decrease as various institutions for dealing with juvenile delinquency get 
into their stride. I am of the opinion that corporal punishment for prison 
offences must be retained.”47 
 
The Committee on Corporal Punishment was eventually formed in March 1952 with 
members appointed by the Governor. The Committee was chaired by the Secretary for 
Chinese Affairs with other members including a judge, the Commissioner of Prisons, 
the Deputy Commissioner of Police, a Magistrate and a local Chinese businessman.
48
 
 
The Terms of Reference for the Committee were however confined to corporal 
punishment on adult offenders and did not touch the issue of corporal punishment for 
the juveniles. Membership of the Committee was also deviated from the Colonial 
Office guideline for having locals as majorities in the Committee. The 
Administration’s explanation was that “since the Committee contained representatives 
of the Police, Prisons, Magistracies and the Supreme Court as well as persons who by 
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race and long residence in the Colony were competent to put forward the view of the 
Chinese population, there would be little point in inviting evidence from members of 
the public which, in existing circumstances in this Colony, was unlikely to be more 
than an expression of personal opinion without practical experience of the problems 
under review.”49 
 
This line of thinking was further elaborated by Goodstadt (2005) saying: 
“Thus, until late in the colonial era, Hong Kong was under the almost 
personal rule of a handful of foreigners whose individual characters and 
preconceptions mattered because they determined the content as well as 
the style of government.”50 
 
The Committee submitted its report on 19 January 1953 after extensive review on the 
type of offences punishable by the sentence of corporal punishment taking particular 
note of the crime situation in Hong Kong. (Schedule of offences for which adult 
flogging was an authorized sentence are listed in Appendix K for reference) Taking 
the offence of ‘larceny’ as an example, the Committee felt that because it was 
customary for the Chinese women to wear jewellery and other ornaments on their 
persons and created great opportunities and temptation to ‘snatch, “society in Hong 
Kong requires for its protection something more than a prison sentence to deter 
would-be offenders. The Committee feels that, if there is to be a programme of 
gradually reducing the number of “floggable” offences, then the offence of Larceny 
from the Person should be amongst the last to be considered.”51 
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The Committee however agreed that “the ultimate aim of the legislature should be the 
total abolition of corporal punishment” but this should not be considered “until social 
conditions were far more stable than they are at present in Hong Kong and had been 
remained so for a number of years.” 52 The Committee, apart from recommending the 
‘cat’ be abolished as an instrument of flogging, also agreed on the following points: 
 (a) that it would be safe to recommend abolition now in the case of 
certain offences; 
(b) that a general guiding principle should be to retain corporal 
punishment for the present in the case of crimes of violence or the threat of 
violence; 
(c) that in the case of other offences (e.g. certain offences under the 
Protection of Women and Juveniles Ordinance) the Committee feel they 
can make no recommendation now, but that the question should be 
reviewed in 5 years time, by which time more statistics will be available on 
which to base a recommendation.
53
 
 
These recommendations received mixed response from the Chief Justice, the 
Commissioner of Police and the Attorney General in Hong Kong. The latter in 
particular believed that total abolition of corporal punishment was not the appropriate 
approach as this punishment was “definitely feared by the criminal classes.” Whereas 
the Commissioner of Police believed that abolition could only be contemplated when 
alternative sentencing options with deterrents like Detention Centre, Borstal and 
Corrective Training and Preventive Detention similar to that of the United Kingdom 
were available in Hong Kong. The reduction of the maximum number of strokes from 
24 to 18 was however accepted.
54
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The agreed recommendations eventually led to the enactment of the Corporal 
Punishment Ordinance 1954 and the Magistrates (Amendments) (No. 2) Ordinance 
1954 for abolishing corporal punishment for adults in certain non-violent offences and 
restricting the use of corporal punishment. There were further amendments on the law 
governing corporal punishment in 1955 at the requests of the Secretary of State. 
Ordinance 45 of 1955 reduced the number of strokes permissible on juveniles under 
fourteen years of age from 12 to 6; a maximum of 12 strokes for offenders aged 14 to 
16 years and to raise from 16 to 17 years the age of persons to whom the maximum 
number of strokes of 18 could be awarded; and to stipulate six weeks as the time limit 
after the determination of the proceedings for the carrying out of the sentence.
55
 
 
In 1959, another amendment was made under Ordinance 35 of 1959 to replace the 
term ‘whipping’ to that of ‘caning’. This amendment was the result of the Secretary of 
State’s directive to the colonies on 27 May 1959 requesting the colonies to consider 
replacing the words “flogging” and “whipping” by “caning”. The opening paragraph 
of the circular memorandum states:  
 
“From time to time corporal punishment in overseas territories is the 
subject of Parliamentary Questions and sensational reporting in the Press. 
Misleading impressions are created by such words as “flogging”, 
“beating” or “whipping”, when a less colourful word such as “caning” 
would more accurately describe the kind of corporal punishment which is 
actually administered to adult or juvenile offenders.”56 
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As recorded in Appendix J, the number of corporal punishment for adults had gone 
down in Hong Kong since 1960 but the use of the cane on juveniles was still very 
high even during the 60s. This situation was monitored and considered to be most 
unsatisfactory by the Colonial Office. The Secretary of State in 1965 requested “a 
review be carried out of the practice of awarding corporal punishment in Hong Kong, 
in order to assess the extent to which its use could be reduced from the present level 
or abolished altogether.”57 
 
With mounting pressures from London, the Governor appointed a new Committee in 
July 1965 to re-examine the law and practice relating to corporal punishment in Hong 
Kong. The Committee was chaired by a judge with nine members; all but two were 
government officials (a doctor and a lawyer in private practice) and half of the 
members were Chinese.
58
 
 
The Committee submitted and published its report in 1966 recommended that there 
should be a total abolition of corporal punishment for children under 14, but for 
persons over 14 the abolition should be for a trial period of three years to ease public 
concern. The Commissioner of Prisons also agreed that should corporal punishment 
be abolished in Hong Kong, his powers to award corporal punishment on prisoners in 
breach of discipline should also be revoked as this power had not been exercised since 
1952 though the courts had awarded corporal punishment to prisoners for these 
offences.
59
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Four out of the ten members of the Committee entered reservations to the Report, not 
against the long term desirability of abolishing corporal punishment, but expressing 
doubts on the timing of abolition and the adequacy of alternative penalties or 
deterrents.
60
 
 
The Administration on the other hand conducted large scale opinion surveys in the 
colony consulting organisations and individuals on the recommendations of the 
Committee and came to the conclusion that “there do not seem to be any overriding 
reasons for the abolition of corporal punishment at the present time and it would be 
wiser to retain provision for it.”61 The conclusion was also based on the fact that there 
“has been no pressure recently from the Secretary of State for any further steps 
towards the abolition of corporal punishment, nor has there been any suggestion that 
Her Majesty’s Government is being currently embarrassed in any way.”62  
 
Hong Kong at this time had encountered a major political as well as law and order 
situation as the result of the 1967 riot. Local communist supporters were influenced 
by the Cultural Revolution in the Mainland and challenged the authority of the Hong 
Kong Government through rallies, riots and later acts of terror by planting improvised 
explosive devices across the colony. Against all these backgrounds, the draft Corporal 
Punishment (Amendment) Bill 1968 aiming to consolidate the current laws relating to 
corporal punishment was put on hold by order of the Governor upon advice of the 
Executive Council.
63
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At the same time, the Administration was introducing an amendment to the Criminal 
Procedure Ordinance to ensure no offenders between the age of 16 and 21 would be 
sentenced to imprisonment unless the court has satisfied that no other appropriate 
method of dealing with him was available. A background report on the young 
offender had to be called before the sentence of imprisonment could be passed. 
 
This amendment was mirrored on a similar provision made in S.17 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1948 in England. When proposing this amendment, the Director of Social 
Welfare stated that: 
“We are not, however, proposing this amendment simply because there is a 
precedent for it in the legislation of the United Kingdom; but because we 
believe-and our belief is backed by experience-that it is true for Hong 
Kong that young offenders, involved even in serious crime, may be more 
effectively rescued from embarking upon a lifetime of crime if contacted 
with hardened criminals through imprisonment is avoided.”64 
 
With the Administration’s success in quelling the riot and gaining full control of the 
colony and the support of the community, the once shelved draft Corporal Punishment 
(Amendment) Bill 1968 was being re-examined at the Legislative Council on 17 
December 1969 with the aim to address a legal loophole where magistrates were not 
having the appropriate authority to remand the young offenders pending for appeal 
against the corporal punishment.
65
 The Bill, consolidating all existing provisions 
relating to the award of corporal punishment in Hong Kong, became law in 1970.  
 
In 1971 when the Commissioner of Police presented the crime statistics to the 
Legislative Council, the legislators noted that the crime rate for 1970 had gone up 
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significantly in Hong Kong. The rate of murder and manslaughter in 1970 had more 
than doubled and robbery cases jumped from 220 cases per year in 1961-66 to 3,000 
cases in 1970. Young persons prosecuted in 1970 for robbery was a 12 fold increase 
when compared with the early 1960 figures. The reduced use of corporal punishment 
by the courts and the restriction of sentencing young offenders to imprisonment in the 
1967 legislation were being blamed as causes for leading to this increase in crimes 
committed in particular by young people in Hong Kong.
66
 
 
The Chief Justice in his address at the Opening of the Assizes in 1971 expressed 
concern on the increase of crimes in particularly those committed by young offenders 
involving the use of offensive weapons and knives. He urged for the amendment of 
the Corporal Punishment Ordinance to enable the courts to sentence offenders over 
the age of 16 to be caned should they be convicted on offences on possession of 
offensive weapon in a public place.
67
 
 
The Government was also at this time actively considering introducing the detention 
centre programme to Hong Kong modeled after the English practice. The Attorney 
General when introducing the Detention Centres Bill to the Legislative Council in 
1972 stated that “I can assure honourable Members that it is the intention of the 
Commissioner of Prisons to submit to the Governor in Council recommendations for 
a Spartan regime, under which the detainee will be subjected to rigourous discipline 
and required to perform hard physical work, consistent with his age and state of 
health, and will be sharply dealt with for any breaches of discipline.”68 
 
                                                          
66
 Hong Kong Hansard, 6 January 1971, pp. 329-335. 
67
See Hong Kong Hansard, 24 March 1971, p. 508. 
68
 Hong Kong Hansard, 9 February 1972, p. 391. 
 219 
The Attorney General did not elaborate the meaning of “sharply dealt with” when 
detainees were found in breach of Detention Centres Rules at the Legislative Council 
and the Detention Centres Bill was passed on 15 March 1972. Records from the 
Hansard found no mentioning regarding the provision of corporal punishment as one 
of the awards for detainees found in breach of the Detention Centres Rules when this 
Bill was debated. However under the provision of the Detention Centres Regulations 
S. 16 (1) (a) as quoted below, corporal punishment was to be given as award for 
detainees found breach of discipline: 
 
“except in the case of a detainee who was stated in the detention order 
made against him to be apparently of or over 21 years of age, caning 
which shall not exceed 12 strokes with a light cane of such pattern as may 
be approved by the Governor;” 
 
Further amendment on Section 5 of the Corporal Punishment Ordinance was 
discussed at the Legislative Council on 1 March 1972. The original legislation 
provided for corporal punishment imposed by the court on an offender under the age 
of 16 to be administered in the court premises. To avoid negative publicity after the 
court caning where “photographs were published in several newspapers…showing a 
flogging horse being taken into the Supreme Court building before the caning and 
also showing the young offender leaving the court after it”,69 it was proposed that the 
court, after consultation with the Commissioner of Prisons, could order the sentence 
be carried out either at the court or in prison. Most corporal punishments thereafter 
were carried out within either the Stanley Prison or at the Lai Chi Kok Reception 
Centre. 
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During the Legislative Council discussion in November of the same year, the 
Attorney General stated that “the Government is well aware that there is not only a 
widespread demand for its use in more cases, but also a clamour for compulsory 
sentences of  corporal punishment to be imposed on persons convicted of crimes of 
violence.” 70  He further promised that the Government would give serious 
consideration for imposing compulsory corporal punishment for specific offences 
should the present trend of violence continues. 
 
On 15 December 1972, the Public Order (Amendment) (No. 2) Ordinance 1972 was 
enacted to require the courts to impose mandatory sentences of not less than 6 
months’ imprisonment or on a detention centre order for people convicted for the 
possession of offensive weapon in a public place. This Ordinance was further 
amended after six months of its operation by adding the option of corporal 
punishment as part of the mandatory sentence, and to spell out clearly that the 
magistrates could not discharge the offender or placing him on probation for such an 
offence.
71
 A Chinese legislator stated during the second reading of the Bill that: 
 
“Whilst it is distasteful in this day and age to retain on the statute book 
provisions for corporal punishment, we are again of the view that this is 
necessary in the circumstances of Hong Kong today.”72 
 
Although corporal punishment had not been awarded to adult prisoners for breach of 
prison disciplines in Hong Kong since 1951, the Prisons Department in the 1970s had 
adopted a very different approach onto the use of corporal punishment for young male 
offenders found in breach of custodial disciplines. Apart from adopting corporal 
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punishment as one type of the awards for breach of the Detention Centres Rules when 
setting up the Detention Centres in Hong Kong in 1972, corporal punishment was 
further introduced to the Training Centre programme, a programme which had been in 
existence in Hong Kong and operated successfully since 1956 without the need for 
physical punishment. 
 
The 1974 Amendments to the Training Centre Regulations
73
 had included under 
Regulations 20 (g) the power for the officer-in-charge of the Training Centres to 
award not exceeding 12 strokes of the cane on young males found in breach of Prison 
Rules. Regulations 20A further stipulates the requirements for the presence of the 
officer-in-charge and the medical officer during the infliction of the corporal 
punishment. During the fiscal year of 1974-75, 28 training Centre boys were caned 
mostly for breaching training centre offences involving violence.
74
 It was further 
reported that 89 Training Centre inmates were awarded corporal punishment in 1975.  
 
Though caning had been awarded to detainees for breach of discipline under the 
Detention Centre Ordinance since 1972, the Annual Reports of the Prisons 
Department were silent on passing corporal punishment at the Detention Centre in 
1972 and 1973. Information on caning inside the Detention Centre was first revealed 
in the 1974 Annual Report which states:  
“A good standard of discipline has been maintained with 133 breaches of 
discipline recorded as against 207 for the previous year. The most common 
punishment awarded is caning, the average number of strokes being 
2.6.”75 
 
                                                          
73
 See Hong Kong Government Gazette, Legal Notice 25/74. 
74
 Commissioner of Prisons, 1974-75 Annual Departmental Report, p. 12. 
75
 Ibid., p. 15. 
 222 
In the 1975 Annual Departmental Report, it was further reported that there were “251 
breaches of discipline recorded as against 133 for the previous year. Caning is the 
main form of punishment awarded, the average number of strokes being 2.”76 
 
The last piece of information concerning corporal punishment inside the Detention 
Centre available to the public contains in the 1976 Annual Departmental Report 
which states: 
 “No problems in control have been encountered and detainees who 
breach discipline are suitably punished. There were 225 breaches of 
discipline as compared with 251 for 1975. Five detainees were reduced in 
grade as punishment and the rest were awarded caning with a light cane; 
this is done on the buttocks with the detainee remaining fully clothed.” 77 
 
The Prisons Department only released figures in 1974, 1975 and 1976 in their Annual 
Departmental Reports regarding the use of corporal punishment on young offenders 
for breach of either the Training Centres Regulations or the Detention Centres Rules. 
No further information on caning for maintaining disciplines in the Training or 
Detention Centres were thereafter released to the public and no reasons for such 
omissions were given. 
 
Further amendments to the list of schedule offences under the Corporal Punishment 
Ordinance were made on 2 April 1975 by including the escape from prison and 
possession of offensive weapon under the Summary Offences Ordinance. The 
Attorney General when raising this motion on prison escapes stated that: 
 “During 1974 there were ten incidents of escape from prison institutions 
and five attempts, involving a total of 59 prisoners. In three of the 
incidents violence was used against prison staff. Under the existing law 
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the only penalty which can be imposed on a person convicted of escape 
from a prison is a further sentence of imprisonment of up to two years. In 
practice the sentence imposed is normally between three and fifteen 
months. This does not appear to provide an effective deterrent to escape 
attempts, particularly when those convicted are already serving long 
determinate sentences, or indeterminate sentences such as imprisonment 
for life, or detention during Her Majesty’ pleasure. It is hoped that the 
possibility of corporal punishment may prove to be a great deterrent.”78 
 
A local English newspaper in 1975 conducted a survey amongst the local Chinese 
civic leaders. Most of them welcomed the increased use of corporal punishment by 
the court lately, commenting corporal punishment was more economical and effective 
in dealing with offenders in Hong Kong especially during the time of financial 
stringency.
79
  
 
In 1975, a total of 113 offenders were ordered to be caned by the court with a total of 
876 strokes inflicted. This figure gone down steadily year after year to 20 offenders 
being caned for a total of 96 strokes in 1979, mainly on ‘possession of offensive 
weapon’ or ‘robbery’ charges.80  
 
The magistrates themselves were frustrated by the lack of sentencing options for 
offences such as ‘possession of offensive weapons’ under the Public Order Ordinance. 
The offenders could either be sentenced to imprisonment for 6 months to three years, 
or for young offenders, sentenced to the detention or training centres, or to be caned. 
On many occasions, young offenders were reluctantly given corporal punishment by 
the magistrates just to avoid placing them to custodial sentence. Some magistrates 
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even commented the corporal punishment as “barbaric and outdated” and ineffective 
in correcting people.
81
 
 
It was commented by a newspaper editorial that the negative attitudes displayed by 
the magistrates on corporal punishment would likely generate opposing feelings from 
those in favour of capital and corporal punishment who “often invoke Chinese 
customs and tradition, emphasizing that Hongkong is essentially a Chinese 
community.” The editorial further states that “the public debate over caning as part of 
Hongkong’s penal provisions is expected to revolve around whether or not the laws 
here should reflect Chinese or western – that is, British –values.” 82  In another 
newspaper’s editorial, it commented that caning “is not a deterrent, but dastardly 
retribution – and the fact our Government allows it to continue in the name of public 
opinion is not good government but moral cowardice,… Hongkong is not an Islamic 
State … Flogging young people is solving nothing, it is making the risk of violent 
crime worse.”83 
 
The Correctional Services Department in 1983 conducted a small scale study 
comparing the reconviction rates of offenders previously being sentenced to corporal 
punishment for the offence of possession of offensive weapon to those sentenced to 
imprisonment or to a detention centre. The finding indicates that “of those young 
offenders who were caned, a significantly higher proportion were subsequently 
reconvicted. For young offenders, in particular, the findings of this study were clearly 
in accord with the conclusions reached by the U.K. committees.”84 The Secretary for 
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Security however brushed aside the findings and stated that “the effectiveness of any 
punishment as a deterrent requires an assessment of its psychological effect on the 
mind of a potential criminal. It is extremely difficult any accurate statistical evidence 
to assess this effect and any assessment must ultimately contain a large element of 
subjectivity on the part of the assessor.”85 
 
When questioned by the Legislative Councillor in 1984 whether Britain had exerted 
political pressure for Hong Kong to reduce the use of corporal punishment in 
sentencing, the reply from the Secretary for Security was a straight denial saying 
“there is and can be no directive to the judiciary in H.K. from outside its own 
structure. No representations from the U.K. have been directed at the courts of H.K. 
or passed onto the courts through the Government.”86 However he did agree that 
following a case law within the European Court of Human Rights, the British 
Government had asked the Hong Kong Government to review its policy on the 
retention of corporal punishment in the local penal system, but the Hong Kong 
Government had decided that on balance it would be inappropriate to abolish this 
form of punishment in Hong Kong. 
 
However it had been reported in the press as early as 1979 that “Britain was closely 
watching Hong Kong’s progress on the issue and Whitehall would very much like to 
see the territory’s decision-makers rule against the cane.”87 
 
In 1987, it was reported that an agreement was reached in November 1986 between 
the Attorney-General’s office, the Judiciary, and the Secretary for Security that the 
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mandatory sentence of corporal punishment under the Public Order Ordinance be 
removed. It was also reported that there were strong reservations among Hong Kong 
magistrates over this mandatory sentence. One magistrate stated that “most of us 
magistrates are Westerners and virtually everyone who comes up in front of us under 
this section is Chinese. For a Westerner to sentence a Chinese to be caned in 1987 is 
politically very sensitive indeed.”88 
 
In November 1988, the issue on corporal punishment in Hong Kong was being 
brought up in the United Nations Human Rights Committee hearing when the British 
Government presented a report on conditions in Hong Kong and nine other dependent 
territories. The British Government’s report shows Hong Kong was amongst five 
other dependent territories: Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Montasarrat, Turks and 
Caicos Islands which were still having corporal punishment as part of the court 
sentences. It was recorded in the Committee’s report that “The hope was expressed by 
a member of the committee that the government of the United Kingdom would use its 
best offices in the consultation with relevant Dependent Territories so that corporal 
punishment would be outlawed  which was against both the letter and the spirit of the 
covenant.”89  
 
Following the British Government’s agreement to ratify the convention in 1988, there 
were mounting pressures for the Hong Kong Government to take appropriate actions 
to address the issue of corporal punishment for the convention’s eventual application 
in Hong Kong.
90
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It July 1989, the Security Branch and the Legal Department had completed a six-
month review on corporal punishment in Hong Kong and recommended to the 
Executive Council that caning be abolished as a judicial penalty. It was further 
reported that public opinions were mixed as they would like to see corporal 
punishment as a sentence be left on the statutes, but they also agreed that it had little 
deterrent value and should not operate as it does. Those in support of the abolition 
were, apart from the human rights activists and the social workers, were members of 
the Judiciary. Apart from the strong international pressure to support total abolition of 
the corporal punishment, there was the local consideration that caning was a British 
colonial relic and this should be removed as Hong Kong would soon to be handed 
back to the Chinese administration. 
91
 
 
The Executive Council, in August 1989, reached its decision to revoke corporal 
punishment in Hong Kong and to start the procedure in amending the law.
92
 The 
Administration admitted that “the retention of judicial corporal punishment would 
have made Hongkong vulnerable to criticism because it would contravene the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” and intended to have the 
relevant Ordinances repealed before next July. 
93
 
 
The Corporal Punishment (Repeal) Bill 1990 was tabled on the Legislative Council on 
11 July 1990 for its First and Second Reading. The Secretary of Security presented 
the Bill by saying that “the courts consider that corporal punishment is unnecessary 
and outdated, and that there are other sentencing options available which better 
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achieve the penal objectives of punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation.” 94  He 
further stated that the latter point raised by the judges was supported by the 
Administration, and even though there were strong public support for the retention of 
the corporal punishment, members of the public also considered this form of 
punishment less effective when compared with imprisonment or other forms of 
punishment.
95
 
 
The Bill went through the third reading on 31 October 1990 without amendment or 
debates from the legislators, and corporal punishment was finally repealed in Hong 
Kong on 1 November 1990, shortly before the Hong Kong Bill of Rights became law 
on 8 June 1991 and the abolition of the capital punishment on 23 April 1993.  
 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
As revealed in this Chapter, corporal punishment had been used as a tool for 
punishment all through the history of Hong Kong from 1841 till its abolition in 1990. 
This was no doubt a method of punishment brought in by the British as the Imperial 
China had already given up this punishment before Hong Kong was ceded to the 
British. 
 
Flogging, whipping or caning as corporal punishment was called at different period of 
time, were being regarded as the most economical and effective way in dealing with 
offenders in Hong Kong as prisoners would get a painful and hopefully a long lasting 
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experience which would deter them from committing crimes again. Furthermore it 
was economical to punish offenders in this way as the Administration did not have to 
waste scarce prison places for these minor offenders and the cost for sentencing 
offenders to corporal punishment was minimal. Assistant Officers of the Correctional 
Services Department selected to inflict corporal punishment in 1988 were only 
receiving a small sum of money in the name of Hardship Allowance (Management 
Consideration).
96
 
 
It is understandable why Hong Kong did not immediately follow British’s abolition of 
corporal punishment under the Criminal Justice Act 1948 as Hong Kong was at that 
time just been through its darkest moment in history. Facing a full scale war, lost in 
battle and under enemy occupation; the colony was struggling to be back on its feet 
after the war and the cat and the cane were extensively used for maintaining law and 
order in the streets. 
 
However when the colony had settled down in the 1950s, there was no indication for 
the Administration to give up the cane despite pressure from the Colonial Office in 
London. The excuse was that the time was not yet ready for the abolition of the 
corporal punishment. Unlike the sentence of capital punishment where London could 
legally influence the sentence, corporal punishment, though against the British 
practice, could not be officially condemned without the fear of being criticized of 
jeopardizing Hong Kong’s judicial independency.  
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Nevertheless the Colonial Office was still able to flex its influence over the 
Administrators in Hong Kong in the beginning by pressing the colonies to rectify the 
nomenclature of the corporal punishment and tried to convince the colonies to set up 
local committees to examine the issue on corporal punishment with the hope that the 
majorities of the locals sitting in the committee would veto the use of corporal 
punishment, thus easing the embarrassment and pressure the British government had 
endured at the United Nations meetings. 
 
The 1952 Committee Report set the long term objective of abolishing corporal 
punishment in Hong Kong and the Commissioner of Prisons was one of the strong 
advocates against corporal punishment in the Committee. Not one case of corporal 
punishment was being awarded to prisoners for breach of prison discipline from 1952 
onwards. The 1966 Committee Report again re-affirmed the objective of abolishing 
corporal punishment in Hong Kong but the recommendations were not being taken 
into consideration as the British Government was losing its influence over the 
colonies and on the other hand Hong Kong was facing a much bigger political, social 
and law and order crisis with the outbreak of the 1967 riot. 
 
The problem of young offenders and youth delinquents were noted during and after 
the riots and in the 1970s saw the colony’s U turn in the dealing with youth crimes. 
To try to stem out young offenders committing crimes involving violence, the 
Administration brought in not only the Detention Centre regime but also the corporal 
punishment. Prison disciplines were also tightened after the 1973 Stanley Prison riot 
when again the young prisoners were identified and blamed for instigating the riot. 
Thought the cane was spared for the adult prisoners, it was however widely used on 
the young prisoners, training centre and detention centre inmates for the sake of 
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maintaining custodial discipline. To avoid criticism from the abolitionists on this 
controversial practice, information on corporal punishments for young offenders were 
only briefly covered and later omitted all together from reports accessible to the 
public. 
 
The eventual abolition of corporal punishment in Hong Kong in 1990 was contributed 
to a combination of factors: the reluctant of the magistrates in passing this out-dated 
and barbaric sentence, the international pressure from London and from the United 
Nations through international human rights convention. The mystified Asian value, as 
argued by those in favour of retaining the cane, had to give way as Hong Kong 
needed to show case herself as a modern and international city. 
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Part II 
 
Penal Policy in Post War Hong Kong 
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Chapter Seven 
The Colonial Office, the Parliament and Colonial Penality 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter is to examine in detail the extent of influence from the British Cabinet 
Minister, in particular the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Parliament on 
Hong Kong’s post-War penal development. The study begins with providing the 
background information on how British colonies and territories were connected to 
London, how colonial policies in general were transmitted to the colonies and 
territories and the degree of flexibilities allowed in adopting the British policies.  
 
The main body of this Chapter will examine how penal policies for the colonies were 
formulated and regulated in London through the Colonial Office and its Advisory 
Committees. The history, composition, function and the work of the Colonial Office 
Advisory Committees are discussed to explore how these small but influential groups 
had formulated the desired penal policies for the colonies. The study also looks into 
the way penal policy initiatives were communicated to the British colonies, including 
Hong Kong and how penal policy and practices in the colonies were monitored by 
London.  
 
Another section is used in this Chapter to illustrate how the British Parliament was 
involved in Hong Kong’s penal policy and practices. Hong Kong is used in this 
Chapter as a case study to illustrate how colonial penality in this Far Eastern crown 
colony was formulated and influence by London. 
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7.2 The Colonial Office and the Colonies 
 
To understanding how Britain’s penal policies for her colonies were formulated, 
communicated to and adopted by the colonial administrators, it is necessary to 
elaborate firstly how the colonies were connected to Britain and how much influences 
Britain had in the colonies’ policy making process. 
 
With Britain holding on to the control of external relations and the ultimate power to 
determine internal policy, the colonies were given some degree of flexibility and it 
was considered that “the most prosperous colonies are those in which the latitude 
given to the administration is wide, and in which experiments can be and are tried 
out.”1   
 
One example of such flexibility could be found in the legislation of income tax 
amongst the colonies. The “colonial income tax legislation is based upon a model 
ordinance [from UK], but such legislation is not uniform throughout the Colonies, 
since many Colonial Government have found it necessary to modify and add to the 
provisions of the model in order to meet their particular needs and circumstances.”2        
 
To ensure the colonies would only enact legislations preferred by and agreeable to 
London, the British Government had control over her colonies’ legislation process.  
“Yet the British Parliament seldom exercises its right to make laws for the 
colonies except in the granting of new constitutions, since the authority of 
the British Government can usually be secured through the crown’s 
control, through official or nominated members, over colonial legislatures. 
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 See Royal Institute of International Affairs (1937) The Colonial Problem. London: Oxford University 
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2
 See Secretary of State (1947) The Colonial Empire (1939-1947). London: HMSO, p. 102. 
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The method of securing the authority of the Governor over the Legislative 
Council varies in different colonies, but in general the official members 
have to vote for the policy of the Executive, while the non-official 
members can rely only on the strength of the arguments, as they are 
usually in a minority.”3  
 
The above position also applied to Hong Kong as the unofficial members of the 
Executive and the Legislative Council were all appointed by the Secretary of State on 
the nomination of the Governor prior to 1985. They were remarked as “merely 
exercising very limited monitoring functions in the overall political processes.”4As 
for the official members, they must vote as directed by the Governor who presided at 
both Councils. On the other hand, the Hong Kong Government would be careful in 
putting up legislation which might arouse strong public opposition and would 
probably avoid such “unless a matter of fundamental importance is involved.” 5 
 
In the context of the policing of Hong Kong, Anderson and Killingray (1991) also 
noticed the way the colonial police were operating and the laws they enforced in the 
colonies were significantly differed from that of England. These laws and practices 
were “formed of parts from other colonies as well as from England, these being 
moulded by the local political and social environments into which they were placed.”6  
 
As regards to the colonial legal system, “…there is considerable variety in the legal 
systems in the British Empire. The position generally is that Imperial Statutes apply to 
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the colonies if so extended ‘by express words or necessary intendment’; and the 
English Common Law, in so far as it does not conflict with enactments of the Colonial 
Legislature, is usually part of the law of a colony.”7  
 
Hong Kong, as a British crown colony, adopted the common law and continues to 
receive it after 1997 when Hong Kong is under the Chinese sovereignty. Wesley-
Smith (1994) has charted the reception of the English law in Hong Kong, and cited 
Section 5 of the Supreme Court Ordinance 1873 to illustrate the position as follows: 
“[S]uch of the laws of England as existed when the Colony obtained a 
local legislature, that is to say, on the 5th day of April, 1843, shall be in 
force in the Colony, except so far as the said laws are inapplicable to the 
local circumstances of the Colony or of its inhabitants, and except so far 
as they have been modified by laws passed by the said legislature.”8  
 
This Section was only being amended in 1966 by the Application of English Law 
Ordinance 1966. Section 3 of this ordinance stated that “the common law and the 
rules of equity shall be in force in Hong Kong, so far as they may be applicable to the 
circumstances of Hong Kong or its inhabitants and subject to such modifications 
thereto as such circumstances may require.”9 
 
It is therefore safe to summarise that as a British crown colony, Hong Kong did 
operate in essence a British legal system where penal policies were based. However 
there were certain degrees of flexibilities allowed for local adaptation. 
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7.3 The Advisory Committees on Colonial Penal Matters 
 
Radzinowicz, L. and Turner, J.W.C. (1944) in the editorial note of Barker’s book 10 
mentioned that prior to the outbreak of the Second World War; the Colonial Office in 
London had set up a special body called the ‘Colonial Penal Administration 
Committee’ which had been very active in promoting the improvement of criminal 
administration in the colonies.  
 
The Colonial Service had in 1937 formed the Colonial Police Service to deal with the 
policing issues of the colonies. The idea of forming a separate Colonial Prison Service 
had been considered at the time but had never materialized.
11
 Instead the Colonial 
Penal Administration Committee was formed within the Colonial Office in January 
1937. Roles and functions of the Committee, according to the Colonial Office file 
were: 
“The Committee has no precise terms of reference; its work consists 
largely in the examination of the annual reports on Penal Administration 
in the various colonies. It is consulted and gives advice on matters of 
policy generally and members are able to put forward proposal for 
discussion. Also opportunities arise now and then for discussion with 
Colonial Prison officers when they are on leave.”12 
 
In 1939, the Colonial Penal Administration Committee was chaired by Lord Dufferin, 
the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies with members including 
Mr. Alexander Peterson, the Prison Commissioner; Mr. Pritt representing the Howard 
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League for Penal Reform and two retired Colonial officials, Sir Alison Russell and Mr. 
Arnett. Other Colonial Office officials in the Committee were Sir Grattan Bushe, the 
Legal Adviser to the Colonial Office and Mr. Clauson, the head of the Social Services 
Department of the Colonial Office with Mr. J.L. Keith as Secretary of the Committee. 
The Committee normally met once every two months even during the War times.
13
  
 
It was agreed within the Colonial Office that the Howard League and the Prison 
Commissioner should be permanently represented at the Committee whereas the 
individual members would be appointed to serve on terms not exceeding three years. 
The Colonial Office also preferred to have a female member to sit in the Committee, 
preferably a retired prison official or an administrative officer from the Colonial 
Service.
14
 Eventually Miss Margery Fry was nominated to join the Committee by Mr. 
Peterson. She was at one time Principal of Somerville and was at the time Chairman 
of one of the juvenile courts in London.
15
In the same year, the Colonial Office placed 
the Committee on a permanent basis and called it the ‘Standing Advisory Committee 
on Penal Administration’.16  
 
As noted earlier, one of the key roles of the Committee was to monitor the work of the 
colonial penal services through studying the Annual Reports of the respective colonial 
prison services. These annual reports submitted by the colonies to the Colonial Office 
were of a standard format to cover items such as prison population, health of prisoners 
and the admission of repeated offenders etc. These reports were firstly considered by 
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the section responsible for prison administration at the Colonial Office and then 
passed on to the appropriate Committee or Sub-Committee for information and 
discussion. On top of these colonial prison annual reports, a number of general prison 
issues such as after-care service for prisoners, extra-mural work, capital punishment 
and corporal punishment, etc. were being looked into by the Committee during its 
meetings.
17
 
 
Apart from the standard Annual Reports submitted by the respective Prisons 
Departments of the colonies, the Colonial Office could from time to time call for 
special returns or set questionnaires for the colonies to provide answers. An example 
of this was the Colonial Office requested information on corporal punishment (topic 
separately covered in Chapter Six) from the colonies and territories. Circular from the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies dated 9 May 1946 mentioned: 
“These returns were discontinued in 1940 but I think it is desirable that 
they should now be resumed especially as the use of corporal punishment 
in Colonial territories is the subject of considerable criticism, both in 
Parliament and other quarters at the present time.”18  
 
The organisation of the Standing Advisory Committee on Penal Administration 
evolved over time and became a sub-committee of the ‘Colonial Social Welfare and 
Advisory Committee’ from 1943 to 1953.19 This took place after the Colonial Office 
had appointed a ‘Juvenile Delinquency Sub-Committee’ to study the issue of juvenile 
delinquency in the colonies. When the Sub-Committee submitted its report in 1942 to 
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the full Committee, Mr. Peterson commented that the issue of juvenile delinquency 
did not limit to penal matters but had “a much wider field than was concerned with 
juvenile delinquency only”. He further proposed “to have an advisory committee 
which would cover the whole field of social welfare and take the place of the present 
committee which deals only with penal matters.”20  
 
The Colonial Office supported this proposal and remarked that the Office also had this 
idea in mind for sometime. A new ‘Social Welfare Advisory Committee’ was to form 
and the existing members of the ‘Advisory Committee on Prison Administration’ were 
asked to resign and the Committee was disbanded.  
 
The members of the new Committee included: 
The Duke of Devonshire as Chairman, 
Sir Charles Jeffries as Vice-Chairman, 
Professor A.M. Carr Saunders from the London School of Economics, 
Miss L. Haeford, Principal Woman Officer of the National Council of Social 
Services, 
Mr. J. Longland, Director of Education, Dorset,  
Mr. E.H. Lucette, former acting Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Ceylon and now 
Secretary, Dr. Barnardo’s Homes, 
Miss M. Nixon, former Welfare Officer, Palestine – now Chief Superintendent of 
Welfare at the Admiralty, Bath, 
Miss E. Younghusband, Principal Officer for Training & Employment, National 
Association of Girls Clubs. 
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 See draft letter to Miss Margery Fry, October 1942. C.O. 859/15/11. 
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Mr. Peterson and Miss Fry were also appointed to the new Committee to advise 
matters regarding penal reform in view of the extended membership of the Committee 
with a much wider scope of interest in the area of social welfare in the colonies.
21
 
 
The Secretary of State in presenting the report on The Colonial Empire (1937-1947) 
to the Parliament mentioned that: 
 “The Colonial Social Welfare Advisory Committee is also a war-time 
creation. It was set up in March, 1943, with the object of furnishing advice 
to the Secretary of State on a wide range of matters, absorbing an earlier 
advisory body established in peace-time and known as the Colonial Office 
Penal Administration Committee. It has already held 28 meetings, has 
advised on many aspects of welfare and has viewed the work being done 
by the Colonial Governments. Two of its sub-committees should be 
mentioned; one, the Colonial Penal Sub-Committee, renamed in 1946 the 
Treatment of Offenders Sub-Committee; and the other concerned with the 
recruitment and training of welfare officers. The former Sub-Committee 
has held 28 meetings since its inauguration. Several members of the 
Advisory Committee have paid visits to the Colonies to investigate or 
advise upon local questions of social welfare. Meetings of the Committee 
have been attended on a number of occasions by visitors both from the 
Colonies and from Great Britain. These visitors have included Colonial 
Governors and officials, representatives of academic and professional 
organisations in the United Kingdom, and officers designated for social 
welfare appointments in the Colonies.”22  
 
During this time, prisons were definitely accepted as part of the welfare service of the 
colonies and it was estimated that the size of the colonial prison population was 
around 11.6 per thousand of the colonial population in a population of roughly 60 
million.
23
 The number of prisoners serving sentences in colonial prisons declined with 
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the shrinking of the Empire after the Second World War. It was reported that the total 
penal population in the British colonies and territories was around 72,186 in 1953-55. 
Majority of the colonial prisoners were in Africa: 27,044 in Kenya; 19,227 in 
Tanganyika; 14,040 in the Federation of Nigeria; 3,910 in Uganda and 3,170 in Gold 
Coast. Hong Kong, with 2,766 prisoners, was the colony having the highest number 
of prisoners outside Africa.
24
 
 
From 1952-1961, the Committee was renamed the ‘Advisory Committee on the 
Treatment of Offenders in the Colonies’. It maintained the same role as an advisory 
body to advice the Secretary of State for the Colonies on matters relating to the 
treatment of offenders in the colonies.
25
 It was marked in the Colonial Office file that: 
“It has been decided that the Treatment of Offenders Subcommittee should 
in future be regarded as a separate Committee and act as a sub-committee 
of the Colonial Social Welfare Advisory Committee. It had accordingly 
been redesignated the Advisory Committee on the Treatment of Offenders 
in the Colonies. The Committee’s terms of reference will be to advise the 
Secretary of State on such matters relating to the Treatment of Offenders 
in the Colonial territories as he may decide to refer to it.”26 
 
Membership of the ‘Advisory Committee on the Treatment of Offenders in the 
Colonies’ in 1952 consisted of: 
Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray, Legal Advisor to the Secretary of States, Chairman of 
the Committee, 
Mr W.H. Chinn, Social Welfare Adviser to the Secretary of State, Vice-Chairman, 
Mr F.C. Chambers, Principal Probation Officer, Member of the Council of the 
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Central After-Care Association, 
Mrs. V.C. Jones, Member of Home Office Advisory Council on Treatment of 
Offenders; Member of Home Office Probation Advisory and Training Board; 
Executive Member, Howard League for Penal Reform; Chairman, Epsom 
Juvenile Court, 
Lord Farringdon, Member of Executive Committee of the Fabian Society; 
Chairman, Fabian Colonial Bureau, 
Sir William Fitzgerald, Colonial Service from 1919-49 and had been Attorney-
General of Northern Rhodesia and Palestine, Chief Justice of Palestine, President 
of Lands Tribunal of England, 
Mr L.W. Fox, Chairman of Prison Commission; President of the United Nations 
European Consultative Group on Penal and Penitentiary Affairs, 
Miss Margery Fry, She had also been appointed as Member of Home Office 
Advisory Council on Treatment of Offenders, 
Mr G.H. Heaton, Three years in HM Prison Services followed by Colonial Prison 
Services in Uganda and later Commissioner of Prisons at Tanganyika and Kenya, 
and 
Mr N.R. Hilton, retired Director of Prison Administration, Prison Commission. 
27
 
 
The backgrounds of the appointed members in this Advisory Committee were indeed 
impressive in view of their experience in the work with prisons and offenders, both at 
home and in the colonies. Mr Fox, being the Chairman of Prison Commission, headed 
the prison services for England and Wales. Both Mrs Jones and Miss Fry were also 
members of the Home Office Advisory Council on Treatment of Offenders. As 
described by Radzinowicz (1999), “An influence and dedicated group” formed “to 
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assist the Home Secretary with advices and suggestions on questions relating to the 
treatment of offenders [in England and Wales].”28 With this new Committee in place, 
the annual reports from the colonies were scrutinized in much greater detail. 
 
From the various Advisory Committees’ meeting minutes, it was evident that the 
Advisory Committees paid special attention to a number of penal issues including 
“the pay of warders, prisoners aid and after-care, industrial training of prisoners, 
recruitment and training of warders.”29 A number of important issues were also raised 
by these Committees including: juvenile welfare; use of mechanical restrain; corporal 
punishment; trainings for the colonial prison service staff; extra mural work for the 
prisoners; prisoner classification; visitation of prisoners and the dealing of the lunatics 
in the colonies. Other issues included the extension of the probation system to the 
Colonial Empire, the treatment of women offender and juvenile delinquents and the 
question on the retention of lunatics in colonial prisons.
30
 
 
Some of these issues were in fact concerns raised by the Members of the Parliament at 
the House of Common debates of which the Secretary of State had to response. Some 
of the issues covered were conditions of prisoners in the colonies and the use of 
mechanical restrains (ankle irons) such as the type used and for how long prisoners 
were placed on irons, etc.
31
 A separate section in this Chapter would further elaborate 
the involvement of the British Parliament in Hong Kong’s penal system and 
programmes. 
 
                                                 
28
 Radzinowicz, L. (1999) Adventures in Criminology. London: Routledge, p. 324 & p. 326. 
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30
 See C.O. 859/15/11. 
31
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An explanation must be made to clarify the difference between the Advisory Council 
for the Treatment of Offenders (ACTO) under the Home Office and the above 
mentioned advisory committees under the Colonial Office. The ACTO was actually 
formed in 1944, five years after the Colonial Office’s Colonial Penal Administration 
Committee was established with terms of reference read: 
“To be a Council to assist the Home Secretary with advice and 
suggestions on questions relating to the treatment of offenders.”32 
 
Similar to the Colonial Penal Administration Committee, members of the ACTO, 
twenty in number, were all appointed and came with varied experience.
33
 
 
ACTO was in existence for twenty years from 1944 to 1964 and eventually replaced 
by the Royal Commission on the Penal System in England and Wales. The 
Commission was dissolved in 1966 and its function was taken over by the new 
Advisory Council on the Penal System (ACPS). The terms of reference for this new 
Committee was: 
“To make recommendations about such matters relating to the prevention 
of crime and the treatment of offenders as the Home Secretary may from 
time to time refer to it, or as the Council itself, after consultation with the 
Home Secretary, may decide to consider.”34 
 
It is of interest to note that this term of reference was slightly different from the 
former ones of the ACTO and covered a much wider area by the inclusion of crime 
prevention on top of the treatment of offenders. ACPS functioned for twelve years 
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from 1966 to 1978. The topics of issues covered and reports prepared by the two 
Councils were: 
35
 
 
1. Proposal that a Special Institution Outside the Prisons should be provided for 
Offenders with Abnormal Mental Characteristics (1949) 
2. Report on Dartmoor Prison by Mr George Benson, M.P. (1952) 
3. Suspended Sentences (1952) 
4. Alternatives to Short Terms of Imprisonment (1957) 
5. The After-Care and Supervision of Discharged Prisoners (1958) 
6. The Treatment of Young Offenders (1958) 
7. Corporal Punishment. Cmnd. 1213 (1960) 
8. Non-Residential Treatment of Offenders under 21 (1962) 
9. Preventive Detention (1963) 
10. The Organisation of After-Care (1963) 
11. Interim Report on Detention of Girls in a Detention Centre (1968) 
12. The Regime for Long-Term Prisoners in Conditions of Maximum Security 
(1968) 
13. Detention Centres (1970) 
14. Non-Custodial and Semi-Custodial Penalties (1970) 
15. Reparation by the Offender (1974) 
16. Young Adult Offenders (1974) 
17. Powers of the Courts Dependent on Imprisonment (1977) 
18. The Length of Prison Sentences (1977) 
19. Sentences of Imprisonment (1978) 
                                                 
35
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As can be seen, the topics covered by ACTO and ACPS were focused on the British 
penal system and were not identical with issues that concerned the Colonial Office. 
Nevertheless with the cross membership of some of its members like Miss Margery 
Fry and Mrs V.C. Jones who sit on both Advisory Committees, it is suggested that the 
mainstream thinking on the treatment of prisons at home would be shared and applied 
in the colonies whenever applicable. 
 
The Colonial Office, apart from monitoring the colonial prison service through its 
Advisory Committees, was also involved in gaining first-hand information on the 
work of the respective penal systems through arranging Colonial Office officials 
visiting the colonies. Examples of their visits to Hong Kong would be discussed in the 
latter part of this section. 
 
Furthermore, the Colonial Office was also responsible for organizing regional 
conferences for Heads of Prisons Departments of the respective colonies or territories 
to discuss matter of mutual interest. One of the examples illustrating how these 
regional penal conferences could formulate colonial penal policies was on the 
establishment of the Colonial Prison Service Medal. During the Conference of Heads 
of Prisons Department in West Africa in 1946, the proposal for setting up the Colonial 
Prison Service Medal was raised for recognition of the long service warders for their 
exemplary services.
36
 
 
The Advisory Committee on the Treatment of Offenders in the Colonies referred this 
matter to the African Governors Conference for discussion in 1947. The proposal 
found no support among the Governors and subsequently the idea was shelved. 
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However, the matter was picked up and being pursued by the colonial prison services 
from Hong Kong, British Honduras, Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Trinidad, 
Cyprus and Kenya who all advocated the introduction of such a medal. The proposal 
gained further support at the 6
th
 Conference of East and Central African Prison 
Commissioners and at the Conference of Prison Commissioners of South East Asian 
Territories held in Malaya in 1951. The main argument for establishing the medal was 
on the parity between the police and the fire services who both had their long service 
colonial medals. The prison service was considered to be more dangerous than these 
two services as prison officers had to face dangerous criminals all the time and 
deserved public recognition.
37
 
 
The Colonial Office also had arrangement with the Her Majesty’s Prison Service in 
organizing study courses for overseas prison officers. Short attachments and visits by 
senior colonial prison officials to the HM Prisons in the United Kingdom were also 
arranged on needed bases. The Committee had also considered the need to set up 
regional training centres for the newly recruited prison officers as regular training 
courses in United Kingdom were difficult and expensive to arrange.
38
 With the 
shrinking of the British Empire especially after the independence of the larger 
colonies in Africa, this idea was not being pursuit. 
 
In Milner’s (1972) work, he observed that the colonies responded differently on penal 
policy initiatives as suggested by England owing to their local conditions. There were 
examples of direct transportation of the penal system from Britain such as: 
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“The type of penal legislation found in Nigeria have until recently been 
virtually identical with those in England, for obvious reasons of historical 
connection.” 39  and that the “Nigerian borstal training is another 
example of the direct transplanting of an English treatment technique.”40  
 
However even in the case of Nigeria when so many similarities with the British 
system were exhibited, local penal tradition was still not being fully replaced as 
examples such as “Decapitation was approved by Maliki law…in execution of 
sentences passed by Moslem courts.” whereas hanging was used for executions for 
criminal Code offences.
41
  
 
Milner (1972) also suggested that in some other African colonies, penal developments 
were given much lower priority than other projects because of economical 
considerations.
42
 Pratt (2006), on the other hand suggested cultural value as the key 
contributing factor to explain why New Zealand had a high imprisonment rate.
43
  
 
Hong Kong as a British crown colony in the Far East had exhibited different 
responses on penal policy initiatives at different times. This was due to the fact that 
Hong Kong had been under the British Administration for a period of over one 
hundred and fifty years. For the first one hundred years, Hong Kong could be 
regarded as adopting in main the penal policies and practices of England and Wales 
but with a slower pace. Discriminative treatments such as reduced penal diets on 
Chinese prisoners were used as deterrents to control the prison population.
44
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The following sections will discuss in greater details the post-War penal policy in 
Hong Kong under the influence of the Colonial Office. 
 
 
7.4   The Colonial Office and Hong Kong’s Penal Development  
(1939-1967) 
 
Until the abolition of the office of the Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1966,
45
 
Hong Kong, like other British colonies, were under the close watch of the Colonial 
Office. As mentioned in the previous section, the Colonial Office would monitor the 
colonial penal service by scrutinizing prison annual reports submitted by the colonies. 
An example of this could be found during the Advisory Committee meeting on 10 
July 1939 when Hong Kong Prisons Department’s 1938 Annual Report was examined.  
 
Remarks made at the meeting were that “the Committee noted that the juvenile 
remand home in Hong Kong is administered by the Commissioner of Police. They 
would be glad to know the reasons for which this home is not under the Prisons 
Department, and to have further particulars in due course of the proposed institution 
to be run on the lines of the home at Borstal.”46  Comments from the Advisory 
Committee would normally be referred back to the Governor of Hong Kong to 
respond. In this case, the Hong Kong Government followed the advice leading to the 
transfer of the responsibility of the Juvenile Remand Home to the Prisons Department. 
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Furthermore, it was a practice for the Colonial Office to pass on requests made by the 
Governor of Hong Kong on matters relating to the prisons for the Advisory 
Committee’s comment. An example of this could be taken from a submission dated 17 
February 1939 from Governor Northcote of Hong Kong to the Secretary of State 
forwarding Commissioner of Prisons Willcock’s twenty pages proposal on the re-
organization of the Prisons Department in Hong Kong. This submission was being 
included as an agenda item for discussion at the 5
th
 Standing Advisory Committee on 
Penal Administration meeting held on 5 June 1939.
47
  
 
Apparently not all penal policy initiatives taken place in the United Kingdom were 
communicated to the colonies especially at the time after the War. Circular 
Despatches from the Colonial Office in the earlier years only related policies and 
issues which were perceived to be of importance to the colonies. In Hong Kong, the 
Commissioner of Prisons only learnt of the ‘Marked System’ being abolished in the 
United Kingdom in late 1946 / early 1947 through reading the publication “Prisons 
and Borstals” published by Her Majesty Stationary Office in 1945. As a result of this 
finding, the Commissioner made a proposal to the Governor on 14 January 1947 for 
the ‘Mark System’ to be abolished in Hong Kong.48 
 
On the other hand, the Colonial Office had from time to time obtained information 
from the Governor of Hong Kong on matters concerning the prison and prisoners in 
the colony mainly for preparing official reports in response to Parliamentary questions 
raised on Hong Kong of which the Colonial Office had no ready answers. Details of 
these questions and their implication to Hong Kong were included in the latter part of 
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this Chapter. 
 
The Colonial Office was also responsible for the selection and appointment of senior 
prison officials for the colonial prison services. This was a standing Colonial Office 
practice for the colonies before the Second World War and also applied to Hong Kong. 
This practice continued even after the Second World War as Mr. John Burdett was 
brought in by the Colonial Office from Africa and was given the appointment as 
Superintendent on a five year contract during the time when Hong Kong was under 
Military Administration. His appointment by the Military Administration was 
subsequently endorsed by the Secretary of State for the colonies as a matter of 
course.
49
  
 
Mr. Shillingford, former Commissioner of Prisons of Jamaica, was appointed by the 
Colonial Office and became Commissioner of Prisons in Hong Kong on 22 May 1947 
to replace Commissioner Willcocks who was wounded during the War.
50
 Ironically, 
Commissioner Willcocks was appointed a member of the Treatment of Offenders 
Sub-Committee in 1946.
51
 
 
Apart from the posting of senior prison officers to Hong Kong, the Colonial Office 
also assisted in the recruitment of Prison Officers from the United Kingdom upon the 
request of the Hong Kong Government. It was a laid down requirement by the 
Colonial Office after the War that European posts in the Colonial Prison Service 
should be filled by staff with prison experience in the United Kingdom unless no such 
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officers were available.
52
 Recruitment was carried out through circulars to the Her 
Majesty Prison Service for interested prison officers to apply. Exceptions to this 
practice happened in 1948 when twenty ex-Palestine policemen were posted to work 
in the Hong Kong prison service after the establishment of the State of Israel.
53
  
 
The overseas recruit would normally joined as Prison Officer and responsible to 
supervise a number of Warders under his charge and be responsible for the order and 
discipline of prisoners in a Hall or in a workshop. The performance of the European 
officers however varied greatly. The former staff from HM Prison Service were in 
general well received in Hong Kong but the same could not be said on those from 
Palestine. The latter group was remarked to have major disciplinary problems and 
many had left the Prisons Department before the completion of their first contract of 
three years.
54
 
 
On the subject of penal policy directives by the Colonial Office, there were occasions 
when the Colonial Office would issue direct instructions to the colonies for 
compliance. These were however rare and one of these examples was the abolishment 
of ‘Opium Monopoly’ in Hong Kong in September 1945, which occurred just one 
month after Hong Kong was liberated from the Japanese after the War and the colony 
was still under Military Administration.
55
  
 
The urgency of this legislation at the time when the War was just ended could only 
attributed to the fact that Britain, as a signatory of the newly formed United Nations 
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and the close allies of America, had to support the strong anti-drug move by the 
United States Government. America had been active in promoting the international 
control on the illicit drugs before the Second World War and as of 1940, “most of the 
offices of the international drug control system were gradually transferred to the 
United States (the Opium Advisory Committee to Princeton and the Central 
Permanent Board and the Drug Supervisory Body to Washington), though their 
official seat (and some staff) remained in Geneva.” 56  Even before the War had 
concluded, the US administration had banned opium smoking in the areas liberated 
from Japan, including previous colonies from 1943 onwards.
57
 
 
The Colonial Office normally tried to influence the colonies in a less commanding 
manner as in the case of advocating the employment of prisoners on development 
schemes amongst the colonies. Attached with a nine pages “Memorandum on the 
Employment of Prisoners on Development Schemes”, the covering Circular Despatch 
from the Colonial Office states that: 
“My Advisory Committee on the Treatment of Offenders in the Colonies 
has prepared the attached memorandum on the subject of the employment 
of prisoners on development schemes in overseas territories. It will be 
noted that the Committee has drawn upon information available in a 
report on Prison Labour which was produced by the Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations in 1955 and that the 
Appendix to the memorandum contains a number of extracts from the 
report, copies of which are also enclosed with this despatch for 
information. The Appendix also gives information derived from the annual 
reports of the Prisons Departments of Overseas Governments and from 
other sources. 
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I am, of course, aware that conditions in many territories may preclude 
the employment of prisoners in the manner discussed in the attached 
memorandum. Nevertheless, I am impressed by the arguments which have 
been advanced by my Advisors as to the desirability of employing 
prisoners on development schemes in favourable circumstances and I 
therefore commend the memorandum to you for consideration.”58 
 
In the attached “Memorandum”, both Hong Kong and Singapore were quoted as 
having comparatively built up centres with prisoners employed to a greater extent on 
indoor prison industries than in territories with large rural areas.
59
 For the case of 
Hong Kong, the Prisons Department had complied fully the recommendations of this 
Circular Despatch with the opening of the Chi Ma Wan Prison in Lantau Island on 3 
December 1956. (see Chapter Two) Prisoners sent to this open prison, first of this type 
in Hong Kong were Star Class prisoners serving short sentences and they were 
engaged immediately in the forestry work on the Island and that “the Department is 
ready to co-operate in any scheme which will provide useful and constructive work.”60  
 
Another way for the Colonial Office to monitor the different colonies’ penal systems 
was through visits. Colonial Office officials were arranged to visit the various 
colonies and to gain first hand information through visits to the local prisons. 
Discussions were normally held with the Superintendents in charge of prisons, the 
Commissioners and the Governor of the colonies after the visits to convey the views 
of the Committee on penal matters and to exert influence over the colonies in 
adopting the desired prison administration and management was to send. 
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Mr. N.R. Hilton, retired Director of Prison Administration, Prison Commission of 
England and Wales, member of the Advisory Committee on the Treatment of 
Offenders in the Colonies, visited Hong Kong from 31 October to 6 November 1951 
before heading towards other colonies in the South East Asia region. He reported that 
he was received by the Governor, the Colonial Secretary and other public officials 
both before and after his visits to the prisons. It was normally during his last meeting 
with the Governor that he would bring up issues noted during his visits with 
suggestions proposed. According to Mr. Hilton, “these suggestions were 
sympathetically received, and without exception, a keen interest was shown on my 
comments and recommendations. In turn the Commissioners and Superintendents in 
charge of the prisons afforded me every facility and were ready and willing to discuss 
all or any part of their administration.”61  
 
All penal institutions in Hong Kong, the Stanley Prison, Victoria Prison and the 
Women’s Prison at Lai Chi Kok together with the Young Prisoner Training Centre and 
the Stanley Boys’ Reformatory were visited by Mr. Hilton with separate reports made. 
The visit reports were comprehensive and from these reports could identify the 
Colonial Office’s area of interest in the penal policies and prison administration and 
management in Hong Kong. The observed items contained in the reports included the 
institution’s prisoner population breakdown and how they were accommodated, the 
prison staff strength and their grades in manning the institution, work or employment 
for prisoners and state of the prison buildings, etc. The general impression gained on 
Hong Kong’s penal condition was satisfactory but it was remarked that the Prisons 
Service in Hong Kong was in need of more progressive administration especially on 
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the lack of After-Care for prisoners.
62
 
 
For Stanley Prison, it was noted that over 70% of the prisoners were first offenders 
and should not require maximum security prison accommodation. It was suggested 
that a Camp prison be set up to accommodate this type of prisoners and to relief the 
problem of overcrowding at Stanley Prison. Another concern was on the urgent need 
to remove the young prisoners, around 90 in number, away from Stanley Prison as 
they were being located in the same prison with adult prisoners. The practice of 
locating prisoners inside the punishment block for security or for protection purpose 
other than on punishment was also being criticized as punishment block should serve 
the sole purpose of keeping prisoners on punishment.
63
  
 
For both Victoria Prison and Lai Chi Kok Prison, the problem noted by Mr. Hilton 
was on the short sentenced prisoners received from courts in Hong Kong. It was 
reported that during the month of October, no less than 68 persons were sent to prison 
for sentence of imprisonment of three days or less. The other concern was on the state 
of the outdated buildings of Victoria Prison which was considered not ideal for 
running a modern penal service. 
 
There were other specific criticisms on Hong Kong’s penal administration such as the 
out-dated method of prisoner classification as described in Chapter Four earlier. The 
method of classifying prisoners merely by their length of sentence in Hong Kong was 
deemed crude and it was recommended to classify prisoners into first offender, 
habitual criminal offender and the young offenders groups and these three groups of 
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prisoners should be separately kept. 
 
The other important issues covered in the reports were the lack of evening education 
and recreation for the prisoners, no provision for after-care, no prisoners aid society 
and no ‘Earning Scheme’ for prisoners in Hong Kong. The revised remission system 
in Hong Kong where prisoners were given one third of their sentence as remission on 
admission was examined with no adverse comments made. However, the ‘Gratuity 
System’ linked with the remission system, a practice similar to that in use in the 
United Kingdom, was considered outdated.
64
 
 
Mr. Hilton prepared his report and sent them to the Governor of Hong Kong. The 
reports on the whole focused more on the welfare of the prisoners and the condition of 
the prisons. The response from the Hong Kong Government on the report was 
however brief, saying “Government greatly appreciates the careful study you have 
made of this matter and will now give detailed consideration to your 
recommendation.”65 
 
When Mr. Hilton’s report on Hong Kong was discussed in London at the 78th meeting 
of the Advisory Committee on the Treatment of Offenders in the Colony on 5 
November 1952, the issue of having very short sentence prisoners in Hong Kong’s 
penal system was raised. The Committee “re-iterated their view that this was a 
ridiculous practice and observe that, put at its lowest, to carry out the admission and 
discharge procedure, medical examination, cleaning up etc. for such a short stay must 
be expensive and wasteful.”66 
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It was noted that the Committee was reluctant to push the matter on the provision of 
education for women prisoners to the Governor of Hong Kong again as they believed 
that they could not achieve much from the current Commissioner of Prisons and 
“came to the conclusion that it would be better to take no further action pending the 
appointment of a new Commissioner when an opportunity for informal discussion on 
these problems may present itself.”67 
 
In the same report by Mr. Hilton, it was mentioned that he had chaired a ‘Regional 
Conference of Prison Commissioners in South East Asia and Hong Kong’ at Penang, 
Malaya from 10 to 14 December 1951. The meeting was attended by prisons officials 
from Hong Kong, British North Borneo, Sarawak, Singapore and Malaya.
68
 
 
Other Colonial Office official, in particular Mr. Chinn, Advisor on Social Welfare to 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies, had visited Hong Kong on a number of 
occasions. During his earlier visit to the colony in late 1940s, he had visited all the 
prisons and had discussed with the Chief Justice on Hong Kong’s under-used 
probation services and the need to improve the physical set up of the juvenile court 
rooms. During his visit in 1954, he had expressed that it was quite wrong that the 
Salvation Army should have the task of after-care which was the Government’s 
responsibility and should be taken-up by the Government.
69
 
 
Despite these criticisms, Hong Kong’s prison service did receive quite a high regard 
from the Colonial Office. Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray, Chairman of the Advisory 
Committee on the Treatment of Offenders visited Hong Kong and other British 
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colonies and territories in the Far East between 24 April and 24 June 1959. When in 
Hong Kong, he visited all the penal institutions and on his visit to Chi Ma Wan Prison 
on 1 May, 1959, he was accompanied by the Governor of Hong Kong.
70
 In Sir 
Roberts-Wray’s subsequent report to the Advisory Council, he remarked that “Before I 
left England Mr. Chinn said that Hong Kong probably had the best administered 
overseas prison service. I have no reason to differ.”71 
 
The influence from the Colonial Office however was not always welcomed by the 
colony. Shortly after Hong Kong’s return to civil administration in 1946, the Chief 
Justice’s displeasure with the Colonial Office’s interference on colonial penal policy 
was plain and open as reflected in part of his minutes to the Governor of Hong Kong 
stating that: 
“I have a sort of recollection that there was a circular despatch from the 
C.O. [Colonial Office] when I was in the Gold Coast, suggesting that the 
remission period should be increased as this had either been done in the 
U.K. or had been recommended by some Commission. There is a Penal 
Reform Committee attached to the C.O. [Colonial Office] under the 
Chairmanship of D.N. Pritt. RC. M.P. (a gentleman whose admiration for 
Soviet Russia presumably does not extend to its penal system) which is 
very active in pressing penal reforms on Colonial Governments without 
much regard to local conditions.”72 
 
The crux of the problem appeared to rest with Hong Kong’s top government 
administrative officials’ reluctance and resistance of having the United Kingdom 
Government exerting pressure onto the local policies. This feeling remained strong 
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within the senior Government officials in Hong Kong even after the Colonial Office 
ceased to exist in 1967. The Commissioner of Prisons proposed to the Colonial 
Secretary in 1968 to enter into direct correspondence with his counter part in the 
Home Office regarding after-care cases for ex-addicts, the Deputy Colonial Secretary 
commented in the minutes to the Colonial Secretary that:  
“Better not, I think. We allowed limited discretion to Heads of Dept. to 
correspond with the S. of S.’s [Secretary of State] technical advisors under 
para. 30 of the M.O.P. But we don’t normally allow them to correspond 
with U.K. departments. The transmission of information can too easily 
develop into pressure on policy matters.”73 
 
Despite these guarded feelings with the Colonial Office, Hong Kong as a British 
crown colony still had to seek the endorsement from London before new penal 
initiatives were to be implemented in Hong Kong as law. The draft Training Centre 
Ordinance was forwarded to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1951 for 
approval and with the endorsement from London became law in Hong Kong on 6 
March 1953.
74
 
 
However on the topic of direct influence from the Colonial Office, an example could 
be taken from the Corporal Punishment Ordinance 1954. When this legislation was 
vetted in London, the official response from the Colonial Office given on 24 March 
1955 was “The power of disallowance will not be exercised in respect of these 
Ordinances.”75 Nevertheless there were further comments to the Ordinance that: 
“2. I note that Section 4(e) of Ordinance No. 39 of 1954 stipulates 
that [w]shipping shall be administered as soon as possible after the final 
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determination of the proceedings in consequence of which the offender 
was sentenced. No time limit, however, is mentioned, and I suggest, for 
your consideration, that the words “and in any case before the expiry of 
15 days” should be inserted after the word “practicable” in a future 
amendment to the Ordinance. The previous time limit was six months 
which, however, I regard as far too long a period for any offender to 
remain in doubt whether or not he may be whipped. 
3. I note that Section 4(b) and (c) make no distinction between 
children and young persons. I am advised that the number of strokes 
inflicted on a child under 14 should not exceed six and the number of 
strokes inflicted on a young person between 14 and 17 years of age should 
not exceed twelve.”76 
 
Hong Kong Government officials had to take note of the comments made by the 
Colonial Office and the Governor of Hong Kong replied the Secretary of State on 8 
June 1955 accepting comments on point 3 but amending suggestion of point 2 from 
15 days to 6 weeks.
77
 This indicates officials in Hong Kong still had a limited degree 
of flexibility in adopting instructions from London. 
 
As the need to bring back a new legislation to the Legislative Council for amendment 
within such a short period of time frame was rare, the Attorney General had to explain 
the rational of proposing the Bill when it was tabled at the Legislative Council for its 
first reading: 
“In conformity with general policy within Colonial Territories, it is 
considered desirable to remove progressively, or to reduce, the penalty of 
corporal punishment in criminal cases. It is thought that further limitation 
                                                 
76
 Ibid. 
77
 See Encl. 22, ibid. 
 263 
may safely be imposed on the extent to which such punishment may be 
ordered to be administered to young offenders.”78 
 
The subsequent amendment was made under the Magistrate (Amendment) (No. 2) 
Ordinance, 1955 dated 14 October 1955.
79
 
 
Further example can be found on 27 May 1959 when the Secretary of State sent a 
memo to the colonies calling to cease in using the term ‘flogging and whipping’ and 
to replace such term with ‘caning’ as: 
“From time to time corporal punishment in overseas territories is the 
subject of Parliamentary Questions and sensational reporting in the 
Press. Misleading impressions are created by such words as “flogging”, 
“beating” or “whipping”, when a less colourful word such as “caning” 
would more accurately describe the kind of corporal punishment which is 
actually administered to adult or juvenile offenders.”80 
 
Hong Kong followed the Colonial Office instruction promptly and the Corporal 
Punishment (Amendment) Ordinance 1959 was enacted on 8 October 1959 to comply 
with the Secretary of State’s directive. 
 
The Colonial Office was paying special attention on the physical punishment of 
prisoners in the colonies, including the use of mechanical restrains, corporal 
punishment and the capital punishment. The explanation to this could be owing to the 
anti-colonial feeling displayed by the Americans after the War who had exert 
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pressures at the United Nations for Western countries, including Britain, to give up 
their colonies. Under such political climate, Britain had to be careful not to project an 
image of ruling the colonies with draconian penal policies and exercising inhumane 
penal practices. Another concern was the Parliamentary questions concerning 
inhumane treatment of colonial prisoners raised by the Members of the Parliament at 
the House of Commons debates of which the Secretary had to respond to. Details of 
this will be discussed in the following section. 
 
The post of the Secretary of State for the Colonies was deleted in 1966 and so was the 
Colonial Office in view of the diminishing British overseas colonies and territories 
following the de-colonisation process. A new position of Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Affairs was created on 1 August 1966 and the post eventually became 
the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs from 1968 onwards 
taking over the responsibility of Hong Kong affairs till the colony’s return to the 
People’s Republic of China in 1997. 
 
 
7.5 Parliamentary Interests on Hong Kong’s Penal System  
 
The British Parliament was another place where penal policy and programme could be 
influenced.
81
 Not only penal policies at home were affected but Parliamentary interest 
could extend to penal policies for the colonies, including Hong Kong. It was done 
through questions raised by the Members of the Parliament at the House of Commons 
on matters connecting to the penal system in Hong Kong. The Secretary of State for 
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the Colonies and after 1968 the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs had to prepare replies either in person at the House of Commons debates or by 
written response in forms of official reports if information was not readily available 
during the debates.  
 
Records from the Hansard indicated that the Parliamentary questions regarding Hong 
Kong’s prison service or penal system were diversify in nature and originated from 
different Members of the Parliament. The number of questions raised was however 
infrequent suggesting the general lack of interest on the prison conditions in the Far 
East. On the other hand from the questions raised, it is possible to form a general 
indication on the type of issues that would cause sufficient interest for the Members of 
the Parliament to speak out at the House of Commons. 
 
The nature of the Parliamentary question in the earlier days could be extremely trivial 
in nature. Mr J. McKay raised a question in 1946 asking why a British prisoner 
serving sentence in Hong Kong had not written to his mother for a year and asked if it 
was possible for him to be sent back to the United Kingdom to serve his sentence. In 
this case, the Colonial Office had to ascertain information from the Governor of Hong 
Kong in order to provide the necessary answer to the Members of the Parliament.
82
 
 
There was also parliamentary question being asked simply out of the Members of the 
Parliament’s lack of understanding on the situation of Hong Kong. Mr Rankin asked 
in 1970 whether the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs would 
“direct the Hong Kong Government, as an act of clemency, to free those long-term 
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prisoners suffering from incurable illness.”83 This scenario was in fact adequately 
covered by the Prison Rules in Hong Kong.
84
 There were well established procedures 
for the Commissioner of Prisons to report cases of prisoner confirmed to be terminally 
ill to the Governor who would then order early release of the prisoner accordingly. 
 
On the whole, most the Parliamentary questions raised on colonial prisoners were 
related to their treatment. Members of the Parliament were concerned that any 
inhumane or improper treatments on the colonial prisoners would tarnish the image of 
the Britain Empire. An example of this was the Parliamentary question raised by Mr. 
Manuel in 1954 asking the Secretary of State for the Colonies “in which Colonies and 
Protectorates it is the practice to attach chains to the ankle of prisoners, and to what 
categories of prisoners this treatment is applied.”85 The question was raised after the 
Member of the Parliament saw a photo in the newspaper that prisoners in the colonies 
were chained. The British Government’s response was that: 
“In 1952, the attention of all Colonial Governments was drawn to the 
very strict Regulations governing the use of mechanical restrains on 
prisoners in the United Kingdom. They were invited to bring local 
practice as far as possible into conformity with United Kingdom practice. 
…But let me point out those are Territories in many cases – both in West 
Africa, East Africa and the West Indies – with a very high degree of self-
government. Territories such as Nigeria, in which we must be very careful 
how far we interfere.”86 
 
This issue on the use of chains in the colonial prisons was being followed-up on 
several House of Common debates into 1957 and the response from the Colonial 
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Office was that “I cannot say when it will be possible to abolish the use of this form of 
restrain completely in all Territories.”87 On this issue, Hong Kong was more in line 
with the practice in England and no follow-up actions were required. 
 
The Parliament was also showing special concern on the detention of young offenders 
in Hong Kong. Mr Ronald Atkins in 1969 raised the question on the case of 
imprisonment of an eleven year old boy in Hong Kong. The Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs was able to explain the case of the boy who was 
given a small fine with one day’s imprisonment, and the time the boy spent on remand 
had been accepted in lieu of the one day imprisonment sentence. Mr Atkins however 
felt that the penal system in Hong Kong should be following the progressive approach 
of the Western countries so that other countries in the region, especially China to 
follow. He remarked that: 
“Is my hon. Friend aware, nevertheless, that there are a number of arrests 
and imprisonments in Hong Kong in circumstances which we would not 
tolerate in this country? Is it not imperative that we show our best, not our 
shoddiest, political goods in this shop window which is so close to the 
Chinese Republic, and which is watched so carefully by the Chinese 
people?”88 
 
Other Parliamentary questions were raised from time to time on the numbers and 
categories of prisoners kept in Hong Kong and how they were treated in general. 
These were specific questions raised on capital punishment, corporal punishment and 
the fate of the prisoners in relating to the handing over of Hong Kong to China in 
1997. As there are separate Chapters covering these more complex issues, these will 
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not be repeated in this section. 
 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
In this Chapter, it is suggested that the penal policies in Hong Kong were heavily 
influenced by Britain during the period from 1945 till the disbandment of the Colonial 
Office in 1968. Through a well structured system of Advisory Committees, the work 
of the prison service in the colonies, Hong Kong included, were under close 
monitoring of the Colonial Office. 
 
In view of the vast size of the British Empire immediately after the Second World War, 
the varied cultural, social, economic backgrounds and the different administrative 
pattern between the crown colonies and territories, the ambivalence of the Colonial 
Office was that it was in no position to dictate a standardised set of preferred penal 
policies for the colonies and territories to follow suit. Instead the colonies and 
territories were invited to take note on what England was practicing in the 
management of prisons and prisoners and the colonies and territories were encouraged 
to follow the British approach. Unavoidably the response from the colonies and 
territories were varied with some taking up the Home practice while others were more 
concerned with their local situation as in the case of prisoners wearing ankle iron in 
some of the colonies. 
 
Apart from sending Circular Despatch and copies of the Prison Rules used by Her 
Majesty’s Prison Service to the colonies and territories as model rules on various 
penal matters, the Colonial Office also took direct action in picking the key penal 
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administrators to run the prisons in the colonies and territories. This ensured that the 
European prison officers who were middle and upper managers in the respective penal 
systems were selected from the Home service or at least to receive some training in 
the United Kingdom. This had allowed for the maintenance of the British approach in 
dealing with prisoners could be extended to the rest of the British Empire. 
 
Furthermore through regional conferences, visits by Colonial Office officials and 
discussions with colonial prison administrators whilst on leave in the United Kingdom, 
the Colonial Office could exercise its influence through direct dialogue with the 
respective prison administrators and the administrators or governors of the respective 
colonies and territories. 
 
From the composition of the Advisory Committees memberships, it is evident that 
colonial penal policies were dominated by a small group of penal elites as suggested 
by Ryan (2003): 
“In the decades immediately following 1945-indeed until well into the 
1970s-penal policy making was in the hands of a relatively small, male 
metropolitan elite which, although never wholly in agreement, nonetheless 
saw itself as a barrier against what it took to be a more punitive public 
mostly more interested in punishment than in welfare or reform.” 89 
 
The emphasis on promoting penal reform in the colonies and territories apparently 
was on the top of the agendas of these Advisory Committees. Not only did the penal 
elites want to export the more ‘civilized’ and ‘progressive’ penal system to the 
colonies and territories, it was necessary to protect the image of Britain when the 
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treatment of offenders in the colonies and territories could attract adverse international 
or local attention if found not in line with the Western standard. After all, penal policy 
“is particularly bound up with popular sentiment”90 and Members of the Parliament 
would not hesitate to question the Secretary of State for the Colonies during 
Parliamentary debates. Adverse prison conditions in the Empire thus became the 
liability of the Colonial Office and had to be addressed. 
 
Despite the strong colonial influence on Hong Kong’s penal policies during the 
immediate years after the War, it is suggested in this Chapter that the Colonial Office 
was only partially responsible for the formulation of penal policies in Hong Kong. 
There were penal policies in England such as preventive detention and corrective 
trainings initiated under Criminal Justice Act 1948 that were not followed by Hong 
Kong at all. There were also occasions when some of these recommended policies 
were only partially adopted or adopted after a long lapse of time in comparison to 
their implementation in the UK. The case on the use of corporal punishment in post-
War Hong Kong as described in Chapter Six is an example to illustrate this point. All 
these variations and the reasons for such will be further discussed in the latter 
Chapters of this thesis. 
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Chapter Eight 
Penal Policy in Post-War Hong Kong (1945-1969) 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter together with the following two Chapters will provide a detail analysis 
on the way Hong Kong selected the penal policies or programmes from Britain. The 
study aims to find out why certain British penal policies or programmes were adopted 
by Hong Kong whilst some were discarded. For penal policies and programmes 
adopted by Hong Kong, the changes made for its local adaptation, if any and the 
reasons behind such changes. Another area of study to be highlighted is on penal 
policies and programmes solely developed in Hong Kong. Again the rationales for the 
formulation of such penal policies and programmes are to be identified. 
 
To allow a systemic analysis on this area, it is necessary to divide Hong Kong’s post-
War penal policy development into three phases according to the way penal policies 
were formulated. The first phase covers the period from 1945 to 1969 when there 
were strong Colonial Office influences as highlighted in the previous Chapter. The 
second phase starts from 1970 and end in 1981 when penal policies formulated in 
Hong Kong were mainly directed at addressing local law and order issues in the 1970s. 
The third and final phase of the penal policy development started in 1982 and ended 
in 1997 with Hong Kong preparing for its return to the Chinese sovereignty marred by 
the Peking incident in 1989.  
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This Chapter focuses on penal policies formulated in Hong Kong at a time when 
Hong Kong had just been liberated from Japanese occupation after the Second World 
War until 1969. Despite the close monitoring of the Colonial Office at the time as 
mentioned in the previous Chapter, a number of major penal policies developed in 
England during the same time frame under the Criminal Justice Acts of 1948, 1961 
and 1967 were not being followed by Hong Kong.  
 
The first key legislation in post-War Britain concerning penal reform was the 
Criminal Justice Act 1948. The substance of this legislation was based largely on the 
Criminal Justice Bill of 1938 which had “embodied several forward looking measures, 
tidied up the legislation by repealing various obsolete aspects, and complemented the 
numerous changes which had already been made.”1  
 
The Criminal Justice Act of 1948 was indeed the first major penal legislation since 
1914. The Act removed those pre-War obsolete concepts such as penal servitude, hard 
labour and the triple division of offenders. Under the provisions of this Act, “the court 
determines only the length of the imprisonment, and all measures for classification 
and the individualisation of the punishment are left to the administration within the 
framework of the Prison Rules.”2 
 
In this new Act, whipping together with the remaining restrictions on the power to 
impose fines in case of felony were removed. As this Act did not spell out any 
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sentencing philosophy, the sentencers were given the liberty to decide the use of 
imprisonment or fines in dealing with the offenders.
3
 
 
New types of correctional programmes and institutions such as the detention centre 
and the remand centre were proposed and imprisonment for young offenders would 
only be used as a last resort. Central After-Care Association was established to 
coordinate statutory after-care supervision on prisoners released from penal 
institutions. Under the same Act, the new sentence of corrective training for young 
offenders was introduced and the provision on preventive detention for habitual 
offenders was strengthened. These measures were based on the belief that a longer 
period of imprisonment within a proper corrective environment would reduce 
recidivism through training, discipline and reformation.
4
 
 
The reformative approach of the British penal system at this time was marked by the 
extension of the education facilities provided by the local authorities to prisoners as 
recommended by the 1947 report of the Education Advisory Committee; the 
introduction of home leave for adult prisoners in 1951 and the setting up of the first 
pre-release hostel at Bristol in 1953. There was also the trend of the increasing 
involvement of specialists such as psychologists and welfare officers in the 
management of prisoners.
5
 
 
To address the problem of overcrowding in the penal establishments in the 1950s as 
well as other issues related to penal administration, the British Government published 
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in 1959 the White Paper on ‘Penal Practice in a Changing Society.’ The Paper 
outlined ways to reduce recidivism and reiterated the importance of keeping young 
offenders away from prison. Many of these principles from the White Paper were 
subsequently incorporated in the Criminal Justice Act 1961. 
 
The main purpose of the Criminal Justice Act 1961 was to encourage the use of 
Borstal training for offenders under 21 and raised the minimum age for the 
imprisonment of young offenders from 15 to 17.  Furthermore, the power of the courts 
was further restricted in the sentencing of the young offenders. 
“The scheme of the Act was that for an offence justifying a sentence of up 
to six months, the normal custodial sentence on a young offender would be 
detention in a detention centre, for a sentence justifying a sentence of 
more than six months and less than three years, the sentence would 
normally be Borstal training, and a sentence of imprisonment would be 
permissible (with certain exceptions) only if the offence warranted a 
sentence of three years or more.”6 
 
These provisions had changed the former therapeutic role of the Borstal in providing 
reformative trainings for selected young offenders with such needs to that of a general 
custodial sentence with prime consideration on the gravity of the crime. Also this had 
taken away some of the discretionary power of the sentencers, a prerogative guarded 
dearly by the Magistrates and Judges under the English legal system.
7
  
 
The Prison Commission in England was dissolved in 1963 and replaced by the 
establishment of the Prisons Department under the Home Office, a move after some 
heated debate in the House of Commons.
8
 The proposal for such change was included 
                                                          
6
 Thomas, D.A. (1995) op cit., p. 126. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 See Hansard House of Commons debate, 12 March 1963. The Prison Commissioners Dissolution 
Order 1963 was approved with a vote of 140 against 63. 
 275 
in the Criminal Justice Act 1961 as it was “an acknowledgement of the increasing 
complex nature of many of the issues which had to be faced, and of the growing 
political significance of penal affairs.”9 
 
The year 1963 also witnessed the British Government’s move to combine the 
probation and after-care service as suggested by the Advisory Council on the 
Treatment of Offenders. The Council also stressed the importance of providing 
welfare work within prison establishments. From 1966 onwards, the probation and 
after-care service took over the duties for providing welfare services to the prisoners 
but prison officers were still expected to assist the prisoners on welfare matters 
whenever possible.
10
 
 
The Criminal Justice Act 1967 dealt with a number of criminal justice issues and 
court procedures such as committal proceedings, bail, legal aid, etc. apart from 
matters relating to penal policies. In this Act, suspended sentence and discretionary 
parole were introduced. The courts were empowered to suspend any sentence of 
imprisonment not exceeding two years, and required to suspend any sentence of 
imprisonment which did not exceed six months unless the case fell within the list of 
scheduled offences or the offender had a previous custodial sentence.  
 
As to the newly introduced parole system, it allowed prisoners to be released on 
parole after serving one third of the sentence or twelve month imprisonment, 
whichever was longer, thus allowing prisoners with a sentence of imprisonment of 
more than eighteen month eligible for parole. Other initiatives of the Act included the 
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abolition of corrective training and the preventive detention, with the latter being 
replaced by extended sentence.
11
 The Criminal Justice Act 1967 had achieved its 
desired result of seeing the prison population dropped through the use of suspended 
sentences and the parole. However this downward trend was only short-lived and the 
penal population soon picked up again.  
 
To gain a better understanding on why Hong Kong had developed a set of penal 
policies and programmes with both similarities and differences with that of the British 
system, it is necessary to provide background information on Hong Kong’s post-War 
political, social, cultural and economics developments during these three phases. The 
flashpoints responsible for penal policy formulation process are also covered in the 
discussion. It is argued in the following Chapters that the political, social, cultural and 
economical state of the colony at the time had dictated the Government’s approach 
towards law and order and eventually set the scene for the development of the unique 
penal system in post-War Hong Kong. 
 
 
8.2 Political Scene of Hong Kong after the War 
 
1945 to 1969 marked the immediate years of Hong Kong’s return to British 
administration after the Second World War. During this period, Britain had largely 
completed her decolonization process and had withdrawal from the East of Suez. For 
political and economical reasons, Hong Kong was being treated differently from the 
other British colonies and remained to be the crown colony of Britain. Hong Kong 
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was in a ‘garrison state’ for most of the time during this period and riding out the 
political turmoil in the face of Communist expansion in the neighbouring regions. 
 
The return of Hong Kong to British sovereignty after the War was in fact not a 
smooth process and this British crown colony was almost handed back to the 
Nationalist China with little opposition from the Foreign Office.
12
 Nevertheless the 
Colonial Office stood firm on the issue of Hong Kong and objected strongly the 
giving up of this colony despite America’s strong anti-imperialism attitude. The 
newly elected Labour government was backing the idea that “…if Hong Kong was to 
be excluded from the general principle of restoring the pre-war situation, it could 
only be as part of a wider regional settlement which might also include Malaya, the 
Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies.”13  
 
The Foreign and Colonial Offices finally agreed in 1942 that Britain should regain her 
Dependencies after the war but should develop their resources, ensure their security 
and prepare them for eventual self-government, in accordance with the principles of 
the Atlantic Charter.
14
 As General MacArthur tends to favour the British to re-occupy 
Hong Kong and on the understanding that this would not preclude future negotiation 
on Hong Kong’s status, President Truman reluctantly concurred.15  
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On 30 August 1945, Rear Admiral Harcourt on board HMS Swiftsure, together with 
the Allied fleet, entered Hong Kong marking the British Government’s official re-
occupation of the colony.
16
  After three years and eight months’ internment in Stanley 
Camp, the surviving Hong Kong civil servants and the police personnel were no 
longer capable of carrying out the enormous duties in putting Hong Kong back into 
order after the Japanese surrender. A Proclamation by the Hong Kong Government on 
1 September 1945 established a Military Administration and on the next day, Admiral 
Harcourt was appointed as the Commander-in-Chief and Head of the Military 
Administration in Hong Kong and Gimson, the Colonial Secretary of Hong Kong 
being interned by the Japanese during the War, temporarily assumed the role of 
Lieutenant Governor.
17
 On 7 September 1945, Brigadier D. M. MacDougall, the 
appointed Chief Civil Affairs Officer, landed in Hong Kong with a team of nine 
officers from the Civil Affairs Service. Full powers of administration were delegated 
to them from 4 December 1945 onwards.
18
  
 
The return of Governor Sir Mark Young in April 1946 marked the end of the Military 
Administration in Hong Kong. However the declining health condition of Sir Young 
resulting from the harsh conditions in northern China during his internment saw his 
retirement in May 1947 without being able to inject more input in the implementation 
of his ‘Young Plan’.19 
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Sir Young’s successor, Sir Alexander Grantham, was not a keen supporter of the 
‘Young Plan’ though he did express his willingness to consider further proposal for 
constitutional reform. He understood fully the post-War view of London was to 
prepare the colonies for independence but Hong Kong would never be granted such a 
status.
20
 
 
Though Britain and China were allies during the War, yet the return of Hong Kong to 
Britain after the War and for Rear Admiral Harcourt to receive the Instrument of 
Surrender from the Japanese on behalf of the Allies in the China War Theatre had 
upset China. On the diplomatic front, there were however still good co-operation 
between Britain and China.
21
  
 
Some local Chinese in Hong Kong also shared this nationalist sentiment and would 
like to see Hong Kong’s return to Chinese rule. In the first Chinese National Day after 
the War, i.e., 10 October 1945, there had been written representations from some 
locals calling the Chinese Government to take back Hong Kong. The Nationalist 
Government however had no such plan in mind but had strong desire to exercise its 
jurisdiction over the Walled City (九龍城寨) in Kowloon, which was historically 
claimed by the Chinese to be the piece of land excluded from the ‘1898 Lease’ of 99 
years covering the northern part of Kowloon and the New Territories.
22
  
 
During a clearance operation inside the Walled City on 12 January 1948, the police 
had to use firearm in breaking up the resistance inside the Walled City who felt that 
this place belonged to the Chinese and not the British. The police action had resulted 
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in strong protest across China and the burning down of the British Consulate, the 
British Information Services, the Swire and the Jardine House in Canton (廣東) on 
16th January 1948.
23
 
 
With the intensification of the civil war in China, the Nationalist Government was no 
longer having the time and energy in addressing the Hong Kong issue. On the other 
hand, both London and Hong Kong realised another threat would be coming from the 
north with the sweeping victory of the Communist forcing the Nationalist armies on a 
rapid retreat. The British Government was determined not to repeat the defeat of the 
colony in 1941 and started to build-up troops in Hong Kong with numbers over 
30,000. Furthermore, the Hong Kong Defence Force Ordinance was enacted on 23 
December 1949 to enable the Hong Kong Government to raise a volunteer force of 
6,000 strong. All members of the garrison were briefed on the importance of 
defending Hong Kong by emphasising on Hong Kong’s link with Britain and that 
“…the presence of a British Government and of British troops in Hong Kong is alone 
responsible for the city’s present flourishing condition and its maintenance as a free 
port which in fact constitutes its value as a commercial centre.”24  
 
On another occasion, the British were even more frank in stating their determination 
in preventing a possible Communist take-over by saying “We can only repeat that we 
do not intend to be talked or jostled out of the Colony. We would resist a military 
assault and we have no intention of withdrawing.”25 
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The Communist taking over of Mainland China was completed in 1949 with the 
Nationalists retreated to Taiwan and 1 October was declared the National Day for the 
People’s Republic of China. British Government weighted the situation and came to 
the conclusion that keeping Beijing at a distance politically and economically by non 
recognition and embargo as suggested by the American would damage the established 
trade relationship with China and the position of Hong Kong.
26
 On 6 January 1950, 
the British Government, in line with her habitual doctrine of recognizing governments 
in de facto control;
27
 extended diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of 
China and the border between Hong Kong and China remained intact.  
 
Britain was unable to establish an agreeable relationship with China despite Britain 
was one of the first Western Governments giving recognition to the new Chinese 
regime. British business interest in China suffered greatly under the new Chinese 
Government. There were also occasional armed incidents involving the military units 
of China and the Royal Navy in Hong Kong water. A more serious incident happened 
in September 1953 resulted in the death of seven Royal Navy crew members with 
another five wounded.
28
  
 
To further safeguard Hong Kong’s position by showing signs of co-operation with 
China, the Foreign Office tried to persuade the Americans to allow the new Chinese 
Government to take over the seat at the United Nation’s Security Council which was 
being occupied by the Nationalist Government of China. The Foreign Office’s 
argument was: 
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“…our weak position in Hong Kong gives us a very real motive for 
wanting to see the People’s Government inside the United Nations. A new 
government like the Peking Government is likely to attach great 
importance to its position as the one permanent Asian member of the 
Council, and it seems to me a good deal less likely that they will allow 
themselves to be used by the Russians for a direct or indirect attack on 
Hong Kong if by so doing they endanger their position in the United 
Nations. Such a situation is unlikely to arise this year but might well arise 
fairly quickly once they have settled with Formosa.”29  
 
It eventually took more than four and half years before a normal diplomatic 
relationship was established with the formal exchange of Charges d’affairs between 
Britain and China.
30
 One of the reasons for this strained diplomatic relationship 
between the two countries was the Korean War. 
 
On 27 June 1950 the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution sponsored 
by America calling member nations to “render such assistance to the Republic of 
Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international 
peace and security to the area.”31 Britain was one of the Western nations backing the 
Americans by sending its military forces to Korean under the banner of the United 
Nations. 
 
During the course of the Korean War, General MacArthur’s offensive in late 
November 1950 resulted in the full scale Chinese intervention and the Chinese 
Liberation Army were sent to Korea as volunteers to assist the North Koreans in battle. 
Britain differed in opinion with America on the counter measures as remarked by 
                                                          
29
 See Bullen, R. & Pelly, M.E., (eds.), (1987) Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series II, 
Volume II. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 See Hastings, M. (1987) The Korean War. London: Macmillan, p. 56. 
 283 
Oliver Franks, the British Ambassador to America at the time, saying “British trade 
with China through Hong Kong made Britain reluctant to introduce economic 
measures against China, not only for economic reasons, but also out of fear of 
provoking a Chinese assault on Hong Kong.”32  
 
With the Communist military success in January 1951, China rejected the United 
Nations’ cease fire resolution and as a result, the United Nation on 1 February 1951 
declares China to be engaged in aggression and imposed embargo on strategic goods 
to China. On top of this, the United States further imposed a total embargo on trade of 
any kind with China. Hong Kong, being the British colony, had to conform to these 
embargoes which caused dearly to the colony’s economy. The situation only 
improved with the stabilization of the Korean Peninsula situation after the signing of 
the Armistice at Panmunjom on 27 July 1953.
33
 
 
Korea was not the only country in this region being affected by the Communist 
aggression. In South East Asia, a State of Emergency had been declared in Malaya 
since June 1948 and British troops were involved in the counter insurgency campaign 
against the Communist backed Malayan Races’ Liberation Army until the granting of 
independency to Malaya in 1957 and the eventual lifting of the State of Emergency in 
1960. In Indo-China, the Communist backed Viet Ming had broken the French in the 
jungle and in possession of the North Vietnam. The Communist infiltration however 
did not stopped and soon South Vietnam was faced with the Communist backed Viet 
Cong and American Special Forces were deployed to Vietnam from 1957 acting as 
military advisors in support of the South Vietnamese Government. Elsewhere in 
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South East Asia, countries like Indonesia and Thailand were also feeling the 
Communist threat and took preventive or counter measures in preventing the 
Communist topping their governments.
34
 
 
Hong Kong, being situated next to China, was naturally becoming the most important 
outpost for the British and the Americans in this region. The Americans was doing 
everything they could to hold the tide of Chinese Communist backed revolutionary 
movement spreading further across South East Asia and topping other pro-Western 
governments.  
 
Prior to the Second World War, there were only a Consul-General, two Consuls and 
two Vice-Consuls in Hong Kong’s American Consulate. In 1953, there were 115 
personnel in total, including four Consuls and twenty Vice-Consuls, with roles 
certainly more than looking after the affairs of only 1,262 American in Hong Kong, 
including themselves.
35
  Whitehall also felt that its military presence in the Far East 
was essential to contain Communist China in the region and to protect Hong Kong 
against internal subversion.
36
 The Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office 
Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick told the Americans on 15 January 1957 that “In the fight against 
communism Britain was the only country which was really making a substantial 
contribution whether in Germany or in the Middle East or in Hong Kong…”37  
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Welsh (1997) suggested that with the Malayan independence in 1957, British strategic 
interests in the Far East were almost at an end. The British garrison in Hong Kong 
was reduced to a level compatible only with the maintenance of internal security. In 
1958, the closure of the naval dockyard in Hong Kong which used to be the major 
naval base for the Royal Navy fleets in the Far East further demonstrated Britain’s 
reduction of its military presence in the region.
38
  
 
The Colonial Office was disbanded in 1966 in view of the diminishing British 
overseas interests following the de-colonisation process. A new position of Secretary 
of State for Commonwealth Affairs was created on 1 August 1966 taking over the 
responsibility of Hong Kong affairs on top of its designated roles. From 1968 onwards 
the post became the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs within 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 
 
  
8.3 The Social, Cultural and Economic Scene in Hong Kong  
 
The Military Administration set up in Hong Kong on 1 September 1945 was facing 
enormous difficulties in putting Hong Kong back into order in view of the shortage of 
supply and experienced personnel as a result of the Second World War. The norm of 
the day was: 
“Whatever was most urgent was done in the easiest and quickest way. 
Whatever could be postponed was forgotten for the time. Only in a very 
few undertakings was it found possible to look further ahead than a few 
months and no question of long term policy was ever considered unless an 
irrevocable decision could no longer be postponed.”39  
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From Admiral Harcourt’s account, Hong Kong did not suffer too much damage whilst 
under the Japanese occupation except the city was being greatly neglected by the 
occupation force and left in filth. The real damage in Hong Kong was caused by large 
scale looting where every empty building “had been completely gutted” with all 
removable items being taken away and floorboards torn up for firewood.
40
 Food was 
of particular concern for the 600,000 survivors of the war and they were all appeared 
to be suffering from malnutrition.
41
  
 
Apart from rebuilding the city, the Military Administration had to restore a good 
working relationship with China, who felt betrayed by the Allied in not returning 
Hong Kong to the motherland and allowing the British to re-occupy the colony. Only 
through high level visits and substantive assistance offered by the Military 
Administration in Hong Kong that this strained relationship with China was restored 
gradually.
42
 
 
Civil Government was restored on 1 May 1946 with the return of the Governor Sir 
Mark Young. His immediate problem was to find enough food in particular rice to 
feed the population. Apart from the ‘Young Plan’ proposed as mentioned earlier, 
Governor Young also determined to reduce the racial impact of the colonial 
administration in Hong Kong by repealing the Peak District (Residence) Ordinance 
1918,
43
 The Acting Attorney General explained during a Legislative Council meeting 
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in 1946 that “the repeal of this measure would tend or might tend to encourage 
rebuilding and reconstruction [at the Peak] and that it would be out of harmony with 
the sprit of the times to retain it.” This had drawn the prompt response from one of 
the Chinese Council member commenting that “This Ordinance has been a source of 
resentment to the Chinese ever since its enactment and I feel sure the repeal of this 
Ordinance, which is being effected by this Bill, will give universal satisfaction to the 
Chinese…”44  
 
Prior to the War, the Colonial Government in Hong Kong relied heavily on cadet 
officers and British recruited officials in running the affairs in Hong Kong. During the 
period of Military Administration immediately after the War, the remaining British 
ex-internees in Hong Kong were simply not sufficient nor fit enough to take up the 
managerial roles. As stated by Admiral Harcourt in his report, “In those difficult days 
the administration relied on its Chinese and Portuguese assistants. Without them the 
personnel position would have been untenable, and it can hardly be denied that they 
thereby established credentials which it would be hard for any future Government to 
ignore.”45 This observation was noted by Governor Young who during the budget 
debate for 1946-1947, stated that: 
“The policy of Government is to ensure that every opportunity shall be 
given to locally recruited persons not only to enter but to rise in the 
service of the public up to the highest posts and to fulfil the highest 
responsibilities of which they are capable or can be assisted to become 
capable.”46  
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In the Secretary of State for the Colonies’ memorandum dated 17 July 1950 to the 
Cabinet concerning employment of native born administrators in the higher grades of 
Colonial civil servants, the situation of Hong Kong on this subject was mentioned: 
“In Hong Kong there are 395 higher civil service posts, of which 51 are at 
present held by local officers, mostly in the educational, medical, nursing 
and other professional services. There is one local-born member of the 
Administrative Service. 
 
In correspondence concerning a Bill to authorise the appointment of a 
Public Service Commission the Governor expressed the opinion that for 
some years to come the majority of Hong Kong vacancies in the higher 
posts would have to be filled from the United Kingdom; he emphasised in 
particular the difficulty of finding good local material for the 
Administrative Service and the Police.”47  
 
The 1946 Annual Report on Hong Kong records that the last population census held 
in Hong Kong before the War was in 1931 and the population was recorded to be 
864,117. Immediately before the War in 1941, an unofficial census was conducted by 
the Air Raid Precautions wardens and the population of Hong Kong was estimated to 
be 1,600,000 of whom 150,000 were fishermen living on board fishing junks. During 
the Japanese occupation of the colony from 1941 to 1945, the population was dropped 
to less than 750,000 as a result of the forced reparation of Chinese to the mainland by 
the Japanese as well as shortage of food in the colony. Soon after the War, there were 
great influxes of population from China to Hong Kong. By the end of 1946, the 
population of Hong Kong had returned to the pre-War level of 1.6 million, with 
around 10,000 being non-Chinese.
48
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The vast increase of population in Hong Kong after the War was the direct result of 
the political turmoil happening north of the border. During the Sino-Japanese conflict 
and the Second World War, the civil war in China had stopped briefly when both the 
Nationalists and Communist armies joint hand to fight the Japanese. With Japan’s 
surrender, fighting between the two Chinese armies resumed and intensified with the 
Communist gaining the upper hand with its forces sweeping across China. Refugees 
in hundreds of thousands fled south and a large number of them eventually arrived 
and settled in Hong Kong causing the great population influx. Population at June 1947 
was estimated to be 1.75 million and quickly shot up to 2.32 million at end of March 
1950.
49
 Hong Kong’s population continued to grow year by year and reached an 
estimate of 2.68 million in 1957.
50
  
 
Arising from this chaotic situation, a quota system was introduced in 1950 to balance 
the number of people entering and leaving Hong Kong. This was the first time the 
Government exercise border control as Chinese were allowed free movement to and 
from Hong Kong prior to this arrangement.
51
 Nonetheless, Hong Kong had already 
experienced great hardship in coping with this population explosion particularly in the 
area of housing, employment, education and social facilities. On the other hand, the 
influx of refugees also brought along successful and experienced manufacturers from 
China whom had managed to move their assets to Hong Kong before the Communist 
taking-over. With the ample supply of cheap refugee labour force in Hong Kong and 
the decline of the shipping related business owing to the embargo, the setting up of 
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light manufacturing industries in the 1950s had laid the foundation of economic 
success in Hong Kong for the years to come.  
 
Hong Kong’s economy continued to boom and in the 1960s was among the twelve top 
exporters in the world. With a population of less than four million, the colony’s export 
exceeded that of Mainland China, who had a population 180 times more than Hong 
Kong.
52
 
  
One of the characteristics of the local Chinese population was their apathy towards 
politics in Hong Kong. Many had only thought of Hong Kong was a place of transit 
for them to ride out the political storms in the near by region. The Hong Kong 
Government was fully aware of this and designed its management approach 
accordingly as stated by Governor Grantham: 
“Hong Kong is…different in that the Chinese population is politically 
apathetic. Provided that the government maintains law and order, does not 
tax them too much and ensures they get justice in the courts, they are 
content to leave the business of government to the professionals.”53 
 
 
8.4 Major Law and Order Issues in Hong Kong  
 
Crimes in Hong Kong 
 
The War-torn Hong Kong rehabilitated gradually but crime rate was very high during 
the immediate years after the War. Crime rates for the second half of 1946 showed an 
increase of 25% above the pre-War normal and 9,908 cases were recorded from 1 
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May to 3 December 1946. There were 522 cases of robbery and 20 cases of assault 
with intent to rob. 73 cases of possession or use of firearms were recorded and two 
police officers were killed and eight wounded during some of these firearm related 
encounters. 
 
During the period from May to December 1946, the magistrate courts in Hong Kong 
had dealt with 36,248 prosecutions (both crime and non-crime cases), convicted 
29,284 cases with 4,856 adults sentenced to imprisonment (1,067 sentenced for 
default of fine payment) and 250 juveniles sentenced to reformatory or to approved 
institutions.
54
 In 1957, there were 18,992 serious offences and 225,045 cases being 
reported with a total of 171,602 persons convicted.
55
  
 
However one must look carefully at the overall crime figures in Hong Kong of which 
a large number of arrested and prosecuted cases were of minor or even non crime 
nature such as hawking and obstruction which were the direct results of the poor 
economy at the time. It was also reported by the Hong Kong Government that a large 
number of these trivial offences were committed by the new immigrants “…who had 
arrived from China only a few weeks or even days, before committing the offences for 
which they were charged.”56 
 
Throughout the first century after the War, Hong Kong was as a whole showing 
relatively low violent crime rates. In the year 1956 – 1957, the overall violent crime 
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rates in Hong Kong was only 24.8 per 100,000 population, which included murder, 
manslaughter, rape, indecent assault, robbery, armed robbery and serious assault.
57
  
 
Broadhurst (2000) argued that these low crime rates might have been the unintended 
result of the Hong Kong Government’s focus on public order by police during the 
colonial ‘garrison phase’ rather than on crime suppression.58 Sinclair (1983) however 
suggested that extensive corruption practices were common amongst the Police and 
other Government departments in Hong Kong since the 1950. Some of the illicit 
profits made by the Police as well as their linkage with the organized criminals were 
used to maintain peace in the streets, coped with the public’s lack of confidence in 
reporting crime to the Police were contributing factors for Hong Kong’s low crime-
rates during this period of time.
59
  
 
One of the example on the organized crime and triad happened in Hong Kong was the 
issue of the Walled City in Kowloon. Further to the Wall City incident of 1948 
mentioned earlier when the British authority over the Walled City was challenged by 
the Chinese Government, the Hong Kong Government had basically ceased its law 
enforcement action inside this tidy spot turning this place the haven for criminals and 
triads with vice and drug dens operated openly. It was only after a murder trial in the 
1959 that the court affirmed Hong Kong Government’s authority over the Walled City. 
Major police actions were launched within the Walled City and ended up with an 
influx of over 1,500 prisoners to Stanley Prison since August 1959.
60
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The 1956, 1966 and 1967 Riots 
 
This strong stance of the government in maintaining social stability by force had in 
fact been a long standing government policy in Hong Kong. The last thing the Hong 
Kong Government would like to see were the Communist and Nationals fractions 
using Hong Kong as the arena for direct confrontation. As early as in 1949, the Hong 
Kong Government was quite explicit to state that: 
“…it is inevitable that some of their political quarrels have been fought 
out again in the Colony. The policy of the Hong Kong Government has 
been to keep Hong Kong free of external political faction. Certain action 
has therefore been taken against those elements which have sought to 
make the Colony an arena for propagating their own political ideas.”61  
 
There were a number of politically instigated public order incidents occurred during 
this period such as the ‘Comfort Mission’ incident started by the Communists in 1952 
and the Kowloon (九龍) and the Tsuen Wan (荃灣) Riot started by the Nationalists 
and the triads instigated riot in 1956. During the latter incident, over 6,000 people 
were arrested.
62
  
 
The 1956 riot started when a housing estate officer ordered the Nationalist flags to be 
removed from the estate during the national day of the Republic of China on 10 
October 1956. Mobs, many with triad backgrounds, used this as an excuse to start a 
disturbance and looted shops and property owned by the known Communists groups 
in Kowloon. This soon broke into a full scale riot which lasted for three days. Over a 
thousand policemen were deployed on the streets of Shum Shui Po (深水埗) where 
the heat of the riot took place. The British Garrison was called to back-up the police 
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and three battalions of soldiers were deployed to the streets with fixed bayonets to 
restore order. 
 
The three day riot resulted in the lost of at least 62 lives, including the Swiss Consul's 
wife who was burnt to death when the car she was travelling was being set on fire in 
Kowloon. Over a thousand people were brought before the court and it was the first 
curfew to be imposed in the history of Hong Kong.
63
 In the subsequent trials, four 
were convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Special arrangement had to be 
made by the Prisons Department for the reception of over 1,300 prisoners involved in 
the riots, with most of the curfew breakers sentenced to less than six weeks.
64
 The 
Emergency (Detention Orders) Regulations passed in the same year was part of the 
aftermath of the Kowloon Riot. The Regulation had provided the Government an 
efficient and speedy tool for the detention and deportation of triad society leaders and 
other unwelcomed characters in the colony.
65
 
 
Differed from the 1956 riot which was politically instigated, the 1966 riot was purely 
resulted from social discontent sparked off by the five cents fare hike of the Star Ferry 
Company. The company provided cheap and regular shuttle ferry service between the 
island of Hong Kong and the Kowloon peninsula in Victoria harbour. The arrest of 
the lone protestor lead to mobs of youth marched to the police stations and later ended 
in a nightly riot along the Nathan Road in Kowloon on 6 and 7 April 1966. 
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Troops were called out by the Governor to support the police and Hong Kong was 
again placed on curfew during the evenings. More than 425 people were arrested with 
334 charged. Throughout the two nights of street battle with the mobs, the police 
“fired 772 gas shells, 62 wooden projectiles and 62 rounds of carbine or revolver 
fire.”66 The subsequent investigation on the riot had identified a number of local 
issues including the public’s hostility to the police. Negative feelings were directed at 
the police for their ineffective action against illegal gambling, narcotics and 
corruption.
67
 
 
The riot that followed in 1967 was entirely different in nature. China in 1967 was 
embroiled in the ‘Cultural Revolution’ (文化大革命) with groups of ‘Red Guard’ (紅
衛兵) moving around the country attempting to remove or to destroy the heritage 
relics, putting public figures as well as officials and scholars on public trial and 
fighting with rival groups of red guards. In 1966, the Red Guards had overrun Macau 
with the Portuguese Governor and his officials publicly humiliated. The British 
Consul General was made to stand in the sun for eight hours. The administration of 
Macau had since being controlled by Mainland China.
68
 
 
Noting the success of the neighbouring city of Macau, the leftist factions in Hong 
Kong were looking for opportunities to take on their fight with the Hong Kong 
Government. An industrial dispute by workers of a plastic flower factory in San Po 
Kong, (新蒲崗) Kowloon in May 1967 had provided the flash point for the local 
Communists. Rioting spread over three days before the police could restore order. 
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As the demonstrations and protest were endorsed by the Chinese Government, the 
Chinese State and local media fared up the sentiments of those sympathising the 
Communist ideology in Hong Kong. Marches were made to the Governor House with 
anti-colonial posts pasted to the wall of the buildings. The demonstration soon ended 
with clashes with the police and riots broke out from place to place and the police 
were targeted for the attack. In July 1967, the police border post at Sha Tau Kok, (沙
頭角) next to the Chinese border was machine-gunned by militiaman across the 
border resulted in the death of five policemen with another eleven wounded.
69
 
 
The Communists changed to a tactic of instilling terror in Hong Kong by planting 
fake and real bombs in the streets and buildings of Hong Kong. It was estimated some 
4,000 bombs were exploded during the months of the riot. More than 50 lives had 
been lost under various circumstances. This terror tactic however caused the public to 
turn away from the leftist as a large portion of the local residents had fled from the 
Communist regime in Mainland China since 1949 and during the period of Cultural 
Revolution. This allowed the Government the opportunities to win the heart and 
minds of the general public in Hong Kong.  
 
Armed with the public support, the Government took decisive actions to rid the 
Communist strong holds with the close support of the British Armed Forces. Many 
suspects were arrested and eventually over 1,700 rioters were sentenced to 
imprisonment, with 214 being females.
70
 China also withheld its hostility towards 
Hong Kong and the colony gradually returned to normal from November 1967 
onwards. 
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The 1967 riot was indeed the watershed for the political reform of the Hong Kong 
Government. The Government had learnt its lessons from the riots and initiated plans 
to open up the government and to become less bureaucratic in order to gain the trust 
and support of the locals. As Scott (1989) suggested: 
“[O]once the need for change was accepted, the colonial state underwent 
a remarkably rapid and successful transformation. The new order stressed 
‘consultation’ as the basis of its legitimacy, a more direct relationship with 
the population as its immediate goal and new and improved social policies 
as its future objectives.” 71                                               
 
 
8.5 Penal Policies in Hong Kong (1945-1969) 
 
As suggested in the earlier sections of this Chapter, the Hong Kong Government had 
to adopt extraordinary measures during the immediate years after the War to maintain 
public order in a city undergoing the process of recovery and rebuilding. The tense 
political conditions with China and the poor social and economic conditions in the 
colony during this time had generated a large under-class; many of them were arrested 
and imprisoned for non-criminal offences. Corporal punishment and deportation 
orders were handed down en mass as quick fixes for deterrence of crime and 
offenders in Hong Kong.  
 
During these early post-War years, the general attitude of the Government and the 
public in Hong Kong were in favour of hard lined approaches towards crime. On the 
treatment of the prisoners in Hong Kong, the Chief Justice in 1958 stated that: 
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“So far as the Colony is concerned, I do not think a prisoner’s (life) 
should be made to compare too favourably with that in the country from 
which such a large proportion of our gangsters came, or at any rate that 
the disparity between them should not be further increased.”72 
 
This remark was given after the Prisons Department had initiated the enhancement of 
the prisoner’s diet in Hong Kong in 1952. Food provided to the prisoners after the 
War were of minimum quantity and standard. This was owing to the fact that the basis 
of the dietary scale for prisoners was worked out at a time when food supply were 
short and most of the prisoners remained idle inside the prison with little or no 
employment owing to the lack of materials, tools, staff and orders.
73
  
 
When debating the improvement of the prisoners’ ration in the Executive Council on 
19 August 1952, the prison Medical Officer revealed that half of the long term 
prisoners were losing weight during their sentences.
74
  
“…the present diet scale, though not frankly inimical to the prisoners’ 
health and such as to cause constitutional or malnutritional harm to 
prisoners, is just barely enough to maintain their health….”75 
 
The Executive Council approved the new dietary scale for the prisoners during the 
meeting on the grounds that all able-bodied prisoners were now usefully employed 
with many of them on hard manual labour or in productive industries. Cost of prison 
food was increase from $1,500,000 to $1,730,000 per year as a result.
76
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The Prisons Department, charged with the reception of all persons sentenced to 
custody by the courts, was in the main following the penal reform moves in Britain in 
the management of the prison. From what had been described so far, the Prisons 
Department in Hong Kong was closely linked with the Colonial Office as well as the 
HM Prison Service in the United Kingdom. The senior prison officials were picked by 
the Colonial Office with colonial prison services backgrounds like Shillingford and 
Burdett or in the case of Norman, experience with the Borstal system in England. The 
Hong Kong Prisons Department was in fact modelled after the HM Prison Service not 
only by adoption of the similar outlook as in the case of uniform, departmental 
insignia and the operational procedures but more importantly in the adoption of the 
Prison Rules in use by the HM Prison Service except those parts which were not 
applicable to Hong Kong. 
 
It was therefore very natural for the Prisons Department in Hong Kong to follow the 
British practice under the Criminal Justice Act 1948 in particular the removal of those 
obsolete penal concepts such as penal servitude, hard labour and the triple division of 
offenders. Apparently there was another reason for Hong Kong to adopt some of these 
changes, which was to simplify the administrative work of the Prisons Department. 
This was important at the time immediately after the War when clerical support was 
in short supply and the penal record systems had yet to be rebuilt. 
 
Apart from drawing the British experience in proposing new penal programmes, there 
were occasions when the Colonial Office had to be consulted for expert opinion on 
the application of laws regarding the management of the prisons in Hong Kong. An 
example could be found in the interpretation of the length of sentence for those 
sentenced to life imprisonment. Though there were initial hesitation and divided 
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views as to whether the Secretary of State for the Colonies should be consulted and 
eventually the views from the Secretary of State were sought.
77
   
 
The only Commissioner of Prisons during the period from 1945 to 1969 with pre-War 
link with the Hong Kong prison service was Commissioner Norman. He worked in 
the Borstal system as housemaster in the North Sea Camp in England before joining 
the Prisons Department in Hong Kong in 1941. He had taken part in the Battle of 
Hong Kong and handed over the Stanley Prison to the Japanese upon Hong Kong’s 
surrender. He became an internee in Stanley for three years and eight months and had 
experienced being locked-up inside the cells of Stanley Prison during the period of 
internment. Norman took up the post of the Commissioner upon the death of Burdett 
in February 1953 after a brief illness and became the longest serving Commissioner of 
Prisons after the War from 1953 to 1968. He was instrumental in guiding Hong Kong’ 
penal services along the British welfarism model at the time.
78
  
 
Despite the removal of corporal punishment in Britain under the Criminal Justice Act 
1948, corporal punishment was never removed from the statutes in Hong Kong. 
Against the public’s hard lined approach and attitude towards offenders, the penal 
elites in Hong Kong were able to stand fast with more liberal and reformative 
measures adopted during this period. Corporal punishment was no longer awarded to 
prisoners in breach of prison discipline in the fiscal year 1952/53.
79
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Apart from corporal punishment, there were other penal policies and programmes 
such as the detention centre programme, the preventive detention and corrective 
trainings under the Criminal Justice Act 1948 in the United Kingdom not being 
followed. One possible explanation was the lack of resources for Hong Kong to 
launch these programmes after the War. The continued use of corporal punishment in 
Hong Kong after the War might be the other reason for not taking up the detention 
centre programme from Britain.
80
 Commissioner Norman did suggest another 
explanation that the first Commissioner of Prisons after the War, Shillingford was not 
keen in prison reform because of his personal reasons. 
“Shillingford was Commissioner of Prisons, Jamaica….He had reached 
pensionable age in Jamaica, where salaries and conditions of service were 
not to be compared with Hong Kong.  He came to Hong Kong with the 
prospect of a considerable better pension if he did a couple of tours there.  
I do not think he had any further interest in us…No use now to press for 
better conditions for the staff, better food for the prisoners, for a much-
needed expansion programme. For four years the department 
stagnated.”81  
 
Regarding preventive detention and corrective trainings, apparently there were 
different views towards these two programmes within the United Kingdom and thus 
the Colonial Office was not keen to press such to be implemented in the colonies. 
Norman had commented that: 
“A memorandum was received from the Secretary of State, whose Advisory 
Committee was not in favour of the introduction of legislation for 
Preventive Detention and Corrective Training unless a real need existed 
and adequate facilities were available. A survey of 517 long-term ordinary 
prisoners at Stanley showed that for Preventive Detention, as defined by 
the Criminal Justice Act, two prisoners would be eligible, and for 
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Corrective Training one prisoner would be eligible. There is clearly no 
need for such legislation at present, nor are separate institutions available 
to implement it. However, the pattern may change in years to come, and 
the situation will be kept under review.”82       
 
Interestingly, the detention centre programme and the preventive detention plan were 
eventually brought back to Hong Kong in the 1970s and these will be elaborated in 
more detail in the next Chapter. 
 
Another aspect advocated in the Criminal Justice Act 1948 was the introduction of 
after-care and welfare services to the prisoners. In Hong Kong there was no organized 
after-care services for offenders after the War despite England had been introducing 
after-care to prisoners upon discharge by probation officers as early as in 1908 under 
the Prevention of Crime Act.
83
 The main reason given by the authorities in Hong 
Kong was that majority of the prisoners were from mainland China and that they 
would be deported from Hong Kong on completion of their sentences. For those local 
prisoners, they would “return to their “families,” the family being the unit in the 
Chinese social structure comparable with the African tribe. Thus the need for an 
elaborate aftercare system is not pressing.”84  In the believe that the imprisonment of 
Chinese prisoners did not carry the same stigma as the Europeans,
85
 the government 
felt no urgency in establishing after-care services within the government and the 
service was left to be operated by the non-government social welfare agencies. 
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A six-month pilot after-care scheme was launched at Stanley Prison and Lai Chi Kok 
Female Prison starting from November, 1951. The services were arranged by the 
‘Discharged Prisoners’ Aid Sub-committee’ of the Hong Kong Council of Social 
Services with caseworkers sent from the Salvation Army to interview and to give 
assistance to all non-deportable prisoners. The Hong Kong Family Welfare Society 
was also offering after-care services for the female prisoners at Lai Chi Kok prison.
86
 
 
The pilot after-care scheme continued after the six month period. In 1955 after the 
enactment of the Deportation of Aliens Ordinance reducing the number of prisoners 
liable to be deported at the end of their sentences, the government saw that there were 
greater roles in after-care and that it should be the government’s responsibility to take 
up this function. One post of After-care Officer for the Training Centre was approved 
during the year by a new grade of staff, the Social Welfare Officer grade was 
created.
87
  
 
Additional posts of After-care Officers were created with the pilot treatment centre for 
addicted prisons at Tai Lam. In the year 1965-66, this new grade of social welfare 
officer was merged with the prison officer grade for better promotion prospect and to 
have their salary lifted to that of the prison officers. The word prison was dropped for 
the grade of ‘Prison Officer’ to become ’Officer’, thus allowing the Prisons 
Department to have more flexibility in the deployment of officers who were deemed 
to be suitable to perform after-care duties without having to enter a separate grade.
88
 It 
was further suggested by the Commissioner that: 
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“The expansion of the after-care service depends upon the number of 
additional posts which can be approved each year. It remains the policy of 
the Department that after-care, and welfare generally, are not separate 
issues which do not concern the majority of the staff, but are vital to the 
whole system of rehabilitation. The changes which have been made are in 
line with this policy.”89 
 
Prisoner welfare, in particular adult prisoners, was always believed to be the duty of 
the head of the penal establishment in Hong Kong whom through their daily contact 
during interviews and inspections should be able to address issues and problems of 
the prisoners. “In Stanley the second Superintendent and in other institutions the 
officer in charge act in the capacity of Welfare Officer dealing daily with prisoners 
requests and queries.” 90  Designated Prison Welfare Officers with social work 
trainings were not introduced to the Hong Kong penal system until 1975.  
 
It is fair to comment that the Prisons Department was adapting a more progressing 
approach towards treatment of prisoners, especially young offenders, during 
Commissioner Norman’s time. The ‘Training Centre’ programme was established 
since 1953 basing on the Borstal model in Britain. The first open prison, HM Prison 
Chimawan was opened on 3 December 1956 using the former buildings of a home for 
the handicapped to house short-sentence prisoners with no added security features 
added to the site.  
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Other measures including the provision of open visits at Stanley and Lai Chi Kok 
Women Prison
91
 and the granting of home leave up to five days at a time for prisoners 
in their last six-months of a sentence of four years and over as mentioned earlier.  
 
The question on the retention of lunatics in Colonial prisons had been a subject of 
concern for the Advisory Committees of the Colonial Office even before the Second 
World War. It was only in 1959 the Prisons Department’s proposed plan for building 
a mental hospital was approved by the Government. The proposed prison for 
prisoners with mental disorder was to be modelled after the ‘Broadmoor Prison’ in 
England with accommodation for 120 patients. The post of one Assistant Chief 
Officer and one Principal Officer were to be recruited from the United Kingdom with 
relevant qualifications. A Psychiatric Observation Unit was opened at Victoria Prison 
on 10 July 1961 with accommodation for 29 patients. Patients were receiving insulin 
and shock therapy treatment under the supervision of the part-time Government 
Psychiatrist.
92
 
 
For general nursing duties, the Prisons Department organized in-service hospital 
warder course since 1961. The syllabus used was drawn from that in use for hospital 
training courses for prison officers in England and Wales. An end of the course 
qualifying examination, approved by Hong Kong’s Medical and Health Department, 
would determine whether the warder is quality to his/her future promotion to the 
grade of Hospital Officer.
93
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The Commissioner himself was appointed by the Government as member of a 
Working Party set up to advice on the adequacy of the law in relation to crimes of 
violence committed by young persons in November 1964. Recommendations covered 
in the Report, published in January 1965, suggested current legal provision adequate 
in dealing with the youth crime issues, the Training Centre programme successful, 
corporal punishment for young offender be abolished, supervision of persons under 21 
by Probation rather than Police Officers. 
 
Penal elites in Hong Kong also paid close attention on the United Kingdom’s prison 
issues especially on discipline and control of prisoners in penal establishments. When 
Lord Mountbatten’s report came out in 1966 recommending the overhaul of the 
security state of the British prisons, Commissioner Norman commented that: 
“It is interesting to compare these developments with the 
recommendations of Lord MOUNTBATTEN’s report on the Prison 
Department in the United Kingdom. His main recommendations-that there 
should be one truly secure prison capable of detaining security risks, that 
apart from these many more people could go to open prisons and that 
greater attention should be paid to staff welfare or training-have in fact 
been the main planks of our policy for many years.”94  
 
There were also major penal policy initiatives in Hong Kong such as the special 
treatment programme provided to prisoners with drug habits leading to the setting up 
of the fist half-way house operated by the Prisons Department in 1968 and the 
enactment of the Drug Addiction Treatment Centre Ordinance in 1969 which was 
unique to other parts of the British Empire. Penal elites in Hong Kong believed Hong 
Kong’s approach in dealing with drug addiction was the solution in addressing a 
major social and penal problem at the time. Reports and reviews on the Hong Kong 
                                                          
94
 See Commissioner of Prisons, Prisons Department Annual Departmental Report 1966-67, p.1 
 307 
experience were shared
95
 and had attracted international attention. The birth of this 
special drug addiction treatment programme in Hong Kong and the details of its 
operation together with evaluation on its success are covered in Chapter Four. 
 
 
8.6 Conclusion 
 
Owing to the post-War political situation in the Far East, the Hong Kong 
Government’s prime concern was to maintain security and stability in the colony. 
This was a difficult task complicated with the influx of refugees from Mainland China 
when the Communist took over the country in 1949. Public order became a prime 
concern of the Government and draconian penal measures were adopted with 
recorded imprisonment rate as a result of mass incarceration. Corporal punishments 
were handed down to both adults and juveniles as quick fixes and deportation was 
used to clear the undesirables who had no right of abode in the colony. Prison 
overcrowding was inevitable and the government had to resort to extraordinary 
measures in releasing prisoners early in order to keep the prison figures down.  
 
Crime rates at the time, though appeared low in current standards, might not be 
reflecting the true picture of the law and order situation in Hong Kong at the time. 
Law enforcement was primarily concerning with internal security issues and the 
problem of wide spread corruption within the society including the law-enforcement 
community had facilitated the emergence of the under world order colluding with the 
law enforcers in regulating the drug, gambling, extortion and vice activities in Hong 
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Kong. A high number of court cases were in fact relating to non-crime cases 
committed by people trying to support their livelihood. 
 
Major public order incidents happened in Hong Kong during this period including 
several large scale riots which occurred in 1956, 1966 and 1967. The last riot, in 
particular, changed the Hong Kong Government’s approach in the administration of 
Hong Kong. 
 
The Advisory Committees of the Colonial Office during this time was playing an 
important role in encouraging the colonies to follow the British penal models. 
Government officials in Hong Kong were nevertheless trying to keep a distance from 
London’s influence by limiting the information that London could obtain from Hong 
Kong. Social and cultural reasons were used to defend the more draconian approach 
in dealing with crime and offenders in Hong Kong.  
 
The decolonization process in other parts of the Empire also sees the reduction of 
direct influences from London in the operation of the prison service in Hong Kong. 
Interestingly, penal policies adopted by the penal elites in Hong Kong at the time 
were closely adhered to Britain’s welfare approach towards person under custody, in 
particular young offenders. 
 
It is noted that most of the local penal policy initiatives were from the Prisons 
Department. Commissioner Norman was particularly instrumental in introducing a 
more reformative regime in the prisons as well as setting up the Training Centre 
programme in Hong Kong and ignored the detention centre experiments in Britain. It 
is argued that this was heavily affected by his background and experience at North 
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Sea Camp in England and his War time experience as a prisoner. The long period of 
service in the Department as the Commissioner allowed him to follow through his 
reformative plans meeting his desires for change. It was because of this reason that 
the prison services during this period had become more liberal and reformative in 
nature amidst the public’s punitive attitude towards crime and criminals. Norman’s 
initiatives happened to match the progressive penal reform move of the time in 
England and gained the endorsement from London as evidenced by his being 
honoured with the award of the CBE upon his retirement. 
 
The Prisons Department of Hong Kong maintained very close connection with its 
counterpart in England at operational level. Not only Prison Rules were adopted in the 
colony, new European Prison Officers as well as specialists were recruited and trained 
the same job skills as that of the Prison Officers of Her Majesty’s Prison Service. This 
knowledge transfer process ensured the framework of the British penal system was 
being carried out in Hong Kong during this period. 
 
With the Colonial Office gone and the practice of employing European prison officers 
from home discontinued, Hong Kong began to venture more on its own penal 
development in the 1970s which will be discussed in the next Chapter.  
 
  
 
 310 
Chapter Nine 
Balancing Security and Disciplinary Welfare (1970-1981) 
 
9.1   Introduction 
 
This Chapter summarises changes on Hong Kong’s penal policies during the period 
from 1970 to 1981. Penal policy initiatives in England, the Colonial influences as well 
as local penal initiatives are studied to find out their respective roles in the 
formulation of penal policies in Hong Kong. 
 
In England, a number of statues on penal policy were developed during the period 
from 1970 to 1981. The Criminal Justice Act 1972 empowered the courts to make 
Compensation Orders, introduced the Deferment of Sentence and the Community 
Service Orders. In this Act, the obligation to suspend sentences of imprisonment of 
not more than six month was also repealed.
1
 
 
Most legislation covering the sentencing powers of the courts was consolidated in the 
Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973. The Criminal Law Act 1977 had included a 
provision allowing a court to suspend a sentence of imprisonment in part, though this 
provision was not brought into force until 1982.
2
 
 
In this Chapter, it is elaborated that Hong Kong during this period had only taken up 
two of the earlier initiatives from England’s Criminal Justice Act 1948, the detention 
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2
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centre programme and the preventive detention system. These two British penal 
practices were not being incorporated in Hong Kong until the 1970s. These were 
launched in Hong Kong not by pressure from England but resurrected through local 
initiative as counter-measures against the rising crimes in Hong Kong.  
 
Hong Kong society was facing a surge of crimes in the beginning of the 1970s in 
particular violent crimes committed by young offenders. The public’s attention was on 
law and order with crime prevention and crime reduction high on Government’s 
agenda. Penal policies in Hong Kong were accordingly shifted from a more liberal 
and reformative approach to that of disciplinary welfare approach with emphasis on 
deterrence and security over offender rehabilitation.  
 
The birth of the detention centre in Hong Kong in 1972 and a detailed evaluation on 
its programme has already been covered in Chapter Three and would not be repeated. 
The issue on preventive detention as a penal policy for Hong Kong however required 
more detailed examination as this Ordinance was never put into operation in Hong 
Kong after its enactment.  
 
Another piece of penal policy inherited from the British during this period was the 
suspended sentence. Suspended sentence was introduced in England and Wales under 
the Criminal Justice Act 1967 and was enacted in Hong Kong in 1971. The legislation 
of the suspended sentence, which was considered a ‘soft option’ at the time when 
Hong Kong was taking strong measures to fight against rising crime, requires in-depth 
discussion in this Chapter. 
 
The period from 1970 to 1981 could also be described as a time of transformation on 
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Hong Kong Prisons Department’s penal philosophies and the resultant quantum jump 
on its organization structure. The 1973 Stanley Prison riot was the watershed for the 
Prisons Department’s subsequent development. The penal philosophy and system 
were shifted from reformation in the 1960s to discipline and control with emphasis on 
penal security. Additional posts for prison staff were created and filled by better 
quality personnel in executing the new penal initiatives. The aftermath of this riot had 
deep and far-reaching implications on the subsequent development of the penal 
system and the organisational structure of the Prisons Department in Hong Kong. 
 
 
9.2   Hong Kong Society in the 1970s 
 
The political situation in the South East Asia region had stabilised after President 
Nixon of the United States visited China in February 1972. The successful meeting 
marked the beginning of the Sino-American rapprochement leading to the subsequent 
withdrawal of the American troops from Vietnam in 1973.
3
 The fall of the South 
Vietnam Government in 1975 however generated a mass exodus of Vietnamese 
seeking political refuge. Hong Kong was one of their favourite destinations because 
of its close geographical location to Vietnam and being the only British colony in the 
region; allowing the refugees better chances to be re-settled to Western countries in 
future.  
 
As described in Chapter Two, the law enforcement community in Hong Kong, in 
particular the Prisons Department, was severely affected not only with the task in the 
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management of the Vietnamese detainees but had to maintain order in the camps in 
view of the rising tensions between the detainees and the Hong Kong Government as 
well as amongst detainees of different ethnical background. 
 
Within the British Empire, the de-colonisation process was taking rapid pace in the 
1960s as mentioned in Chapter Seven. The United Nations was actively involved in 
promoting the independence of these colonial territories through ‘The Declaration on 
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’ adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly on 14 December 1960. Article 5 of the Declaration 
states that: 
“[I]mmediate steps shall be taken, in United Nations Trust and 
Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet 
attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those 
territories.”4  
 
Hong Kong was however treated differently from this UN Declaration mainly because 
of opposition from Mainland China. In 1972, The Chinese Government wrote to the 
United Nations expressing the view that Hong Kong and Macao were, and always had 
been, part of Chinese territory. Accordingly these two places should be removed from 
the United Nation’s list of colonial territories covered by the ‘Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’. The Chinese 
Government would resolve the territorial issue when the time was ripe. According to 
Keay (1997): 
“The Chinese letter had been duly noted by the UN, Hong Kong had been 
removed from the UN’s list of colonies and the British in due course 
                                                 
4
 ‘The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, New York, 14 
December 1960’. http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/dicc/dicc.html. Accessed on 20 January 2012. 
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obligingly began to refer to the place as ‘the Territory of Hong Kong’ 
rather than ‘the Colony of Hong Kong’.” 5 
 
Mainland China had gradually opened up to the West with the normalization of the 
relationship with America. After the death of Chairman Mao Zedong (毛澤東) in 
1976 and the arrest of the ‘Gang of Four’ (四人幫) in the subsequent year, Deng 
Xiaoping (鄧小平) won the power struggle in China and began to launch his 
economic reforms in China and Hong Kong benefitted greatly out of this change of 
political climate. 
 
Hong Kong in the 1970s had recovered from the 1966 and 1967 riots and had 
benefitted economically from the stabilized situation in the Mainland through trade 
and industry. During Governor MacLehose’s visit to Mainland China in March 1979, 
he had taken the opportunity to raise the question on the future of Hong Kong. The 
need for bringing up this question was owing to the fact that the 99 year lease of the 
New Territories from China would expire in 1997. Upon his return from Beijing, the 
message he presented to the people of Hong Kong suggested he had secured the 
Chinese leader’s blessing on the future of Hong Kong with status quo to be remained 
after 1997.
6
  
 
The Governor was in fact receiving a very clear message from Deng Xiaoping that 
China was determined to regain the sovereignty of Hong Kong. This message was not 
revealed in Hong Kong but secretly related to London due to its extreme sensitivity to 
the Hong Kong community. The British Government took no risk from this news by 
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instigating preventive measures leading to the subsequent enactment of the British 
Nationality Act in 1981. This amendment on British nationality changed the status of 
the Hong Kong residents from ‘British Citizens’ to ‘British Overseas Citizens’ 
cancelling their rights of abode in the United Kingdom should China took back Hong 
Kong.
7
 
 
Locally, the Hong Kong Government readjusted its ways of administration of Hong 
Kong after the 1967 riot. Jack Cater, a former deputy Colonial Secretary and Special 
Assistant to the Governor during the 1967 riot was quoted by Cheung (2009): 
“The government learned the lesson from the riots and introduced a 
series of reforms. Certainly we took the opportunity of producing a new 
system and reform…before 1967, there was no real channel of contact 
between the government and the people. After the riots, we set up district 
offices to improve communication with the people. I don’t think there 
would have been any reform at all.”8 
 
The Hong Kong Government also agreed that social and economic development were 
needed to improve the condition of living in Hong Kong, in particular housing 
programme including urban renewal plans with the target of providing quality 
housing for 1.8 million people in ten years. Other plans included the provision of 
social security schemes for the needed and action against the wide spread corruption 
practice in the colony, both within and outside the civil service.
9
 
 
These plans were materialised with the arrival of the new Governor of Hong Kong, 
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Sir Murray MacLehose in 1971. Governor MacLehose, later Lord, was the first 
Governor for Hong Kong not selected from the Colonial Service but from the Foreign 
Office since 1904.
10
 Under his governorship, six year free primary education was 
introduced in 1972; and in 1978, nine year compulsory education was launched for 
the children in Hong Kong. A ten-year housing programme was commenced in 1973 
to addressing the housing problem in Hong Kong with extensive public housing 
building projects planned. A public assistance scheme was also launch during this 
period to provide a social security network for the disadvantaged. These social 
reforms enabled the local residents to feel that “the governance of the colonial 
administration had become relatively reasonable and was one of the most efficient 
governments in Asia even though it remained a colonial regime.” 11 
 
There were further evidences on the gradual social reforms in Hong Kong where the 
local Chinese were given more recognition in the 1970s, such as allowing the 
legislators in using Chinese in the Legislative Council debates in 1970. The 
Government also improved the representativeness of the Executive Council and the 
Legislative Council in 1976, the two power source in Hong Kong, by having equal 
number of fifteen official and unofficial members each in the Legislative Council. For 
the Executive Council, the unofficial member exceeds the official members by eight 
against seven.
12
 Nevertheless, all unofficial members of both Councils were being 
appointed by the Governor as party politics were yet to be developed in Hong Kong in 
the 1970s. 
 
Hong Kong’s population had reached 5.1 million as reflected in the 1981 population 
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census. Work on improving the infrastructure of Hong Kong began to take shape 
during the 1970s. The first Cross-Harbour Tunnel linking up Hong Kong island and 
the Kowloon peninsula opened in 1972 allowing free flow of land traffic in the urban 
areas of Hong Kong. The new railway station at Hung Hom was completed in 
November 1975 and the opening of the Lion Rock Tunnel facilitated vehicle traffic 
from Kowloon to the New Territories and Mainland China.
13
  
 
Public transportation in Hong Kong was further enhanced with the opening of the 
Mass Transit Railway in 1979. The year 1980 also witnessed the completion of the 
bridge linking the small fishermen’s island of Ap Lai Chau to Aberdeen availing lands 
for developing housing projects. The High Island Reservoir was also completed and 
began operation during the year. Together with the completed water supply link from 
Mainland China to Hong Kong, the residents in Hong Kong could have a guaranteed 
fresh water supply.
14
 
 
Economically, Hong Kong had gone through a period of ups and downs during the 
1970s and in particular the effects of the world oil crisis and stock crash in 1973. The 
local stock exchange index, the Hang Seng Index, plunged from 1,774 points to 400 
in April 1973 and the inflation rate for 1973 was 27% mainly due to impacts from the 
oil crisis. The economy of Hong Kong recovered gradually with the opening up of the 
China market in 1978 and the growth in the local property market. The revenue 
income for the Government in 1977-78 had exceeded ten billion Hong Kong dollars 
with a record surplus of HK$1.2 billion. Import and export trading in 1980 had 
exceeded HK$200 billion. 
15
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With an impressive economic growth during the late 1970s, the Government of Hong 
Kong was able to inject more resources on social reforms and in the maintenance of 
law and order. The senior officials in Hong Kong could act with more autonomy as 
both Britain and China showed less interest to the Hong Kong affairs after the 1966-7 
disturbances. Scott (1989) suggested that: 
“The increased autonomy of the Hong Kong government, stemming from 
both internal and external sources and backed by the imposing figure of 
the Governor, enabled the senior civil service to take measures, mainly in 
the field of social policy expenditure, which would probably have been 
unthinkable to the predecessors but which fitted in well with the spirit of 
the new Hong Kong.”16 
 
 
9.3   Crime Wave in the 1970s 
 
Governor Murray MacLehose took over Hong Kong at the time when the colony was 
facing a serious crime wave. In his first address to the Legislative Council on 18 
October 1972, he stated that: 
“I have also spent much time and thought on the two prerequisites of the 
very continuance of our community – on the one hand the prosperity that 
has provided everything that has been done or which ever will be done 
and, on the other, public safety. Obviously prosperity and social progress 
are of little value if unaccompanied by the ease of mind that only personal 
safety can produce.”17 
 
On Hong Kong’s law and order situation, Governor MacLehose further stated that: 
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“I am well aware of honourable Members’ concern at the growth of crime, 
and that their concern is well founded. The facts are that over the last four 
years key crime has increased by 40% and violent crime – that is to say 
murder, manslaughter, serious assaults and robbery – by 135%, and that 
the proportion of young people committing these crimes has steadily 
increased.”18 
 
A number of Legislative Councillors responded and supported the Governor’s concern 
on crime. The old Chinese dictum of “Use heavy penalty when and where the social 
order is threatened” was put forward suggesting deterrence is needed to combat 
crimes in the society of Hong Kong.
19
 
 
The Attorney General echoed the Legislators’ concerns. He agreed that the growth of 
violent crime in the past few years had caused concern for the safety and welfare of 
the residents of Hong Kong and feared that the effectiveness of the Government in 
maintaining law and order would be compromised. He further commented that one 
should not try to compare the relatively low crime rate in Hong Kong with other 
major cities of the world but should look at the rate of increase in crime as:  
“The number of reported homicides in 1972 will be more than double the 
1969 figure. The number of reported robberies this year will probably be 
three times the 1969 level.”20  
 
The Attorney General also mentioned the community’s perception on the cause of this 
increased crime wave to the shortage of police and the inadequate punishment of 
offenders by the courts. He cited court figures showing the number of offenders on 
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robbery charges sentenced to more than twelve months imprisonment by the Supreme 
Court and District Courts had increased from 59% in 1971 to 69% in 1972.
21
 He 
further stated that: 
“In the magistracies, custodial sentences were imposed on 80 per cent of 
such offenders during the 1972 quarter, as oppose to 39 per cent in the 
1970 quarter, and the average sentence of imprisonment imposed by 
magistrates for robberies rose from 10 to 13 months.”22 
 
To combat the rising crime trend, the Attorney General further elaborated that Hong 
Kong needed to shift its penal policy on the treatment of offenders from reformative 
to deterrence as: 
“During the past generation we in Hong Kong have prided ourselves 
upon an increasingly liberal and humane attitude towards the treatment 
of offenders. More and more emphasis has been put upon the needs and 
the rehabilitation of the offender, rather than upon the legitimate 
protection of the interests of the community as a whole. Generally 
speaking, our chief aim has been to re-educate the criminal, in the hope 
that he will re-enter society and make a useful contribution to it, rather 
than to punish him and to deter others from behaving in a similar manner. 
It is a matter for regret that the time has now come for us to take a 
harsher view.”23 
 
On the issue of deterrence punishment, the Attorney General acknowledged the 
Government would consider the introduction of compulsory corporal punishment for 
specific offences as measures to stop violent crimes. The other measures the 
Government had in mind was to give the Magistrates and the District Courts more 
power, in particular the latter with the maximum length of imprisonment increased to 
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seven years and to remove jury trial at the District Court for efficiency. The 
preventive detention system was also proposed to be introduced in Hong Kong, a 
system which had been used in the United Kingdom for nearly twenty years after the 
War. He explained the proposal as: 
“It provided that a person who had been convicted of a serious offence on 
three or more previous occasions, and had undergone at least two 
custodial sentences, could be ordered to be detained as a habitual 
criminal for between 5 and 14 years, if the court considered this to be 
expedient for the protection of the public.”24 
 
 
9.4   The Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) 
 
The Independent Commission Against Corruption, commonly known as the ICAC, 
was Hong Kong’s trump card in combating corrupted practices both within and 
outside the public organizations. The ICAC was formed under the order of Governor 
MacLehose in 1973 when corruption was a common practice in Hong Kong. The 
flash point leading to the formation of the ICAC was on a high profile corruption case 
against a senior police officer. Police Superintendent Peter Godber fled Hong Kong in 
1973 when accused of corruption with unexplainable wealth six times more than his 
21 years salary with the Royal Hong Kong Police Force.
25
 
 
The ICAC, staffed mostly by former British police personnel at its inception stage, 
was given extensive powers to investigate corruption cases in Hong Kong. During the 
1970s, action against police corruption was on high priority of the ICAC in view of 
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wide spread police corruption. The ICAC operations were extremely successful with 
police corruption syndicates broken up one after another and many corrupted 
policemen left the Force prematurely with their illicit gains.
26
  
 
By 1977, the ICAC operation against the police had reached a point that a large 
number of serving police felt that they were targeted. Some 3,000 off-duty police 
staged a protest in Hong Kong demanding an end to prosecutions on police corruption. 
The ICAC headquarters which was not far from the Police Headquarters was 
surrounded by the protesting police, glass entrance doors were smashed and some 
ICAC officers received minor injuries when trying to stop the police from storming 
into their office. The Governor of Hong Kong eventually backed down in fear of 
possible police mutiny and a partial amnesty on minor corruption cases happened 
before 1973 was announced to pacify the police force.
27
  
 
The ICAC however remained active in its anti-corruption work both within as well as 
outside the Hong Kong Government. It was fair to comment that Hong Kong had got 
rid of the corruption culture which had embedded in the society before the formation 
of the ICAC. Government departments were taking positive action to work with the 
ICAC in cleaning their corrupted elements as reflected in the following example by 
the Prisons Department: 
“The department has wholeheartedly co-operated with the Independent 
Commission Against Corruption and other law enforcement agencies to 
combat the problem of corruption which, although comparatively minor, 
is nevertheless detrimental to the service. The degree of co-operation is 
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amplified by the various actions which have been taken by these agencies 
during the year. Also in the field of anti-corruption and with the 
co-operation of the Independent Commission Against Corruption, the 
department has produced a notice, suitably worded, which is displayed in 
all visiting areas in penal institutions. In addition, two pamphlets, suitably 
worded, are enclosed in the first letter sent out by every prisoner to his 
family or friend after admission. I can, therefore, record with certainty 
that every member of the department and every prisoner is fully aware of 
the degree of emphasis which the prison authorities apply to stamping out 
corruption and at which we have been most successful.”28 
 
The setting up of the ICAC and the Government’s determination to rid corruption had 
produced a healthy law enforcement and penal environment in Hong Kong. With 
corrupted prison staff removed and the triad elements within the prisoner population 
no longer in a position to exercise influence within penal institutions through bribe, 
prison discipline had greatly improved. 
 
 
9.5 Penal Policy Initiatives in Hong Kong during the 1970s 
 
Preventive Detention  
 
Preventive detention was first set up in Britain under the Prevention of Crime Act of 
1908 with the aim of removing the persistent offenders from the society. The 
preventive detention sentence was set up as a two-stage custodial sentence. The first 
stage consisted of the punishment part with the normal tariff for his current offence 
whilst the second part being the additional minimum five years sentence of preventive 
detention for the protection of the society. The length of the preventive detention 
                                                 
28
 Commissioner of Prisons, Annual Departmental Reports, 1974-75, p. 1. 
 324 
depends on his criminal history and his risk to the society.
29
 
 
Conditions in the special preventive detention prison in England where prisoners 
served their second part of the sentence were supposed to be better than a normal 
prison. It was the philosophy of the politicians and administrators to use this extra 
period of imprisonment in “graying habituals -“old lags”- whiling away their years 
in a secure bucolic setting as the fire of crime dwindled into embers.”30 
 
The preventive detention had never been a popular sentencing option for the courts in 
England. Winston Churchill, whilst taken over the post as Home Secretary in 1910, 
commented that: 
“[L]lest the institution of preventive detention should lead to a reversion 
to the ferocious sentences of the last generation. After all preventive 
detention is penal servitude in all essentials, but it soothes the conscience 
of judges and of the public and there is a very grave danger that the 
administration of the law should under softer names assume in fact a 
more severe character.”31 
 
As the preventive detention was losing its popularity In England, the number of 
prisoners receiving this sentence was small. The annual average number of prisoners 
sentenced to preventive detention in the 1920s was only 31.
32
 It was under the 
Criminal Justice Act 1948 that the preventive detention was being revived by spelling 
out a clearer definition on the scope of prisoners to be cover and the arrangements to 
be given to these prisoners during the period of detention. 
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Under Prison Rule 165 of 1950, prisoners under preventive detentions in England 
would be paid a higher rate for their work done and with avenue to spend their 
earning inside the prison or to purchase approved items from outside the prison. They 
were also allowed to keep their own garden allotment and to keep or sold their 
products from the allotments. They were also enjoying better privileges than other 
prisoners by having additional letters and visits, to attend hobby classes and having 
meal and recreation in association.
33
 
 
The experiment however failed to achieve the aim of separating the persistent 
offender on more serious offences from the society but ended up locking the group of 
prisoners who were “pathetic repeat offenders, whose harm to society amounted only 
to annoyance. The sentence underwent various modifications, but the fundamental 
notion was so flawed that it petered out in the 1970s as an order that ensured 
compulsory postrelease supervision.”34 
 
The preventive detention system developed in England under the Criminal Justice Act 
1948 was never transported to Hong Kong. One of the reasons of this system not 
being transported to Hong Kong was probably due to the divided views between the 
Colonial Office and the Home Office on the effectiveness of prevention detention. 
The Commissioner of Prisons in Hong Kong commented in the 1955-56 Annual 
Department Report that: 
“A memorandum was received from the Secretary of State, whose 
Advisory Committee was not in favour of the introduction of legislation 
for Preventive Detention and Corrective Training unless a real need 
existed and adequate facilities were available. A survey of 517 long-term 
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ordinary prisoners at Stanley showed that for Preventive Detention, as 
defined by the Criminal Justice Act, two prisoners would be eligible, and 
for Corrective Training one prisoner would be eligible. There is clearly 
no need for such legislation at present, nor are separate institutions 
available to implement it. However, the pattern may change in years to 
come, and the situation will be kept under review.”35   
 
The idea of preventive detention was not being mentioned until being brought up 
again in the Commissioner of Prison’s Annual Report of 1963-64. The system was 
again considered not suitable for operation in Hong Kong on reasons that: 
“Preventive Detention on the United Kingdom pattern does not exist in 
Hong Kong nor, from Hong Kong’s point of view, would there be any use 
in its introduction. Prisoners with very long sentences are grouped 
together within the security arrangements of Stanley.”36  
 
The Hong Kong Government however made a U-turn on this penal policy during 
1972 when the crime rate was on the rise. During the debate on Governor 
MacLehose’s first Address to the Legislative Council in 1972, the Attorney General 
said that the Government was considering the introduction of a system of preventive 
detention to Hong Kong with the object to remove habitual criminals for long periods 
from the society.
37
 He further explained the proposal that: 
“It provided that a person who had been convicted of a serious offence on 
three or more previous occasions, and had undergone at least two 
custodial sentences, could be ordered to be detained as a habitual 
criminal for between 5 and 14 years, if the court considered this to be 
expedient for the protection of the public.”38 
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The Attorney General also explained to the Legislative Council members how 
preventive detention was being operated in England after the War and the type of 
offenders covered by this programme, i.e., person convicted of a serious crime on 
three or more previous occasions with at least two custodial sentences. The period of 
preventive detention passed down by courts in England could be from 5 to 14 years.
39
  
 
The Attorney General also acknowledged that the preventive detention system in 
England was not successful and was abolished since 1967. The main reason for its 
failure was blamed to the courts’ reluctance to pass a sentence of imprisonment longer 
than the normal tariff of the offence convicted. He stressed that Hong Kong would 
learn from the English experience and would avoid similar failures. The proposed 
preventive detention system in Hong Kong would compose of two parts: part one 
consisted of a normal length of sentence to be passed for the offence convicted with 
part two being the period of preventive detention added by the court thereafter.
40
 
 
Not all quarters in Hong Kong accepted this proposal. The Bar Association in Hong 
Kong raised its concern on the usefulness of the proposed preventive detention in 
keeping the worst offenders from the society and argued that: 
“This measure is unlikely to be used against the big-time criminal for 
whose serious crimes long terms of imprisonment are already available. 
In practice, it will probably come to be used, as it was in England, against 
petty criminals and hopeless recidivists who are really social misfits and 
who in Hongkong include large numbers of drug addicts and petty 
thieves.  
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This was the principal reason why it was abolished in 1967 in England 
after an experiment lasting only 19 years. These misfits are not the 
offenders who are causing the present wave of public concern.”41 
 
The Bar Association’s concern was duly noted when preventive detention was finally 
presented under the Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Bill 1973. The Bill stated 
clearly that it was not intended for persistent petty thief but for ‘hardened criminals 
who were positive menace to society’.42  
 
The Bill targeted offenders aged 25 years or over who were convicted of offence 
punishable by at least two years’ imprisonment. These offenders would have at least 
three previous convictions since the age of 17 with offence punishable by at least two 
years’ imprisonment. Two of these previous must be custodial sentences and his 
aggregate sentence of imprisonment would not be less than two years. Finally it was 
up to the Attorney General to make application to the court within thirty days after the 
supporting conviction for the preventive part of the sentence.
43
 
 
The length of the preventive sentence proposed was similar to that of the English 
practice, i.e., from 5 to 14 years. The operation of this system was suggested as: 
“It will be necessary to make special arrangements for the reception of 
offenders of this kind. Since they are not being punished for any particular 
offence, but being removed from society for a long period because they 
are a menace to it, they need to be provided with more recreational 
facilities, better accommodation and food and less discipline than the 
ordinary prisoner. This bill will therefore not come into force until such 
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time as the necessary arrangements have been made for the 
accommodation of this new class of prisoners.”44 
 
This Bill received general supports from the legislators and one even commented that 
“Due to different social conditions here, it is however hoped that such a system, if 
handled with care and caution and used only against hardened criminals who are a 
positive menace to society, will be good for the preservation of law and order in Hong 
Kong.”45 
 
The Bill became law on 20 June 1973 after the third reading as Criminal Procedure 
(Amendment) Ordinance 1973. Apparently the Prisons Department had prepared to 
put this Bill into action by setting up a ‘Preventive Detention Wing’ inside Stanley 
Prison to house the eligible prisoners. As reported in the Prisons Department’s Annual 
Report, the building work of this Wing was close to completion by October 1975.
46
  
 
However nothing further was heard on the preventive detention scheme either from 
the Government nor the Prisons Department and this legislation was never put into 
operation in Hong Kong since its enactment. There was no official explanation given 
on the reasons for not launching this enacted Preventive Detention Ordinance in Hong 
Kong.  
 
To look into the reason why preventive detention was not being put into operation in 
Hong Kong, the comments made by the Special Committee on Crime and Punishment 
of the Bar Association in 1973 might give a clue as: 
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 “The Attorney-General declared last November that the introduction of 
preventive detention would depend upon the availability of special 
facilities. The Committee sees no sign that they are available, or will be 
available for a long time to come.” 47  
 
This prediction by the Bar Association could very well be the reason why this 
Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Ordinance 1973 was not put into operation in Hong 
Kong. In 1975 the average daily penal population of Hong Kong was 8,467 against 
the certified accommodation of 6,503. In another words, prisons in Hong Kong were 
at the time 30% overcrowded.
48
 With such high occupancy rate in the penal 
institutions, it would not be surprise for the Prisons Department to have no enthusiasm 
in setting aside accommodation to operate the preventive detention programme in 
Hong Kong and to provide special ‘privileged’ treatments for a small group of 
habitual offenders.   
 
As nothing further was mentioned on preventive detention, the Criminal Procedure 
(Amendment) Ordinance 1973 with the enactment of preventive detention in Hong 
Kong was repealed on 31 May 2000 under the Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Ordinance 2000.
49
 The only statement on preventive detention made by the 
Government to the Legislators during the Bills examination stage was that: 
“the Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Ordinance was enacted on 27 
June 1973 but had not taken effect. The Administration proposed to repeal 
the Ordinance because the object of the Ordinance was to introduce 
preventive detention which was now an outdated concept.”50 
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Suspended Sentence in Hong Kong 
 
The suspended sentence introduced in England under Criminal Justice Act 1967 was 
enacted in Hong Kong in February 1971. The legislation of the suspended sentence 
was grouped under the Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Bill 1970 tabled at the 
Legislative Council in December 1970. The Bill covered a number of issues including: 
the question of bail; arrest by police without warrant; indictments; pleas and guilt; 
statement of evidence; admissions; aiders and abetters and the concealing of offences 
and the use of force. These proposed changes were along legislations enacted in 
England and Wales under the Criminal Law Act 1967 and the Criminal Justice Act 
1967. 
 
In the proposed Bill on suspended sentence for Hong Kong, it was stated clearly by 
the Acting Attorney General that the practice of suspending all sentence of 
imprisonment of less than six months in England would not be adopted in Hong Kong 
as: 
“This means that immediate short sentences of imprisonment have been 
abolished in England, a principle which this Government would not like 
to see adopted in Hong Kong at this time.” 51 
 
The Government fully anticipated that this proposed legislation would give the public 
a wrong impression that the Government was introducing a ‘weak method of dealing 
with offenders’52 and thus given powers to the courts “to impose such conditions as it 
thinks fit upon the offender.”53 Examples given included: to order the convicted 
person not to undertake certain kinds of work; not to attend specific places and not to 
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mix with undesirable characters. 
 
The Government also stressed that the introduction of the suspended sentence in Hong 
Kong was to give the court an additional sentencing option. The proposed suspended 
sentence was emphasised not to be interpreted to be a soft option as “suspended 
sentence of imprisonment will be awarded in many cases where, at present, a fine or a 
probation order is imposed.”54 
 
Finally, the Government stated that the proposed suspended sentence would be an 
experiment with a set time span for evaluation: 
“Nevertheless, the Government recognizes that this is a controversial 
measure and that it is difficult to assess with any accuracy the extent to 
which it will assist us in the prevention of crime and in dealing with 
offenders. Consequently, section 109H provides that these parts of the bill 
which deal with suspended sentence will expire at the end of 1973, unless 
this Council appoints a later date by resolution. The moving of that 
resolution, if it is thought proper to take this course in three years time, 
will give honourable Members an opportunity to express their views on 
the success or otherwise of this experiment.”55 
 
Legislators were in general not in favour of launching suspended sentence in Hong 
Kong in particular the debate of this Bill happened at the time when the increased 
crime trend began to worry the public. The Legislators were also unhappy on the Bill 
as it did not specify the type of offences that could spare immediate imprisonment. In 
response, it was recorded that: 
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“The Government appreciates that it is not easy to persuade the public of 
this [suspended sentence] and that there is a widespread feeling among 
Members of this Council and among citizens generally that the increase in 
violent crime has been such that it would be unwise, at this juncture, for 
legislation to be passed which might appear to be advocating leniency 
towards offenders who resort to violence.”56 
 
With the Government putting up a list of crimes to be excluded from the ambits of the 
proposed suspended sentence, the Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Bill was passed 
on 24 February 1971. A new Section 109B was added to the Criminal Procedure 
Ordinance and introduced suspended sentences to the colony. In brief, a court when 
passing a sentence of imprisonment for a term of not more than two years, may 
suspend that sentence for not less than one and not more than three years.  
 
Suspended sentence under the Criminal Procedure Ordinance was brought up for 
review on 12 December 1973 as promised when this Bill was proposed in 1971. It 
was reported that a total of 1,362 cases of suspended sentence were given by court 
since March 1971 when this sentence came into operation. In 252 of these cases, the 
offenders had committed further crimes and their suspended sentences were activated 
accordingly. This was considered to be a success though the trial period of this 
experiment was not long. The Attorney General reported that the Chief Justice as well 
as the Magistrates who had more frequent use of this sentence all supported the 
continuation of this sentencing option and thus recommended “the provision for the 
suspension of prison sentences should continue in operation for a further three 
years.”57 This was agreed by the Legislative Council on the same meeting. 
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On 8 December 1976, the provision of suspended sentence was again brought up for 
review at the Legislative Council. On this occasion, it was reported by the Legislator 
that suspended sentence “is an effective form of deterrent, particularly in the case of 
young offenders whose offences are of less serious nature and who have not yet 
become hardened criminals.”58 The Council agreed that suspended sentence be made 
a part of the permanent law during the meeting. 
 
Partial suspended sentence as practiced in England under the Criminal Justice Act 
1977 was never taken up in Hong Kong although it was being considered by the 
Government as late as in 1986.
59
 The possible explanation for such was that “the 
main objective of a suspended sentence [in Hong Kong] therefore remains to avoid 
sending the accused to prison at all.”60 
 
The introduction of the suspended sentence was only able to slow down the growth of 
penal population for two years and the penal population surged again in 1974. 
Furthermore, the suspended sentence was never meant to be used as a general 
sentence but to be used on exceptional circumstances for the courts as an additional 
sentencing option for the suitable cases.
61
 
 
 
Disciplinary Welfare and the Prisons Department 
 
Penal policies in the 1970s were much more deterrent in nature than the 1950s and the 
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1960s. The Detention Centre Ordinance was introduced in Hong Kong in March 1972 
transporting the English detention centre practice, enacted under the Criminal Justice 
Act 1948, to Hong Kong. Not only was the ‘short, sharp and shock’ concept was 
introduced to Hong Kong, the colony had quietly built into the detention centre 
system in Hong Kong the use of caning to punish detainees for breach of centre 
discipline.
62
  
 
In 1974, a radical change was made on the Training Centre programme when caning 
was introduced as one of the awards for inmates found in breach of the training centre 
regulations. This move was in total contradiction to what Commissioner Norman’s 
belief that corporal punishment should not be introduced to young offenders in Hong 
Kong. The training centres during his time were able to reform young offenders 
through character training through education and vocational training without the need 
of physical punishment. However Commissioner Norman had already retired in 1968 
and his post was taken up by Mr. Pickett. In January 1972, Mr. Thomas Garner 
succeeded as Commissioner of Prisons in Hong Kong upon Mr. Pickett’s retirement.63  
 
Mr. Garner joined the Hong Kong prison services in 1947 after leaving the British 
Army the same year at the rank of Sergeant Major. Unlike his predecessors, 
Commissioner Garner had no HM Prison Service or Colonial Prison Service 
backgrounds. During his service with the Prisons Department, he had close 
involvement with the experimental drug addiction treatment centre programme at Tai 
Lam Prison before the programme was enacted into the Drug Addiction Treatment 
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Centres Ordinance in 1969. Commissioner Garner was also responsible for proposing 
the detention centre programme to Hong Kong addressing the Government and the 
community’s appeal for adopting tougher and more deterrent punishment for the 
young offenders.
64
  
 
Mr. Garner also had to face immediate challenges shortly after taken up the post as 
Commissioner of Prisons Department by facing the 1973 Stanley Prison riot. Through 
his skilful leadership, he had succeeded to address the recommendations made by the 
advisors from HM Prison Service by enhancing the physical security of the penal 
institutions as well as re-organized the Department. Furthermore through his strong 
leadership style, he was able to secure vast developments both in the expansion of 
penal institutions as well as the 276% increase in prison staff numbers during his ten 
years as Commissioner.
65
  
 
Another important change happened to the Prisons Department after the 1973 Stanley 
Prison Riot was the change in the chain of command within the Hong Kong 
Government. “On Monday 1st October, 1973 Security Branch [of the Government 
Secretariat] assumed responsibility from Social Services Branch for prisons matter.”66 
Furthermore a high level Fight Crime Committee was set up during the same year 
under the chairmanship of the Chief Secretary for Administration. Apart from 
providing advice and recommending measures to prevent and reduce crime, it also 
coordinates crime-fighting efforts and monitors their results.
67
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These deterrent penal policy measures taken by the Government apparently did not 
stop the rising crime trend. During the Governor’s Address in the opening session of 
the Legislative Council in 1975, Governor MacLehose again stressed the 
government’s commitment in combating violent crimes in Hong Kong. He placed 
close attention to the law and order situation in Hong Kong and noted that the 
workload of the Prisons Department had a 44% increase of penal population from 
1973 -1975 as the result of the fight crime campaign.
68
  
 
Despite the Prisons Department’s introduction of more deterrent approach on young 
offenders, the Senior Legislative Council Member Dr. Chung Sze Yuen was still 
thinking otherwise. When responding to the Governor’s Address, Dr. Chung said that 
the locals in Hong Kong believed that the Government was “not putting sufficient 
emphasis on the fear of punishment as an effective deterrent to violent crime.”69 He 
further stated that: 
“We often hear the following comments. The terms of imprisonment with 
certain exceptions are generally too lenient. There is almost a complete 
absence of corporal punishment. The material standard of living in the 
prisons is even better than the normal standard of living of many prison 
inmates if they were on the outside.”70  
 
Thus the less eligibility concept was again being raised by the Legislators. In response, 
the Secretary for Security stressed that the Prisons Service in Hong Kong had two 
main tasks; prisoners be keep under discipline in secure accommodation and to reduce 
recidivism through rehabilitation. Both tasks would require facilities which might be 
greater than individual members of the public might enjoy but were necessary for 
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carrying out the tasks effectively.
71
 
 
The Secretary also cited some interesting figures to back his argument. Regarding the 
size of the living accommodation for the prisoners, he commented that the newer 
penal institutions, including the detention centre, were having more spacious areas in 
accommodation than the older prison building such as the Victoria Remand Centre. 
Prisoners released from these newer facilities were noted to have a higher success rate 
than those from the older facilities, especially Stanley Prison where “three out of four 
prisoners released in 1971-73 have returned to serve a further sentence.” 72 
 
As to the prison diets, the Secretary for Security accepted that the cost of the basic 
prison diet at HK$6.29 per day was higher than the cheapest hospital diet of HK$4.63. 
The design of the prison diet was being monitored by the Medical and Health 
Department with advices from the nutritionists. The fact that prisoners had to perform 
physical labour and prisoners could not receive supplementary food provision from 
visitors as in the case of patients in the public hospitals were taken into account in 
designing the prison diet.
73
  
 
The Secretary also pointed out that dietary punishment (rice and water, salt for 
Chinese prisoners and bread and water, salt for European prisoners) was used to 
enforce prison disciplines. The cost of the food for dietary punishment was only 
HK99 cents per day. He mentioned that “in the last 21 months 600 prisoners in 
Stanley Prison were awarded some 3,000 days’ dietary punishment and 800 prisoners 
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in other institutions were awarded a total of 3,500 days.”74 
 
He concluded by saying that: 
“I can assure honourable Members that the Commissioner of Prisons and 
his staff are alive to the necessity of ensuring that those sentenced to 
terms of imprisonment are properly supervised in a disciplined 
environment, work hard and are not provided with facilities above those 
which are the minimum essential to ensure, so far as possible, that on 
release they do not revert to their criminal tendencies.”75 
 
On the other hand, there were special programmes set up for the treatment and 
welfare of prisoners during this period. The purpose built psychiatric prison, the Siu 
Lam Psychiatric Centre (小欖精神病治療中心) was in operation on 27 November 
1972. This Centre was design in line with the English model and senior prison officers 
with relevant psychiatric prison experience were specially recruited from the HM 
Prison Service to manage this psychiatric centre, providing much needed services for 
the criminal insane. The setting up of Siu Lam Psychiatric Centre in Hong Kong had 
also fulfilled London’s expectation for the colonial prisons to address the issue on 
lunatic prisoners.  
 
In January 1975, Prisoner Welfare Officers posts were provided at adult prisons 
holding adult prisoners. Officers with social work or related backgrounds were 
assigned to take care of prisoner welfare matters and to act as links between the 
prisoners and their families. Another important function they had to perform was to 
monitor prisoners’ sentiments towards the institutional management. Counselling 
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sessions were organized to facilitate prisoners’ adjustment to the institutional regime 
and routine. The psychologist service as recommended by the UN Advisor, Dr. Robert 
Andry was formally launched in Hong Kong in July 1976 and Clinical Psychologists 
were recruited by the Prisons Department to provide professional psychological 
services to the prisoners.
76
 
 
With a highly disciplined penal environment aided by the introduction of welfare and 
psychological services to the prisoners, Commissioner Garner began his campaign in 
building up the image of the Prisons Department within the region. The Prisons 
Department of Hong Kong hosted the first ‘Asian and Pacific Conference of 
Correctional Administrators’ in February 1980. This Conference provided the forum 
for the correctional administrators and senior prison officials to look at common 
issues that affected the region. The Conference was a great success and became an 
annual event hosted between different countries within the region.
77
   
 
In 1981, the Government had embarked a comprehensive review of the prison 
legislations. Governor MacLehose in his 1981 Address to the Legislative Council 
stated that: 
“A comprehensive review of our prison legislation is in train. Proposals 
are being put to Executive Council for a number of amendments to the 
Prison rules to bring them in line with modern penal practice and a Bill to 
amend the Prisons Ordinance will be submitted to this Council during this 
session.”78 
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The Governor did not spell out the details on the proposed amendments and the 
Prisons (Amendment) Rules 1981 were laid before the Legislative Council on 25 
November 1981. As Prison Rules were subsidiary legislations of the Prisons 
Ordinance, debates from the Legislators were not required and were endorsed by the 
Legislative Council accordingly.
79
  This Prisons Rules amendment had included, 
amongst others, removal of the dietary punishment and corporal punishment from the 
list of awards that could be imposed by the Prison Superintendents on prisoners in 
breach of Prison Rules.
80
 
 
The Prisons Department’s proactive move to remove dietary punishment and corporal 
punishment was not publicised and this was successful in keeping the amendments off 
the media attention. The possible reason why it was implemented with minimal 
publicity was due to the fact that the courts in Hong Kong were still ordering judicial 
corporal punishment in the 1980s, a practice which was only repealed from the 
statutes in 1990.
 81
  
 
This move could also be seemed as one of Commissioner Garner’s controversial ideas 
which would not be appreciated by the public that favoured a stringent approach to 
punishment.
82
 In fact Garner had a greater plan for such actions, i.e. the re-naming of 
the Prisons Department in 1982 which would be discussed in the next Chapter. 
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9.6   Conclusion 
 
Hong Kong during the 1970s had encountered challenges not only from within the 
colony itself but also from regional and global events. The vast increase of crime rate 
coped with the world financial crisis in the early 1970s had drawn the public and the 
Government’s attention towards law and order and especially on how to deter 
potential offenders in order to stop the crime wave. 
 
The much advocated progressive and reformative penal policies adopted by the 
former Commissioner of Prisons from mid 1950s to late 1960s were criticized for 
lacking the deterrence effect in stopping crime. It was also criticised that the ‘less 
eligibility’ philosophy in the treatment of offenders under custody was not followed. 
Deterrent sanctions from the Criminal Justice Act 1948, i.e., the detention centre 
programme and the preventive detention system, both not being considered by Hong 
Kong in the last two decades were retrieved and repackaged for its adaptation in Hong 
Kong. 
 
With the deletion of the Colonial Office and without the close scrutiny of the 
Advisory Committees on the Treatment of Offenders on the Colonies’ penal services, 
Hong Kong apparently enjoyed more freedom in formulating its own penal policies in 
the 1970s. To address the public’s concern on violent crimes committed by young 
offenders, caning was incorporated to the newly created Detention Centre programme 
and later extended to the Training Centre programme on male young offenders found 
in breach of Centre Regulations during the early part of the 1970s.    
 
The legislation process for the suspended sentence in Hong Kong illustrated how the 
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Government had re-packaged this rehabilitative orientated sentence under the 
Criminal Justice Act 1967 to a deterrent sentence to address public demand in Hong 
Kong. The public of Hong Kong favoured the hard-lined approach towards crime and 
criminals and the Government had to formulate its penal policies along the public’s 
expectation. The legislation process of this Bill was extremely cautious and had taken 
six years of trial before becoming permanent in the statute-book. 
 
The enactment and later the inaction of the preventive detention system in Hong Kong 
had illustrated the differences in thinking between the penal elites in Hong Kong. The 
Attorney General was representing the interest of the Judiciary to satisfy the public’s 
quest for tougher sentences in introducing the legislation. The Prisons Department, 
with the support of the newly created policy head, the Secretary for Security, were 
more concerned with operational constrains and were successful in keeping the 
preventive detention system from launching within the prison service in Hong Kong.  
 
The 1973 Stanley Prison riot was indeed the watershed for the post-War Prisons 
Department. Commissioner Garner, taken over the Department in 1972, was able to 
convince the new Governor through its new chain of command with the Security 
Bureau to adopt the recommendations from the advisors from England and for the 
Government to inject resources for the implementation of these recommendations. 
 
Security measures for the management of prisoners such as the security classification 
of prisoners and penal institutions, setting up of the prison inspectorates, etc. were 
copied from the HM Prison Service in England and transported for use in Hong Kong. 
Penal security overrides reformation with home leaves and open visits for adult 
prisoners curtailed.  
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Through the skilful leadership of Commissioner Garner, the Prisons Department had 
massive expansion programmes after the 1973 Stanley Prison riot. Many new prison 
projects were approved and most important of all was the generous provision of 
additional prison staff for the Prisons Department. With the setting up of the ICAC 
and the corrupted prison staff elements removed, a new breed of better educated 
prison officers joined the Prisons Department and they became the backbones of the 
Department responsible for the subsequent changes that followed. 
 
The approved staff establishment of the Prisons Department was increased more than 
three-fold from around 1,500 in 1969-70 to almost 5,000 at the end of 1981. The 
average daily penal population was also increased from 6,000 in 1969 to near 10,000 
in 1981. The net expenditure of the Prisons Department in 1981 was HK$237 million, 
more than eleven-fold when compared to the expenditure of HK$20.8 million in 
1969-70.
83
  
 
With a highly disciplined but stable penal environment in place, the penal elites in 
Hong Kong were able to provide welfare and rehabilitative services for the offenders 
under custody. Prisoner welfare services, psychiatric treatment facilities and 
psychological services were set up with specialists posts established allowing the 
Prisons Department in Hong Kong to be one of the forerunners in the region to follow 
the modern rehabilitative penal model of the West.  
 
Draconian penal punishments such as dietary and corporal punishment were quietly 
removed from the Prison Rules in order not to arouse public sentiment on the need for 
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deterrent punishment in Hong Kong. All these changes had prepared the Prisons 
Department to be transformed to a more rehabilitative orientated service in 1982 
which is to be discussed in the following Chapter. 
 346 
Chapter Ten 
Penal Policy and the Change of Sovereignty (1982-1997) 
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
The period from 1982 to 1997 covered the final phrase of penal policy development in 
Hong Kong whilst still under British administration. 1982 also started an eventful 
period when the future of Hong Kong was being intensively deliberated between 
Britain and China.  
 
Through the signing of the “Joint Declaration of the Government of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the 
Question of Hong Kong” in Beijing on 19 December 1984, the fate of Hong Kong was 
sealed. Hong Kong would cease to be a British colony on 1 July 1997 when she 
would be handed over to the People’s Republic of China and became one of China’s 
Special Administrative Regions. 
 
Penal philosophies and policies between Hong Kong and Mainland China varied 
greatly in view of the difference in social and political background. There were grave 
concerns that Hong Kong’s penal system might be eroded after 1997 if safeguards 
were not installed before the handing over. 
 
This Chapter will look into the political, social and cultural factors relating to Hong 
Kong’s preparation to the handing over of the sovereignty in 1997 and how these 
factors affected penal policy formulation in Hong Kong. Special attention will be 
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given to penal policy changes resulting from the enactment of the Hong Kong Bill of 
Rights together with other penal policy changes associated with the change of 
sovereignty in 1997. The abolishment of capital and corporal punishment in Hong 
Kong, the enactment of the ‘Release under Supervision Scheme’, the ‘Post-release 
Supervision Scheme’ and the enhancement of the sentence review system for long 
term prisoners all happened during this period. As these topics have been covered in 
the earlier Chapters in view of their more complicated nature or as a specific penal 
programme, these will not be repeated in this Chapter. However the benchmarking of 
Hong Kong’s penal system and facilities by the human rights groups as precautionary 
measures against possible abuse of human rights in Hong Kong, including the rights 
for those under custody, will be covered in this Chapter. 
 
Penal policy changes happened in England during this period was mostly not being 
followed by Hong Kong except the Community Service Order set up under the earlier 
Criminal Justice Act 1972. The reasons why it took fourteen years for Hong Kong to 
pick up the Community Service Order scheme and the reasons why Hong Kong did 
not adopt the other British penal policy initiatives during this period will also be 
discussed in this Chapter. 
 
This Chapter will also provide explanation on the rationales for the change of the title 
of the Prisons Department to Correctional Services Department in 1982. The 
corresponding organisational changes taken places from 1982 to 1997 in meeting the 
changing penal policies in Hong Kong were also discussed. 
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10.2 Hong Kong Society before the Handing Over of Sovereignty  
 
Hong Kong had a new Governor, Sir Edward Youde who succeeded Lord MacLehose 
in May 1982. Governor Youde was, like his predecessor, came from the Foreign 
Office. One of his first tasks after arriving in Hong Kong was to prepare Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher’s visit to Beijing in September of the same year. The 
question on the future of Hong Kong was high on her agenda as the lease for the New 
Territories in Hong Kong would expire in fifteen years by 1997. Early decisions were 
anxiously awaited for by the business circle as well as those having an interest in the 
property market in Hong Kong as all land leases for the properties in the New 
Territories would expire in 1997.
1
  
 
The Prime Minister’s meeting with the Chinese leaders in Beijing in 1982 was a 
failure. The British’s hope of reasoning with China on the validity of the nineteenth 
century treaties or the scaled down hope of winning an administration extension on 
Hong Kong after 1997 was flatly rejected by the Chinese side. For two years, the two 
Governments locked horn in the negotiation and the residents in Hong Kong were 
caught in the middle and confidence dropped as a result. The economy of Hong Kong 
also suffered and on 23 September 1983 the Hong Kong dollar collapsed and the 
exchange rate dropped to HK$9.55 to one US dollar, calling the Hong Kong 
Government to take the decisive action of pegging the Hong Kong dollar to the US 
dollar at a fixed exchange rate of HK dollar $7.80 to one US dollar which lasted until 
today.
2
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The painstaking negotiation eventually concluded on 18 December 1984 when both 
Governments signed the “Joint Declaration of the Government of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the 
Question of Hong Kong” in Beijing, agreeing the handing over of Hong Kong to the 
Chinese Government on 1 July 1997. The Chinese Government in return agreed that 
Hong Kong would be given the ‘Special Administration Region’ status and allowed 
Hong Kong to operate the ‘one country, two systems’ way of life for fifty years from 
1997.
3
 
 
With the future of Hong Kong settled, the economy of Hong Kong started to prosper 
again. The earlier tide of brain drain had stopped and in fact many of those who left 
Hong Kong earlier had returned with a foreign passport trying to cash in with the 
renewed business opportunities in Hong Kong. Things however changed quickly after 
the ‘Tiananmen Square Massacre’ in Beijing when student led reform rallies were 
crashed by the Peoples’ Liberation Army on 4 June 1989 which was televised 
worldwide and stunned the residents in Hong Kong. A million people took part in a 
march in Hong Kong expressing their anger on the massacre and showed solidarity 
with the dissidents in Beijing.
4
 
 
This incident had severely damaged the Hong Kong resident’s confidence on the 
future of Hong Kong especially when the city would be under the Chinese rule in less 
than ten years. Panic emigration from business tycoons, middle managers and civil 
servants were rapid and the British Government had to offer 50,000 Hong Kong 
families the British Citizenship to safeguard those who might be compromised by 
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their service to the colonial government so that they did not have to depart Hong 
Kong at once. For the majority of the Hong Kong residents who did not have the 
means to migrate to other countries, the Government in 1989 drawn up a ‘rose-garden 
plan’ by injecting huge capitals from its reserve for developing infrastructures in 
Hong Kong. This included the building of the new airport at Lantau Island and 
creating job opportunities in Hong Kong as well as maintaining the competitive edge 
of Hong Kong within the region.
5
 Action was also in hand to introduce the Bill of 
Rights to Hong Kong to ensure the human right conditions in Hong Kong would be 
legally protected after the handing over of Hong Kong in 1997. 
 
The Chinese Government was keeping a close watch on what the Hong Kong 
Government had proposed and was suspicious on how the Hong Kong Government 
would spend its revenue. Governor David Wilson, another Foreign Office official 
who took over the governorship from Sir Edward Youde who died during one of his 
Beijing trips on 5 December 1986, was being replaced by Mr. Christopher Patten in 
July 1992. Governor Patten was the former Conservative Party Chairman who had 
lost his parliamentary seat in the 1992 election. It was unheard of in the history of 
Hong Kong for a politician instead of a diplomat or a Foreign / Colonial Office 
official to be appointed as Governor of Hong Kong. The appointment of a seasoned 
politician as Governor in Hong Kong was in fact a deliberate political decision to 
counter the stepped up pressure and interference by the Chinese Government on Hong 
Kong matters leading to the handing over in 1997. 
6
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With the support of the British Government, Governor Patten quickly began his plans 
for political reform in Hong Kong as means to bolster self-confident for the residents 
in Hong Kong. The idea of the political reform was to offer the public wider access to 
the government and gave them a stake in the political arena by expanding the number 
of seats in the Legislative Council and for part of these seats to be elected. The 
number of eligible voters to vote for the Legislative Councillors was also greatly 
increased empowering these elected Legislators the duty to represent the interests of 
their voters in various policy areas. The reform package went through the legislature 
in 1994 and the local political atmosphere had changed ever since. Government 
policies tabled for legislation would no longer be rubber-stamped by the appointed 
legislators but had to win the support from the legislators representing interests from 
different quarter as suggested by Spurr (1995): 
“Hong Kong will meet its destiny with a highly vocal legislature. The old 
quiescence has gone for ever. The Legislative Council at least feels free to 
heckle the colonial government. These days questions are posed, speech 
delivered, that a generation ago would have been considered 
impermissible. Legco wields a virtual veto over budgetary affairs. The 
council has gone so far as to reject a Sino-British agreement restricting 
the number of judges from outside Hong Kong permitted to sit on its 
specially created Court of Final Appeal.”7 
 
On the midnight of 30 June 1997, the Union Jack was lowered inside the Convention 
and Exhibition Centre of Hong Kong followed by the hoisting of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region flag and the flag of the Peoples Republic of China, 
marking the end of the one hundred fifty-six years’ British Administration in Hong 
Kong.
8
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10.3   Law and Order Situation before the Handing Over 
 
Crime rates during this period had fluctuated but did ease off towards the close of 
1997. The overall reported crime rate in Hong Kong was at its peak of 1,610 per 
100,000 in 1983. The violent crime rate dropped from 477 per 100,000 in 1976 to 259 
in 1986 and 340 in 1991. In 1997, the overall crime rate was comparatively lower at 
1,038 per 100,000 and violent crime rate at 212 per 100,000.
9
  
 
One of the explanations for the lower crime rate in 1997 was the enhanced co-
operation between the law enforcement agencies of Hong Kong and Mainland China. 
It was the wish of both Hong Kong Government and the Mainland authorities to see 
Hong Kong a stable and safe city by the time of its return to China. The Chinese 
authorities were more positive in tracking down and arresting criminals who freed to 
China after committing crimes in Hong Kong, in particular those robbery cases 
involving the use of firearms by sending them to Hong Kong for judicial action. 
10
 
 
 
10.4   Penal Policies in England (1982-1997) 
 
This was a busy period when new penal policy for both young and adult offenders 
emerged in England and Wales. The borstal system established in England before the 
War was finally replaced by ‘Youth Custody’ under Criminal Justice Act 1982 which 
came into force in May 1983. Unlike the borstal system where inmates had to earn 
their release within the minimum and maximum period of stay in the borstal, the 
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youth custody was always a determinate sentence with length of sentence set by 
court.
11
 This happened at the time after the detention centre with emphasis on the 
‘short, sharp and shock’ programme was being re-introduced to the England in 
1980.
12
 
 
The Criminal Justice Act of 1988 had created a new sentence of ‘detention in a young 
offender institution’ merging the former detention centre and youth custody sentence. 
Again the court would decide the length of the sentence and the HM Prison Service 
would decide where the young offender should be assigned to. The ‘juvenile court’ 
was renamed ‘youth court’ to cover cases up to seventeen years old. The maximum 
period of detention of young offenders in the Young Offender Institution (YOI) would 
be one year. 
 
The Criminal Justice Act of 1991 also incorporated the recommendations of the 
‘Carlisle Committee Report of 1988’ and replaced the remission and parole systems 
with a new framework to ‘restore meaning to sentence’. Prisoners with less than 12 
months sentence would be automatically released after serving half of their sentence 
but the un-served part of the sentence might be reactivated by court if the offender 
was reconvicted of a fresh offence before the original term of sentence expired. 
Prisoners sentenced to 12 months or more but less than four years would be on 
‘Automatic Conditional Release’  at the half way point and required to be supervised 
until the time reaching two third of the original term.
13
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For those sentenced to four years or more with determinate sentences, they were 
eligible to apply for ‘Discretionary Conditional Release’ after serving half of the 
sentence. Their cases were dealt with by the Parole Board and they would normally be 
released after serving two third of their sentence even if their applications were 
unsuccessful. For prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment, they could be considered 
for ‘Release on Licence’ after completing their ‘tariff’ part as ordered by the court 
during the original sentence. Decision of their release on licence could be from the 
Parole Board or from the Home Office through the recommendations of the Parole 
Board, and the licence period was life long. 
14
 
 
Following the James Bulger killing case in 1993,
15
 the Home Secretary Michael 
Howard introduced the American ‘Boot Camp’ type of correctional programme to 
England in 1995 and called it the ‘High Intensity Training (HIT)’ programme. Two 
HIT centres were set up for male offenders aged 18 – 21; one at a military 
establishment in Colchester and the other at Thorn Cross YOI.
16
 
 
Turning back to the HM Prison Service, the riots started on 1 April 1990 at 
Manchester’s Strangeways Prison dragged on for 25 days. The media coverage of the 
Strangeways Prison riot had inspired copy-cat riots in another twenty penal 
establishments across England causing millions of pounds of damage to property. The 
subsequent ‘Prison Disturbances April 1990: Report of an Inquiry’ prepared by Lord 
Justice Woolf and Sir Stephen Tumim in February 1991 called for the fundamental 
review of the objectives of imprisonment. The key conclusion was that a stable penal 
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establishment had to depend on three independent pillars; i.e., security (no prisoner 
escape), control (safe prison without disturbance) and justice (fair and humane 
treatment on prisoners).
17
 
 
In response to the Woolf Report, the Home Office prepared a White Paper ‘Custody, 
Care and Justice: The Way Ahead for the Prison Service in England and Wales’ in 
1991. The document outlined the future direction of the HM Prison Service in 
particular improvement in the three key areas of custody, care and justice. “The aim 
was to provide a better prison system, with more effective measures for security and 
control; a better and more constructive relationship between prisoners and staff; and 
more active, challenging and useful programmes for prisoners.” 18 
 
Another important penal policy under the Criminal Justice Act 1991 was the provision 
of the private sector involvement in the criminal justice system in England and Wales. 
Court security officers, prisoner escort services and penal establishments were 
allowed to be operated by private security companies instead of by the state. The first 
private penal institution operated under the provision of Criminal Justice Act 1991 
was the Wolds Remand Prison in Humberside operated by Group 4 in April 1992. By 
1998, six penal establishments were contracted out as well as all court security officer 
and prisoner escort services.
19
 
 
There were further security scandals after the Strangeways Prison riot. Two high 
profile escape incidents took place in England in 1994 and 1995 involving ‘Category 
A’ prisoners who should be guarded under the highest security conditions. The first 
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incident involved the escape of six ‘Category A’ prisoners, five of them members of 
the Irish Republican Army from Whitemoor Prison in September 1994. Explosives 
and detonators were later searched out from the prison. The second incident took 
place in January 1995. Two ‘Category A’ and one ‘Category B’ prisoners escaped 
from the Parkhurst Prison on the Isle of Wight. The subsequent ‘Woodcock Report 
1994’ and the ‘Learmont Report 1995’ led to the tightening up of security in all penal 
establishments and placing custody as the primary objective of imprisonment.
20
 
 
Another piece of important penal policy during this period was the introduction of the 
American style mandatory and minimum sentences to England and Wales for certain 
categories of offenders under the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997. Life imprisonment 
would be given to offender convicted of a second serious violent or sexual offence 
unless there were exceptional circumstances. A minimum of seven years sentence 
should be passed to offender who was convicted of a Class A drug trafficking offence 
for the third time and at least three years sentences for a third time offender with 
offence in domestic burglary.
21
 
 
 
10.5 Penal Policies, Human Rights and Related Issues in Hong Kong  
 
Community Services Order - The New Approach in Penal Policy Legislation  
 
The legislation of the Community Services Order (CSO) in Hong Kong in 1984 
demonstrated a change of strategies by the Government in proposing new penal 
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policies in the 1980s. Compared to the launching of the suspended sentence in Hong 
Kong earlier, this new penal programme received much fewer opposition from the 
public and the legislators despite the fact that it is a non-custodial sentence. 
 
The CSO was introduced to England and Wales under the Criminal Justice Act 1972, 
and put into operation in 1973 under the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973. The 
rational of this sentence was for the offenders to be involved in constructive activities 
in the form of personal service to the community.
22
 
 
On 13 November 1981, the Chief Justice and the Attorney General of Hong Kong 
referred to the Law Reform Commission the question of whether CSO should be 
introduced as a form of sentence in Hong Kong. A Sub-committee was subsequently 
set up within the Commission to study to whom the CSO should apply; the kind of 
obligations to be imposed by CSO and how such orders be imposed and supervised.
23
  
This was a departure from the traditional practice of having a non-civil servant to lead 
the study of a new penal policy and programme, a job which used to be performed by 
the respective policy branch and government departments.  
 
The Sub-committee stated clearly that as it was concerned about the views of the 
public on the introduction of CSO in Hong Kong, the publics were invited to make 
submissions on the proposal. This approach was again a departure from the past when 
public views were represented only by the Legislators during the legislation process.   
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Possible stake-holders within the government departments, voluntary agencies and 
various community organizations were also being consulted to gather their views 
towards the CSO and to identify possible job placements they could offer if such a 
scheme was successfully launched in Hong Kong. The consultation was further 
supplemented by an open forum in October 1982 to collect views from the possible 
stake-holders on the idea of a pilot scheme.
24
 
 
The Sub-committee’s report was endorsed by the Law Reform Commission in April 
1983 and received the Executive Council’s approval. The law drafting completed and 
the Community Service Orders Bill 1984 was tabled at the Legislative Council for its 
First and Second Reading on 10 October 1984. To alleviate any possible public 
concern on the Government being soft on crime and punishment, the Bill stressed that 
violent offenders would be excluded from this programme and that the CSO would 
only be introduced initially on an experimental basis as a pilot scheme. It was stressed 
that: 
“The community service order scheme has been operating successfully in 
the United Kingdom where the scheme was introduced in six areas as an 
experiment in 1972 before extending to the whole territory in 1975. As 
Hong Kong has different social and cultural background, it is advisable 
for us to learn from our own experience before deciding whether to extend 
the scheme or to bring the scheme to an end.”25 
 
Because of the extensive consultation and lobbying prior to the legislative process, 
only three legislators spoke out in the Legislative Council and all gave their support to 
this Bill. The Bill was passed on 21 November 1984.
26
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The approved CSO scheme for Hong Kong was quite similar to the English model 
despite the fact that the Sub-committee in the planning stage had studies CSOs in 
other jurisdictions. The pilot CSO scheme was launched in 1987 and as reported by 
the Social Welfare Department, 200 offenders had joined the pilot scheme in 1987.
27
 
In its subsequent development, Lo and Harris (2004) described the Hong Kong and 
the British CSO schemes were not ‘twins’ but rather ‘cousins’ in view of Hong 
Kong’s continuous emphasis on the rehabilitative role of this sentence whereas CSO 
in Britain had moved towards a more retributive end.
28
 
 
Offenders carrying out the CSO projects in Hong Kong are mainly invisible to the 
public as their identities are not reviewed for the protection of privacy. This is a vast 
departure from the British practice where offenders carrying out CSO tasks have to 
wear the ‘Community Pay Back’ vests. 
 
 
The Hong Kong Bill of Rights 
 
Attorney General Michael Thomas before he left office in 1988 had informally 
drafted the Bill of Rights for Hong Kong. He believed there would be a need for such 
legal protections to be specified in the statutes in Hong Kong in view of the 
limitations of the Basic Law.
29
  Other legal experts also looked into the need for a Bill 
of Rights to be established in Hong Kong to “provide an important inhibition on the 
misuse of power and the destruction of our freedom”.30  
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In October 1989, four months after the Beijing Incident resulting from Hong Kong 
residents’ confidence towards their future dropping to an all time low, Governor 
David Wilson announced that a Bill of Rights for Hong Kong would be proposed. The 
draft Bill was published in March 1990 and the substance of the Bill were largely the 
reproductions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
adopted by the United Nations in 1966 which was extended to Hong Kong through 
the British Government and entered into force in 1976. The Hong Kong Bill of Rights 
Ordinance was on 8 June 1991 became law in Hong Kong with a corresponding 
amendment on the Letters of Patent for Hong Kong. 
 
The amended Article VII (3) of the Letters Patent specifies that: 
“The provisions of the ICCPR, adopted by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations on 16 December 1966, as applied to Hong Kong, shall be 
implemented through the laws of Hong Kong. No law of Hong Kong shall 
be made after the coming into operation of the Hong Kong Letters Patent 
1991 (No. 2) that restricts the rights and freedoms enjoyed in Hong Kong 
in a manner which is inconsistent with that Covenant as applied to Hong 
Kong.”31 
 
With the entrenchment of the ICCPR in the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, the 
Administration had to re-examine its existing Ordinances and practices to ensure its 
compliance with this human rights standard.
32
  
 
There were special human rights concerns on the penal polices and the operation of 
custodial services in Hong Kong especially with the capital and corporal punishments 
still kept in the statute book. Hong Kong had all along observing the ‘United Nations 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners of 1955’ in its custodial 
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services with most of the laid down Rules being practiced in full. In 1986, an internal 
review was carried out by the Correctional Services Department to examine the 
Department’s compliance to the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules and the 
findings confirmed that CSD had measured up to most of the standards and in some 
cases even exceeded the standards set by the Rules.
33
 
 
During the drafting process of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights, the Government had 
identified a number of existing laws were at odds with the Bill. The Prison Rules and 
the Detention Centre Regulations were being identified as two out of the twenty odd 
problematic laws requiring rectification.
34
  
 
CSD, with the help of the Attorney General’s Chamber, examined the related 
Ordinances, Rules and Regulations as well as Standing Orders and Departmental 
Instructions governing the operation of the Department, the penal establishments and 
the management of prisoners therein. Prompt remedial actions were taken on those 
violations which did not require the change of law.  
 
On searching of external orifices and conducting urine tests on prisoners under Prison 
Rules 9(1A) ad 34(a), CSD had revised its guidelines by ceasing the routine bodily 
search and urine tests and conducting such searching or tests only on need basis and 
on suspected and targeted prisoners. Other body fluids like blood, stools etc would 
only be taken from prisoners and examined for health reasons. 
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Prison Rule 61 (w), which stipulates that “Every prisoner shall be guilty of an offence 
against prison discipline if he… is convicted of a criminal offence committed while a 
prisoner” was considered to be double punishment and in breach of Article 11 (6) of 
the Bill of Rights which guarantees that no one shall be tried or punished for the same 
offence more than once. A circular instruction was issued to the Heads of Penal 
institutions on 24 February 1993 to cease such practices and to set aside the 
punishment of loss of remission imposed upon those involved prisoners still in 
custody.
35
 
 
Freedom of movement for released prisoners undergoing statutory supervision was re-
assured by re-phrasing the wording of the respective supervision orders from 
requiring the supervisees “to obtain approval before leaving Hong Kong” into “a 
supervisee must inform his supervisor of an intention to leave Hong Kong for more 
than a certain number of days or of an intention to take up residence abroad.”36 
 
Prison Rule 47 forbids a prisoner to correspond with another person other than 
relatives or friends unless he had obtained special permission to do so and allowing 
the management to censor mails for objectionable matters. This Rule contravenes with 
Article 14 of the Bill of Rights on the protection of privacy and correspondence and to 
be amended. 
 
The other issue was on disciplinary proceedings against prisoners in breach of prison 
offences under Prison Rules 57 to 65. These Rules gave provision for the management 
to place prisoners on internal disciplinary proceedings for breach of prison offences 
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which were also criminal offences in nature such as assault, etc. In exceptional 
circumstances this could attract the maximum penalty of six months’ loss of remission 
awarded by the Commissioner of Correctional Services. It was felt that disciplinary 
offences under Prison Rules 61 which were criminal offences in nature should be 
separated and prisoners found in breach of these to be charged by the Police and to go 
through the judicial process in the courts. This would allow prisoners to have full 
legal protection during the process, including the provision of legal representative. 
Only minor breach of prison disciplines such as ‘disobeying an order’, ‘using abusive 
language’ and ‘minor assaults’, etc should remain. Prison Rule 61(t) “makes repeated 
groundless complaints” was also recommended to be removed in order to avoid the 
impression of using prison disciplinary action to suppress prisoner complaints. 
37
   
 
The power of the Superintendent of Correctional Services to award ‘loss of remission’ 
in prisoner adjudication cases to be scaled down to a maximum of 30 days. 
Nevertheless the power of the Commissioner to award a loss of remission of up to six 
months is deemed necessary.
38
 
 
Prison Rule 76(b) and 239.1(e)(ii) restricting any CSD officers on unauthorized 
communication with the media would require amendment to confined the disclosed 
information to prison security and materials related to prisoners’ privacy. 
 
The proposed amendments were tabled in the Legislative Council on 10 July 1996 
under the Subsidiary Legislation section as Prison (Amendment) Rules 1996 and were 
to come into effect on 1 November 1996. They were however being repealed even 
                                                          
37
 Ibid, pp. 54-6. 
38
 Ibid, p. 55. 
 364 
before they came into effect. It was reported in October 1996 that the Bills Committee 
had finally reached its agreements on the details of the proposed Prison Rules 
amendments after negotiation with the Administration and the CSD.
39
 The Prison 
(Amendment) Rules 1997 were introduced in 28 May 1997 by Law Notice 275 of 
1997.
40
 The amendments covering all of the proposed changes, under Law Notice 375 
of 1997, came into effect on 30 June 1997, the last day when Hong Kong was still 
under British Administration. 
 
It should be noted that no references were made to the Prison Rules in use by the HM 
Prison Services in England when amendments to the Prison Rules in Hong Kong were 
being proposed. Prison Rules in England covering prisoner discipline and 
adjudication had already undergone major changes as a result of the Woolf Report
41
 
and the subsequent Home Office White Paper Custody, Care and Justice in 1991.
42
 
 
 
Last Minute Legislation before the Handing Over - the Long Term Prison 
Sentences Review Mechanism 
 
The Board of Review, Long Term Prison Sentences was first established in 1959 
under the Legal Department and chaired by the Attorney General with members from 
officials representing the Secretary of Security, Director of Social Welfare and the 
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Commissioner of Prisons Department / Correctional Services to make 
recommendations to the Governor on the exercise of the prerogative contained in 
Article XV of the Letters Patent which reads:  
“…may grant to any offender convicted of any crime or offence by any 
court of law in the Colony (other than a court martial established under 
any Act of Parliament), either free or subject to such conditions as the 
Governor may think fit to impose, a pardon or any remission of the 
sentence passed on such offender, or any respite of the execution of such 
sentence for such period as the Governor thinks fit, and may remit any 
fines, penalties, or forfeitures due or accrued to Us.”43  
 
The Board was not a statutory body but served only as an advisory body with the 
following terms of reference: 
“To review the sentences of all prisoners in the categories prescribed by 
Prison Rule 69A at such intervals as are thereby prescribed, or at such 
lesser intervals as circumstances may require, and to review such other 
cases as the Governor may from time to time require, and in each case to 
tender appropriate advice to the Governor on the exercise of the 
prerogative.”44 
 
Under Prison Rules 69A, the Commissioner of the Correctional Services was required 
to submit the following categories of prisoners to the Board for regular reviews: 
 
1. Prisoners serving life sentences,  
2. Prisoners with long-term sentences (i.e. 10 years or longer), 
3. Prisoners on detention until Her Majesty’s pleasure be known, i.e. young 
prisoners who were aged below 18 when committing the offence of murder, 
and  
4. Prisoners serving determinate sentences who were under the age of 21 at the 
date of conviction. 
 
                                                          
43
 See Article XV of the Letters Patent. 
44
 Board of Review, Long Term Prison Sentences, First Report, Government Printer, Hong Kong, 1992,  
p. 2. 
 366 
The Board would call for reports from the Correctional Services Department covering 
the prisoner’s conduct whilst in prison together with a complete medical record 
covering the prisoner’s health condition. The Police would be asked to present the 
prisoner’s criminal history as indicated in the criminal record. The Social Welfare 
Department would submit report giving details of the prisoner’s family circumstances, 
his employment prospects on release, his rehabilitation prospects and any 
compassionate grounds for consideration. The court would provide the Trial Judge’s 
Report and comments made by the Judge at the sentencing and the summing-up of the 
case, etc in reflecting the nature of the offence.
45
  
 
Should prisoner claimed that he had provided useful assistance to the law enforcement 
agencies, the Board would also consider reports from the related government 
departments in connection to the claim. For sex offenders or prisoners with mental 
problems, reports from the Correctional Services Department’s Clinical Psychologists 
and / or the Visiting Psychiatrist from public hospitals were also called.  
 
The Board would study the submitted reports in detail and to decide whether any 
remission of the prisoner’s sentence would be justified in the course of the sentence 
review, and submitted its recommendations to the Governor for sentence remission.
46
  
 
In April 1986, the Board was granted authority by the Executive Council to make its 
own independent recommendations to the Council as a result on the change of policy 
towards prisoners with indeterminate sentences. The previous assumption was that a 
life sentence should be imprisonment for the remainder of the prisoner’s life. This 
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approach was changed as the Executive Council approved a policy of substituting 
determinate sentences in certain deserving cases as recommended by the Board.
47
 
 
From November 1988 onwards, the administration of the Board was transferred from 
the Legal Department to the Security Bureau under the Secretary of Security. The 
chairmanship of the Advisory Board was changed to a judge of the High Court 
appointed by the Governor with a normal term of three years. The ex-officio members 
were drawn from the related government departments, i.e. representatives from the 
then Security Branch, the then Legal Department, the Correctional Services 
Department and the Social Welfare Department. Non-official members were 
appointed to the Board and they were drawn from various sectors of the society with 
recommendation from the concerned government departments. They came with 
diversified backgrounds including psychology, psychiatry, social work, legal 
profession, education and business. 
 
It was only in March 1992 that the Board had published its first report after operating 
for more than 30 years. The Report was printed in both English and Chinese and were 
made available not only to the public but also to appropriate prisoners for the sake of 
transparency as it contains information on what the Board would look for when 
reviewing a prisoner’s case. According to the report, the Board had met 135 times 
from 1959 to 1991, roughly once per quarter. During the three years period from 1989 
to 1991, the Board had reviewed 1,065 cases and had only made eleven 
recommendations or 1% to the Executive Council for change of sentences.
48
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From 1992 to 1997, the Board had reviewed a total of 2,229 cases including 416 life 
sentences cases and 82 cases on prisoners detained at Her Majesty’s Pleasure. The 
Board had all along adopted a very cautious approach in its reviews and 
recommendations made thus only 28 prisoners’ life sentences were substituted by 
determinate sentences during this period.
49
  
 
In January 1997, the Security Bureau of the Administration proposed to the 
Legislative Council Panel on Security for the establishment of a “Statutory Board of 
Review, Long Term Prison Sentences (BOR, LTPS)” to improve the transparency and 
efficiency in operation and fairness of the existing system.
50
 The Executive Council 
approved the revised proposal on 4 March 1997. The proposed Bill was published in 
the Gazette on 7 March with the First Reading and commencement of Second 
Reading debate on 19 March 1997. A Bill’s Committee was formed and six meetings 
were held from 11 April to 3 June to look into the proposed legislation almost clause 
by clause. 
 
There were a number of changes or amendments contained in the proposal: 
 To add a Deputy Chairman who will be a Judge of the High Court, and to 
remove government officials as ex-officio members on the Board. Government 
officials can attend the meeting as required but will not be members of the Board. 
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 To give separate authority to the statutory BOR, LTPS to prescribe post-release 
supervision for prisoners whose sentence the Governor has remitted from an 
indeterminate sentence to a determinate one on the advice of the BOR, LTPS. 
 To introduce a "Conditional Release Under Supervision" Scheme under the 
statutory BOR, LTPS. This will provide an additional tool for the Board to 
perform its sentence reviewing role better. 
 To make changes to the present system for reviewing discretionary life sentence 
cases, to bring it into line with the provisions of Article 5(4) of European 
Convention on Human Rights, this is virtually identical with Article 5(4) of the 
Hong Kong Bill of Rights.
51
 The main proposals were –  
in cases of prisoners already serving discretionary life sentence at the time 
the legislation comes into effect, the Chief Justice should make 
recommendations to the Governor on the appropriate punitive tariff period 
to be set. Such recommendations would be submitted to the Governor for 
approval and the decision made by the Governor in each case should be 
binding and final. (There were 22 cases of prisoners serving discretionary 
life sentences in 1997);  
in respect of new cases, a trial judge would be required to specify in open 
court the tariff period in handing down a discretionary life sentence, and to 
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submit a written report to the Governor setting out any special 
considerations or circumstances for future review purposes; and  
the statutory BOR, LTPS would have the power to determine whether 
discretionary life sentence prisoners should be released upon the expiry of 
the tariff period of their sentences. 
Apart from preventing the possible influence by the future Administration at the 
Board meetings by removing government officials from the Board and the alignment 
of the standards entrenched under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights in dealing with 
indeterminate cases, the range of options open to the Board to discharge its functions 
was greatly broadened under the proposed legislation. For example, the Board could 
decide on a determinate sentence with post-release supervision, a determinate 
sentence without any supervision, or conditional release under supervision to be 
followed by a determinate sentence. The availability of these tools would provide 
better safeguard to both the interests of the affected prisoners and the community.  
 
The urgency of the legislation appeared not corresponding with the explanations 
given by the Administration during the meeting with the legislators on 13 January 
1997. It was stated that the operation of the Board would not be affected if the 
legislation could not be enacted before the handing over of the sovereignty and that 
the future Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region could 
still have the same authority under the Basic Law to pardon prisoners. It was however 
brought out that there would not be legal basis for introducing the punitive tariff 
period into discretionary life sentences as covered in the ECHR case sample until the 
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legislation is in place.
52
 Furthermore the concern on the fate of the twenty odd 
prisoners who were young murders at time of conviction and were sentenced to be 
detained under Her Majesty’s Pleasure were mounting with the approach of the 
handing over on 1 July. Both the Security Bureau and the Legislators were facing 
pressure from prisoners’ family members to have this issue resolves before the 
handing over.
53
 
 
In May 1997 following a successful judicial review challenging the review process by 
one of the prisoners detained under Her Majesty’s Pleasure, the Administration had 
asked the BOR, LTPS to review all the remaining twenty cases still being detained 
under Her Majesty’s Pleasure. As a result, one prisoner was granted release on licence 
without determinate sentence, three were granted release on licence with determinate 
sentences and two had their indeterminate sentences commuted to determinate 
sentences. The remaining fourteen prisoners’ sentences of detained under Her 
Majesty’s Pleasure remained unchanged and the Administration mentioned that 
“…their indeterminate sentences will continue to be reviewed, on a regular basis, by 
the Board of Review, Long Term Prison Sentences, -which may recommend to the 
Governor that their sentences be changed. The change of sovereignty will not affect 
these arrangements.”54 
 
The Long Term Prison Sentences Review Bill was passed by the Legislative Council 
on 23 June 1997, published in the Gazette on 27 June and have the notice published in 
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an extraordinary Gazette on 29 June 1997 (Sunday) for the Ordinance to be brought 
into effect on the same day, just one day before Hong Kong becomes China’s Special 
Administrative Region. 
55
 
 
10.6  Benchmarking Hong Kong’s Penal Policy and System in 1997 
 
With the approach of 1997, the fate of Hong Kong’s prison and the prisoners therein 
became a concern not only to the prisoners but also to the human rights groups in 
Hong Kong and in overseas. Their main concerns were the poor prison conditions in 
Mainland China as reported by the media and the extensive use of death penalty not 
only on murder cases but also on a wide range of crimes including economic offences. 
 
The Human Rights Watch and the Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor in 1996 
decided to investigate the human rights conditions of Hong Kong’s prisons with an 
aim “to establish a benchmark of prison conditions prior to the changeover. It was 
also meant to establish a precedent of independent monitoring of Hong Kong’s prison 
conditions, to encourage future monitoring.”56 
 
Hong Kong’s prison system had never been subject to a full scale inspection by an 
outside body although the CSD has a well established system of internal inspection 
conducted by a team of correctional officers working under the Department’s 
Inspectorate Unit. The initial negative response and reaction from the CSD on such a 
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suggestion was predictable especially there had been many prior disagreements 
between the Department and the human rights groups over the management of 
Vietnamese refugees and boat people under the care of the CSD. Nevertheless with 
support from the Government, the Human Rights Watch/Asia and the Hong Kong 
Human Rights Monitor were allowed to proceed with their inspection.  
 
The two human rights groups had assembled a team with members including Sir 
Stephen Tumim, the former Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales, 
inspected twelve out of Hong Kong’s twenty-two penal institutions from 17 March to 
4 April 1997. The inspections covered a closed detention camp for screened-out 
Vietnamese migrants, two women prisons, a psychiatric centre, a drug treatment 
centre and a detention centre for young offenders.
57
 The inspections were aiming to 
assess “the government’s practices with reference to the relevant provisions of 
international human rights treaties binding on the territory, and to other authoritative 
international standards, in particular the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules 
for the Treatment of Prisoners.”58 
 
The inspections went on smoothly with the full co-operation of the CSD and the 
findings and recommendations from the inspections were in general favourable giving 
positive comments on the prison conditions in Hong Kong. It was reported that:  
“The territory’s prisons are administered by an extremely competent and 
professional corps of correctional officers. Under their vigilance, the 
prisons are relatively safe and secure, and serious physical violence is a 
rare occurrence. The physical infrastructure of the prison system is, with 
the exception of a couple of facilities, in very good shape. The Prison 
Rules that regulate the operation of the prisons, particularly after their 
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recent amendment, reflect a healthy concern for prisoners’ fundamental 
rights: among other provisions, they do not allow corporal punishment; 
they carefully limit the use of mechanical restraints, and they specifically 
enumerate the types of conduct that constitute disciplinary offenses and 
the ways in which such offenses may be punished.”59 
 
Apart from the positive comments, there were a number of observations and 
criticisms made after the inspections and overcrowding was one of the key concerns 
raised in the report. Hong Kong’s prison system was at the time bearing the burden of 
keeping a large number of screened-out Vietnamese boat people in closed centres, 
which at times outnumbered the entire prisoner population.
60
 Owing to the size of this 
detained population group, the CSD had to reshuffle large numbers of prisoners 
within the penal institutions to make way to accommodate the Vietnamese detainees 
as well as setting up temporarily holding centres for such purposes, and employing 
temporary correctional staff for their management. The High Island Detention Centre 
with a population of 2,700 Vietnamese detainees at the time of the inspection was 
facing most of the criticisms in this Report.
61
 
 
The Report on the other hand recognised the efforts made by the CSD in maintaining 
“a high degree of order and regimentation” in its penal institutions enabling a clean 
and orderly environment for those under custody. The inspecting teams were 
“impressed with the functioning of Hong Kong’s penal facilities. The filth, corruption, 
extreme violence, lack of adequate food and medical care, and corporal punishments 
that afflict the great majority of the world’s prisoners are not an issue in the Hong 
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Kong prison system. The U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners are, to a notable degree, respected.”62 
 
The Report when commenting on the prisoner adjudication system in Hong Kong 
remarked that ‘the welcome development’ on ‘the recent amendments to the Prison 
Rules lowered the maximum amount of forfeiture of remission from two months to one 
month. In special cases, the Commissioner can order up to three months’ loss of 
remission (previously six months)’ 63 
 
Two sample cases on prisoner adjudication and punishment are cited in the Report. 
“At Shek Pik Prison, a prisoner found guilty of gambling received twenty-eight days’ 
loss of remission, twenty-eight days’ loss of privileges, and twenty-eight days separate 
confinement. At Victoria Prison, a prisoner found guilty of verbally abusing CSD staff 
received fourteen days’ loss of remission, fourteen days’ loss of privilege, and 
fourteen days’ separate confinement.”64 The Report was however silent on the level 
of award given by the Prison Superintendents in these cited cases as well as on all 
other cases examined. 
 
The completed report thus presented a snapshot on conditions of the Hong Kong 
penal system in 1997 and could be used for benchmarking with the conditions of the 
prison in Hong Kong after 1997. 
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10.7   Conclusion 
 
The set timeline for Hong Kong to be handed over to the Chinese Government on 1 
July 1997 had generated unprecedented penal policy changes and advancements that 
would unlikely to have taken place in Hong Kong by 1997 without this change of 
sovereignty.  
 
Despite the signing of the Joint Declaration guaranteeing Hong Kong’s capitalist style 
of life for fifty years after the handing over, the 4 June incident taken place in Beijing 
in 1989 had altered the British Government as well as the local Administration’s plans 
for Hong Kong. With same feeling shared by the legislators, the Government had 
launched different plans to regain the confidence of the Hong Kong residents and to 
look into ways to safeguard the degree of freedom and way of life enjoyed by the 
Hong Kong residents would not be adversely affected after the handing over.  
 
One of the areas which worried Hong Kong residents most was law and order under 
the Chinese Government after 1997. The media had painted a rather negative picture 
on China’s law enforcement mechanism and the treatment of offenders. Prison 
management in China was in particular at the centre of many critical reports covering 
issues such as forced prison labour camps, brutal prison regimes and the extensive use 
of the death sentences even on crimes other than murder. There were genuine fear that 
the prisons in Hong Kong might adopt the Chinese way of operation after the handing 
over with tightened prison regime in line with prisons run in China and the re-
introduction of the death penalty in Hong Kong. 
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The speedy enactment of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights was the most important move 
the British government had made in Hong Kong to safeguard the rights enjoyed by the 
Hong Kong residents not be corrupted after the handing over. With the Bill of Rights 
encompassing the internationally recognized International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, those legislations enacted before the Bill of Rights and the 
subsequent legislations all required to take into consideration the Bill of Rights factors 
and implications.  
 
It is of interest to note that when the Hong Kong Bill of Rights was enacted in 1991, 
similar legislative provisions were absent in England as it was only in 1998 that the 
Human Rights Act 1998 was enacted in the United Kingdom which became fully 
operational in 2000. This sequence of having the colony of Hong Kong enacting such 
an important piece of legislation before the Home Government was indeed 
extraordinary and could only be attributed to the 1997 change of sovereignty. 
 
As illustrated in this Chapter and in the earlier chapters on death sentences and 
corporal punishments in Hong Kong, there were step by step moves taking by the 
Administration after the 1989 Beijing Incident to rectify various penal laws, 
Ordinances and procedures which might have negative impacts on the ordinary people 
of Hong Kong as well as prisoners in custody after 1997. The last minute rush of the 
legislative enactment to amend the Prison Rules up to the requirements of the Hong 
Kong Bill of Rights and the setting up of a statutory Board of Review, Long Term 
Prison Sentences to safe guard the fate of prisoners serving indeterminate sentences 
were cases in point. 
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From the example on the enactment of the Community Services Order Ordinance, it 
demonstrated that the Hong Kong Government was still very cautious in putting 
forward penal policy which might be perceived by the public as soft on criminals. 
With lessons learnt from the strong reactions from the Legislators when suspense 
sentence was introduced in Hong Kong earlier, the Government had used the Law 
Reform Commission to test the water with extensive consultation held before the 
legislative process, which proved to be effective at the end. 
 
Most of the British penal initiatives under the Criminal Justice Act 1991 were not 
taken up by Hong Kong. The detention and training centre programmes in Hong Kong 
were considered very effective and there was no reason to introduce the British youth 
justice system to Hong Kong which would not be welcomed by the community for its 
soft approach on young offenders. 
 
Hong Kong did not follow Britain’s amendment of the remission system under the 
Criminal Justice Act 1991. There was a real danger that the British move for releasing 
prisoners with less than twelve months sentence at half way point, if followed in 
Hong Kong, would be considered by the public as getting soft onto the fight against 
crime. This was particularly true at time when Hong Kong’s crime rate was on the rise 
during early 1990s. The only similar approach Hong Kong had adopted was the 
provisions of ‘release on licence’ for lifers being granted determinate sentences. 
 
The other thing which Hong Kong resisted most was the privatisation of the criminal 
justice system. It was a firm belief by the penal elites in Hong Kong that the criminal 
justice system in Hong Kong should not be privatised as there was no such need for 
Hong Kong to follow suit the English practice. Hong Kong’s law enforcement 
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community had no militant or confrontational staff unions like the Prison Officers 
Association in the United Kingdom and the Hong Kong Government was not short on 
resources in launching capital projects within the general revenue. 
 
Another point worth noting is that when proposing amendments to the Prison Rules 
found in conflict to the Bill of Rights, the Administration or the CSD seldom made 
reference to the penal policies and practices taken place in England at the time. An 
example on this was the curtailment of the power of the Prison Superintendent in 
awarding ‘Loss of Remission’ in prisoner adjudication to thirty days. There were no 
record showing the CSD had taken note of the penal practices in England after the 
Woolf Report and the subsequent Home Office White Paper ‘Custody, Care and 
Justice’ in 1991 where similar recommendations in redefining prison offences and 
limiting the power of awards in prisoner adjudication had been proposed. This 
example reaffirms the argument that the Administration and the Correctional Services 
in Hong Kong at the time had been moving away from the penal policies and 
practices in England and was comfortable in the design and to develop its own penal 
policies and practices deemed fit to the Hong Kong setting. 
 
Finally the bench marking exercise by the Human Rights Watch in 1997 was a blunt 
reminder to the Chinese that any future change of penal policies in Hong Kong 
resulting in the deterioration of prison conditions would be condemned as the British 
had laid a set of penal policies setting prison conditions in Hong Kong in par with 
international standards. Despite the political agenda behind the inspections, it did 
however provide a rare opportunity for the public to gain an in-depth understanding 
on the work of the Correctional Services in Hong Kong in 1997.  
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Conclusion 
 
This is the first comprehensive analysis on the topic of colonial penality exhibited in 
post-War Hong Kong. Hong Kong was chosen as the place for this case study as it had 
been a British crown colony for more than one hundred fifty years from 1841 to 1997. 
Regarded as the “Pearl of the Orient”1, Hong Kong could be said as one of the most 
successfully developed British colonies in the history of the British Empire. When 
Hong Kong was returned to Chinese sovereignty on 1 July 1997, it was one of the 
world class metropolitan cities and the global centre for business, finance and 
communication. The global positioning of Hong Kong as reported by the Hong Kong 
Government in 1997 was: 
“Hong Kong is ranked the seventh-largest trading entity in the world. It 
operates the busiest container port in the world in terms of throughput, 
and the busiest airport in the volume of international cargo handled. It is 
the world’s fourth-largest banking centre in terms of external banking 
transactions, and the fifth-largest foreign exchange market by turnover. 
Its stock market has Asia’s second largest market per capitalisation.”2 
 
By end of 1997, Hong Kong was estimated to have a population of 6.62 million. 
Owing to its geographical location with Mainland China, Chinese are the most 
predominant ethnic group in Hong Kong. Hong Kong is small in size with a total land 
area of only 1,096 square kilometres. This makes Hong Kong one of the most densely 
populated cities in the world with an overall population density of 6,160 per square 
kilometre in 1997. With a hilly typography and large sectors of rural area designated 
                                                 
1
 See Hamilton, G. (1963) Flag Badges, Seals and Arms of Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Government 
Press, p. 37. The lion was holding a pearl in the armorial bearings of Hong Kong. 
2
 See Chapter 5, Hong Kong Year Book 1997, http://www.yearbook.gov.hk/1997/eindex.htm 
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as green belt, the build-up areas in Hong Kong are limited. In Hong Kong Island and 
Kowloon, which represent Hong Kong's older urban areas, the population density had 
reached 27,230 people per square kilometre in 1997.
3
 
 
Despite this dense population jam-packed in a metropolitan city, Hong Kong is 
considered as one of the safest cities in the world with a low reported crime rate. The 
crime rate for 1997 as reported by the Hong Kong Police was 1,036 per 100,000, 
which was the lowest in the past 24 years.
4
 One of the contributing factors for this 
low crime rate was the existence of a highly efficient police force in Hong Kong 
which was also very well staffed. In 1997, the Hong Kong Police Force composed of 
38,969 personnel including 5,455 Auxiliary Police and 5,926 civilian support staff, 
making a high police population ratio of 499 per 100,000 population or 1 police 
(regular or auxiliary) to 200 citizens.
5
 On the other hand, the imprisonment rate for 
Hong Kong in 1998 was 181 per 100,000 population, which is much higher when 
compared to the figure of 126 per 100,000 for England and Wales in 1998.
6
 
 
The successful use of punishment through its penal policies and the related 
programmes are another essential factor for Hong Kong’s success in the maintenance 
of law and order whilst a British colony. Part of this thesis presents an in-depth 
historical study on how penal policies and programmes in Hong Kong were 
formulated during the post-War years from 1945 to 1997. In this case study, it is 
revealed that Hong Kong had at times followed the history of penal development in 
                                                 
3
 See Chapter 24, ibid. 
4
 See Chapter 18, ibid. 
5
 See Traver, H. (2009) ‘Hong Kong Police Force’ in Gaylord. M., Gittings, D. and Traver, H. (Eds.) 
Introduction to Crime, Law and Justice in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. 
6
 See International Centre for Prison Studies, World Prison Brief. University of Essex. 
http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/index.php?search=U 
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England and Wales but had also developed its unique penal policies and programmes. 
Signs of colonial penality were abundant during the post-War years in Hong Kong 
requiring the scope of this study to extend beyond the penal institutions and its 
activities to include wider social factors in Hong Kong and England.  
 
Punishment in a colonial setting is more than just crime control and offender 
management but complicated by its other function in upholding the colonial authority 
as agent of social control. In the case of Hong Kong, a place where the West meets the 
East with “a history of suspicion between the majority Chinese population and the 
British colonists”,7 there is the additional cultural factor to be considered where penal 
philosophies of the West may not be agreed by the dominant Chinese population 
where the traditional Chinese penal philosophy prevails. The colonial administration 
would not hesitate to exercise draconian punitive measures for law and order 
maintenance but at times this had the support of the locals. The public consensus in 
Hong Kong, representing the interest of both Chinese and Western business circles as 
well as the majority Chinese population, welcomed the adaptation of deterrent 
punitive sanctions in dealing with law breakers which ties closely with the Asian 
value of which offenders should always be dealt with severely.  
 
Penal reform in England that took place before and after the Second World War had 
become models and examples for the British colonies to follow and directives from 
the Colonial Office were keeping the colonies in close check on their reform progress. 
The various penal reform measures at home were however not transported to Hong 
                                                 
7
 Howell, P. and Lambert, D. (2006) ‘Sir John Pope Hennessy and colonial government: 
humanitarianism and the translation of slavery in the imperial network’ in Lambert, D. and Lester, A. 
(eds.) Colonial Lives Across the British Empire: Imperial Careering in the Long Nineteenth Century. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.244. 
 383 
Kong en bloc but were only selectively picked and adopted according to the needs and 
the time table dictated by the local penal elites. The political, social and economic 
conditions in Hong Kong were the key factors influencing this small circle of decision 
makers in Hong Kong.  
 
The present study has identified a three-phase transformation of penal discourse in 
Hong Kong during the post-War period. The first phase is from 1945 to 1969 when 
Hong Kong had recovered from the impacts of the Second World War and developed 
gradually into a period of penal welfarism following closely the welfare model of the 
English penal system. The War had provided opportunities for the penal services in 
Hong Kong to start afresh. The Prisons Department had in fact changed in 
organisation and administration drastically after the Second World War by allowing 
the local Chinese to join as Warders. This was in contrary to the pre-War colonial 
mentality of which Chinese were never trusted to manage prisoners of which the 
majority of them were of the same race. This localisation trend, partly because of the 
decolonisation policy and partly because of the difficulties in getting non-Chinese 
staff to work in the Prisons Department after the War, had gradually opened up to the 
Prison Officer grades to the Chinese until all recruitment, including induction 
trainings, was conducted locally. This moved had paved the way for the development 
of a progressive penal system in Hong Kong whereas the cultural barriers were lifted 
with needs of the local prisoners more readily addressed.  
 
The second phase is from 1970 to 1981 when penal policies in Hong Kong had moved 
away from the British penal welfarism model and focused more on deterrence, 
security, discipline and control to fight the rising crime trend. The 1973 Stanley Prison 
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riot turned out to be the watershed for the post-War penal services in Hong Kong 
laying foundations for the organisational and administrative revamp of the key 
operating agent, the Prisons Department to model after its counter-part in England. 
 
The third and final phase of penal policy development prior to 1997 was on enhancing 
and preserving the British penal and human rights standards in Hong Kong to 
safeguard the penal system in Hong Kong not to be eroded after the return of the 
British colony to China in 1997. 
  
This study further revealed that colonial influence was more prominent in the first 
phase when the British Empire was still strong and the Colonial Office was keeping a 
close watch on colonial affairs. Penal issues in the colonies were high on the Colonial 
Office’s agenda to prevent any negative publicity arising from colonial penal matters 
that might tarnish the image of the British Empire represented by a modern and 
civilised value and culture. However it is also revealed in this study that local 
consideration, in particular political, social and cultural issues had played important 
roles in deciding which British penal initiatives to be adopted and which should be 
discarded. In the case of Hong Kong, not many post-War penal initiatives developed 
in England under the various Criminal Justice Acts, etc. were adopted by Hong Kong. 
Instead, local law and order issues such as the wide spread problem of drug addiction 
in Hong Kong was being addressed through local initiatives. 
 
With the downsizing of the British Empire and the subsequent closing down of the 
Colonial Office in late 1960s, Hong Kong had more freedom in deciding its own 
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penal policies. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, youths were blamed for the 
high crime rates when half of the population in Hong Kong was young people of the 
post-War baby boom generation. The colonial government was always able to defend 
its deterrent penal policy and practice such as the introduction of the detention centre 
programme and corporal punishment in the name of maintaining law and order. The 
only exception, as illustrated in this study, was the suspension of capital punishment 
in Hong Kong after 1966. Despite the overwhelming public support for carrying out 
execution in Hong Kong, it was not possible to carry out this sentence as the British 
Government had direct control over the legal procedures on capital cases and there 
was not a chance for the public opinions of the colonies to override those in London, 
especially when the penal reform movement in England was strong after the Second 
World War.  
 
Penal policies in Hong Kong were indeed derived from a very small circle of penal 
elites from within the Government. The Attorney General would consider issues 
concerning sentencing options and their effects whereas the Commissioner of Prisons 
or after 1982 the Commissioner of Correctional Services would consider penal 
initiatives towards the treatment of offenders, the correctional programmes and their 
effectiveness. The two parties did not necessarily share the same penal philosophies as 
illustrated by Commissioner Norman’s strong anti-corporal punishment stances and 
the resistance of the Prisons Department in launching the preventive detention scheme 
after its enactment. 
 
Nevertheless there were more examples of close co-operation between the two. Many 
penal initiatives were generated from the different Commissioner of Prisons such as 
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the setting up of the training centre programme, the drug addiction treatment centre 
programme and the detention centre programme. Except the drug treatment centre 
programme which was a local initiative, the other two programmes were modified 
after the British borstal and detention centre programmes respectively. The 
backgrounds of the different Commissioners on the other hand would also lead to 
rather different approaches adopted in the treatment of offenders. Norman’s welfare 
approach towards young and adult offenders was rather different from Garner’s 
authoritarian approach. Furthermore both of them had served long years as 
Commissioners which allowed them to fully develop their respective visions on penal 
initiatives into reality.  
 
The Prisons Department had a close link at operational level with its counterparts in 
England and thus able to find out and learn from the penal policy issues and problems 
at home. In the cases of the borstal and later the detention centre programmes, their 
problems and issues encountered at home were studied with local adaptations made to 
fit in the local situation when the legislations were being drafted in Hong Kong so as 
not to repeat the same mistakes that occurred in England and Wales. The Prisons / 
Correctional Services Department faced little challenges on its work as the public in 
general were in lack of interest on penal matters and pressure groups for penal reform 
did not exist in Hong Kong during this period. This situation was different from 
England reflecting the differed public perceptions on punishment between the two 
societies.  
 
With the Department’s rapid expansion and focus on institutional order and discipline 
after the 1973 Stanley Prison riot, the penal system in Hong Kong has enjoyed a 
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rather stable and peaceful period despite being tied down by the additional task of 
managing the Vietnamese refugees / detainees. This stable penal environment allowed 
the Prisons Department to develop gradually in the area of offender rehabilitation 
through disciplinary welfare. Corporal punishment and dietary punishment as awards 
for breach of prison discipline were quietly removed in meeting international 
standards. The re-focus on rehabilitation subsequently led to the change of the 
department’s title to that of the Correctional Services Department in 1982.  
 
There was no demand or necessity for Hong Kong to follow the later penal policy 
changes in England especially changes on the youth justice system and the revised 
sentencing practices. The exceptions were the introduction of the suspended sentence 
in 1970 and the community service order in 1984 as additional non-custodial 
sentencing options. The legislative process of these two non-custodial sentencing 
options in Hong Kong had however clearly demonstrated the Government’s 
apprehension on the public opinion towards punishment of offenders. As reflected by 
the legislators on many occasions when penal policies were debated at the Legislative 
Council, the Government was repeatedly urged not to be soft on crime and criminals 
for fear that laws would not be respected and more crimes would emerge.  
 
Another indication on Hong Kong people’s cautious approach towards punishment 
was demonstrated by the cases reviewed by the Release under Supervision Board 
established since 1987. The Board, with appointed members from the public, was 
extremely selective and cautious in releasing long serving prisoners from prison to 
undergo supervision in the community by after-care officers of the Correctional 
Services Department.  
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Penal policies in Hong Kong after 1982 were focused more on addressing the issue of 
possible erosion of the penal system after Hong Kong’s change of sovereignty in 1997. 
The Hong Kong Bill of Rights were enacted to safeguard the international human 
rights standards would still be observed in Hong Kong after 1997 and there were 
moves to take out the draconian penal practices from the statutes such as the sentence 
of corporal punishment by court and finally the abolition of the death sentence in 
Hong Kong. Prison Rules were reviewed and amended to align with the spirit of the 
Hong Kong Bill of Rights. 
 
The political reform in Hong Kong during Governor Patten’s time in late 1990s had 
witnessed the increased participation and influence of the legislators in penal policy 
legislation. In the legislative process for the Post-release Supervision Scheme, the 
initial proposal by the Correctional Services Department and the Government carried 
a much stronger disciplinary welfare principle with the involvement of a policeman in 
the supervision team. This was however voted down by the legislators and the 
policeman post being replaced by a social worker from the Social Welfare Department. 
This has reflected a new development of having penal elites’ proposal challenged and 
the legislators’ changing attitude towards penal reform and rehabilitation. The 
community’s shifting attitude on the treatment of offenders had led to the changing 
approach of the Government in launching subsequent penal policies. In proposing the 
community service order programme in Hong Kong, extensive public consultation 
and engagement were carried out by the Administration. 
 
The legislation relating to prisoner’s sentence review mechanism was rushed before 
the handing over in 1997 as a further protection on the rights of the prisoners. The 
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contained amendments allowed the review authority to be placed under a statutory 
board so that its operation could be governed by law rather than by executive decision 
after the handing over.  
 
In order to take stock of the development of Hong Kong’s penal system under the 
British administration, the human rights groups were even allowed to inspect and 
audit the work of the penal institutions operated by the Correctional Services 
Department before the handing over. This served as a parting testimony to the 
incoming Special Administration Region Government in 1997 what the British had 
left was a well managed, humane and internationally renowned penal system in Hong 
Kong.  
 
This thesis has attempted to analysis Hong Kong’s penal development and reform 
after the Second World War not only through the history of the penal institutions and 
programmes but more importantly the interaction between the social, economic, 
cultural and political conditions and the resultant penal policies that existed at the 
time and accounted for the changes.  
 
Colonial penality, as illustrated in the case example of Hong Kong, has demonstrated 
the complex issues related to penal policy formation and execution in a colonial 
setting. Political, cultural and social factors all had its contributions during the 
different period of time in shaping Hong Kong’s penal policy and programme. The 
ambivalence on the concept of punishment between the penal elites and the 
community at large had on occasions found to be at odds with Hong Kong’s penal 
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systems and services for the offenders. This ‘tough on crime’ attitude, not part of the 
colonial penality, but voiced from the local community, had dominated Hong Kong’s 
penal policy development throughout the post-War period.  
 
In this thesis, various drivers of penal changes in post-War Hong Kong have been 
identified and examined. These included the influence of the key individuals mainly 
law makers and top officials within the Government administration who were in the 
position of making policy decisions; the impacts of the local penal elites who had 
tailored the specific penal programmes that suits Hong Kong; the influence of the 
Colonial Office and the British Government in advocating the western penological 
ideals to the colonies; the changing composition of the local population; the problems 
of drugs and triads; the rising crime tides and the moral panics in the 1970s; the 
impact of the prison riots and the subsequent reform of the Prisons Department and 
finally the change of government in 1997 and the issues on human rights.  
 
Each of these drivers had its specific impacts on shaping Hong Kong’s penal policies 
and system as elaborated in this thesis. However when comparing and weighting the 
importance of these drivers, it is argued that political impacts were the most 
prominent driving force responsible for shaping the colonial penality in Hong Kong. 
The political impacts were not only coming from within the colony but also being 
affected by regional as well as global dynamics.  
 
Hong Kong’s economic and social changes after the War were heavily influenced by 
international politics. The resumption of the British administration after the Second 
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World War had major political impact on Hong Kong ensuring Hong Kong to remain 
a British crown colony with the adaptation of the British legal system and under the 
control of the Colonial Office in London. With penal elites with British penal service 
backgrounds selected by the Colonial Office, it was not surprising that the colony had 
followed the British penal progress of which penal welfarism was emphasised in the 
1950s and 60s. 
 
It was also because of the unstable political situation in the neighbouring region right 
after the end of the Second World War and up to the 1960s that saw Hong Kong 
flooded with migrants, some brought with them wealth and talents but a greater part 
of them came as refugees bringing with them major social problems in employment, 
housing and public order issues to the colony. The consequences of the use of 
punishment as a tool of social control was a rise in the prison population. Open 
prisons and the drug treatment centres were developed not only on operational needs 
but as measures to respond to the social and economic conditions at the time. 
 
Britain’s decolonisation process after the War, a major move affected by international 
as well as national political interests, saw the down sizing of the British Empire and 
Hong Kong became the only sizable British colony since late 1960s. With the deletion 
of the Colonial Office from the British governmental structure, the previous 
monitoring roles of the various advisory committees on colonial penal matters were 
no longer in place. Hong Kong was able to enjoy greater autonomy in designing its 
own penal policies according to the social and cultural needs which sometimes in 
contradiction with the welfare and rehabilitative penal philosophies at home, such as 
the insistence on the use of corporal punishment as deterrence to juvenile crime in 
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Hong Kong. There were nonetheless limitations on this penal autonomy as reflected 
in the example of the death sentence in Hong Kong where condemned prisoners were 
no longer executed after 1966 despite the calls for execution to be carried out in the 
colony by the locals. This was only possible because of Hong Kong’s position as a 
British colony when the judicial process of a capital case required the intervention of 
the Privy Council which would uphold the British value and interest over the locals.   
 
Hong Kong had enjoyed a period of political stability after the 1967 riots with rapid 
economic growth benefitted by China’s modernisation process. However with the 
approach of 1997 and the signing of the Joint Decoration by the British and Chinese 
governments during the 1980s deciding on the future of the colony, the days of which 
the British Government could influence the governance of the colony were numbered. 
Nevertheless the brutal suppression of demonstrations by force at Beijing in 1989 had 
shocked the world and caused major confidence crisis amongst the local residents on 
the future of Hong Kong. Both the British Government and the Hong Kong 
Administration had to plan for contingencies and the introduction of human rights 
instrument to Hong Kong and its legislation had become a matter of great urgency in 
addressing the anxieties of the local residents.  
 
Fearing punishment after Hong Kong’s return to China would become the state 
apparatus for oppressing the dissidents and the possibilities of the return of death 
sentences to Hong Kong after 1997, major overhaul of the penal system in Hong 
Kong was carried out by removing rules and practices that were found in conflict with 
the human rights instrument. The removal of the capital sentence from the statute 
even before Britain and against local public opinion was only possible under such 
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unique political background.  
 
Alexander and Anderson (2008) after analysing a number of British colonial penal 
systems in Africa and Asia from the eighteenth century through to the 1970s suggest 
that “there was something peculiarly colonial about the politics of punishment in the 
age of empire, for the politics of social difference and repression informed the politics 
of confinement in significant ways. Thus, in the colonial context, imprisonment could 
never be anything but political.”8 This case study on penality in Hong Kong has 
illustrated the relationships of punishment with the broader set of social institutions 
and affirms the argument that political elements were the key drivers of penal changes 
under the colonial context even up to the end of the twentieth century. With the unique 
and distinctive characteristics exhibited in the case study of colonial penality in Hong 
Kong, Britain’s last crown colony; this thesis has contributed to the understanding of 
colonial penality in the final chapter of the British Empire. 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Alexander, J. and Anderson, C. (2008) Politics, Penality and (Post-) Colonialism, Cultural and Social 
History: The Journal of the Social History Society, 5(4), pp. 391-4. 
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Appendix A 
 
Penal Population / Imprisonment Rate and Staff Strength 
(1946-1997) 
 
 
 
Source:  
Figures compiled from Prisons Department / Correctional Services Department  
Annual Reports, 1946 – 1997. 
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Appendix B 
 
Regulations for the Government of  
Her Majesty’s Gaol in the Island of Hongkong  
 
  
One European Constable will be ordered for duty daily, he will never leave his 
post unless by order of the Magistrate. He will keep in his possession the key 
of the door of the prison yard, and which door must never be opened unless in 
his presence. One sub Inspector and four Privates of the Native Police will 
constantly attend at the prison, this Guard will furnish a Sentry day and night 
to be stationed in the Verandah. 
 
 On occasions of alarm the Constables will instantly accoutre, two will remain 
to guard the Gaol, and the others will proceed to the Magistrate for orders. 
  
The keys of the Gaol will be under the charge of the Senior 
Non-Commissioned Officer and must be always at hand. 
 
 1. Each prisoner must be searched before he is locked up, and knives or other 
cutting instruments taken from him. 
 
 2. No clothes, food or anything else will be allowed to enter the Gaol without 
being previously inspected by the Constable on duty. 
 
 3. No prisoner will be allowed to quit his cell, unless to labour, or to obey a 
call of nature, without the Magistrate’s permission. 
 
 4. No prisoner will be allowed to receive visitors unless by the sanction of the 
Magistrate, and in the Verandah. Prisoners so receiving visits will be searched 
after their friends shall have left them. 
 
 5. Permission to purchase tobacco, fruit, and other harmless luxuries, will be 
given to well-behaved prisoners. 
 
 6. No unnecessary communication to be allowed between prisoners and 
policemen. 
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 7. The Senior Non-Commissioned Officer will visit the cells morning and 
evening, and satisfy himself of the safety of his prisoners. He will recollect 
that the preservation of their health will mainly depend upon cleanliness of 
person and abode, to which he will particularly direct his attention. 
 
 8. The Constable on duty will see that no prisoners leaves the prison unless 
under the special charge of a policeman.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: 
 
1845 Annual Return on Goals and Prisoners in CO 133/2, pp 120-6 
 398 
Appendix C 
 
Framework Agreement made between Secretary for Security and 
Commissioner of Correctional Services and Programmes of 
Correctional Services Department (1993) 
 
 399 
 
 400 
 
 401 
 
 402 
 
 403 
 
 404 
 
 405 
 
 406 
 
 407 
 
 408 
 
 409 
 
 410 
 
 411 
 
 412 
 
 413 
Appendix D 
 
Training Centre Admissions (1948 – 2000) 
 
 
 
  
Source:  
Figures compiled from Prisons Department / Correctional Services Department 
Annual Reports, 1948 – 2000. 
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Appendix E 
 
Annual Success Rates for Correctional Services Department’s 
Young Offender Programmes (aged below 21) 
(1988 – 1999) 
 
 
 
 
Note 1: The period of mandatory after-care supervision for the Training Centre 
programme is three years from date of discharge whereas supervision period for 
the Detention Centre, Drug Addiction Treatment Centre programmes and the 
young prisoners are one year from date of release from the institution. 
 
Note 2: Success in supervision means no new conviction during the supervision 
period or being recalled back to institutions for breach of supervision order. 
Supervisees released from the Drug Addiction Treatment Centres are required to 
abstain from drug taking as evidenced by regular drug tests. 
 
 
Source:  
 
Conference Proceedings of the 19
th
 Asian and Pacific Conference of Correctional 
Administrators, Shanghai, China (1999). Agenda Item Two – The Corrections of 
Young Offenders, Table 5, Annual Success Rates for CSD Young Offenders 
Programmes (age under 21), p. 20. 
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 Appendix F 
Hong Kong Population Pyramids 
(1967, 1972, 1977 and 1982) 
 
 
 
Source: 
http://www.statistics.gov.hk/publication/general_stat_digest/B1010005012008XXXX
B1303.pdf   Date accessed: 2011-10-20 
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Appendix G 
 
Detention Centre Admissions (1972 – 2000) 
 
 
 
 
Source:  
Figures compiled from Prisons Department / Correctional Services Department 
Annual Reports, 1972 – 2000. 
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Appendix H 
Drug Addiction Treatment Centre Admissions-by Sex (1970 – 2000) 
 
 
Source:  
Figures compiled from Prisons Department / Correctional Services Department 
Annual Reports, 1972 – 2000. 
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Appendix I 
               
 
List of Prisoners Executed in Hong Kong 
(1946 – 1966)1 
 
No 
 
Date/ 
 
 
P. No. 
 
 
 
   Name  
 
Age 
 
Offence 
Remarks 
Remarks 
 
1 1.4.46  1809 Lam Tim Cheung
2
 27 Murder Exh m d  
2 10.7.46 116 George Wong 40 High 
Treason 
Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
3 30.7.46  Lt Kishi Yasuo  War Crime Buried at sea
3
 
4 30.7.46  Lt Matsumoto 
Chozaburo 
 War Crime Buried at sea 
5 13.8.46 19 Chan Po Kwong 36 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section  
6 13.8.46 304 Tsui Kwok Ching 32 High 
Treason 
Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
7 20.8.46  81 So Leung 32 High 
Treason 
Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
8 1.10.46  Sgt Maj Yamada 
Kiichiro 
 War Crime Buried at sea 
9 12.11.46  Sgt Miyasue 
Suekichi 
 War Crime Buried at sea 
10 12.11.46 312 Lau Tung Nuen 30  Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
11 22.11.46  Sgt Kawamoto 
Kaname 
 War Crime Buried at sea 
12 19.5.47 
 
515 Cheuk Chau 28 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
                                                 
1
 Information extracted from hand written record kept by Stanley Prison – now deposited with the 
Correctional Services Museum and from Prisons Department records kept at the Public Records Office 
of Hong Kong under HKRS 125-3-145. 
2
 Executed during the period of Military Administration. 
3
 Cases no. 3, 4 & 9 were not mentioned in the prison record book but the execution of cases 3 & 4 
were mentioned in Hong Kong’s War Crimes Trials Collection and the local newspaper South China 
Morning Post & the Hongkong Telegraph. Date of hanging for case 9 was recorded in the Stanley 
Prison Journal. 
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13 19.5.47 
 
516 Cheung Kee Cheong 22 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
14 19.5.47 
 
517 Liu Mun 22 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
15 20.5.47 
 
518 Li Yau 25 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
16 20.5.47 
 
519 Mak Kau 27 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
17 20.5.47 520 Chan Yui Shu 27 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
18 27.5.47  Col Noma 
Kennosuke 
 War Crime Buried at sea 
19 14.8.47 479 Chau Leung Fun 31 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
20 26.8.47 528 Inouye Kanau 30 War Crime 
> High 
Treason 
Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
21 9.9.47 637 Nu Wei Chun 32 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
22 16.9.47 J1031 Col Tamura Teuchi  War Crime Buried at sea 
23 16.9.47 J1030 Maj Hirano Noburu  War Crime Buried at sea 
24 23.9.47 J1071 Sgt Maj Ito Junichi  War Crime Buried at sea 
25 14.10.47 J1082 Sgt Maj Kamada 
Yasushi 
 War Crime Buried at sea 
26 21.10.47 J1081 Capt Ushiyama 
Yukio 
 War Crime Buried at sea 
27 28.10.47 640 Tse Kwok Wah 29 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
28 10.12.47 698 Yuen Chu 29 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
29 11.12.47 J1050 WO Takayama 
Masao 
 War Crime Buried at sea 
30 21.1.48 J1048 R Admiral Sakonju 
Naomasa 
 War Crime Buried at sea 
31 17.2.48 J1072 Col Kanazawa Asao  War Crime Buried at sea 
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32 24.2.48 J1069 Maj Hirao Yoshio  War Crime Buried at sea 
33 9.3.48 J1046 Sgt Nakajima 
Tukuzo 
 War Crime Buried at sea 
34 16.3.48 J1103 Tamara Ryukichi  War Crime Buried at sea 
35 6.4.48 J1013 Maj Uete Taichi  War Crime Buried at sea 
36 6.4.48 J1014 Lt Kuruta Iwao  War Crime Buried at sea 
37 7.4.48 J1005 Lt Kawaida Susuma  War Crime Buried at sea 
38 29.6.48 J1077 Sgt Maj Yoshioka 
Eizo 
 War Crime Buried at sea 
39 27.7.48 798 Lam Kui 36 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
40 27.7.48 799 Chung Kai 42 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
41 24.8.48 J1113 Sagejima Mangan  War Crime Buried at sea 
42 7.9.48 1094 Lau Hoi 20 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
43 7.9.48 1095 Ho Cheuk Kui 26 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
44 24.9.48 J1115 Lt Col Kondo Hideo  War Crime Buried at sea 
45 1.10.48 J1119 Lt Iwasaki Yoshio  War Crime Buried at sea 
46 12.10.48 1064 Leung Ngau 24 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section  
47 12.10.48 1065 Leung Wing 24 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
48 22.3.49 J1121 Fukute Yoshihiko  War Crime Buried at sea 
49 31.5.49 1408 Wong Fuk Lam 23 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
50 6.4.50 1620 Pun To 28 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
51 18.4.50 1585 Wong Yui 35 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
52 25.4.50 1673 Chong Yin 25 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
53 30.11.50 1784 Ko Chan Sum 31 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
54 30.11.50 1785 Chau Hung Sang 29 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
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55 7.12.50 1982 Ng Shui 26 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
56 7.12.50 1957 Kong Yin 29 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
57 23.1.51 2005 Yu Yau 40 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
58 23.1.51 2006 Yu Muk 29 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
59 23.1.51 2007 Leung Chi 40 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
60 14.2.51 2046 Chan Ning 38 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
61 14.2.51 2047 Cheung Ho 33 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
62 10.5.51 2106 Cheung Man 27 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
63 10.5.51 2107 To Nam 29 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
64 10.5.51 2108 Cheung Fai San 30 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
65 11.5.51 2127 Siu Ming 26 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
66 18.9.51 2279 Lau Wah 22 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
67 18.9.51 2280 Yuen So 27 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
68 11.11.51 2347 Cheung Hon 29 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
69 17.1.52 2366 Tsui King Cheung 29 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
70 23.5.52 3091 Chu Shing 34 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
71 12.6.52 2334 Shau Shing 41 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
72 12.6.52 3075 Mak Chan Yun 28 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
73 23.10.52 3374 Wong Tak Chuen 25 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
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74 13.11.52 3400 Lam Yu 28 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
75 16.12.52 3551 Hui Shiu King 32 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
76 23.12.52 3552 Hung Chuen 29 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
77 23.12.52 3464 Lu Sing Kiu 67 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
78 21.7.53 3927 Hui Shek Yuen 30 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
79 20.10.53 3973 Wong Hung 28 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
80 20.10.53 3974 Ching Shui 20 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
81 9.3.54 4213 Tsoi Muk Li 27 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
82 18.3.54 4224 Ho Chung Foon 25 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
83 29.6.54 4475 Cheung Cho Wah 28 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
84 12.10.54 4434 Lung Yee Hing @ 
Lung Tsai 
23 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
85 12.10.54 4433 Kam Yun Chuen 30 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
86 6.1.55 4829 Chau Hing 36 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
87 22.4.55 4992 Liu Ngai Ngok 41 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
88 20.9.55 5338 James Richard 
Becker 
22 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
89 25.10.55 5021 Yam Kwan Pak @  
Ah Kwan 
20 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
90 29.11.55 5487 Poon Shing 46 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
91 21.2.56 5559 Chu Fung Lun 28 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
92 28.2.56 5434 Lam Man Chee 23 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
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93 21.8.56 6050 Lai Hok Tang @  
Hak Tsai 
22 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
94 30.10.56 6177 Lee Ming @ Ah Tak 
@ Lee Tak 
30 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
95 27.11.56 6248 Tang Choi 38 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
96 19.2.57 6228 Wong Kwan Fat 28 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
97 23.7.57 6608 Lee Shu Wing 29 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
98 23.7.57 6609 Tse Sang @ Li Fuk 28 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
99 23.7.57 6610 Choi Kwok Fai 27 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
100 23.7.57 6611 Li Chun 31 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
101 10.6.58 7591 Leung Kai Wing @ 
Hui Kin Hung 
44 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
102 12.8.58 7967 Chan Hing 40 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
103 2.9.58 7836 Lam Shung Ming @ 
Lim Ching Mang 
44 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
104 16.12.58 8545 Lee Lam 40 Murder No record of exhumation 
105 17.2.59 8129 Cheung Yue Wing 53 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
106 21.7.59 9012 Chung Kwong @  
Chung Kwok Tim 
34 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
107 11.8.59 8764 Kwan Cheung Tai 29 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
108 11.8.59 8765 Yu Ming Shing 30 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
109 8.9.59 9120 Ng Yim 40 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
110 15.9.59 9052 Choi To 22 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
111 21.10.59 8949 Lam Kwong Choi 46 Murder No record of exhumation 
112 22.3.60 9932 Wong Hon @ 
Wong Wai 
34 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
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113 22.3.60 9933 Szeto Hin Chiu 29 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
114 22.3.60 9934 Lo Kan 40 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
115 21.3.61 877 Kwong Kwong 34 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
116 21.3.61 923 Cheng Oi 48 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
117 4.7.61 1087 Hui Chun Wing 43 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
118 25.7.61 1221 Tsui Cheung Kan 22 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
119 15.11.61 1277 Ho Chun Yuen 36 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
120 8.6.62 1639 Ma Wai Fun 41 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
121 28.11.62 1835 Lee Wai 31 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
122 28.11.62 1836 Ngai Ping Kin 32 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
123 28.11.62 1837 Ma Kwong Tsan 35 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
124 15.4.66 16428 Lau Pui 35 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
125 16.11.66 21482 Wong Kai Kei 26 Murder Exhumed & reburied in 
Urn Section 
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Appendix J 
 
Offenders Sentenced to Corporal Punishment in Hong Kong 
(1945 – 1990) 4 
 
Year Adult (A) Adult 
(B) 
Adult 
(C) 
Young 
Offender 
Juvenile 
Offender 
(A) 
Juvenile 
Offender 
(B) 
Prison 
Offence 
1945        
1946 131 
(including 
juveniles) 
NA 188 NA 42 NA 1 
1947 285 NA 291 35 0 1307 14 
1948 215 NA 160 18 0 4531 25 
1949 92 NA 95 10 10 3974 Nil 
1950 248 NA 278 7 7 424 1 
1951 122 25 130 4 0 432 2 
1952 94 39 88 382 0 308 Nil 
1953 104 7 117 144 0 101 Nil 
                                                 
4
 There are different sets of statistics showing the number of offenders sentenced to corporal 
punishment in Hong Kong and the statistics varied greatly especially in the early years. These are 
presented together to allow a better understanding of the situation.  
Figures from Adult (A) and Young Offender:- 1946-1951 data from Commissioner of Prisons JT 
Burdett to Hon. Colonial Secretary, Minutes dated 22 August 1951.HKRS 41-1-1425-1. The 1951 data 
was only up to 22 August 1951.1952-1964 data from Colonial Secretary’s Confidential Memo, Annex, 
dated 11 June 1965. HKRS 41-1-1425-2.1965-1968 data from Memorandum for Executive Council, 
dated 14 November 1969. HKRS 41-2-32.  
Figures from Adult (B) and Juvenile Offender (B): Statistics from Hong Kong Annual Reports, 
Supreme Court and Magistracies, 1946-1990. 
Figures from Adult (C), Young Offender and Prison Offence: Statistics from Annual Departmental 
Reports of the Prisons Department. 1946-1981, Annual Departmental Reports of the Correctional 
Services Department. 1982-1990. 
. 
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1954 241 132 227 54 0 55 Nil 
1955 93 25 106 87 0 102 Nil 
1956 117 25 100 144 0 172 Nil 
1957 100 18 100 73 0 123 Nil 
1958 80 55 76 244 0 251 Nil 
1959 36 6 24 234 1 287 Nil 
1960 6 1 7 267 0 165 Nil 
1961 14 2 11 172 0 171 Nil 
1962 3 3 9 267 0 277 Nil 
1963 2 3 0 126 0 85 Nil 
1964 1 10 6 119 0 141 Nil 
1965 8 6 4 139 0 120 Nil 
1966 0 0 0 96 0 64 Nil 
1967 0 1 0 17 17 20 Nil 
1968 0 0 1 0 1 0 Nil 
1969 NA 0 0 NA 0 0 Nil 
1970 NA 62 68 NA 0 0 Nil 
1971 NA 137 162 NA 0 11 Nil 
1972 NA 21 29 NA 0 9 Nil 
1973 NA 142 53 NA 0 20 Nil 
1974 NA 18 48 NA 0 27 TC-28 
DC 
1975 NA 97 113 NA 0 6 TC-89 
DC 
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1976 NA 76 72 NA 0 6 TC- ? 
DC-220 
1977 NA 30 36 NA 0 4 Nil 
1978 NA 11 26 NA 0 10 Nil 
1979 NA 3 20 NA 0 2 Nil 
1980 NA 5 9 NA 0 2 Nil 
1981 NA 14 14 NA 0 0 Nil
5
 
1982 NA 8 13 NA 0 3  
1983 NA 8 19 NA 0 5  
1984 NA 11 21 NA 0 1  
1985 NA 4 4 NA 0 0  
1986 NA 11 8 NA 0 0  
1987 NA 2 1 NA 0 0  
1988 NA 5 8 NA 0 2  
1989 NA 0 2 NA 0 0  
1990 NA 0 1
6
 NA 0 0  
Total 1992 1023 2745 2639 36 13218 43 + 
unknown 
no. in 
TC/DC 
 
                                                 
5
 As corporal punishment for breach of prison offences had never been awarded since 1952, the 
Commissioner of Prisons had since 1977 proposed to the Administration for its deletion from the 
Prison Rules. The approval was granted on 10 November 1981 to remove the power to award corporal 
punishment for breach of prison offences. See Annual Departmental Reports of the Prisons Department. 
1977-1981. 
6
 The Executive Council agreed in April 1989 to abolish corporal punishment in Hong Kong and the 
Corporal Punishment Ordinance was revoked on 1 November 1990. See Annual Departmental Reports 
of the Prisons Department. 1989-1990. 
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  Appendix K 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Report of the Committee on Corporal Punishment, Memorandum for 
Executive Council dated 24 June 1968, p. 19. HKRS 41-2-32. 
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